Human Rights: The Sri Lankan Experience 1947-1981. by Jayawickrama, Nihal Mahendra Sudrikku
HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE SRI LANKAN EXPERIENCE 
1947 - 1981
A thesis submitted to the University of London 
as an internal student of the School of Oriental 
and African Studies for the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy.
September 1983.
Nihal Mahendra Sudrikku Jayawickrama
ProQuest Number: 11010514
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 11010514
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
ABSTRACT
This is an analysis of the attempts made in Sri Lanka to 
provide constitutional protection for certain civil and political 
rights. The 1972 and 1978 Republican Constitutions, each of which 
contained a chapter on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, is 
examined against the background of the less idealistic Order in 
Council of 1946 which contained the first Constitution of Indepen­
dent Ceylon. The latter, which served as the basis for government 
for nearly twenty-five years, was drafted in the mid 'Forties, at 
a time when Bills of Rights-consciousness was hardly evident in the 
British Empire and still less among the elitist leadership thrown 
up by colonial rule in Ceylon.
The thesis is structured into eight chapters. After an 
introductory survey in Chapter I of the "foundations of freedom" 
which were evident at Independence, the attempts made thereafter 
at formulating a Bill of Rights and the measure of success that 
attended, or eluded, these attempts are examined in Chapter II.
The actual content of the protected rights in the 1978 Constitution, 
having regard to the overriding effect of "existing law", is examined 
in Chapter III. Since the effective enforcement of fundamental 
rights is dependent upon the existence of an independent court, the 
practical effectiveness of the legal safeguards designed to secure 
judicial independence are assessed in Chapter IV. The Sri Lankan 
experience of ex post facto and pre-enactment review of legislation 
is the subject of Chapter V. In Chapter VI, the effectiveness of 
the traditional as well as of the special remedies available at 
different times for the review of executive action is examined. 
Chapter VII looks at the impact on human rights of states of 
emergency which have existed in Sri Lanka for nearly half its 
independent life. The final chapter applies the experience of Sri 
Lanka to the problems involved in drafting and enforcing a Bill of 
Rights.
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PREFACE
In April 1978, I began work at King's College London, under 
the supervision of Prof.James Fawcett, on a research project on 
International Human Rights Law. Three months later, while on a 
brief visit home, my passport was impounded by the Sri Lanka 
Government, and I remained grounded in Colombo until September of 
the following year. In October 1979, thanks to the kindness of 
the Department of Law, School of Oriental and African Studies,
London, I was able to resume my research project. The results of 
the first part of it, which involved researching the national, 
regional and international jurisprudence on human rights, has now 
been published.^ The second part was a country study of a bill of 
rights in operation. The country chosen was my own, and my 
examination of the Sri Lankan experience constitutes this thesis.
I have attempted to examine the effectiveness of the 
procedures contained in Sri Lankan law for the enforcement of 
civil and political rights which two recent Constitutions have 
sought to guarantee. Although much has been written in the past 
on Sri Lanka's constitutional evolution, and her Independence and 
Republican Constitutions have been examined and analysed by both 
lawyers and political scientists, the machinery which these 
Constitutions expressly provided or had in contemplation for 
securing fundamental rights have not been subjected to such scrutiny. 
The Sri Lankan experience in this regard has much to offer to those 
who still debate whether or not human rights need any . special 
protection under the law, and what form such protection, if so 
desired, should take.
To understand the events of the period under review and the 
attitudes of people who often determined the course of those 
events, I have relied, not only on published historical matter, 
but also on parliamentary proceedings and contemporaneous reports 
in newspapers and journals, supplemented at times by my own notes
1. See Paul Sieghart, The International Law of Human Rights 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).
vii
and tape recordings. The analysis of the role of the Judiciary in
the enforcement of protected rights has been based on judgments of
the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court.^ In dealing with
the period 1970-1977, when I was associated with the Government in
the capacity of Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Justice, I
have referred to hitherto unpublished official correspondence and
2
other documentation, copies of which are in my possession. If I 
have dealt with any aspect of a subject in greater length than 
others, it is either because that aspect has not previously been 
examined adequately, or because I have felt that I was in a position 
to make a special contribution by reason of my own knowledge and 
experience of it. I have throughout attempted to evaluate Sri 
Lanka's needs, expectations and performance in respect of civil and 
political rights against the standards established by international 
instruments and their interpretation and application by internat­
ional and regional tribunals. If, in so doing, I appear to have 
been unduly demanding, I trust that it would be appreciated that in 
the area of human rights, there can be no half-way house: human 
rights are not only fundamental; they are also inalienable.
1. The Supreme Court judgments were reported regularly until 
about 1974 when publication was interrupted and delayed by frequent 
strike action at the Government Press, the death of the long- 
serving editor, and the decision to publish each judgment not only 
in the .English language but also with a Sinhala translation of it. 
In 1979/80, the reporting of these judgments appears to have 
virtually ceased. I am grateful to several friends and colleagues 
in Colombo who made available to me copies of all the relevant 
unreported judgments. I am also grateful to Mr.O.L.de Kretser, 
retired Puisne Justice, who gave me a copy of his District Court 
judgment in the Kodeeswaran Case (1964).
2. Following the impounding of my passport in 1978, a Special 
Presidential Commission of Inquiry appointed by the present Govern­
ment to probe the political activities of the previous Government, 
subjected my official career to a searching inquiry. In so doing, 
the Commission provided me with access to nearly all the relevant 
files of that period and permitted me to take copies of whatever 
documents I desired. Although I did not then realise it, copies
of several of these documents have proved as invaluable in my 
present study as they were for the purpose of my defence.
This study would not have been possible but for a generous 
research fellowship awarded to me by the Leverhulme Trust. To the 
Trustees, and to Mr.Paul Sieghart who initiated it and then helped 
to revive it after my extended "visit" home, I am most grateful.
I am also grateful to five institutions in London which provided 
me with all the facilities for my research: the Institute of Advanced 
Legal Studies, the School of Oriental and African Studies, the 
British Institute of Human Rights, the Institute of Commonwealth 
Studies, and the Legal Division of the Commonwealth Secretariat.
To Prof. James S.Read, Mr. Leslie Wolf-Phillips and Dr. Peter SI inn, 
who let me attend their Comparative Constitutional Law Seminar, and 
Mr. Reg. Austin who allowed me to participate in his Human Rights 
Seminar, I am grateful for many hours of stimulating discussion 
which helped me to acquire a perspective of the subject I was 
researching. For his direction, encouragement and kindness, at all 
times and in ample measure, I am deeply indebted to my supervisor,
Dr. Peter Slinn.
As four years of research draw to an end, I remember with 
gratitude that but for the efforts of three dedicated members of 
my own profession, Mr.S.Nadesan,Q.C., Mr.J.C.T.Kotelawela, and 
Mr.Faiz Mustafa, who devoted their time, energy and experience, 
free of charge, from day to day, for nearly eight months, to defend 
me before the Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry and thereby, 
to secure the return of my passport, I would not have been able 
even to begin it. Through it all, my wife Sarojini, and my two 
little daughters, Nishana and Sharanya, have been compelled to 
lead a nomadic existence and they will, no doubt, be most comforted 
to know that my labour of love has now reached its completion.
Nihal Jayawickrama
London,
September 1983.
PROLOGUE
Q: Does an Order, Lord, that is complete carry out an 
act that should be carried out in the presence of 
an accused monk if he is absent ? Lord, is that a 
legally valid act ?
A: Whatever Order, Upali, that is complete carries out 
an act that should be carried out in the presence 
of an accused monk. If he is absent, it thus comes 
to be not a legally valid act, not a disciplinarily 
valid act, and thus the Order comes to be one that 
goes too far.
Q: Does an Order, Lord, that is complete carry out an 
act that should be carried out by the interrogation 
of an accused monk if there is no interrogation ?
A: Whatever Order, Upali, that is complete carries out 
an act which should be carried out on the interro­
gation of an accused monk. If there is no interro­
gation, it thus comes to be not a legally valid act, 
not a disciplinarily valid act, and thus the Order 
comes to be one that goes too far. 1
Thus was enunciated, in this conversation between the Buddha and 
his disciple, the Venerable Upali, six centuries before the birth 
of Christ, the rule of natural justice.
In the course of a ministry of forty-five years, the Buddha
expounded a philosophy of life based upon tolerance and compassion
in which the human mind was the principal element:
Mind is the forerunner of all evil states. Mind is 
chief; mind-made are they. If one speaks or acts with 
wicked mind, because of that, suffering follows one, « 
even as the wheel follows the hoof of the draught-ox.
Mind is the forerunner of all good states. Mind is 
chief; mind-made are they. If one speaks or acts with 
pure mind, because of that, happiness follows one, 
even as one's shadow that never l e a v e s . ^
These poetic utterances of the Buddha, recorded three months after
His passing away, encompassed a wide variety of subjects. For
1. I.B.Homer, trans., The Book of the Discipline (Vinaya- 
Pitaka), Vol.IV: Mahavagga or The Great Division IX (London, Luzac 
Sc Co.Ltd, 1962), pp.466-468.
2. Narada Thero, trans., The Dhammapada (Colombo Apothecaries' 
Co. Ltd, 1972), v.1.
3. Ibid., v.2.
2instance, the need for an impartial tribunal:
He is not thereby just because he hastily arbitrates 
cases. The wise man should investigate both right and 
wrong;!
the rejection of penalties that cause unnecessary suffering:
All tremble at the rod. Life is dear to all. Compar­
ing others with oneself, one should neither strike 
nor cause to strike;2
the sanctity of life:
If a person destroys life, is a hunter, besmears his 
hand with blood, is engaged in killing and wounding, 
and is not merciful towards living beings, he, as a 
result of his killing, when born amongst mankind, will 
be short-lived;3
the futility of victory at war:
A man may spoil another, just so far
As it may serve his ends, but when he's spoiled
By others he, despoiled, spoils yet again.
So long as evil's fruits is not matured,
The fool doth fancy 'now's the hour, the chance !'
But when the deed bears fruit, he fareth ill.
The slayer gets a slayer in his turn;
The conqueror gets one who conquers him;
The abuser wins abuse, the annoyer, fret. 1
Thus by the evolution of the deed. ^
A man who spoils is spoiled in his turn;
the importance of ahimsa or non violence:
Hatreds do not cease through hatred: 
through love alone they c e a s e ;3
the recognition of the supremacy of man:
By oneself, indeed, is evil done; 
by oneself is one defiled.
By oneself is evil left undone; 
by oneself, indeed, is one purified.
Purity and impurity depend on oneself.
No one purifies another;6
the equality of women:
A woman child, 0 Lord of men, may prove 
Even better offspring than a male;'
1. Ibid., v.256.
2. Ibid., v.130.
3. Narada Maha Thera, The Buddha and His Teachings (Colombo: 
Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd, 1972), p.309.
4. Ibid., p.201.
5. Narada, The Dhamnapada, v.5.
6 . Ibid., v .165.
7. Narada, The Buddha, p.313.
3the repudiation of slavery and the caste system:
Birth makes no brahmin, nor non-brahmin makes,
'Tis life and doing that mould the brahmin true.
Their lives mould farmers, tradesmen, merchants, serfs. 
Their lives mould robbers, soldiers, chaplains, kings
the reciprocal duties of employers and employees:
A master should minister to servants and employees by 
i. assigning them work according to their strength, 
ii. supplying them with food and wages, 
iii. tending them in sickness,
iv. sharing with them extraordinary delicacies, and 
v. relieving them at times.
The servants and employees, who are thus ministered 
to by their master, should:
i. rise before him,
ii. go to sleep after him, 
iii. take only what is given, 
iv. perform their duties satisfactorily, and 
v. spread his good name and fame;^
the relevance of the welfare state:
Planters of groves and fruitful trees 
And they who build causeways and dams 
And wells construct, and watering sheds 
And (to the homeless) shelter give - 
Of such as these by day and night 
For ever doth the merit grow 
In righteousness and virtue might ^
Such folk from earth to Nirvana go;
and the freedom of thought, belief and expression:
Do not accept anything on mere hearsay (i.e. thinking 
that thus have we heard it from a long time). Do not 
accept anything by mere tradition (i.e. thinking that 
it has thus been handed down through many generations). 
Do not accept anything on account of rumours (i.e. by 
believing what others say without any investigation).
Do not accept anything just because it accords with your 
scriptures. Do not accept anything by mere supposition. 
Do not accept anything by mere inference. Do not accept 
anything by merely considering the appearances. Do not 
accept anything merely because it agrees with your pre­
conceived notions. Do not accept anything merely 
because it seems acceptable (i.e. should be accepted).
Do not accept anything thinking that the ascetic is 
respected by us (and therefore it is right to accept 
his word).
But when you know for yourselves - these things are 
immoral, these things are blameworthy, these things 
are censured by the wise, these things when performed 
and undertaken conduce to ruin and sorrow - then indeed 
do you reject them.
1. Ibid., p.309.
2. Ibid., p.588.
3. Mrs.Rhys David, trans., The Book of Kindred Sayings (Sanyutta 
Nikaya) (London: OUP, 1917).
4When you know for yourselves - these things are 
moral, these things are blameless, these things are 
praised by the wise, these things when performed 
and undertaken conduce to well-being and happiness 
- then do you live and act accordingly.!
In Sri Lanka, the introduction of Buddhism is inextricably 
linked with the founding of the Sinhalese race. For nearly twenty- 
five centuries, the Sri Lankan outlook on life has been conditioned 
by exposure to the humanising influence of Buddhist philosophy. In 
almost every village there is a Buddhist temple, and in nearly 
every home there is an image of the Enlightened One who, through 
renunciation and meditation, searched for an answer to the perennial 
problem of human suffering. The concept of human rights is, there­
fore, not alien to Sri Lanka nor, indeed, to Asia. Many of the 
rights which are today internationally recognised as fundamental
2
could well be described as a part of the traditions of the East.
1. Narada, The Buddha, p.284.
2. See Justice T.S.Fernando, "Human Rights: A Tradition of the 
East", Ceylon Daily News, 10 December 1964.
CHAPTER I
THE FOUNDATIONS OF FREEDOM
One of the most significant developments in the aftermath of
World War II was the recognition of human rights under international
law. For the first time, human rights became the concern of the
international community. The preamble to the Charter of the United
Nations expressed a determination
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights of men and women.
One of the purposes of the United Nations was declared to be the
achievement of international co-operation
in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language or religion. 1
The States which subscribed to the Charter and became members of the
United Nations thereby pledged themselves to "take joint and separate
action" to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or
r e l i g i o n " . 2 The Charter did not contain a precise definition of
human rights. Nor did it prescribe any machinery for their
enforcement. Yet a proper legal commitment was made by each of the
original member states that it would, within its territorial
jurisdiction, observe and respect human rights. On 14 December 1955,
Ceylon accepted these obligations and was admitted to the membership
of the United Nations.
When Ceylon entered the international cornnunity, a "common 
understanding" had already been reached in regard to the concept of 
human rights embodied in the UN Charter. The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR), which was proclaimed by the General 
Assembly on 10 December 1948, was a "common standard of achievement 
for all peoples and all nations". It contained nearly forty rights
1. Art. 1(3)
2. Arts. 55(c), 56.
6and freedoms whose "effective recognition and observance" was intended 
to be secured by the member states through "progressive measures".
At the first ten sessions of the General Assembly at which it was 
represented, Ceylon participated in the preparation of two draft 
treaties which sought to elaborate, and provide for the implementation 
of, the rights and freedoms contained in the Declaration. On 
16 December 1966, the representative of Ceylon voted in the General 
Assembly for the adoption of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). These two instruments came 
into force on 3 January and 23 March 1976 respectively. On 29 May 
1980, Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister signed the relevant documents of 
accession.
Under the ICCPR, the Government of Sri Lanka agreed "to respect 
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to 
its jurisdiction", and "to take the necessary steps to adopt such 
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to", 
the civil and political rights recognised therein."^  Under the ICESCR, 
the Government committed itself "to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, 
with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation" of the 
economic, social and cultural rights therein recognised "by all
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative„ 2 measures .
The principal legislative method by which States seek to
secure civil and political rights within their national boundaries
is by the adoption of enforceable bills of rights. Europe gave the
lead in establishing the principle of collective enforcement when
in 1950 the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
3
and Fundamental Freedoms was signed at Rome. Three years later, 
when the United Kingdom extended the application of ECHR to over 
forty dependent territories, Ceylon no longer belonged to that
1. Art.2.
2. Art.2.
3. The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) was signed at 
San Jose, Costs Rica, in 1969. In 1980, the African States Members 
of the Organisation of African Unity, meeting at Nairobi, approved 
the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights (AFCR).
7category; on 4 February 1948, by the Ceylon Independence Act 1947 and
the Ceylon (Independence) Order in Council 1947, the Crown Colony of
Ceylon had been granted its independence. But neither of these
instruments, preceding as they did the formal proclamation of UDHR,
contained a comprehensive bill of rights. It was ten years later,
during the peak period of British decolonisation, that such a bill of
rights became a standard element in the Westminster-Whitehall export
model constitution which scores of countries emerging into statehood
were encouraged to accept and operate. Consequently, during the first
twenty-five years of independence, Ceylon had no bill of rights but
only a constitutional limitation on the exercise of legislative power,
designed to prevent Parliament from discriminating against minority
communities or religions. By the Constitution of the "Tenth Day of
the Waxing Moon in the Month of Wesak in the Year Two Thousand Five
Hundred and Fifteen of the Buddhist Era" (22 May 1972), adopted and
enacted by a constituent assembly, Ceylon declared itself the free,
sovereign and independent Republic of Sri Lanka. On 8 September 1978,
a new constitution passed by the National State Assembly rejected the
?
pure Westminster model of 1972 in favour of a presidential executive 
for what became known as the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri 
Lanka. The former contained a brief chapter on "Fundamental Rights 
and Freedoms", but did not indicate how these were to be enforced.
The latter, which is now in force, contains a more elaborate 
statement of fundamental rights and has vested the Supreme Court 
with jurisdiction for their protection.
The existence of a bill of rights does not, however, by itself 
offer a guarantee that in that country human rights would be adequately 
or effectively protected; at most, it articulates aspirations. With 
the decolonisation of Africa, all but one of the independence
1. The grant of fully responsible status within the British 
Commonwealth of Nations was preceded by four months of limited 
self-government under the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council 
1946 in its unamended form.
2. The 1972 Constitution which prohibited the judicial review 
of legislation and established a National State Assembly which was 
"the supreme instrument of state power" may be regarded as a closer 
model of Westminster than the 1946 Constitution under which Parliament 
was a "controlled" body with a restricted legislative power.
8constitutions contained enforceable bills of rights. But, as Professor 
Read has noted, the circumstances attending the birth of African 
States did not appear to be propitious for the protection of human 
rights:
The new states emerged often hurriedly from authoritarian 
colonialism with dominant nationalist movements but 
essentially weak political systems, with -vulnerable 
opposition parties and institutions like the judiciary, 
the press and the professions too weak to exert effective 
pressures on government, with poor and poorly-educated 
populations and struggling economies - rocky soil for the 
nurture of human rights, I
In nearly every respect, Ceylon offered a sharp contrast to these
African States. On the one hand, it was a relatively prosperous
country, with the highest per capita income in Asia. Its sterling
reserves were high, and in 1945 its registered unemployed was only
21,366. It had one of the smallest military budgets and one of the
most extensive social welfare programmes, absorbing 56.1 per cent of
the revenue and covering free education, a free mid-day meal for
schoolchildren, free medical facilities, free milk for expectant
mothers and growing children, and subsidised prices for rice and
flour. On the other hand, a long familiarity with the application of
English common law concepts, constitutionalism, experience of
political and social organisation and agitation as well as of the
conduct of government, a remarkably high standard of literacy, a
vibrant middle class, a national press, and a spiritual commitment
to the dignity and worth of the human person, were characteristics
that were strikingly evident on the eve of independence. In other
2
words, as the following survey suggests, the foundations of freedom 
already existed.
1. James S.Read, "The Protection of Human Rights in Municipal 
Law", Human Rights: The Cape Town Conference, ed. C.F.Forsyth and 
J.E.Schiller (Cape Town: Juta & Co.Ltd, 1979), p.156.
2. The expression "Foundations of Freedom" is the first-level 
subheading of the work by Prof. Read cited above, as well as the 
title of a work by Prof .D.V.Cowen (Cape Town: OUP, 1961) 
acknowledged therein.
A National Consciousness
9
The island of Sri Lanka is approximately 25,000 square miles 
in extent: about one-half the area of England and Wales and five- 
sixth that of Ireland. It is located slightly north of the equator 
and is separated from the sub-continent of India by forty miles of 
shallow water. Between its furthest points, the island is 270 miles 
from north to south and 140 miles from west to east. Its principal 
towns are Colombo, Galle and Trincomalee, situated on the western, 
southern and eastern coasts (the latter is believed to be one of the 
finest natural harbours in the world); Jaffna in the north; and 
Kandy in the temperate central highlands. Its population rose from 
1,167,000 in 1834 to 6,658,999 in 1946 and 12,711,143 in 1971. It 
is today estimated at approximately 15,000,000.
Sri Lanka is a multi-racial, multi-religious and multi- 
linguistic society. The numerically predominant Sinhalese, whose 
livelihood depends upon the very fertile soil of the country and the 
waters which surround it, are of Aryan stock and are said to be 
descended from the original settlers of the island. The ancient 
chronicle, the Mahavamsa,^  fixes the date of the arrival of the 
first settler, a Bengali prince from North India, at 544 B.C. 
Environment and history have divided the Sinhalese into the better 
educated and more enterprising inhabitants of the low country and the 
sheltered and orthodox Kandyans. The Tamils are the second largest 
ethnic group. Of Dravidian stock, they are descended from 
successive waves of invaders from the Pandyan and Chola kingdoms of 
South India who, ccmmencing around 400 A.D., established their own 
kingdoms in the northern and eastern parts of the island. An 
assiduous and hardworking people, the Tamils soon derived sufficient 
wealth from their comparatively arid homelands to be able to venture 
south and entrench themselves in increasing numbers in the 
professions and in the public service. The Moors are the descendants 
of Arab traders from the Persian Gulf who followed the path of Vasco 
da Gama and established themselves in the southern and eastern ports. 
The Burghers are the survivors of the Portuguese and the Dutch who
1. The history of Ceylon as recorded on ola leaves by a succession 
of Buddhist monks, commencing between 247 and 207 B.C.
10
ruled over parts of Sri Lanka from 1505 to 1638 and from 1639 to 1796 
respectively. They are an essentially urban people who wielded 
considerable influence during the British occupation from 1796 to 
1948. The Malays are of Javanese and other Indonesian and Malaysian 
descent and first arrived as soldiers in the Dutch army. The very 
small ethnic groups include the rich Indian merchant corrmunities of 
Sindhis, Parsees and Borahs, and the few Englishmen who no longer 
work on the tea plantations or in commercial undertakings, but have 
opted to spend their retirement in a country which nature has treated 
very kindly. In addition to these groups, there are the Indian Tamils 
brought by the British from South India in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries as cheap labour for the coffee and tea 
plantations of central Sri Lanka. This community continued to live 
in isolation from the mainstream of life and created sensitive 
political and social problems after independence. The most recent 
population statistics (1971) give the ethnic breakdown as follows:
TABLE 1 
TOTAL POPULATION 1971
Race Population Percentage
Sinhalese a 9,146,679 71.9
Tamils 1,415,567 11.1
Indian Tamils 1,195,368 9.4
Moors 853,707 6.7
Burghers 44,250 0.3
Malays 41,619 0.3
Others 13,957 0.1
Total 12,711,143 100.0
Source: Statistical Abstract of the Democratic Socialist 
Republic of Sri Lanka - 1977 (Colombo: Dept, of Govt. Printing, 
1979).
a. Includes low-country Sinhalese (5,445,706 or 42.8 per cent 
and Kandyan Sinhalese (3,700,973 or 29.1 per cent).
There is also a microscopic aboriginal population known as "Veddhas" 
who live in the backwoods of the Uva province. Historians are of 
the view that they were inhabitants of Sri Lanka at the time of the
11
arrival of the Aryans. Over the years they have become culturally 
assimilated into the surrounding populations and today what could 
be described as the Veddha population is less than seven thousand. 
They live by a form of unirrigated shifting agriculture and speak 
a dialect of Sinhala.
The second distinguishing factor among the Sri Lankan 
population is religion. While Buddhism predominates, as it has 
done for over two thousand years, several other religions also find 
many adherents in the country. Although the Sinhalese were initially 
all Buddhists, many of those who lived on the coastal belt and were 
thus exposed to the missionary zeal of the Portuguese, as well as 
others who sought education and obtained it in schools established 
by British missionaries, soon became converts to Christianity. The 
Tamils are mainly Hindus except those among them who were converted 
to Christianity in the American missionary schools which flourished 
in their homelands. The Moors and Malays are, of course, all of the 
Islamic faith, while the Burghers are either Roman Catholics or 
belong to the Dutch Reformed Church. The statistical breakdown by 
religions is as follows:
TABLE 2 
RELIGIONS 1971
Religion Adherents Percentage
Buddhists 8,567,570 67.4
Hindus 2,239,310 17.6
Christians3 986,687 7.7
Muslims 909,941 7.1
Others 7,635 0.1
Total 12,711,143 100.0
Source: Statistical Abstract - 1977.
a. Comprises Roman Catholics (833,111 or 6.9 per cent) and 
other denominations (103,576 or 0.8 per cent).
The third distinguishing factor is language. Three languages 
are spoken: Sinhala, Tamil and English. Sinhala and Tamil are 
identified with the two ethnic groups. The Moors and Malays
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generally speak the predominant language of the region in which they 
reside. The Burghers speak English, though many are able to make 
themselves understood in Sinhala. Until 1956, English was the 
language of administration, but the total English-speaking population 
in that year was minimal. In 1963, when the over-five-year 
population was 8,970,480 (of a total national population of approx. 
10,582,000), the statistics relating to the English-educated among 
them were as follows:
Among the Sinhalese and the Tamils, caste is yet another 
distinguishing factor. Though the caste system is less extensive 
and rigid than in India, it is still a significant factor in social 
life in some parts of the country. Numerically, the largest caste 
among the Sinhalese is the Goyigama which, apart from its traditional 
occupation of farming, has dominated the political life of the 
country during the past fifty years. The Karawa, Salagama and 
Durava castes have been traditionally associated with fishing, 
cinnamon-peeling and toddy-tapping respectively, but since the turn 
of the century these have provided the leadership in professional 
life as well as in trade, commerce and in the plantation sector.
On the other side of the street are the Vahumpura (jaggery makers), 
Batgam (foot-soldiers), Hena (washers), Hunu (lime burners),
Berawa (drummers), Navandanne (goldsmiths) and the Rodiyas (gypsies). 
No census of the castes has been taken in this century, but the 
estimated figures in mid-1970 were:
TABLE 3 
ENGLISH EDUCATED IN 1963
English only 
English and Sinhala 
English and Tamil 
English, Sinhala and Tamil
37,321
548,266
186,041
106,518
Total 878,146
TABLE 4 
CASTES AMONG THE SINHALESE
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Goyigama ... 4.5 m.
Karawa, Salagama and Durawa ... 0.8 m.
Batgam and Vahumpura ... 3.0 m.
Others ... 0.6 m.
Source: Janice Jiggins, Caste and Family in the Politics of the 
Sinhalese, 1947-1976, p.35.
The social structure of the Tamils of the northern and eastern 
provinces is still based largely on the ancient caste system. 
Originally, the members of each caste had obligations to perform to 
one another, and corresponding to these obligations there were 
reciprocal rights. The different castes included:
TABLE 5
CASTES AMONG THE TAMILS
Madapallies ... bastards of royal descent
Karayars ... fishermen
Chiviars ... palanquin bearers
Kusavers ... potters
Vannan ... washermen
Kammalars ... blacksmiths
Koviars ... domestic servants
Thanakararars ... elephant keepers
Navalars ... coconut pluckers
Chetties ... merchants
Kaikulurs ... weavers
Vellalas ... land owners.
cce: H.W.Tambiah, The Law and Customs of the Tamils of
Ceylon (Colombo: Tamil Cultural Society of Ceylon, 1954).
Despite the heterogeneous character of its society, despite 
mutual fears and jealousy raised by the conflicting claims of race, 
language and religion, despite the influence of nature which has also 
conspired to keep the ethnic groups apart confined to their 
traditional homelands, the diverse elements within the island had
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blended sufficiently through many generations of association and 
several centuries of co-existence to create what was quite distinctly 
one nation. The cry for partition which reverberated across, and 
tore asunder, the sub-continent of India as the colonial empire 
began to be dismantled, did not produce even an echo beyond the 
waters of the Palk Strait as Ceylon prepared for self-government 
and independence.
A Legal Inheritance
At Independence, Ceylon's courts applied and administered a 
multiplicity of laws.'*' Roman-Dutch law was the common or residuary 
law of the country, applicable on all matters on which there was no 
relevant statute and the personal laws were silent. These latter 
were the Kandyan law, applicable to the Kandyan Sinhalese; Muslim 
law, accepted by all who profess the Islamic faith; Thesavalamai, or 
"the customs of the Malabar inhabitants of the province of Jaffna"; 
and Buddhist ecclesiastical law containing rules of succession to 
temples and temple lands. But by far the most comprehensive was 
the large body of statute law enacted during a century and a half 
of British rule. This statute law, which was of general application, 
introduced the basic concepts of English cannon law, including 
certain elements which today form part of international human rights 
law. Of course, this law lacked the sanctity attached to an 
entrenched bill of rights, in the sense that its amendment or repeal 
required no special procedure or majority. Yet, much of it had 
survived the vicissititudes of constitutional change and appeared 
to have achieved a degree of durability and tenacity which usually 
characterises the corrmon law of a country.
Right to Life
The taking of life, except in the exercise of the right of private
defence or in the execution of the lawful sentence of a competent
2
court, was a punishable offence. Sentence of death, which was 
mandatory for murder, the waging of war against the Crown, the giving
1. For a full discussion, see L.J.M.Cooray, An Introduction to 
the Legal System of Ceylon (Colombo, Lake House Investments Ltd, 
1972), pp. 1-148.
2. Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code.
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of false evidence resulting in the execution of an innocent person,
and the abetment of suicide, could, however, be imposed only upon
conviction after a trial by jury before a judge of the Supreme Court,
or upon a trial-at-bar by three Supreme Court judges without a jury.^
Every such conviction was subject to an appeal to the Court of 
2
Criminal Appeal. After sentence of death had been pronounced, the 
presiding judge was required to make a report to the Governor, 
setting out his opinion, with reasons, on whether or not the sentence 
should be carried out. After considering this report, the Governor 
was required to comnunicate his decision to the Supreme Court. The 
Governor also had the authority to grant a pardon or to comnute a 
sentence of death to a term of imprisonment, whether on a petition 
from the condemned prisoner or on his own initiative. Sentence of 
death could not be pronounced on or recorded against any person who 
was under 16 years of age, or on any woman who was found to be
3
pregnant at the time of her conviction.
Freedom from Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
The practice of proceeding by torture against any person suspected 
of a crime had been abolished very early in the nineteenth century; 
so also, punishments such as breaking on the wheel and mutilation.
The other Dutch requirement of a confession of guilt before sentence 
of death could be legally pronounced, which in turn required a 
sentence of torture for the purpose of obtaining the confession, had
4
also been abolished atihe same time. Only a confession made to a 
judicial officer was admissible in evidence against an accused 
person, but only if it appeared to the court not to have been caused 
by any inducement, threat or promise. A confession made to a police 
officer or while being in police custody was not admissible.^
Every death occuring in a police station, mental or leprosy hospital 
or prison was required to be investigated by a judicial officer.
1. Criminal Procedure Code, S.440A.
2. Court of Criminal Appeal Ordinance, s.4.
3. Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 53, 54, 309, 328, 329.
4. Adoption of Reman Dutch Law Ordinance, s.4.
5. Evidence Ordinance, ss. 24, 25, 26.
6. Criminal Procedure Code, s.363.
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A prisoner was prevented from being put under mechanical restraint 
as a punishment. Normal conditions of imprisonment included 
regular visits and correspondence. Prisoners were categorised and 
separated, but solitary confinement was prohibited. Ill-treatment 
by a jailor or subordinate prison officer was a punishable offence.'*'
Freedom from Slavery and Forced Labour
2
Slavery had been abolished in Sri Lanka in 1844. The performance 
of any type of work by unconvicted prisoners except of their own 
accord in order to keep themselves occupied during otherwise idle
3
hours, was prohibited.
Right to Liberty and Security of Person 
A person could be deprived of his liberty only on such grounds and 
in accordance with such procedure as was established by law. A 
person executing a warrant of arrest was required to notify the 
substance thereof to the person arrested and, if so required, to 
show him the warrant. Thereafter, he was required to endorse on the 
warrant the time when and the place where the arrest was made, and 
to bring the person arrested before a court without unnecessary 
delay. A person arrested without a warrant, unless he was released 
on his own bond or on bail, was required to be produced before a 
magistrate within 24 hours of the arrest. If the offence of which 
a person was accused was bailable, and he was prepared to give bail, 
the magistrate was required to release him on bailor, where the 
magistrate thought fit, on his executing a bond without sureties. 
Alternatively, the magistrate could, from time to time, authorise 
the detention of such person for a term not exceeding fifteen days 
in the whole.^
If a prisoner comnitted for trial before the Supreme Court 
(for a non-bailable offence) was not brought to trial at the first 
criminal sessions after the date of his cormitment at which he might 
properly be tried (provided that 21 days had elapsed between the 
date of the cornnitment and the first day of such criminal sessions) 
he was entitled to be released on bail, unless good cause was shown 
to the contrary or unless the trial had been postponed on his 
application.^
1. Prisons Ordinance, ss. 48, 49, 71, 87, 88.
2. Abolition of Slavery Ordinance, s.2.
3. Prisons Ordinance, s.65.
4. Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 37, 39, 53, 54, 126A, 127A, 394.
5. Courts Ordinance, s.31.
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Right to a Fair Trial
Every person was subject to the criminal law and had the capacity to
sue and to be sued under the ordinary law of the land. Subject only
to the procedural requirement of one month's notice of action, a
minister or public officer was also liable to be sued in the ordinary
courts in respect of an act or omission in the exercise or purported
exercise of his official duties.^
No judge was competent to hear a case to which he was a party
or in which he was personally interested; nor could he hear an appeal
2
or review any judgment, sentence or order passed by him. No district
judge could, except with the express consent of the accused, try any
3
case which he had ccnmitted for trial as magistrate. A party to a
case was entitled to apply to the Supreme Court for the transfer, in
4
the interests of justice, of his case from one court to another.
Trial by jury had been introduced in 1812, and all criminal
trials before the Supreme Court were generally by jury before a judge.^
An accused person was entitled to elect the linguistic panel from which
the jury should be chosen for his trial , and could object to at least
two such jurors without stating the grounds therefor. Jury service
depended on the ability to speak, read and write a language and on
income, and jurors were chosen by the drawing of lots.^
Every court was required to hold its sittings in public,
except in proceedings relating to sexual offences when the court
could, in its discretion, exclude therefrom all persons other than
lawyers, witnesses and officers of court.^
Hie Evidence Ordinance provided that:
Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any 
legal right or liability dependent on the existence 
of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts 
exist. 8
Applied to criminal proceedings, this section contained the rule 
that an accused is presumed innocent until proved guilty according 
to law. The burden of proving the commission of an offence, therefore, 
rested on the prosecution.
1. Civil Procedure Code, s.461.
2. Courts Ordinance, s.89.
3. Criminal Procedure Code, s.18.
4. Ibid., s.422; Courts Ordinance, ss. 22, 23.
5. Ibid., s.216.
6. Ibid., ss. 165B, 257.
7. Courts Ordinance, s.85. See also Criminal Procedure Code, s.7, 
Rural Courts Ordinance, s.19, Children and Young Persons Ord.,ss.18-20.
8. S.101.
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An accused was furnished with the charge sheet or the indictment,
and a list of prosecution witnesses and documents. If he had been
comnitted for trial, he was entitled to receive, on payment, a copy
of the record of the proceedings of the non-summary inquiry.^- A
criminal trial on indictment did not commence until 14 days at least
had elapsed after service of the indictment on the accused. If he
was on remand, he was entitled to receive visits from, and to
2
communicate with, his legal adviser. He was also entitled, as of
3
right, to be defended by a pleader. Communications between him and
/|
his legal advisers were privileged.
All evidence in criminal trials was required to be taken in 
the presence of the accused or, when his personal attendance had been 
dispensed with, in the presence of his pleader. Where the evidence 
of any witness had been taken in the absence of an accused whose 
attendance had not been dispensed with, such evidence was required 
to be read over to him in the presence of such witness, in addition 
to being afforded a full opportunity of cross-examining such witness 
thereon.^ An accused was entitled to cross-examine the witnesses 
who had testified against him, and to obtain the attendance and 
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as 
witnesses against him. There were uniform rules for the 
examination, cross-examination and re-examination of witnesses.
If any evidence was given in a language not understood by the 
accused, and he was present in court, it was required to be inter­
preted to him in open court in a language understood by him.^
An accused could not be compelled to testify on his own 
behalf. A confession made to a police officer or while in police 
custody (except voluntarily to a judicial officer) was inadmissible 
in evidence.^
1. Criminal Procedure Code, S.165D.
2. Prisons Ordinance, s.71.
3. Criminal Procedure Code, s.287. But not in a Rural Court 
where lawyers were not permitted: Rural Courts Ordinance, s.21.
4. Evidence Ordinance, ss. 126-129.
5. Criminal Procedure Code, s.297.
6. Ibid., ss. 165, 189.
7. Ibid., s.300.
8. Evidence Ordinance, s.132.
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Juvenile offenders were tried in special courts in accordance 
with a relatively informal procedure. Probation officers played an 
active role in these courts, and imprisonment as a form of punishment 
was required to be avoided. The publication of juvenile court 
proceedings was considerably restricted.^
Every order, judgment or sentence of a trial court was subject 
to an appeal to a higher court. The appeal might be on a question 
of law or fact or of mixed law and fact. An appeal court generally 
had the power to affirm, reverse or vary any judgment or give 
directions to the trial court, or order a new trial or a further 
hearing.
A person who had once been tried by a court of competent
jurisdiction for an offence and been convicted or acquitted of such
offence was not liable to be tried again for the same offence nor on
2
the same facts for any other offence.
Right to Privacy, Honour and Reputation 
A search for purposes of criminal investigation could be made 
only upon the authority, and production, of a warrant issued by a
3
judge, and in the presence of the occupant of the place searched.
The outer door of a dwelling house could not be forced open in order 
to seize a person under civil process.^
Officers of the post office were prohibited from opening any 
postal article in the course of transmission by post, except in so far 
as might have been necessary for the purpose of returning the postal 
article to the sender. It was also an offence for any other person 
to wilfully or maliciously open any letter intended for delivery to 
another. Where it was necessary to open and examine a postal 
article for purposes of enforcing the customs law, due notice was 
required to be given to the addressee whose presence was permitted 
at such opening."*
In regard to telegraphic messages (including telephonic 
conversation), any person who, without lawful authority, intercepted 
or acquainted himself with the contents of any such message or, being
1. Children and Young Persons 0rd.,s.2. For principles to be 
observed by all courts in dealing with children and young persons, 
see ss.21-26.
2.Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 330-331.
3. Ibid., ss. 68-79. See also Excise Ord.,s.36; Firearms Ord.,s.39.
4. Civil Procedure Code, s.366.
5. Post Office Ord.,ss.56, 74, 75. See also Penal Code, ss.164- 
167; Criminal Procedure Code, s.67.
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a public officer having official duties in connection with such
message, disclosed its contents to any person other than in
pursuance of such duties, conmitted an offence thereby.^
The publication of any imputation concerning any person,
intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such
imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, was an offence.
2
Also punishable was criminal intimidation, insult and annoyance.
The Evidence Ordinance prohibited indecent and scandalous questions
3
as well as questions intended to insult or annoy. The Teleconm- 
unication Ordinance prescribed penalties for tendering obscene or
4
indecent messages and for causing annoyance by telephone calls; 
while the Post Office Ordinance prohibited the transmission by post 
of injurious, filthy or noxious articles and indecent material.^
Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion 
Early in the nineteenth century, it was provided that "liberty of 
conscience and the free exercise of religious worship" was allowed 
to all persons "provided always that they quietly and peaceably enjoy 
the same without offence or scandal to the Government".^ Later, the 
manifestation of religion or belief in worship, observance or 
practice was protected by the Penal Code.^ The religious festivals 
of the four major religions were recognised by law and celebrated asg
national holidays. Legislation also incorporated several voluntary 
religious bodies and gave each of them the character of a legal
9
persona capable, inter alia, of acquiring and holding property.
The Education Ordinance provided that a pupil in a government or 
assisted school should not be required to attend any instructions 
in, or any worship or observance connected with, a religion which 
was not the religion of his parents.^ The University of Ceylon was
1. Telecommunication Ord., s.33.
2. Penal Code, ss. 479, 483, 484, 488.
3. Ss. 151, 152. See also Civil Procedure Code, ss. 176, 177.
4. Ss. 37, 38.
5. Ss. 19, 20.
6. Adoption of Roman-Dutch Law Ordinance, s.6.
7. Ss. 290-292.
8. Holidays Ord., Second Schedule.
9. For a list, see N. Jayawickrama, Human Rights in Sri Lanka 
(Colombo: Dept, of Govt. Printing, 1976), p.71.
10. S.35. The Children and Young Persons Ord., s.39, required 
regard to be had to religious persuasion of person being sent to 
approved or certified school.
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declared to be open to all persons of whatever race, creed or class, 
and no test of religious belief or profession was to be adopted or 
imposed in order to entitle any person to be admitted as a teacher 
or student. ^
Freedom of Association 
The law recognised the legality of trade unions and of their normal 
activities, including the promotion, organisation and financing of 
strike action.^
Right to Family Life
A male who was above sixteen years of age and a female who was above
twelve years of age (or if the daughter of European or Burgher
parents, fourteen years of age) could contract a lawful marriage,
provided that neither was already married, nor within the prohibited
degrees of relationship. Every marriage was required to be
3
registered in accordance with the law. The marriage of minors 
required thejrior consent of a parent or guardian, or of the court.
No suit or action lay to compel the solemnization of a marriage by 
reason of any promise or contract of marriage, the seduction of the 
female or any other cause. Nor would such promise, contract or 
seduction vitiate any marriage which had been duly solemnized and 
registered.^ "
A marriage .might be dissolved by a court on the ground of 
adultery subsequent to marriage, malicious desertion, or incurable 
impotency at the time of marriage.^ An action for dissolution could 
be instituted by either spouse. Pending the action, the wife, 
whether she be plaintiff or defendant, was entitled to apply for 
the payment of alimony by the husband.
A married woman was capable of acquiring, holding and 
disposing of movable or immovable property, and of contracting as 
if she were unmarried.^ Upon a decree for dissolution being entered, 
the court was empowered, for the benefit of either spouse or of the 
children, to make order for a conveyance or settlement of property
1. Ceylon University Ord., s.7.
2. Trade Unions Ord., s. 18. See also s.26 (immunity from civil 
action) and s.27 (immunity in respect of tortious acts).
3. General Marriages Ord., ss.15-18.
4. Ibid., s.20.
5. Ibid., s.19.
6. Civil Procedure Code, ss. 597, 614.
7. Married Women's Property Ord., s.6.
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or for the payment of money. Questions relating to the custody, 
maintenance and education of children were determined by court in 
accordance with fixed principles of law.
The sanctity of the family was recognised in the following
provision of the Evidence Ordinance:
No person who is or has been married shall be compelled 
to disclose any communication made to him during 
marriage by any person to whom he is or has been married, 
nor shall he be permitted to disclose any such communi­
cation unless the person who made it, or his represent­
ative in interest, consents, except in suits between 
married persons, or proceedings in which one married 
person is prosecuted for any crime committed against 
the other. 1
Upon the dissolution of a marriage on the ground of the adultery of
the wife, the court could award damages against the person found to
have committed adultery with her, and also require him to pay the
2
costs of the action. In matters of succession too, the family unit 
was expressly recognised. If death occured without a valid will, the 
spouse and children of the deceased had priority; illegitimate 
children, however, inherited only the property of their intestate 
mother.^
Family life also received some recognition in the sphere of 
labour law. The employment of a woman worker at any time during the 
period of four weeks immediately following her confinement was 
prohibited; instead, she was entitled to receive maternity benefit
4
for a period of six weeks. On an estate where Indian labour was 
employed, the employer was required to provide each married labourer 
with a separate room for himself and his or her spouse, and was 
prohibited from compelling them to share such room with any person 
other than a child of such labourer or of his or her spouse.^
Every Indian widow resident on an estate and having at least one 
child below the age of ten was entitled to receive an allowance of 
rice freeof charge each month from her employer.
1. S.112.
2. Civil Procedure Code, s.598.
3. Matromonial Rights and Inheritance Ord., s.33.
4. Maternity Benefits Ord., ss. 2, 3.
5. Estate Labour (Indian) Ord., s.24.
6. Minimum Wages Ord., s. 11.
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Rights of Children
Every birth was required to be registered within 42 days of the event.
A child of whom a married woman had been pregnant at any time during
the marriage was presumed to be the legitimate offspring of the
mother and her husband of that marriage.^ The employment of children
below the age of twelve years was prohibited, while the employment
of older children was strictly regulated by statute. The law also
sought to prevent cruelty to children and to ensure that a child
received adequate food, clothing, medical aid and lodging, as well
as care, from a parent or other person legally liable to maintain,
2
or having the custody of, such child.
Right to Participate in Public Life
A British subject who was not less than 21 years of age and had
resided in an electoral district for a continuous period of six
months was entitled to be registered as an elector, provided that he
was not otherwise disqualified, if he was domiciled or permanently
3
settled in the island or could read and write a language. Voting
was by secret ballot. The law contained very strict provisions
designed to preserve the secrecy of the ballot as well as to ensure
4
the purity of the election.
The Constitutional Experience
Ceylon's transformation from a Crown Colony into Dominion 
Status was a gradual evolutionary process spread over a period of 
146 years.^ Consequently, when after over a century of experiment­
ation with constitutional forms and techniques, the stage of 
representative and responsible government was finally reached, the 
Ceylonese had had an opportunity not only to acquire a knowledge 
of the system, but also to appreciate its value as an instrument 
for the protection and promotion of their own well-being. This was 
eloquently demonstrated in the years that followed: eight general 
elections at six of which the government in office was, often 
decisively, voted out.
1. Evidence Ordinance, s.112.
2. Children and Young Persons Ord., ss. 59, 71-74. See also 
Minimum Wages Ord., s.4, which prohibited the employment of children 
below ten years of age on estates.
3. Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Order in Council 1946, ss.4-7.
4. Ibid., ss. 37, 40-42, 53-58, 84.
5. For a detailed description, see K.M.de Silva, "The Legislative
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In 1802, by the terms of the Peace of Amiens, the Dutch
settlements in the maritime provinces of Ceylon became a British
possession. Thirteen years later, upon the signing of the
Kandyan Convention of 2 March 1815, the island of Ceylon in its
entirety became a part of the expanding empire of King George III.^
Yet, barely two decades later, the process of decolonisation was
set in motion. In 1833, upon the recommendation of a constitutional
commission headed by Lt.Col.W.M.G.Colebrooke, a confirmed Benthamite,
provision was made for the appointment of a Legislative Council of
nine official and six unofficial members; the latter were to be
selected Mas far as possible in equal proportions from the
respectable European merchants or inhabitants and the higher
2
classes of natives". In 1835, three Ceylonese (a low country 
Sinhalese, a Tamil and a Burgher) were appointed; a beginning had 
been made in constitutional government in which the Ceylonese had a 
share, however minuscule. The Governor was, of course, the effective 
ruler of the colony. But in 1838, the Legislative Council, whose 
advice and consent he was required to seek before he made any law, 
was authorised to criticise and revise those portions of the budget 
which did rot relate to the fixed civil and military expenditure.
In 1860, members were allowed to put down motions for debate 
without the prior authorisation of the Governor, except where it 
was sought to dispose of or charge any part of the revenue. The 
composition of the Legislative Council, however, remained unchanged 
for the next fifty-four years: in 1889, the number of unofficial 
members was increased to eight by the addition of two Ceylonese to 
represent the Kandyan Sinhalese and the Moors. The Executive Council,
Council in the Nineteenth Century", History of Ceylon, Vol.3 
(Colombo: University of Ceylon, 1973), pp.226-248; A.J.Wilson,
"The Development of the Constitution, cl910-1948", ibid., pp. 359-380; 
K.M.de Silva, "The History and Politics of the Transfer of Power", 
ibid., pp.489-533.
1. The Kandyan Convention was entered into between the Governor 
and Commander-in-Chief of the British Settlements and Territories in 
Ceylon and the Adigars, Dissawas and other principal chiefs of the 
Kandyan Provinces. For full text, see Legislative Enactments of 
Ceylon, rev.ed (1956), chap.390.
2. Order in Council, 28 September 1833. See also G.C.Mendis, 
Documents on British Colonial Policy in Ceylon, 1796-1833,(QUP.1956).
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which the Governor was required to consult "upon all occasions of
difficulty or importance" but whose advice he was not obliged to
accept, consisted predictably of officials only, though not
exclusively of Englishmen. From time to time, Ceylonese who served
permanently or acted in the office of Queen's Advocate or Colonial
Treasurer sat in the Executive Council.
In 1910, the principle of election was introduced.'*’ Four
unofficial members were elected from constituencies described as
Urban European, Rural European, Educated Ceylonese and Burgher.
While the qualifications for inclusion in the Burgher constituency
were racial stock and literacy in English, the franchise for the
Educated Ceylonese seat was mainly confined to the very small
English-educated Sinhalese and Tamil elite. Of a total adult male
population of 1,120,762, only 2938, of whom 1659 were Sinhalese and
2
1072 were Tamils, were entitled to vote.
In 1920, provision was made for an unofficial majority in the
3
Legislative Council: 14 official and 23 unofficial members. Of 
the latter, eleven were to be elected territorially and five from 
special constituencies (two by Europeans, one by Burghers, one by 
the European dominated Chamber of Corrmerce and one by the Sinhalese 
controlled Low Country Products Association. The principle of 
representative government was thus conceded. In 1924, provision 
was made for representative government as defined in the Colonial 
Laws Validity Act 1865: in the new legislature, over one-half of 
the members would be elected.^ The new Legislative Council consisted
1. Royal Instructions, 24 November 1910.
2. Ironically, the contest for the Educated Ceylonese seat was 
strenuously fought on caste issues. Governor MacCallum, in a 
confidential despatch of 24 January 1912 to the Colonial Secretary 
(quoted by K.M.de Silva in History of Ceylon, Vol.3, at p.387) stated:
"The Goyigamas were not of sufficient strength to secure the 
Educated Ceylonese seat for one of their own caste by 
election . . ./and sol as a body they supported Mr.P.
Ramanathan than accord a vote for Dr.H.M.Fernando, a 
Sinhalese who belongs to the Carawe caste."
Ramanathan, a Tamil lawyer, was elected.
3. Order in Council, 13 August 1920.
4. Ceylon (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1923.
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of 12 official and 37 unofficial members, of whom 34 were elected.
Of them, twenty-three were elected territorially and eleven
communally (three Europeans, two Burghers, one western province
Ceylon Tamil, three Moors and two Indian Tamils). Although the
Governor was ex-officio president of the Council, provision was
made for a vice-president to be elected, and for the first time a
Ceylonese began to preside over its deliberations. The franchise
was based on an income or property qualification and a literacy
test. For all practical purposes, power (but not responsibility)
was vested in the English educated middle class. Four per cent of
the population had been enfranchised.
Although the principle of representative government had been
conceded, the elected representatives were not responsible for the
conduct of the government. The Legislative Council was unable to
implement its decisions. But the Governor, unless he secured the
consent of the Council, could not enforce his will except by the
use of his special powers which, if resorted to too frequently,
would reduce representative government to a sham. He therefore
had to attenpt by one means or another to obtain the support of the
elected representatives in a Council in which they tended to form
a permanent opposition partly because they felt that that was the
only way open to them to exercise any power and partly because they
knew that in any event they could not be called upon to assume
responsibility. Despite this conundrum, the system marked a
significant leap in Ceylon's constitutional evolution. As the
Donoughmore Commission observed in its report of July 1928:
It was true that it transferred the balance of power from 
a responsible Executive to an irresponsible Legislature; 
an experiment which could not be without risk; on the one 
hand, the very extent of the power entrusted to them made 
the elected members in a real sense co-partners in the 
Government. It was clear that without their active 
co-operation the Government would be helpless, but it was 
equally clear that they were as anxious as the official 
members to promote the good government of the country and 
would not be likely to withhold that co-operation. The 
system thus provided a means of educating the unofficial 
members in the arts of government and the complexities of 
public business, and of providing them with that training 
which would enable them in future years to assume 
responsibility for the administration of the island. 1
1. Ceylon: Report of the Special Commission on the Constitution 
(1928; Cmd. 3131), p.19. This report is commonly referred to as the
Donoughmore Report.
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1931 saw not only the consolidation of representative 
government, but also the grant of a considerable measure of 
responsible government and, more significantly, universal adult 
franchise. The Ceylon (State Council) Order in Council 1931, 
which was based on the recommendations of the Donoughmore 
Commission, which in turn was inspired by the committee system of 
the League of Nations and of English local government, provided 
for a State Council with both legislative and executive functions.
It consisted of 50 members elected territorially on universal 
adult franchise, 3 ex-officio members without voting rights, and 
12 persons nominated by the Governor to make the Council more 
representative. The Council divided into seven executive 
committees, each being charged with the general direction and 
control of a number of government departments. Each committee 
elected a chairman, and these seven chairmen together with the 
three officers of state formed the Board of Ministers. Certain 
areas of governmental activity were left to the officers of state 
who were responsible to the Governor - the public service, 
external affairs and defence under the Chief Secretary; elections, 
legal advice and the administration of justice under the Legal 
Secretary; and finance under the Financial Secretary. However, 
the Board of Ministers as a whole was charged with the general 
conduct of the business of government and in particular the 
preparation of the annual budget. The Governor was required to 
consult freely with his Ministers and to communicate to them all 
public despatches. The Chief Secretary functioned as chairman of 
the Board, with one of the Ministers (usually the Leader of the 
Council) as vice-chairman.
With the grant of universal adult franchise, the electorate
in 1931 comprised over one and a half million. In 1936, when the
second election was held, the electorate had increased to about
two and a half million. The revised register in 1940 contained
a total number of 2,635,000 electors. On the eve of dominion
status, Sir Ivor Jennings summed up this last phase of constitutional
evolution thus:
The Donoughmore Constitution had few friends at its 
beginning and none at all at the end. It had never­
theless some advantages. It covered the awkward gap
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between representative government and responsible 
government. It enabled the Ceylonese Ministers to 
take some of the steps - especially in the fields 
of education and health - which they thought 
necessary. It gave them a broad experience of the 
problems of government. It taught them the necessity 
for corordination and common action. There may be 
argument whether they could have taken complete 
responsibility in 1931; there was no doubt at all 
in 1945. 1
Nationalism and Trade Unionism
2
Ceylon's struggle for independence was relatively peaceful. 
Except for the occasional romantic folk hero who emerged to lead a 
mild skirmish in the early years of British rule, very little blood 
was actaully shed in the cause of national independence. The 
movement was essentially one for the reform of the constitution and 
it was led from time to time by the emerging elite. Until the final 
stage, the dominant objective of the constitutionalists was a 
greater share of state power rather than freedom or liberation. As 
the events of 1956 were to demonstrate, the power base of the 
national elite who secured independence, properly attired in British 
morning dress, was to erode in less than a decade. They appeared
to be as far removed from the common man as the colonial rulers had
been. Consequently, independent Ceylon did not, unlike many African 
States, inherit a powerful nationalist movement which was capable 
of dominating the post-independence political life of the country 
and thereby stifling the growth of political thought and philosophy.
In 1864, a dispute between the Governor and the unofficial 
members of the Legislative Council on financial policy led to the 
formation by the latter of the Ceylon League. Led by George Wall, 
who represented the plantation interests, and C.A.Lorenz, who 
represented the Burgher community, it campaigned strenuously to 
secure for the Council control of the financial affairs of the colony. 
It did not succeed, and after five years it faded away. Yet it was
the first credible attempt in the island to combine and agitate for
1. Ivor Jennings,
2. For a full discussion, see K.M.de Silva, "The Reform and 
Nationalist Movements in the Early Twentieth Century", History of 
Ceylon, Vol.3, pp.381-407.
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constitutional reform. In 1916, the legal profession organised 
itself through the Ceylon Reform League and petitioned for the 
abolition of nominated members, racial representation and the 
official majority. In the following year, the Ceylon National 
Association was formed to demand "a share in the actual administ­
ration of the country". A joint conference on constitutional 
reform convened by these two bodies in 1917 led to the formation 
two years later of the Ceylon National Congress. At its first 
session, Ponnambalam Arunachalam, its president, described its 
moderate and reformist objective as being "only to substitute for 
one form of British administration which we have outgrown and 
which is impeding our development, another form more suitable to 
our needs and conditions". What was envisaged was a legislature 
with an unofficial majority elected on a territorial basis by means 
of a wide male and restricted female franchise, minority represent­
ation by nomination, and the introduction of a quasi-cabinet system 
with a few departments headed by unofficial members.
These efforts by the low-country elite, the westernised 
professional class, to acquire a share of political power for 
themselves produced counter reactions among other elitist groups.
In 1918, the Kandyan Sinhalese, who feared that in a unified 
independent Ceylon they would be numerically outnumbered by the 
Sinhalese of the highly populous low-country, organised themselves 
into the Kandyan Association in order to maintain and assert their 
own separate identity. When the Congress intensified its demand 
for the abolition of communal electorates and for election on a 
territorial basis, the Kandyan wing defected altogether from it.
In 1934, an attempt was made by S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike to bridge the 
schism between the Sinhalese through the Sinhala Maha Sabha, and 
partially succeeded in attracting members of the Kandyan elite to 
it. At the same time as the Kandyan defection, the Tamils too 
withdrew from the Congress. They formed the All-Ceylon Tamil 
Conference to unite Tamil resistance to the territorial principle 
of election and to agitate for comnunal representation. In 1944, 
the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress began arguing for an electoral 
system that would assure the minorities equal representation with 
the Sinhalese. At this time, the Burghers and Europeans also
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declared their opposition to any further reforms that would lead to 
the transfer of political power to the Sinhalese. In 1927, the 
European Association was established to protect the interests of 
the conniunity whose name it bore. The Muslims, however, recognising 
the inevitability of self-government and majority rule, asked only 
for "adequate representation" for themselves: in 1923, the Ceylon 
Muslim League urged them to work for full responsible government in 
Ceylon.
Parallel to the constitutionalist and the communally oriented 
reform movements, there were also other forces at work. The 
Christian missionary activities provoked a Buddhist resistance 
movement. It began in the western and southern provinces, the 
educational centres of the missionaries and the home of the emerging 
non-goyigama elite. It first manifested itself between 1864 and 1890, 
when Buddhist leaders engaged their Christian counterparts in five' 
public debates at which they vigorously asserted the virtues of their 
own belief. These highly publicised, well attended, and emotionally 
charged denunciations of Christianity not only helped to boost the 
self-confidence of the Buddhists, but also enabled them vicariously 
to reject the cause of western imperialism with which all missionary 
activity was seen to be inextricably bound. Newspaper accounts of 
these debates attracted the attention of Col.H.S.Olcott, the 
American founder of the Theosophical Society. When, in 1880, Olcott 
and his Russian associate, Madame Blavatsky, arrived in Galle and 
dramatically embraced Buddhism, they did so amidst scenes of 
unparalleled religious fervour. The Theosophists taught the Buddhists 
the techniques of modem organisation, and this ability soon 
manifested itself in the temperance movement which caught the 
imagination of the masses to a far greater extent than the agitation 
for constitutional reform had succeeded in doing. From the villages 
it spread enthusiastically into the towns and brought together, 
ostensibly for a common purpose, sections of the rural elite such 
as school teachers, small traders and village notaries, and the 
conspicuously affluent urban elite, a few of whom even held 
controlling interests in the liquor industry. This movement provided 
the Ceylonese with an opportunity to learn the mechanics of organising 
and influencing public opinion. It provided the visible impetus for 
an otherwise remote constitutional dialogue.
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More dramatic perhaps was another development which was 
taking place away from the centres of wealth and power. Working 
people were beginning to organise themselves and resort to strike 
action against their employers: in 1906, a strike by carters so 
alarmed British officials that they believed that Indian sedition 
had been imported in the guise of trade union agitation. In 1918, 
an attempt by A.E.Goonesinghe to mobilise youth to agitate for the 
immediate relief of social problems through the Young Lanka League 
was aborted when Goonesinghe was persuaded to join the Ceylon 
National Congress. Goonesinghe's conservatism was replaced by the 
more militant leadership of the Marxist movement which emerged during 
the depression of the 1930s. A group of intellectuals who had 
studied at British universities in the late 'twenties and had come 
under the influence of men such as Harold Laski formed the core of 
this new phenomenon in Ceylon society. One of them, Colvin R.de 
Silva, barrister-at-law, organised the Wellawatte Mill Workers 
Union, the first Marxist organisation for labour agitation in the 
colony.
Political Organisations
The political institutions established from time to time did 
not envisage the existence of opposing political parties. Indeed, 
even when a considerable measure of internal self-government was 
granted in 1931 and universal adult franchise introduced, the 
institutional structure then established was not designed to promote 
the development of political parties. Nevertheless, during the 
last two decades of colonial rule, due primarily to the desire of 
different social groups to safeguard and promote their own welfare, 
a number of political organisations emerged, and when the first 
parliamentary election was held in 1947, the voters were offered a 
choice between competing political philosophies.^
A.E.Goonesinghe, who had been a pioneer in labour agitation 
and whose Ceylon Trade Union Congress had organised a number of 
strikes in the 1920s, was invited to London by the British Labour 
Party in 1927. On his return, he formed the Labour Party upon a
1. For a fuller survey, see Calvin A.Woodward, The Growth of a 
Party System in Ceylon (Providence, U.S.A: Brown University Press, 
1969).
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somewhat less socialistic ideology than its British counterpart; 
its creed was described as "political democracy" and he stood for 
moderately progressive social reforms.
The return to Sri Lanka of a group of intellectuals who had 
been fervently attracted to Marxist doctrine while studying in 
British and American universities coincided with the depression of 
the 1930s. S.A.Wickremasinghe, Colvin R.de Silva, Philip Gunewardene, 
M.G.Mendis, N.M.Perera and Leslie Goonewardene were as articulate 
as they were individualistic. Yet a common antipathy towards 
British imperialism brought them together in 1933 in a campaign 
directed against the sale of poppies on Remembrance Day. The Surya 
Mai Movement, named after the indigenous flower which replaced the 
poppy in collections made on behalf of local servicemen, led to the 
formation, on 18 December 1935, of the Lanka Sama Samaj Party.
While structured as a closed and militant body, the LSSP was able 
to develop a mass following through agitation and the creation of 
ancillary organisations such as trade unions and youth movements.
It organised workers in the industrial, commercial, communication 
and harbour areas, and then moved into the economically critical 
plantation sector. It reached its widening popular base of workers 
and the middle class intelligentsia through two newspapers 
published in Sinhala and in Tamil. In 1939, the executive 
committee of the LSSP passed a motion of no-faith in the Third 
International and expelled the Stalinist minority from the party. 
Thereafter, it adopted a Trotskyist stance with a revolutionary 
programme inspired by the platform of the Fourth International. The 
expelled Stalinists formed the United Socialist Party in 1940 under 
the leadership of S.A.Wickremasinghe.
The LSSP espoused a policy of "revolutionary defeatism" 
towards World War II. Consequently, the party was proscribed in 
1942 and its leaders detained. Some of them escaped to India where 
they helped to form the Bolshevik Leninist Party of India as a 
section of the Fourth International. On their return, a power 
struggle between them and those who had spent the war years in 
detention in Ceylon led to the formation in 1945, under the 
leadership of Colvin R.de Silva, of the Bolshevik Leninist Party.
The USP did not oppose the war and was, therefore, not proscribed 
initially. However, its increasing use of the strike weapon was
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considered dangerous to the war effort and, in March 1942, it was 
declared illegal. In July 1943, the USP dissolved itself and formed 
in its place the Ceylon Communist Party.
The fears and tensions of the declining years of communal rule 
gave birth to two other political parties with a purely communal 
basis. Efforts made since the late 1920s to organise the Indian 
estate labour into one comprehensive organisation had proved quite 
ineffective until eight thousand Indian railway road workers were 
dismissed in 1939. Then, on the suggestion of Jawaharlal Nehru, the 
Ceylon Indian Congress was formed under the leadership of G.R.Motha 
and I.X.Pereira. Its main objective was to obtain political and 
legal rights for Indians. The All-Ceylon Tamil Congress through 
which G.G.Ponnambalam had unsuccessfully advocated representation 
for the minorities on an equal basis with the Sinhalese, emerged as 
a political party seeking to represent the northern and eastern 
provinces in the new House of Representatives.
On the eve of Independence, several groups and personalities 
began searching for a broad ideological consensus. They realised 
that an electoral majority in the new Parliament could only be 
obtained by an organisation which was sufficiently comprehensive.
They feared that the Marxists, with their charismatic leadership 
and a solid base of popular support acquired through trade union 
links with the working class, may well satisfy that requirement. 
Accordingly, after discussions between the Ceylon National Congress, 
the Sinhala Maha Sabha, the Ceylon Muslim League, the Moors 
Association and the leaders of the Tamil community such as Aruna- 
chalam Mahadeva and Subbiah Natesan, the United National Party was 
founded in 1946. The founding groups of the UNP were not dissolved 
upon its formation; they were permitted to retain their separate 
organisations provided they accepted the programme and principles 
of the UNP and acted in accordance with its constitution and the 
decisions taken by the party. They continued parallel to the party 
as organised blocs of power and interest. For the moment, therefore, 
potential areas of conflict between the different groups were 
submerged by the urgent need to form a political union based on a 
belief in progressive capitalism, private enterprise, parliamentary 
democracy, and a moderate approach to the solution of social problems; 
in short, a political party which would, after an electoral victory, 
ensure the maintenance of the status quo.
34
A n  E m e r g i n g  E l i t e
The hundred years immediately preceding Dominion Status saw 
the emergence of a middle class in Sri Lanka.'*' Helped considerably 
by the educational and the economic policies of the colonial 
administration, an enterprising section of the community was able 
to break away from the traditional pattern of life and from the 
established social strata, and enter the professional, commercial 
and public service systems. In their wake, and often as 
complementary to their initiative, a larger section found employment 
of a type and nature which exposed them to new areas of economic 
activity and, consequently, to new values and standards in a rapidly 
changing world. When the stage of full self-government was finally 
reached and men and ideas were urgently required to grapple with a 
variety of problems, Ceylon was not found lacking in either.
Education
Education was at first not regarded as a service to be provided 
by the State. Instead, it was left in the hands of British mission­
aries who ventured out in quick succession seeking converts to 
Christianity. The London Missionary Society (1804) was followed by 
the Baptists (1812), the Weslyan Methodists (1814) and the Church 
Missionary Society (1818). Missionaries sent by the American Board 
of Commissioners for Foreign Missions arrived in 1816, and confined 
their activities almost exclusively to the northern province. From 
their separate efforts emerged a system of excellent denominational 
schools. In 1832, the government policy on education changed. 
Henceforth, it was to be a legitimate sphere of state activity, 
directed towards certain clear objectives: to prepare candidates 
for public employment, as an aid to natives to cultivate European 
attainments, to wean them away from caste and from a dependance on 
subsistence agriculture. The Colombo Academy (now Royal College) 
was established by the Government in 1835, and soon rivalled the 
missionary institutions in their efforts to create a class of 
Ceylonese who stood apart from the mass of their countrymen. More 
schools were established in the provinces, some teaching subjects 
like surveying and others providing a more rudimentary knowledge of
1. See Michael Roberts, "Elite Formation and Elites, 1832-1931", 
History of Ceylon, Vol.3, pp.263-284.
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the English language. The literate percentage of the population 
which was 17.4 in 1881 and 26.4 in 1901, increased to 39.9 in 1921* 
In 1947, on the eve of Independence, 1,004,586 pupils were 
registered in primary and secondary schools, and the literacy rate 
was 57.8 (or 70.1 of the male and 43.8 of the female population).
The educational effort was not confined to the missionaries
and the government. The Buddhist revival in the second half of 
the nineteenth century saw not only the establishment of two centres 
of oriental learning, the Vidyodaya Pirivena in 1872 and the 
Vidyalankara Pirivena in 1876, but also a sustained effort to build 
up a network of primary and secondary schools. Between 1880 and 
1890, the Buddhist Theosophical Society established forty Buddhist 
schools. In the years leading to Independence, these schools 
fulfilled an important historical function. They served as the 
training ground of a new elite, educated in a Buddhist atmosphere, 
and therefore more responsive to the social and cultural ethos of 
the great mass of the Ceylonese people.
Parallel to the revival of Buddhism was the recovery of
Hinduism and Islam - two phenomena which also contributed to the 
emergence of a viable middle class. The Saivaite scholar, Arumuga 
Navalar, established a school in every Tamil village where Saivaite 
education could be imparted in a purely Saivaite environment. 
Thereafter, mindful of the value of an English education, he 
founded in 1872 the Saivangala Vidyasalai (now the Jaffna Hindu 
College) where English could be taught along with the religious 
background necessary for Hindu children. The recovery of Islam 
came a generation later. The presence in Ceylon of the exiled 
Egyptial hero, Arabi Pasha, was the opportunity availed of by local 
Muslim leaders to jolt their community out of their conservative 
secularism. Education was used for this purpose, and the Muslim 
Educational Society which was established endeavoured to create an 
elite educated on modem lines who would provide the leadership 
which the Muslims sorely needed. The Al-Madrasatuz Zahira (now 
Zahira College) was established in 1892 with this end in view.
Economic Enterprise
The rapid economic expansion which began in the mid-nineteenth 
century offered Ceylonese with initiative an opportunity to break 
loose from a feudal social structure inhibited by caste and class
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considerations. As early as the 1830s, a few low-country Sinhalese 
had involved themselves successfully in coffee smallholdings. From 
the 1850s, a larger number invested with equal success in cinnamon 
plantations and still more took to coconut. While rubber also 
attracted Ceylonese entrepreneurs, tea remained the preserve of the 
Europeans until the early twentieth century when the former began 
purchasing tea plantations which were already developed and carving 
out new plantations in the hitherto virgin mid and low country, 
particularly in the southern province and the Kelani valley. Equally 
lucrative were gemming operations in the Sabaragamuwa province, the 
extraction and export of graphite which gathered momentum in the 
1860s, and the manufacture and distribution of arrack which appears 
to have been a profitable occupation even during the Dutch period.
In Colombo, the ownership of urban property was a major source of 
capital accumulation.
These pioneering efforts of a class which soon achieved 
national elite status opened up a variety of other business lines. 
Servicing the plantations and the plantation districts assumed the 
proportions of a new industry. Forest clearing contracts, the 
supply of food and labour, the operation of general merchant stores 
and 1'hotels" in the new "bazaar towns", transport of supplies, 
supply of furniture, barrels and timber, railway sleepers and 
telegraph poles, and building contracts, were some of the less 
prestigious, nevertheless lucrative, channels of capitalist 
enterprise which bolstered the social mobility of a substantial 
section of the comnunity. In 1946, the gainfully employed population 
accounted thus:
TABLE 6
GAINFULLY EMPLOYED POPULATION BY OCCUPATIONS, 1946
Occupation Percentage
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 52.9
Manufactures 11.0
Commerce and Services 21.1
Public and Professional Services 5.7
Domestic and Personal Services 9.3
Source: B.L.Panditaratne and S.Selvanayagam, "The Demography of 
Ceylon - An Introductory Survey", History of Ceylon, Vol.3, at p:.302.
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Professionalism
The Civil Service was at first exclusively European, recruit­
ment being dependant solely upon patronage. Ceylonese aspirations 
were satisfied with the appointment, mainly of Burghers, into a 
clerical service. However, following the recommendations of the 
Colebrooke Commission, local candidates began to be admitted into 
the service. By 1868, in a 1084-strong civil establishment, 894 
woe Ceylonese. Of 282 superior appointments, 92 were filled by 
Ceylonese. 84 of the superior appointments came within what was 
strictly the civil service, and of these ten were held by Ceylonese. 
Professionalism was evident in other areas too as the following 
statistics show:
TABLE 7
NUMBER OF CEYLONESE MALES IN SELECT OCCUPATIONS
Occupation 1881 1901 1911 1921
Barristers, Advocates and Proctors 268 356 553 800
Physicians and Medical Practitioners (inv.) 326 (inv.) 789
Land Surveyors 99 160 (n.d.) 465
Civil Engineers (n.d.) 11 (inv.) 56
Auctioneers and Brokers (n.d.) 26 54 74
Source : Michael Roberts, "Elite Formation", History of Ceylon,
Vol.3, p.272.
n.d. - no data
inv. - data ignored because categorisation is suspect.
In 1934, the percentage of Ceylonese in the public service had risen 
to 68.1 per cent, and by 1939 it had increased to 78 per cent. From 
1943, recruitment to the Civil Service was by an open competitive 
examination held only in Ceylon.^
1. For a full account, see W.A.Wiswa Warnapala, "Bureaucratic 
Transformation, c.1910-1948", History of Ceylon, Vol.3, pp.408-427.
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A National Press
The active involvement of Ceylonese in the economic life of 
the country from the early years of British rule, and the compara­
tively slow transfer to them of a share of political power, inevitably 
led to a search for other avenues of expression. The newspaper 
offered a wider audience than one's own social circle or economic 
interest group, and therefore sooibecame a popular medium. At first, 
a national newspaper would have a limited circulation confined to 
Colombo and perhaps a few other provincial towns; the average daily 
sale would have been considered very successful if it reached a 
thousand. But with the remarkable increase in literacy and the 
growing political consciousness of the people, the newspaper became 
a powerful medium of communication. On the eve of Independence, 
the transition from limited circulation to mass production had 
already taken place; newspapers in all three languages were being 
distributed to the furthest ends of the island, carried to their 
readers by the most modem means of transportation.^ Of course, the 
press gave expression, in the main, to the views of a handful of 
newspaper proprietors who were, more often than not, anglicised, 
affluent, and ardent advocates of the established order. But the 
Ceylonese had learned quickly to discern. They joined common cause 
with the press barons to secure political independence for the 
country. But as later events were to demonstrate most eloquently, 
not all the sophistry, blandishments and wierd prognostications of
the national newspapers could wean them away from a political course
2
once they had decided to adopt it.
The first newspaper in the island was the Government Gazette 
which contained "obituary notices recounting the virtues of 
departed ones, poetry of varied merit, and interesting and instructive 
communications on various subjects". In 1832, Governor Robert 
William Horton encouraged the publication of the Colombo Journal 
which was printed at the Government Press and was edited by its 
superintendent. In 1834, the merchants of Colombo combined to 
publish the Observer and Commercial Advertiser whose first issue
1. For a detailed and documented discussion on jounalism in 
Ceylon, see H.A.J.Hulugalle, The Life and Times of D.R.Wijewardene, 
(Colombo: Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd, 1960).
2. For instance, at the 1956 general election, all the national 
newspapers launched a vigorous campaign against S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike 
who eventually won a decisive victory.
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invited "those who are inclined to favour a free press" to become 
subscribers. The Observer attacked the Government so relentlessly 
that in 1837 the Ceylon Chronicle emerged to offer a defence of the 
administration. This newspaper was privately aided by the Governor 
and sustained through the efforts of a committee of civil servants.
The Governor was a frequent contributor until it folded up sixteen 
months later in September 1838. Within four days, the types and 
printing presses of the Ceylon Chronicle began issuing the Ceylon 
Herald, a newspaper which at first opposed and later supported the 
Government. It survived for eight years until July 1846 when it was 
purchased by a group of Europeans who wished to start a newspaper 
to oppose the Observer which by now had begun supporting the 
Government. Thus came into being the Ceylon Times which still 
survives as The Times of Ceylon.
The Examiner was first published in September 1846 by a few 
British merchants as a mercantile organ. It later passed into the 
hands of a group of lawyers before ceasing publication in 1900. Two 
other newspapers in circulation at this time were the bi-weekly 
Kandy Herald and the Ceylon Independent, both of which were 
published by the planting community. The Ceylon Standard was 
started in 1908 by a group of wealthy Sinhalese. Upon its liquidation, 
there arose the Morning Leader which was at first owned by the 
members of the De Soysa family; then by a syndicate of leading 
members of the Karawa community; and finally by one of them, W.A.de 
Silva. With information supplied and policy influenced by Sir Marcus 
Fernando, who was connected by marriage to the De Soysa family, and 
ably edited by Armand de Souza, the Morning Leader soon became very 
influential. In 1913, Ponnambalam Ramanathan, who was seeking 
election to the Educated Ceylonese seat in the Legislative Council 
against Sir Marcus Fernando, founded the Ceylonese. Its first 
editor and manager were both Americans, and its news presentation, 
sales promotion, reporting and methods of publicity were distinctly 
American.
At this stage there appeared on the journalistic scene a man 
who was determined to build for himself a newspaper empire similar 
to those which he had observed in England in the years he had spent 
at Cambridge and at the Inns of Court. D.R.Wijewardene, the eldest 
son of a wealthy Goyigama timber merchant from Sedawatte, a suburban 
hamlet in the Colombo district, perhaps also shared the belief of
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the wealthy Goyigama upper-middle class at that time that a 
controlling share of political power and initiative ought to be 
snatched from their Karawa compatriots before it was too late.
In 1918, Wijewardene bought for a pittance the goodwill and plant 
of the now bankrupt Ceylonese, and in its place launched the 
Ceylon Daily News. In 1923, he purchased the ninety year old 
Ceylon Observer and thus acquired an evening daily. When the 
Ceylon Independent was put in the market, Wijewardene bought it 
and then allowed it to die since to run it successfully would have 
meant creating a rival to the Daily News. With the aid of modem 
technical expertise and a rigorous and aggressive competitiveness, 
Wijewardene soon put the Morning Leader out of business, leaving 
the European-owned Times of Ceylon, an evening newspaper with a 
daily circulation of about 4000 copies, as the only rival.
The earliest Sinhala newspaper was the Lankalokaya, started 
in 1860 and edited by W.P.Ranasinghe. In the same year, the 
Lakrivikirana, and in 1865 the Lakminipahana, both weeklies, 
commenced publication. The Sarasavi Sandarasa which was started 
by the Buddhist Theosophical Society had as its editor, Pandit 
Weragama Bandara who "introduced a fine style, elegant and popular, 
and brought a new spirit into Sinhalese writing". Also in circulation 
at this time were the Sinhala Baudhaya and the Sinhala Jatiya: the 
latter being edited by Piyadasa Sirisena, a well-known publicist of 
his day. H.S.Perera founded the Dinamina which was bought by 
Wijewardene and transformed into the most influential Sinhala daily 
newspaper in the country.
Several Tamil newspapers were published in Jaffna. The first 
attempt at journalism was made in 1841 when the Morning Star, a 
bi-monthly Tamil journal was launched under the editorship of Henry 
Martyn. The Catholic Guardian commenced in 1876. Other newspapers 
published in Jaffna from time to time included the Ceylon Patriot, 
the Jaffna Freeman and the Hindu Organ. In course of time, two 
national newspapers, the Virakesari and the Thinakaran emerged to 
play an important part in the social and political life of the 
Tamils.
CHAPTER II
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS
At Independence, Sri Lanka inherited a substantial body of 
law which provided for human rights. During the next three decades, 
as constitutional bills of rights gained acceptance throughout the 
new Commonwealth, efforts were made in Sri Lanka to build upon this 
inheritance by specifically protecting human rights in the Constitu­
tion. Each Constitution embodied a distinctive approach, different 
in style, technique and content from the standard Westminster- 
Whitehall model devised for inclusion in independence constitutions.
In this chapter, it is proposed to examine Sri Lanka's attempts at 
formulating a bill of rights, and the measure of success that 
attended, or eluded, these attempts.
The 1946 Constitution
The 1946 Constitution  ^did not contain a bill of rights. In
fact, a bill of rights was not demanded by any section of the
comnunity with any degree of seriousness; nor was it contemplated
either by the Royal Commission which recommended the new constitutional
scheme or by the British Government which brought the new Constitution
into force. This apparent unconcern for what was soon to become the
standard technique for prescribing the limits of state authority
so as to ensure that the equally important area of individual rights
and freedoms is not trespassed or encroached upon, was perhaps due
to the fact that, despite the turmoil and turbulence that then
prevailed on several continents both far and near but beyond the
seas, the island of Ceylon had reached the penultimate phase of its
extended constitutional evolution quietly and imperturbably. As a
Colonial Office commentator has observed:
Ceylon was able to approach independence with all the 
machinery of government well designed, smoothly running 
and in full working order. The Ceylon Civil Service
1. This expression refers to the Ceylon Independence Act 1947, 
and the Ceylon (Constitution and Independence) Orders in Council of 
1946 and 1947 respectively.
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had been gradually transformed from a service staffed 
by British people to one staffed by Ceylonese: a 
service with a proud and undiminished record of 
efficiency and integrity, trained to give Ceylon 
Ministers the same kind of able and impartial advice 
and to execute their policy with the same devotion to 
duty as its United Kingdom model and counterpart. The 
financial business of the state was organised under 
well-tried regulations and practices. The Judiciary 
were secured in a position of full independence of 
political or external control, and the rule of law 
firmly established. The Police were recognised and 
respected as the instrument not of the executive 
government of the day but of the law; their function 
not to oppress or coerce the citizen but to protect ^
him in the peaceful pursuit of his lawful occupations.
The preparation of a constitutional scheme on which the 1946
Constitution was to be based was undertaken by the Board of Ministers
of the State Council in June 1943 in response to a Declaration issued
by the British Government in the previous month that "the post-war
re-examination of the reform of Ceylon's constitution, to which His
Majesty's Government stands pledged, will be directed towards the
grant to Ceylon by Order of His Majesty in Council of full responsible
government under the Crown in all matters of internal self- 
2
government". The Declaration added that "such detailed proposals 
as the Ministers may in the meantime have been able to formulate in 
the way of a complete constitutional scheme" will be examined by a
3
suitable commission or conference. When the Ministers were 
preparing their constitutional scheme, the Ceylon National Congress 
submitted to the Board for its consideration a draft constitution 
prepared by one of its joint secretaries, J.A.L.Cooray, which 
embodied a comprehensive bill of rights. It was a justiciable bill 
of rights with procedural remedies for their enforcement. Some of 
the Ministers, including D.S.Senanayake, then Leader of the State 
Council and vice-chairman of the Board, believed that a constitution 
containing comprehensive guarantees of human rights would allay the 
fears of minority conmunities in regard to their position in the new 
political order. The majority of the Ministers, however, decided
1. Sir Charles Jeffries, Ceylon - The Path to Independence, 
(London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), pp.130-131.
2. Declaration by His Majesty's Government, 26 May 1943,
S.P. XVII - 1943, para.l.
3. Ibid., para.7.
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not to include such a bill of rights.^ Several factors probably 
influenced their decision:
1. The 1943 Declaration had indicated quite clearly that 
the acceptance by the British Government of any constitutional 
scheme submitted by the Ministers would depend, firstly, upon
full compliance with certain conditions set out in that Declaration, 
and secondly, upon the subsequent approval of the scheme by three- 
quarters of all members of the State Council. The conditions set 
out related, in the main, to certain reserved subjects and powers; 
they did not require the inclusion of a bill of rights.
2. The State Council elected in 1936, to which was to be 
submitted the Minister’s scheme, consisted of the following:
TABLE 8
COMMUNAL DISTRIBUTION IN THE STATE COUNCIL, 1936
Low Country Sinhalese ... 31
Kandyan Sinhalese ... 8
Ceylon Tamils ... 8
Indian Tamils ... 3 +
Europeans ... 5 +
Muslims ... 2 +
Burghers ... 1 +
+ includes nominated members.
To secure an affirmative vote of 44 (three-quarters of all the
members), the total Sinhalese membership would have had to be
supplemented by some at least of those who belonged to the minority
communities. This, as the Ministers observed at that time, was
"a difficult condition", although it was believed that the State
Council possessed "the larger patriotism that transcends sectional 
2
differences". In consideration of their support for a scheme 
prepared by the Ministers, the minorities could have insisted on 
the inclusion of a bill of rights. This they did not do.
Instead, pre-occupied as they were with the fear of being swamped 
by majority rule, the minorities appeared to be satisfied with
1. J.A.L.Cooray, Constitutional and Administrative Law of Sri 
Lanka (Colombo: Hansa Publishers Ltd, 1973), p.508.
2. Statement by the Ministers on the Reforms Declaration by His 
Majesty's Government, 8 June 1943, S.P. XVII-1943, para.2.
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checks on the exercise of legislative power which would ensure the 
integrity, not of the individual, but of the community.
3. There was no public participation in the preparation of 
the Ministers' constitutional scheme; nor was the scheme expected
to be submitted to the people at a referendum. The only requirement 
was that it should be acceptable to three-quarters of the members 
of the State Council which included a substantial minority group. 
Neither within the Board, nor in the State Council at that time, 
was there an embryonic political opposition whose views would have 
had to be accommodated. The Ministers were drafting a scheme under 
which they themselves would be called upon to assume responsibility 
for full self-government. The only limitations which they need 
impose upon their share of political power would be those concessions 
required to be made in exchange for the support of the minority 
communities in the State Council.
4. The Ministers' scheme was prepared by Sir Ivor Jennings
who, at that time, was Principal of the Ceylon University College.
From the day on which the 1943 Declaration was issued by the British
Government, Sir Ivor functioned as honorary constitutional adviser
to the Board of Ministers, and in that capacity wielded considerable
influence on the course of events leading to Dominion Status.^- On
one question, at least, he had quite definite views; as he himself
wrote some years later:
In Britain we have no Bill of Rights; we merely have 
liberty according to law, and we think - truly, I 
believe - that we do the job better than any country 
which has a Bill of Rights or a Declaration of the 
Rights of Man. 2
It would appear that in later years Sir Ivor had occasion to change
3
his views on this subject, at least with reference to Ceylon.
But at the material time there is no doubt that the Ministers' 
thinking was conditioned greatly by the views which Sir Ivor Jennings 
then held.
5. The 1946 Constitution was drafted before the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed a common standard of 
achievement; indeed, even before the United Nations was constituted.
1. Ivor Jennings, The Constitution of Ceylon, 2nd ed. (Bombay: 
Indian Branch, OUP, 1951), Preface.
2. Id., Approach to Self-Government (OUP, 1958), p.20.
3. According to Cooray, Constitutional Law, p.509, Jennings 
admitted, in a talk over the BBC in 1961, that a comprehensive
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None of the constitutional documents that had led to responsible 
government and eventual Dominion Status in Canada, New Zealand, 
Australia or South Africa contained a bill of rights. In the then 
far flung British Empire, only the 1875 Constitution of the Kingdom 
of Tonga contained a declaration of rights: a unique phenomenon 
which may perhaps be attributed to the influence of Christian 
missionaries upon a very receptive local ruler.'*' Therefore, it is 
safe to assume that when in the early 1940s the Colonial Office 
set out to transform the constitutional structure of its "model 
tropical dependency" into that of a Dominion (and thus pave the 
way for the emergence of the New Commonwealth), it did not have 
before it, as it has had since the 1960s, a model constitution in 
which a bill of rights formed an integral and essential component.
The Minister's Scheme 
The constitutional scheme prepared by the Board of Ministers 
contemplated the following limitation on legislative power:
7. Parliament may make laws for the peace, order and
good government of Ceylon.
8. In the exercise of its power under Article 7
Parliament shall not make any law -
(a) to prohibit or restrict the free exercise of 
any religion; or
(b) to make persons of any community or religion 
liable to disabilities or restrictions to which 
persons of other comnunities or religions are 
not made liable; or
(c) to confer on persons of any community or 
religion any privileges or advantages which 
are not conferred on persons of other 
communities or religions; or
(d) to alter the constitution of any religious body 
except with the approval of the governing 
authority of that religious body. 3
chapter on fundamental rights was very desirable in Ceylon's Const­
itution, particularly in the heterogeneous society of Ceylon. After 
admitting that the constitution he helped to draft had had only a 
limited success, Sir Ivor had added: "If I knew then as much about 
the problems of Ceylon as I do now, some of the provisions would 
have been different".
1. Professor Read states that King George Tupou I was prevailed 
upon by the Consul-General for Hawaii to include a bill of rights in 
the constitution based upon the Declaration of Rights of Hawaii of
7 June 1839. See James S. Re ad, "Bills of Rights in the Third World: 
Some Commonwealth Experiences", (1973) VRU, 21.
2. This expression was used in the Donoughmore Report.
3. S.P. XIV-1944. Also reproduced in Appendix I, Soulbury Report.
46
In an explanatory memorandum, the Ministers stated that:
Article 8 is a general protection to minorities, whether 
racial, social or religious. This being a restriction on 
legislative power, it would be for the courts to say 
whether the Article was infringed, and they could declare 
an Act of the Ceylon Parliament to be invalid if it 
contravened the Article. It is based on a provision in 
the Constitution of Northern Ireland. 1
Therefore, the only fundamental rights which the Ministers
intended that the Constitution should protect, and prevent
Parliament from interfering with, were: (1) the freedom of
religion, and (2) the freedom of communities and groups from
discrimination.
The Soulbury Report
In July 1944, the British Government appointed a commission
headed by Lord Soulbury, a former Conservative Cabinet Minister
in the United Kingdom, not only to examine the constitutional
scheme prepared by the Ministers, but also to "provide full
opportunity for consultation to take place with various interests
including minority communities concerned with the subject of
constitutional reform and with:, proposals which Ministers have 
2
formulated". After a stay of nearly three and a half months in 
Ceylon, during which evidence was recorded at public sessions and 
information was gathered at private discussions, the commission 
submitted its report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
who presented it to the United Kingdom Parliament in September 
1945. In its report the commission agreed, inter alia, that 
the legislative power of Parliament should be limited in the 
manner proposed by the Ministers. The commission did not make 
any other reconnendations on this subject; nor did it propose the 
inclusion of a bill of rights. A White Paper embodying the 
decisions of the British Government was published on 31 October
3
1945, and the proposals contained therein were accepted by the 
State Council by 51 votes to 3; only two Indian Tamils and one
4
Sinhalese voting against it.
1. Ibid.
2. Statement made by the Secretary of State in the House of 
Cannons on 5 July 1944, Reform of the Constitution: Further Corres­
pondence , S.P. XII-1944, p.3.
3. Ceylon: Statement of Policy on Constitutional Reform (1945; 
Gnd 6690).
4. Jennings, Constitution, pp. 11-12.
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The Protected Rights 
The Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council 1946, which was 
made on 15 May 1946 to give effect to the recommendations of the 
Soulbury Commission, sought to protect only the following elements 
of some of the fundamental rights:
1. The right to periodic elections (Sections 11 and 15)
2. The right to protection against legislative action which seeks
to prohibit or restrict the free exercise of religion (Section 
29(2)(a))
3. The right to protection against legislative action which seeks
to discriminate against a community or religion (Section 29
(2)(b) and (c))
4. The right to a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
(Sections 52, 53, 54, 55 and 56), and
5. The right of access, on general terms of equality, to the public 
service (Sections 58, 59, 60, 61 and 62).
These sections could be amended or repealed only with a special
majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of members
of the House of Representatives. A proposal contained in the
constitutional scheme prepared by the Ministers that any such
amendment or repeal should be by express words to that effect, did
not find a place in the Constitution.'*'
The 1946 Constitution has been described as having "had
entrenched in it all the protective provisions for minorities that
2
the wit of man could devise". Section 29 was undoubtedly the most 
important provision in this respect. Its relevant portions read 
as follows:
(2) No such law shall -
(a) prohibit or restrict the free exercise of any 
religion; or
(b) make persons of any community or religion liable 
to disabilities or restrictions to which persons 
of other communities or religions are not made 
liable; or
(c) confer on persons of any community or religion 
any privilege or advantage which is not 
conferred on persons of other communities or 
religions; or
1. S.P. XIV-1944, s.10.
2. Jeffries, Independence, p.115.
48
(d) alter the constitution of any religious body 
except with the consent of the governing 
authority of that body, so, howeverthat:in 
any case where a religious body is incorpor­
ated by law, no such alteration shall be made 
except at the request of the governing auth­
ority of that body.
(3) Any law made in contravention of subsection (2) of 
this section shall, to the extent of such contra­
vention, be void.
The application of this provision is examined in a later chapter.^
It would perhaps suffice at this stage to note the following:
1. Only the law-making process was sought to be regulated. Neither 
executive or administrative action, nor the acts of private 
individuals, fell within its control.
2. The protection offered was only against discriminatory treatment 
in respect of "privileges", "advantages", "disabilities" and 
"restrictions". The violation of human rights generally, 
whether of an individual or of a group, whether separately
or in community with others, and conduct outside the scope 
of the four enumerated concepts, did not fall within its 
control.
3. The expression "community" was not defined. Was it intended 
to mean only ethnic groups, or did it also contemplate 
divisions based on language and caste ?
4. The expression "free exercise" was a vague and indeterminate 
concept. Was the right intended to be absolute or could a 
court whittle it down in the interests of orderly government ?
Despite its limited scope, however, section 29 did represent an 
embryonic form of an enforceable bill of rights.
The right to periodic elections was contained in those 
provisions which limited the duration of each elected House of 
Representatives to a period of five years, and required the 
Governor-General, upon making a proclamation dissolving Parliament, 
to summon a new Parliament on a date not later than four months. 
Although no remedy was provided for the enforcement of this right, 
it would have been possible for the validity of a purported 
legislative act made by a Parliament which had outlived its term 
of office or by an authority other than a duly elected Parliament,
1. Infra, Chap.V.
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to be challenged in court. Thereby, any attempt to frustrate these 
provisions could effectively have been thwarted.
The right to a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
was secured by providing that judges of the Supreme Court will be 
appointed by the Governor-General; they may hold office until the 
prescribed age of retirement and will not be removable except on 
an address of both Houses of Parliament; their salaries which may 
not be diminished will be charged on the Consolidated Fund; and 
that the appointment, transfer, dismissal and disciplinary control 
of other judicial officers will be the sole and exclusive respon­
sibility of an independent Judicial Service Commission.
Similarly, the right of access, on general terms of equality, 
to the public service was secured by vesting the appointment, 
transfer, dismissal and disciplinary control of public officers in 
a Public Service Commission which was insulated from political 
influence. It must be noted in this connection that the Constitution 
did not claim to guarantee fundamental rights. It was merely 
seeking to provide certain "safeguards" in order to remove the 
fear which existed in the minds of the Tamil minority of "domination 
and oppression" by a "permanent and unassailable majority".^
The approach adopted by the Soulbury Commission may be 
contrasted with the recommendations made by the Willink Commission 
appointed in 1957 to ascertain the facts about the fears of 
minorities in Nigeria and to propose means of allaying those fears 
whether well or ill founded. That country, too, was on the eve of 
Independence. Almost all the witnesses who came before that 
commission were insistent that nothing but a separate state could 
meet their problems; only the Christian bodies asked for provision 
in the constitution guaranteeing fundamental rights. The commission, 
however, unanimously recommended a bill of rights:
Provisions of this kind in the Constitution are difficult 
to enforce and sometimes difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, 
we think they should be inserted. Their"presence defines 
beliefs widespread among democratic countries and provides 
a standard to which appeal may be made by those whose 
rights are infringed. A Government determined to abandon 
democratic courses will find ways of violating them but 
they are of great value in preventing a steady deterioration
1. Soulbury Report, paras 137, 177.
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in standards of freedom and the unobtrusive encroach­
ment of a Government in individual rights.
The Nigerian bill of rights was modelled on the European Convention
on Human Rights and was itself to serve as the model for the New
Commonwealth in the next two decades.
The Constitution in Operation 
The Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council 1946 was brought 
into operation progressively: Parts I, IV and IX on 17 May 1946; 
Part III on 5 July 1947; Parts II, V, VI and VII on 1 September 
1947; and Part VIII on 14 October 1947, which was the date of the 
first meeting of the new House of Representatives. At a general 
election which was spread over a month, 55.9 per cent of the 
electorate had polled to produce the following result:
TABLE 9
THE 1947 GENERAL ELECTION RESULT
Party Seatswon
Votes
polled
Percentage
polled
United National Party 42 751,432 39.8
Lanka Sama Samaj Party 10 204,020 10.8
All-Ceylon Tamil Congress 7 82,499 4.4
Ceylon Indian Congress 6 72,230 3.8
Bolshevik Leninist Party 5 113,193 6.0
Communist Party 3 70,331 3.7
Labour Party 1 38,932 2.1
Independents 21 549,381 29.1
Source: Based upon Dept, of Elections, Results of Parliamentary 
General Elections in Ceylon, 1947-1970 (Colombo: Dept, of Govt. 
Printing, 1971).
D.S.Senanayake, as the leader of the largest party, was invited to 
form a government. His Cabinet consisted of eleven members of the 
UNP; two Independents, both of whom were Tamils; and the member of the 
Labour Party. The votes of six members nominated to represent 
"important interests" which were either "not represented" or were
1. Nigeria: Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into 
the fears of Minorities and the means of allaying them (1958;Cmnd 
505), pp.97-103.
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"inadequately represented",^ together with those of several 
Independents, assured the Government of a comfortable majority 
in the House.
With the establishment of a Government, events moved swiftly 
towards Dominion Status. On 11 November 1947, three Agreements 
were signed in Colombo by the Governor on behalf of the United 
Kingdom and by the Prime Minister on behalf of Ceylon. They were:
1. A Defence Agreement to regulate the relations between the two 
countries in respect of defence
2. An External Affairs .Agreement similarly regulating relations in 
respect of external affairs
3. A Public Officers Agreement transferring to the Government of 
Ceylon the responsibilities in respect of officers in the public 
service appointed with the consent of the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies.
Two days later, the Ceylon Independence Bill was introduced in the
British Parliament, and after its passage through both Houses,
received the Royal assent on 10 December 1947. On 19 December, the
Ceylon (Independence) Order in Council was passed. The Agreements,
the Independence Act and the Independence Order in Council all came
into force on the "appointed day", 4 February 1948. On this day,
the first non-European colony achieved independence. As Lord
Soulbury remarked in the House of Lords:
This is a historic occasion. It is a landmark in the 
development of the evolution of the British Empire, and 
it brings another step nearer what I believe to be the 
ultimate aim of British statesmanship - the fusion of 
Empire and Commonwealth. 2
As with the older Dominions, Independence did not bring with it a
new constitution; it was simply a matter of brushing aside the
vestiges of colonial dependence. Therefore, for a bill of rights
to find its way into the Ceylon Constitution, there was required
both the prescribed majority and the desire to invoke it. During
the life of the first Parliament, the Government possessed neither.
Before the life of the first Parliament ended, several
significant events, some of which were ominous, took place. With
the enactment of a citizenship law, the Indian Tamil community was
1. 1946 Constitution, s.11(2).
2. Quoted in Jeffries, Independence, p.126.
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virtually disfranchised.-^ The elitist leadership of the Tamil
Congress abandoned the demand for "balanced representation" and
crossed the floor to join the Government, while those of the
party who remained in the Opposition formed the Federal Party
with regional autonomy as its objective. Disillusioned with the
conservative economic and social policies of the Government, the
Leader of the House, S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike, resigned and formed
the Sri Lanka Freedom Party to provide "a democratic alternative
to the party in power" and to afford "the people who, while being
dissatisfied with the policies and programmes of the Government,
wished to make a change that was neither revolutionary nor
2
extreme, the opportunity of doing so". Finally, in February 
1952, the rugged but wily farmer who, as Prime Minister, had 
donned English morning dress to unfurl Ceylon's national flag on 
Independence Day, fell off his horse and died. The Governor- 
General, Lord Soulbury, interrupted a holiday in England to rush 
back to his office, and then stunned both Cabinet and Country by 
choosing the late Prime Minister's son, Dudley Senanayake, the 
youngest member of the Cabinet, to head the Government. The new 
Prime Minister immediately dissolved Parliament.
At the second general election, held in May 1952, 70.7 per 
cent of the electorate polled to produce the following result:
TABLE 10
THE 1952 GENERAL ELECTION RESULT
Party Seatswon
Votes
polled
Percentage
polled
United National Party 54 1,026,005 44.8
Sri Lanka Freedom Party 9 361,250 15.5
Lanka Sama Samaj Party 9 305,133 13.1
Communist Party 4 ’ 134,528 5.8
All-Ceylon Tamil Congress 4 64,512 2.8
Federal Party 2 45,331 1.9
Labour Party 1 27,096 1.2
Independents 12 326,783 14.0
Source: Ibid.
1. Infra, p. 279.
2. S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike, Speeches and Writings (Colombo: Govt. 
Press, 1963), p.141.
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Together with the six nominated members and its allies in the 
Labour Party, the Tamil Congress and among the Independents, the 
Government of Dudley Senanayake commanded a two-third's majority 
in the House. But the rubber boom which followed the outbreak of 
the Korean war and almost coincided with Independence was beginning 
to subside. It was time not for constitutional reform, but for 
economic strategy. A reduction of the government subsidy on rice 
led to a "hartal" or a general stoppage of work; during a state of 
emergency which was declared to deal with widespread destruction 
of public property, several people died at the hands of the 
authorities.^ Two months later, in October 1953, Dudley Senanayake, 
by then a sick man, resigned his office, quit politics, and left 
the island. He was succeeded by Sir John Kotelawela, the Cabinet's 
most senior member and a colonel in the volunteer force. Fiercely 
pro-west at a time when resurgent Asia was seeking to establish 
its own identity, Kotelawela brought back to Ceylonese society 
more than a touch of the ancien regime. Leaving aside domestic 
affairs, he concentrated on international politics. Having hosted 
a conference of Asian Prime Ministers, he next attended the Bandung 
Conference where, according to "The Economist", he "catapulted 
himself into American hearts". He then set out on a global tour 
of friendly capitals and returned home as Ceylon's most decorated 
personality.
In December 1955, Ceylon secured admission into the United 
Nations. By subscribing to the UN Charter, Ceylon re-affirmed its 
"faith in fundamental human rights" and pledged itself to take 
action in order to promote "universal respect for, and observance 
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language or religion". The minimum standards of 
human rights had already been set out in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. This subject, however, did not receive any 
further attention from the Government. Instead, in February 1956, 
against a background of escalating tension between the Sinhalese 
and the Tamils on the question of an official language, Sir John 
advised the Governor-General to dissolve Parliament, fifteen months 
before it was due.
1. Infra, p.449.
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The general election of April 1956 was a watershed in the life 
of the country. It was a confrontation between the forces of 
nationalism and the westernised elite who had secured and enjoyed 
Independence; between the common man and the establishment; 
between the many who had stood in the shadows for too long and the 
few who had stalked the corridors of power and influence for several 
decades. To face this election, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party led by 
S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike had formed a coalition, the Mahajana Eksath 
Peramuna (People’s United Front), with two small but equally 
nationalistic groups, the Viplavakari Lanka Sama Samaj Party led by 
Philip Gunewardene and the Bhasha Peramuna (Language Front) led by 
W. Dahanayake, and entered into no-contest pacts with the Lanka Sama 
Samaj Party and the Communist Party. To secure the victory of 
their sixty candidates, in the weeks preceding the election, in the 
thousands of little villages in and around Ceylon, ten thousand 
Buddhist monks, ayurvedic physicians and village schoolmasters 
trekked from house to house. In three days of polling, 69 per cent 
of the electorate completely changed the face of Ceylon politics:
TABLE 11
THE 1956 GENERAL ELECTION RESULT
Party Seatswon
Votes
polled
Percentage
polled
Mahajana Eksath Peramuna 51 1,045,725 39.7
Lanka Sama Samaj Party 14 274,204 10.5
Federal Party 10 142,036 5.4
United National Party 8 718,164 27.4
Communist Party 3 119,715 4.6
All-Ceylon Tamil Congress 1 8,914 0.3
Independents 8 289,491 11.1
Source: Ibid.
Having secured an absolute majority of the elected members, Banda- 
ranaike found no need to invite representatives of the two Marxist 
parties, with whom he had entered into an electoral arrangement, to 
join his Cabinet. Consequently, the LSSP occupied the front benches 
of the Opposition and the Government had to be content with its 
absolute majority.
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Moves to Amend the Constitution 
The first step towards the amendment of the 1946 Constitution 
for the purpose, inter alia, of incorporating a bill of rights, was 
taken one year after the assumption of office of the new government. 
On 26 April 1957, the Prime Minister moved in the House of Repres­
entatives :
That it is expedient that a Joint Select Committee of 
the Senate and the House of Representatives should be 
appointed to consider the revision of the Ceylon 
(Constitution and Independence) Orders in Council 1946 
and 1947, and other written law, with reference to the 
following among such other matters as the Committee 
may consider necessary -
(1) the establishment of a Republic;
(2) the guaranteeing of fundamental rights;
(3) the position of the Senate and Appointed Members 
of the House of Representatives; and
(4) the Public Service Commission and the Judicial
Service Commission. 1
The motion having been agreed to, on 7 January 1958 the Senate
concurred. On 18 February 1958, by resolution of both Houses, the
following were appointed to serve on the Joint Select Committee:
S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike (SLFP/MEP)
Stanley de Zoysa (SLFP/MEP)
D.P.R.Gunewardene (VLSSP/MEP)
T.B.Illangaratne (SLFP/MEP)
M.D.Banda (UNP)
S.J.V.Chelvanayakam, Q.C. (FP)
Colvin R. de Silva (LSSP)
M.S.Kariapper (Ind.)
P.B.G.Keuneman (CP)
N.M.Perera (LSSP)
R.S.V.Poulier (Nominated MP)
Senator M.W.H.de Silva, Q.C. (SLFP/MEP)
Senator A.P.Jayasuriya (SLFP/MEP)
Senator E.B.Wikramanayake, Q.C. (UNP)
Senator C.Wijesinghe (SLFP/MEP)
Senator S.Nadesan, Q.C. (Ind.)
Senator E.J.Cooray (UNP)
Senator N.U.Jayawardene (Ind.)
Represented on this Joint Select Committee were all the political 
parties in Parliament; the four major communities (and within the 
Sinhalese community, the four major caste groups and the two 
divisions of Kandyan and Low-country Sinhalese); and the four 
major religious groups (including the different Christian denomi­
nations). Of its eighteen members, only seven belonged to the 
ruling party and only six to the dominant Sinhalese-Buddhist-
1. First Report of the Joint Select Committee of the Senate and
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Goyigama group. It was clear, therefore, that in this exercise 
in constitutional revision, what was intended was not that the 
pre-conceived views of any particular political party or interest 
group should prevail, but that a general consensus should be 
achieved: a fact which would have more than compensated for the 
Government's lack of a two-third majority in Parliament.
Before Parliament was prorogued, the Joint Select Committee 
was able to meet thrice in March and April of that year, and to 
cause a questionnaire to be published in the national newspapers 
seeking the views of the public on, inter alia, -
1. What are the "fundamental rights" which you would 
like to see guaranteed in the revised Constitution ?
2. What procedure do you suggest for dealing with any 
infringement of such rights ? In particular, what 
safeguards do you suggest in respect of legislation 
which is alleged to contravene the provisions of 
the Constitution ?
Thereafter, on the six occasions on which it was able to meet before
Parliament was again prorogued, the Committee considered in the main
matteis^relating to the delimitation of electoral districts. Among
them was a matter which had a direct bearing on the requirement of
"universal and equal suffrage". The Constitution provided that for
every 75,000 persons resident in a province, a Delimitation Comnission
shall allot one electoral district to that province. In 1946, almost
everyone resident in Ceylon was entitled to vote upon attaining the
age of 21 years. In 1948, Parliament changed this position
substantially. A large proportion of the resident population was
excluded from the electoral process as they could not satisfy the
stringent requirements of Ceylon citizenship.'*' In 1958, there
were approximately 1,147,500 residents (out of a total resident
population of 9,361,300) who were not citizens. Consequently,
while certain electorates had as many as 70,903 voters (Kelaniya)
and 68,115 (Balangoda), certain others, particularly in the central
highlands, had as little as 9,484 (Kotagala) and 4,470 (Talawakele).
In other words, one voter in Talawakele had the same electoral
power as 14 voters in Kelaniya. The Committee recommended that this
distortion be rectified by amending the Constitution to provide that
the number of persons to be taken into account in the demarcation
the House of Representatives appointed to consider the Revision of 
the Constitution, Parliamentary Series, No.15 of the Third Parliament. 
1. Infra, p.279.
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of an electoral district should be only those residents who are 
citizens. This was a unanimous recommendation.
On 6 February 1959, the Joint Select Committee agreed, inter 
alia, that appeals to the Privy Council should be discontinued and 
a new judicial tribunal should be set up to adjudicate on consti­
tutional issues as well as to entertain appeals from the Supreme 
Court.^ On 5 March 1959, according to the minutes of the committee's 
proceedings,
The following rights were generally approved of for
inclusion in the Constitution, to be considered further
in detail in the form of draft legislation:-
(a) Political Rights -
i) Equality before the law (cf. Articles 14 and 15 
of the Indian Constitution). 
ii) Protection of life and personal liberty, of which 
no person shall be deprived except according 
to procedure established by law (cf. Article 21 
of the Indian Constitution).
iii) Right to freedom of speech and expression (cf.
Article 19 of the Indian Constitution). 
iv) Right to assemble peaceably and without arms 
(cf. Article 19 of the Indian Constitution).
v) Right to form associations or unions (cf. Article 
19 of the Indian Constitution).
The Rights (ii) to (v) are to be exercised subject to 
any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the 
public interest.
(b) Economic Rights -
i) Equality of opportunity in matters of public 
employment.
ii) The right to acquire, own and dispose of
property according to law and the right not to
be dispossessed of property save by authority 
of law (cf. Article 31 of the Indian Constitution),
iii) The Right to reside and carry on any lawful
occupation, trade or profession in any part of 
the territory of Ceylon (cf. Article 19 of the 
Indian Constitution).
(c) Right to freedom of religion -
i) Freedom of conscience and worship and the free 
profession and practice of religion,
ii) Freedom to manage religious affairs.
(d) Cultural and Educational rights of minorities -
i) Right of any section of the citizens of Ceylon 
having a distinct language, script or culture of 
its own to conserve and develop the same.
1. Supra.
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ii) Right of any section of the citizens of Ceylon 
to establish and administer educational 
institutions provided: (1) such institutions 
conform to the educational requirements of 
that State, and (2) such institutions do not 
have the right to claim assistance from the 
State except as provided by law.
iii) The State shall not in granting aid to
educational institutions discriminate against 
any educational institution on the ground 
that it is under the management of a minority, 
whether religious or linguistic.
(e) Right to enforce Fundamental Rights -
The right to move the highest tribunal by appropriate 
proceedings for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights 
and to obtain suitable redress, for which purpose 
such tribunal shall be vested with the power to issue 
the necessary directions or orders or writs requisite 
for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
The Committee agreed that for purposes of Fundamental 
Rights the expression "State" shall be defined to include 
the Government and Parliament of Ceylon and all local 
and other authorities in Ceylon. 1
The committee were also "generally of the view that it would be
useful at this stage of their proceedings to obtain the services
of officers possessing the necessary knowledge of constitutional
law and practice to prepare detailed material necessary in the
future deliberations". In this connection, Prime Minister
Bandaranaike had preliminary discussions with Justice T.S.Fernando
a former Attorney-General who was an active member of the Geneva-
based International Commission of Jurists, and J.A.L.Cooray,
lecturer in constitutional law at the Ceylon Law College who in
1943 had prepared a comprehensive bill of rights for the Ceylon 
2
National Congress.
In April 1959, Bandaranaike was faced with a Cabinet crisis 
a confrontation between the right and left wings of his Cabinet, 
which he attempted to resolve by re-shuffling the subjects and 
functions allocated to the Ministers. This led to the resignation 
from the Cabinet in May 1959 of his left-wing Ministers, including 
two members of the Joint Select Committee, D.P.R.Gunewardene and 
M.W.H.de Silva, Q.C., the Minister of Justice and vice-chairman
1. Supra.
2. Interview with J.A.L.Cooray, September 1981.
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of the comnittee. In June 1959, he re-constituted his government
and reiterated the basic policies of his party thus:
Politically, we are democratic as we believe that the 
democratic way of life is the most suitable for human 
progress. Economically, we believe in the socialist 
approach, as we are of the opinion that it is only in 
this way that justice can be done to the mass of the 
people. A third factor in our policy is our belief 
that cultural and religious views must be preserved 
and fostered. It will thus be seen that we are 
opposed to both communism and fascism, to capitalism 
and materialism. Our party stands against any attempt^ 
to impose any of these on the people of this country.
But the Government had lost its vitality; its spiritual base had
become questionable; and Bandaranaike himself was very much a
prisoner of the right-wing. On 25 September 1959, the Prime Minister
was assassinated at the hands of a Buddhist monk in a conspiracy
in which several prominent right-wingers of his party were later
found to have been implicated. He was succeeded by W.Dahanayake
who had led the right-wing revolt six months previously. A series
of bizarre events, including the dismissal of ten Cabinet Ministers
and the survival of the Government on a no-confidence vote through
the single vote of an appointed MP, culminated in the dissolution
of Parliament barely two months later. The first reformist
government of Ceylon had survived for only three and a half years.
At the general election held in March 1960, Dahanayake led his 
newly formed Lanka Prajathanthrawadi Pakshaya (Ceylon Democratic 
Party), while former Cabinet colleagues D.P.R.Gunewardene and 
C.P.de Silva led the MEP and the SLFP respectively. Four former 
members of Bandaranaike's parliamentary group, I.M.R.A.Iriyagolle, 
K.M.P.Rajaratne, S.D.Bandaranaike and T.B.Subasinghe, led four 
other new parties, the Samajawadi Mahajana Peramuna (Socialist 
People's Front), Jathika Vimukti Peramuna (National Liberation 
Front), Bosath Bandaranaike Peramuna (Bodhisattva S.W.R.D.Banda­
ranaike Front), and the Sri Lanka Jatika Peramuna (Sri Lanka 
National Front). At a free-for-all, but extraordinarily peaceful, 
election at which Prime Minister Dahanayake lost his own seat in 
a constituency which he had represented for over a decade, 77.6 
per cent of the electorate polled to produce an indecisive result:
1. Bandaranaike, Speeches, 179.
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TABLE 12
THE 1960 (MARCH) GENERAL ELECTION RESULT
Party Seatswon
Votes
polled
Percentage
polled
United National Party 50 908,996 29.6
Sri Lanka Freedom Party 46 648,094 21.1
Federal Party 15 176,492 5.7
Mahajana Eksath Peramuna 10 325,832 10.6
Lanka Sama Samaj Party 10 322,352 10.5
Lanka Prajathanthrawadi 
Pakshaya 4 125,344 4.1
Comnunist Party 3 141,857 4.6
Jatika Vimukti Peramuna a 2 11,201 0.4
All-Ceylon Tamil Congress 1 38,275 1.2
Samajawadi Mahajana Peramuna 1 24,143 0.8
Sri Lanka Jatika Peramuna 1 11,115 0.4
Bosath Bandaranaike Peramuna 1 9,749 0.3
Independents 7 270,881 8.8
Source: Ibid.
a. One member was returned uncontested.
The Governor-General invited Dudley Senanayake, who had returned to 
politics and assumed the leadership of the UNP in the previous year, 
to form a government. His minority government, which held barely a 
third of the seats in _aJ57-member House of Representatives, opened 
Parliament with a Throne Speech which promised, inter alia, that 
"early steps for the revision of the Constitution for the purpose 
of establishing a Republic of Ceylon within the Conmonwealth and for 
providing a guarantee of fundamental rights to the minorities" would 
be taken.^ The Government was defeated on the Address of Thanks. 
Senanayake advised a dissolution and Ceylon prepared to poll a 
second time in one year.
For the general election scheduled for July 1960, the Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party was led by Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the 
assassinated Prime Minister's 41-year old widow. Though lacking 
any real political experience, she had reluctantly agreed to provide 
a symbolic, and undoubtedly charismatic, leadership to a fragmented
1. Throne Speech of 6 April 1960, Ceylon Today, Vol.IX, No.4, p.l.
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party in the hope of restoring the credibility which it enjoyed in 
the heady days of Bandaranaike's administration. She immediately 
entered into no-contest pacts with the Lanka Sama Samaj Party and 
the Communist Party. Consequently, faced with two clear alternatives, 
75.6 per cent of the electorate polled to produce a decisive result:
TABLE 13
THE 1960 (JULY) GENERAL ELECTION RESULT
Party Seats Votes Percentagewon polled polled
Sri Lanka Freedom Party 75 1,022,154 33.6
United National Party 30 1,143,290 37.6
Federal Party 16 218,753 7.2
Lanka Sama Samaj Party 12 223,993 7.4
Communist Party 4 90,219 3.0
Mahajana Eksath Peramuna 3 102,833 3.4
Lanka Prajathanthrawadi Peramuna 2 29,190 1.0
Jatika Vimukti Peramuna 2 14,030 0.5
All-Ceylon Tamil Congress 1 46,803 1.5
Independents 6 140,522 4.6
Source: Ibid.
Mrs.Bandaranaike, though not a member of Parliament herself, was 
invited to form a government. Upon her acceptance and appointment, 
a vacancy was created in the Senate to enable her to be nominated 
to the Upper House. Assured of an absolute, though tenuous, majority 
in the House of Representatives, Mrs.Bandaranaike formed an 
exclusively SLFP Government in the knowledge, no doubt, that for 
the radical programme of change in the social, cultural and economic 
spheres to which her Government was committed, the support of the 
left-wing parties would be forthcoming.
Mrs.Bandaranaike's Government did not show any immediate 
inclination to resume the task of constitutional revision which had 
been interrupted by the assassination of Bandaranaike in the previous 
year. A willingness to consider an amendment to the Constitution 
to make Ceylon a Republic, if Parliament so desired it, was expressed
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in 1961, but was not followed up.^ Mrs.Bandaranaike had asked for 
and obtained a mandate to continue her husband's programme of work, 
and perhaps believed that the economic restructuring of society 
should receive priority over everything else. It was this belief 
and the conviction that the Government was proceeding in the wrong 
direction that led to the abortive coup d'etat in January 1962 by 
right-wing elements in the higher rungs of the armed services, 
police and the civil service. They had planned to arrest the Prime 
Minister, the Minister of Finance Felix Dias Bandaranaike (who was 
her Parliamentary Secretary and spokesman in the House of Represent­
atives), left-wing leaders and trade unionists and certain senior 
civil servants, dissolve Parliament, suspend the Constitution, and 
establish a government with the Governor-General at its head. It
was claimed by the alleged conspirators that UNP leader Dudley
2
Senanayake was aware of the plan. The resulting state of emergency 
was hardly propitious for the discussion of a draft bill of rights.
Meanwhile, relations between the two major communities as well 
as the economic situation deteriorated, and the Finance Minister 
resigned when his proposal to cut the rice ration was rejected by 
Parliament, In August 1963, the three left-wing parties led by 
veteran Marxists, N.M.Perera, D.P.R.Gunewardene and S.A.Wickrema- 
singhe, combined to form the United Left Front with a 21-point 
programme. This unity, however, was shortlived and the new Front 
disintegrated when, in April 1964, the LSSP coalesced with the SLFP 
and three of its members joined the Cabinet on a 14-point programne 
agreed to between the two parties. One of the points on the 
programme related to the establishment of a Press Council, a 
proposal which enabled the Opposition to re-group its diverse 
forces for attack. In December 1964, fourteen right-wing members 
of the government parliamentary group, including the Leader of the 
House C.P.de Silva, crossed the floor and voted with the Opposition 
on this issue, thus bringing down the Government by one vote. Two 
weeks later, Parliament was dissolved, eight months before it was 
due.
1. Throne Speech of 13 July 1961, Ceylon Today, Vol.X, No.8, p.l.
2. Coup d'etat: Statement read on behalf of the Government by 
Felix R.Dias Bandaranaike, Parliamentary Secretary for Defence and 
External Affairs, in the House of Representatives on 13 February 1962 
(Colombo: Govt. Press, 1962).
63
The alignment of forces at the general election held in March 
1965 followed the usual pattern, except that those right-wing 
members of the SLFP who defected had formed their own party, the 
Sri Lanka Freedom Socialist Party. At a poll at which 82.1 per cent 
of the electorate voted, the result was as follows:
TABLE 14
THE 1965 GENERAL ELECTION RESULT
Party Seatswon
Votes
polled
Percentage
polled
United National Party 66 1,579,181 38.9
Sri Lanka Freedom Party a 41 1,226,833 30.2
Federal Party 14 217,986 5.4
Lanka Sama Samaj Party 10 302,095 7.4
Sri Lanka Freedom Socialist 
Party 5 129,986 3.2
Communist Party 4 109,744 2.7
All-Ceylon Tamil Congress 3 98,726 2.4
Mahajana Eksath Peramuna 1 110,388 2.7
Jatika Vimukti Peramuna 1 18,791 0.5
Independents 6 237,805 5.9
Source: Ibid
a. The SLFP, LSSP and CP campaigned together on the basis of a 
no-contest electoral agreement.
Dudley Senanayake, the leader of the UNP, formed a "national 
government" which comprised representatives of the SLFSP, MEP, JVP, 
as well as the two Tamil communal parties, the FP and the TC. 
Together, the Government commanded the support of at least 96 
members - nine short of a two-third majority.
The National Government promised that it will "be fair to all, 
irrespective of race, community or religion, and will protect human 
rights at all times".'*' It took steps to re-activate the Joint Select 
Committee on the Revision of the Constitution. By 8 October 1966, 
both Houses had resolved to appoint a committee with the same 
terms of reference which included the question of the guaranteeing
1. Throne Speech of 9 April 1965, Ceylon Today, Vol.XIV, Nos.3 
and 4, p.8.
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of fundamental rights. By 3 May 1967, a committee had been 
constituted with representatives from both government and opposition 
parties. But at its first meeting held on 19 May 1967, a letter 
signed by Mrs.Bandaranaike, Maithripala Senanayake, N.M.Perera, 
Leslie Goonewardene and P.G.B.Keuneman, requesting the Speaker 
to accept their resignations, was tabled. The reasons why these 
representatives of the three opposition parties declined to 
participate are discussed below. Their withdrawal meant that the 
chances of securing a two-third's majority, which was necessary to 
amend the Constitution in any respect, became quite remote. 
Nevertheless, the committee proceeded with its work, but not from 
the point at which an interruption had occured in 1959; thus 
further minimising the possibility of a consensus even on a matter 
such as fundamental rights. It prepared, as its predecessor had 
done nearly ten years previously, a questionnaire to be sent to 
Senators, Members of Parliament and recognised public organisations." 
During the next session of Parliament, nine sittings were held at 
which, apart from considering the written replies received in 
response to the questionnaire, a number of witnesses who wished to 
give oral evidence were examined. In its report, presented to 
Parliament on 13 June 1968, the committee recommended that a
2
chapter on fundamental rights be incorporated in the Constitution. 
There is no record of the comnittee having met again; certainly, no 
action was taken to implement this recommendation.
Shortly after the defeat of the SLFP-LSSP Coalition 
Government at the general election of March 1965, these two parties 
together with the Conmunist Party decided to formalise their 
relationship and to prepare a programme of work which they would 
agree to implement in the event of a victory at the next election. 
Accordingly, several joint committees were appointed to examine 
and report upon a number of areas of governmental activity, 
including constitutional reform. On this subject, the three 
parties decided against attempting any patch-work revision of the 
1946 Constitution; they resolved to have a new republican 
constitution drafted and enacted by a constituent assembly. This 
decision appears to have been motivated by a number of factors:
1. Report of the Joint Select Committee of the Senate and the 
House of Representatives, Parliamentary Series No.16 of the Sixth 
Parliament.
2. Ibid, Parliamentary Series No.30 of the Sixth Parliament.
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1. The LSSP was proscribed in 1942, and during the war years 
its leaders were detained under Defence Regulations. Consequently, 
they took no part in the discussions and consultations that 
preceded the preparation by the Board of Ministers of their 
constitutional scheme. In any event, they had throughout agitated 
for a complete break with the British Crown, and regarded the
1946 Constitution as a fraud perpetrated to keep Ceylon in a 
continuous state of subjection. The LSSP's co-founder, ColvinR.de 
Silva, one of Ceylon's most eminent and successful criminal lawyers, 
had consistently declined to take silk and thereby be regarded as 
one of "Her Majesty's Counsel" learned in the law. Although the 
LSSP had been willing to go along with Bandaranaike' s proposals 
for constitutional reform in the mid-fifties, they now advocated 
a deliberate break in legal continuity or a legal revolution so 
that the new constitution would have no links whatsoever with the 
British Crown or Westminster.
2. In academic circles the question had been raised whether 
in the exercise of the power of Parliament to amend or repeal any 
of the provisions of the Constitution, Parliament (i.e. the Queen, 
the Senate and the House of Representatives) could legally divest 
itself of one of its constituent parts; and in particular, that 
part from which it actually derived its legal authority. Parliament 
was shortly to attempt, successfully as it turned out, the 
abolition of the Senate. Yet, without the benefit of hindsight, 
before the Joint Select Committee itself, it had been argued by 
C.F.Amerasinghe, senior lecturer in law at the University of Ceylon, 
that Parliament as defined in the Constitution could not be 
organically changed except by the substitution of a totally new 
constitution.
3. In 1964, in the case of Bribery Commissioner v.
2
Ranasinghe, Lord Pearce, delivering the judgment of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, had referred to section 29(2) of 
the Constitution which "entrenched religious and racial matters, 
which shall not be the subject of legislation", and expressed the 
opinion that:
They represent the solemn balance of rights between 
the citizens of Ceylon, the fundamental conditions on 
which inter se they accepted the Constitution; and 
these are therefore unalterable under the Constitution.
1. Ibid, p.102.
2. (1964) 66 N.L.R. 73, at 78.
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Previously, the Privy Council had referred to this subsection as
containing "fundamental reservations", subject to which Parliament
enjoyed the power to make laws for the peace, order and good
government of Ceylon.^ This obiter dictum of the highest court
of appeal provoked a spirited controversy in Ceylon.
H.L.de Silva, a leading constitutional lawyer, asserts that
whenever it is intended to erect a theory of unalterability of a
2
constitution, "words of crystal clarity" are used. He refers to
Article 11 of the Constitution of Japan which states that:
The fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by 
this Constitution shall be conferred upon the people of 
this and future generations as eternal and inviolable rights.
Section 29, however, does not appear to be lacking in clarity,
having regard to the language usually employed in similar statutory
instruments. The legislative power of Parliament described in
section 29(1) is restricted by section 29(2) so unequivocally that
any law made in contravention of that subsection is declared by
section 29(3) to be void. Section 29(4) states that Parliament
"in the exercise of its powers under this section" may amend or
repeal any provision of the Constitution with the prescribed
majority; "its powers under this section" being clearly defined by
the preceding subsections (1), (2) and (3).
The Privy Council's obiter dictum appears also to be borne
out by historical fact. Some of the documents relating to the
transfer of power have not yet been released for public inspection.
But D.J.Morgan, who a few years ago was provided with full access
to all official documents when he examined the history of colonial
development, makes it quite clear that the provision of "lasting
safeguards for the interests of minorities" was the predominant
factor in the negotiations that preceded the 1946 Constitution and,
3indeed, Independence. The intention expressed in the 1943 
Declaration to reserve bills which "have evoked serious opposition 
by any racial or religious community and which in the Governor's
1. Ibralebbe v. The Queen (1963) 65 N.L.R. 433, at 443.
2. H.L.de Silva, Some Reflections on the Interpretation of the 
Constitution of Ceylon and its Amendment", (1970) Journal of Ceylon 
Law, 238, at 249.
3. D.J.Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development, 
Vol.5 (London: Macmillans, 19&0), pp. 68-77.
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opinion are likely to involve oppression or unfairness to any 
community"; the requirement that any constitutional scheme 
prepared by the Ministers should be approved by three-quarters 
of all the members of the State Council; the specific direction 
to the Soulbury Commission to hold discussions with minority 
groups; and the view expressed by the Colonial Affairs Committee 
even after the Soulbury Report had been presented that "the 
Sinhalese majority, whose power under a completely self-governing 
constitution would be predominant, has yet to prove their 
willingness and capacity to operate self-governing institutions 
in collaboration with the minorities, with due regard to their 
rights and susceptibilities", underlie the importance attached 
to this factor. According to Morgan, minority safeguards were to 
be included in the subjects specified for formal Agreements 
between the two Governments as a condition precedent to Independence; 
an insistence which the British Government agreed to drop upon 
being satisfied that "the rights of minority groups were safeguarded 
in the Constitution". Two of these safeguards were the Senate 
which was intended to impede precipitate legislation and to handle 
inflammatory issues in a cooler atmosphere, and the Public Service 
Commission which was designed as an impartial and authoritative 
body, free from partisanship; the most important safeguard was 
undoubtedly section 29(2). It was clearly the basis upon which 
Independence was sought and granted.
Be that as it may, even if Lord Pearce's observations were 
purely obiter and not expressed after a full consideration of the 
relevant facts, it nevertheless gave some indication to Ceylonese 
legislators of the perils that lay in the path of those who 
ventured to revise the Constitution in the traditional manner.
The Need for a Bill of Rights 
Two events which took place in the early 1960s underscored 
the need for more comprehensive guarantees of individual liberty 
than were to be found either in section 29 of the Constitution or 
in existing law. The pressure of public opinion in the one case, 
and the strength of judicial activism in the other, helped to carry 
the day. But these were ephemeral forces and could hardly be relied 
upon as effective protective mechanism against the arbitrary 
reach of state power.
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The Death Penalty (Special Provisions) Bill
On 18 January 1962, a bill was tabled in the House of Repres­
entatives "to impose the death penalty upon offenders convicted of 
murder, abetment of murder, conspiracy to murder, abetment of 
suicide, and other like offences, for which capital punishment was 
prescribed by law prior to the Suspension of Capital Punishment Act, 
No.20 of 1958, and to make provision for the execution of offenders 
so convicted, and to make special provision for the offenders 
convicted of conspiracy to murder the late Prime Minister in Case 
No.S.C.8/M.C.Colombo 23838A and in regard to further appeals in 
that case".'*' The sequence of events leading to this bill was 
evident from its preamble:
Whereas according to the Penal Code the punishment 
prescribed for the offences of murder, abetment of 
murder, conspiracy to murder, abetment of suicide and 
other like offences was, prior to the Suspension of 
Capital Punishment Act, No.20 of 1958, death:
And whereas by that Act the punishment for the said 
offences was altered for a period of three years from 
9 May 1958 to rigorous imprisonment for life:
And whereas the Prime Minister of this country was 
assassinated on 25 September 1959:
And whereas Parliament thereafter decided to reimpose 
the death penalty for the said offences with the object 
that, among other things, the persons responsible for 
that assassination should suffer capital punishment:
And whereas the Suspension of Capital Punishment 
(repeal) Act, No.25 of 1959, was enacted by Parliament 
for that purpose:
And whereas three persons, namely, Mapitigama 
Buddharakkita Thera, Hemachandra Piyasena Jayawardene 
and Talduwe Somarama Thera, were found guilty by the 
unanimous verdict of the jury of the offence of 
conspiracy to murder the late Prime Minister and were 
duly sentenced to death in Case No.S.C.8/M.C.Colombo 
23838A:
And whereas the Court of Criminal Appeal has by its 
judgment on the appeal in that case upheld that verdict 
and the convictions against the said offenders:
But whereas the Court of Criminal Appeal has also 
by its judgment on that appeal set aside the sentences 
of death imposed on the said offenders in respect of 
the offence of conspiracy to murder the late Prime 
Minister and substituted sentences of imprisonment for
1. Ceylon Daily News, 19 January 1962.
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life on the ground that the Suspension of Capital 
Punishment (Repeal) Act, No.25 of 1959, in so far 
as it was retrospective, did not relate to the 
offence of conspiracy to murder:
And whereas it has now become necessary to declare 
the law according to the real intention of Parliament 
as aforesaid and to validate the sentences of death 
pronounced by the Supreme Court for the offence of 
conspiracy to murder in Case No.S.C.8/M.C.Colombo 
23838A, and to make provision for the due execution 
of such sentences notwithstanding the judgment of 
the Court of Criminal Appeal.
An act of faulty draftsmanship had failed to give effect to the
true intention of Parliament. But, as the Cabinet asserted:
No legal technicality will be allowed by this Government 
to stand in the way of justice being meted out to the 
persons found guilty of the crime of assassinating the 
Prime Minister of the country.
It stressed that:
It is the declared policy of the Government that the 
persons responsible for the assassination of the late 
Prime Minister shall suffer the extreme penalty.
Accordingly, the bill sought to provide that:
1. The punishment prescribed for these offences "shall be deemed 
at all times to have been, and to be, death" in respect of 
offenders convicted after the date of the repeal of the suspending 
Act (i.e. 2 December 1959) "whether such offences were committed 
before or after that date".
2. The sentences of death pronounced by the Supreme Court on the 
three persons "shall be deemed at all times to have been, and to 
be, valid notwithstanding the judgment of the Court of Criminal 
Appeal which is hereby declared to have been, and to be, null 
and void to the extent that such judgment purports to substitute 
sentences of imprisonment for life in lieu of the sentences of 
death aforesaid".
3. Section 309 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which prescribed
the mode of execution of sentence of death "shall notwithstanding 
that judgment or any other law apply to the execution of the 
sentences of death aforesaid".
4. No suit or proceeding shall lie against any person in connection 
with the implementation of its provisions in their application 
to Case No.S.C.8/M.C.Colombo 23838A.
1. Statement issued by the Cabinet, Ceylon Daily News, 25 Jan­
uary 1962.
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5. No person or officer shall be liable to any civil or criminal 
proceedings for any act done for the purpose of giving effect 
to its provisions in their application to Case No.S.C.8/M.C.
Colombo 23838A.
6. Its provisions shall have effect notwithstanding anything in 
any other law, and shall not be called in question in any court.
The government parliamentary group unanimously approved the bill 
"and complimented the Cabinet" for introducing it. In the course 
of the discussion, the members also suggested that the Government 
should introduce legislation to abolish appeals to the Privy Council.'*' 
Public reaction was swift and predictable. There was almost 
universal revulsion. The entire Opposition was united in condem­
nation of it. Dudley Senanayake (UNP) described it as "the most
vindictive, unconstitutional and undemocratic piece of legislation
2
ever to be presented in a democratic country in the world".
Colvin R.de Silva (LSSP) called it "murder by statute". The 
Conmunist Party urged that "in seeking to hang Buddharakkita and
/|
Jayawardene, the Government should not hang democracy in the process”. 
Local authorities throughout the country passed resolutions calling 
for the withdrawal of the bill. They were joined by trade unions 
and public interest bodies. The General Council of Advocates, 
with only three dissenting votes, resolved that the bill was "an 
outrage on justice"; H.V.Perera,Q.C., the doyen of the Bar and one 
of Ceylon's most respected lawyers, thought that it "debased the 
whole of society", while D.S.Jayawickrama,Q.C., another a-political 
leader of the Bar, described it as "judicially indefensible,
wicked in design and inhuman in its intention".'* Editorial comment
in the national newspapers expressed the same sentiments. The Times 
of Ceylon pointed out that the bill "savours strongly of blind and 
unthinking vengeance, a sort of lynching by legislative act". It
reminded the Government that there would be no shame in its 
withdrawal: "The best of governments can and do make mistakes in
1. Ceylon Daily News, 19 January 1962.
2. Ibid, 22 January 1962.
3. Ceylon Observer, 21 January 1962.
4. Ceylon Daily News, 22 January 1962.
5. Times of Ceylon, 25 January 1962.
6. Ibid.
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haste, and it is only wisdom to rectify a blunder at the earliest
possible opportunity". It was only a matter of time before this
national feeling began having an effect on Government MPs. On
23 January, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Finance,
George Rajapakse, wondered publicly whether "any man's life was
safe today"D.A.Rajapakse, another southern province MP,
2
announced that he was unable to support the bill. On 24 January, 
the Cabinet announced that since one of the accused had informed 
the Government of his intention to appeal against his conviction 
to the Privy Council, "the Government does not propose to have the 
bill debated upon at once". In fact, the bill was never taken up 
for debate and had disappeared altogether from the order paper 
when Parliament reconvened after the next prorogation.
Restrictions on travel abroad
In August 1964, the Prime Minister, Mrs.Bandaranaike, 
clarified her Government's policy, which had been operative since
4
July 1962, in regard to travel abroad. Ceylonese wishing to travel 
were classified into: (1) those to whom exchange was released for
travel and maintenance abroad, and (2) those whose travel expenses 
and costs of maintenance were met from funds provided by foreign 
governments, agencies or individuals.
A person in the former category, usually an official or a 
businessman (since exchange was not released for social or 
educational purposes) will be issued with a passport valid for a 
single journey and for travel only to that country for which 
exchange had been released and to the countries en route. If he 
was already in possession of a passport valid for travel to several 
countries, the validity of that passport will be appropriately 
modified. This had been done in the case of the President of the 
Senate when he left on a state visit to the USSR; all endorsements 
to other countries being deleted. The Prime Minister disclosed 
that foreign missions in Ceylon had been informed that the Ceylon 
Government would consider it "an unfriendly act" if holders of 
Ceylon passports were permitted, in the course of their travels
1. Ceylon Observer, 24 January 1962.
2. Ibid.
3. Ceylon Daily News, 25 January 1962.
4. Statement made by the Prime Minister in the Senate on 
4 August 1964, Ceylon Today, Vol.XIII, No.8, pp. 9-12.
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abroad, to enter their countries on temporary visas when their 
passports lacked the appropriate validation.
Any invitation to a person in the second category was
required to be addressed to the Government. Any such invitation
which named the individual concerned or stipulated that the
selection should be made from any specific organisation in
Ceylon, will not be entertained. The Prime Minister explained
that if, for instance, a writers association abroad wished to
invite a writer of repute from Ceylon to attend a conference,
"surely the government of Ceylon is in a better position than a
foreign agency to select a writer of repute who will bring credit
to Ceylon in the country concerned". The rationale for these
restrictions was simple:
If these safeguards are not applied assiduously, we 
lay ourselves open to the possibility of the subversion 
of our citizens to serve foreign interests and of the 
weaning away of our citizens from their loyalty to 
their motherland. In a small country like our's, 
situated as we are, competing forces can wage and, 
in fact, are waging, a strong battle to capture the 
minds of our people. The device of the 'pre-paid 
ticket' is a powerful weapon, that can be used by 
foreign elements to win over the loyalties of our 
people. 1
A veritable wall was constructed along the sandy beaches of Ceylon
to protect the Ceylonese from the evils that lay beyond the waters
2
of the Indian Ocean. To maintain the integrity of this "wall", 
airline and shipping agencies were prohibited from issuing any 
travel tickets unless "clearance" had first been granted by the 
Ministry of Defence and External Affairs. This clearance usually 
took the form of an appropriate endorsement on the passport.
In October 1964, the general secretary of the United Nations 
Association of Ceylon received an invitation from its parent body, 
the Geneva-based World Federation of United Nations Associations, 
to attend a seminar in Kuala Lumpur. All expenses involved in his 
participation were being met by WFUNA. He applied to the Ministry 
for a certificate of clearance and was notified that the clearance 
required could not be granted. He then applied to the Supreme Court
1. Ibid, at p.10.
2. Douglas J probably contemplated this type of governmental 
action when he observed that if it is argued that travel may increase 
the likelihood of illegal events happening, "so does being alive".
See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 US 500.
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for a writ of mandamus on the Permanent Secretary, claiming that 
as a free citizen he was entitled to leave his country and return 
without let or hindrance; the Permanent Secretary had, maliciously 
and for reasons best known to himself and which he had chosen not 
to disclose, refused to grant that clearance. Whether mandamus 
lay was a matter of some considerable doubt since "clearance" was 
unknown to the law and was an executive device which was being 
applied without legal authority therefor. But, upon ascertaining 
that this was indeed the position, T.S.Fernando J, who presided 
over the three-judge bench, expressed in such strong terms the 
Court's disapproval of the attitude of the executive and insisted 
that no restrictions other than those warranted by law should be 
placed on a citizen's freedom of movement, that Crown Counsel 
assured, after a brief adjournment, that the necessary clearance 
would be granted forthwith.'*'
A few weeks later, a lawyer member of the United National
Party who had been nominated by his party to attend a legal
conference in Instanbul, with all expenses involved being met by
the host organisation, was refused clearance to leave the island.
As soon as he invoked the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
the executive caved in and granted the clearance. When Sri Skanda
Rajah J insisted on knowing why this illegal practice was being
continued, Crown Counsel announced that the Government had decided
that in future there would be no legal bar to anyone leaving the
country if he had a valid passport and a travel ticket. The Court,
however, as an expression of its strong disapproval of the
repetition of an executive excess, ordered the Permanent Secretary
2
to pay the petitioner the costs of the application.
In each instance, the Supreme Court had intervened to redress 
a wrong. But had the State insisted on a considered judgment, 
after full argument, it is unlikely that, in the absence of a 
proper legal enunciation of the freedom of movement, the Court 
would have been able to base an order on the informal regime of 
rights which it was seeking to observe and apply.
1. Aseerwatham v. Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of 
Defence" and External Affairs, Journal of the ICJ, Vol.VI, p.319.
2. Gooneratne v. Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Defence 
and External Affairs, ibid., p.320.
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The Response of Political Parties to the Demand 
for a Bill of Rights
The demand for a bill of rights gathered momentum in the late 
1960s. But apart from small civil rights interest groups, this 
agitation was largely confined to minority ethnic communities and 
was identified with the demand for greater recognition of minority 
rights. Ten years earlier, all the political parties had responded 
enthusiastically to Bandaranaike1s proposal to incorporate a bill 
of rights in the Constitution. Now they approached the subject 
very warily. This was particularly evident when, in 1968, the 
United Nations Association invited representatives of the major 
political parties to express their views on the question whether 
fundamental rights should be incorporated in the Constitution.'*'
M.Sivasithamparam (Tamil Congress) and M.Tiruchelvam (Federal 
Party) were both agreed that section 29 of the Constitution was 
"absolutely inadequate". The latter, who was then a Minister in 
the Government, in a very emotional speech declared that the only 
protection for the minorities against the "despotism of the majority 
community" lay in the incorporation of fundamental rights in the 
Constitution. Justice Minister A.F.Wijemanne (United National 
Party), who spoke on behalf of the Prime Minister, pointed out that 
many, if not all, the fundamental rights were already in existence 
in the ordinary statute law; he wondered whether it would not be 
wiser to leave them there. He concluded, however, by observing 
that:
In the circumstances of our country, where there exist 
racial, religious and linguistic minorities, it is the 
cherished desire of all lovers of freedom, justice and 
equality, that there should be a declaration of funda­
mental rights in the Constitution.
Presumably, his party was included in that category, although he did
not say so specifically.
The Opposition representatives believed that the agitation 
for a bill of rights had developed upon a misconception, namely, 
that fundamental rights were synonymous with minority rights.
Pieter Keuneman (Conmunist Party) questioned the relevance, in the 
Ceylonese context, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
1. The proceedings of this meeting were recorded on tape by 
the author, and these tapes constitute the source material for 
this section.
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which was "not the acme of wisdom", but the result of hard bargaining;
the right to work and the right to leisure were significant omissions,
while the right to property was inconsistent with socialism. ^
Felix Dias Bandaranaike (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) believed that
the "fundamental right of free elections at periodic intervals" was
the "basic safeguard against tyranny"; it was the only right that
needed to be enshrined in a constitution. Colvin R.de Silva (Lanka
Sama Samaj Party) was deliberate and emphatic: he could not conceive
of rights being enshrined in a constitution:
Constitutions are made in terms of the stage of dev­
elopment at which any given society or country has 
arrived. In terms of that stage of development it 
looks upon things, and for any generation of people 
to imagine that it can so completely project itself 
into the infinity of the future so as to be able to 
decide in its own generation that it will constrain 
a future generation or generations for ever within 
the confines of its own postulates is to make the 
mistake of thinking that any human collectivity is 
the equivalent of the divinity. It is not.
According to him, one consequence of placing a statement of funda­
mental rights in a constitution and contending that "it must be 
eternally inviolate" is to say that "the only means of changing 
that statement will be successful revolution". The other conseq­
uence was equally objectionable:
If you place a declaration as being fundamental, then 
you have to accept an authority outside the makers 
of laws with the task of deciding whether the law is 
in fact a law. Whether we have faith in the Supreme 
Court is not the issue. Do we want a legislature 
that is sovereign or do we not ? That is the true 
question. If you say that the validity of a law 
has to be determined by anybody outside the law­
making body, then you are to that extent saying that 
your law-making body is not completely the law-making 
. body.
In his view, it was "absolutely essential" that "this country at 
this stage of development" had a legislature that was sovereign;
"it must be in a position no different from the Parliament of 
England".
Fundamental rights cannot be regarded as the postulates of 
a particular generation. The right to life, liberty or equality, 
the freedom of expression, assembly or association, does not
1. He made no reference, however, to ICCPR which does not 
include the right to property.
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become less relevant as society continues to transform, whether 
for better or for worse. Dr.de Silva believed that the aim of all 
governments must be "to provide the general framework within which 
the individual personality can most completely flower". These 
rights surely are very necessary components in the constitution 
of that framework. Even the right to property, in the limited 
sense of encompassing food, clothing and shelter, the tools or 
implements of a trade or profession, and the fruits of one's labours, 
appear to be a no less material component.
Dr.de Silva's second objection was based on the assumption
that a sovereign legislature, fashioned on Westminster, would
thrive on Ceylon's soil. This was a questionable assumption,
having regard to the fact that neither constitutional conventions
nor a consensus between the government and the people or between
opposing political parties existed in any real sense in Ceylon
to temper the exercise of legislative power. As the presidential
commission which investigated whether a bill of rights should be
incorporated in the Constitution of Tanzania noted:
The process of government in the United Kingdom provides 
a striking example of the force of a national ethic in 
controlling the exercise of political power. A govern­
ment in Britain with a majority of one seat in Parliament 
could legislate to abolish elections, detain political 
opponents without trial, and establish a censorship of 
the press, radio and television. Indeed, most of these 
things were done by Parliament when the British people 
stood on the brink of disaster in the Second World War.
They are not done in peacetime; not because there is 
anything in the law to prevent a government acting in 
this way but because they are unthinkable. In other 
words, there is a consensus between the people and their 
leaders about how the process of government should be 
carried on. It is on this that the traditional freedoms 
of the British people depend. 1
In the absence of these informal restraints, express constitutional
limitations would appear to be necessary.
Twenty years after the 1946 Constitution had cane into force 
it was clear that time had run out in so far as the inclusion in it 
of a bill of rights was concerned. From the experience of India 
and that of other colonies which, from the mid-fifties, began 
graduating into statehood within the Commonwealth, it would appear
1. The United Republic of Tanzania: Report of the Presidential
Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One Party State 
(Dar Es Salaam: Govt. Printer, 1965), para. 104.
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that Ceylon lost its best opportunity of having a genuine, 
enforceable bill of rights when in 1946 it received a constitution 
which did not contain such mechanism. There is no doubt that, 
on the one hand, had the minority comnunities so demanded or 
the Board of Ministers so provided; or on the other, had the 
Colonial Office so insisted or the Soulbury Comnission so 
recorrmended, a constitution with an enforceable bill of rights 
would have been accepted by the State Council. That opportunity 
passed by, virtually by default. The next opportunity presented 
itself when in 1959 the Joint Select Committee of Parliament 
resolved unanimously, influenced no doubt by the Indian 
experience, to amend the Constitution to include an enforceable 
chapter on fundamental rights. Apart from the consensus which 
had been reached between political and interest groups on this 
subject in the euphoric atmosphere of a social revolution, 
Bandaranaike himself had an abiding commitment to the twin 
concepts of democracy and socialism, to the rule of law and 
social justice. But, as has already been noted, fortuitous 
circumstances were to arise to let this opportunity too pass by.
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The 1972 Constitution
The manifesto of the United Front of the Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party, the Lanka Sama Samaj Party and the Communist Party stated, 
inter alia:
We seek your mandate to permit the members of Parliament 
you elect to function simultaneously as a Constituent 
Assembly to draft, adopt and operate a new Constitution.
This Constitution will declare Ceylon to be a free, 
sovereign and independent Republic pledged to realise 
the objectives of a socialist democracy; and it will also 
secure fundamental rights and freedoms to all citizens.
At the general election held on 27 May 1970, a remarkably high poll
of 85.2 per cent produced the following result:
TABLE 15
THE 1970 GENERAL ELECTION RESULT
Party Seatswon
Votes
polled
Percentage
polled
Sri Lanka Freedom Party3 91 1,812,849 36.6
Lanka Sama Samaj Party 19 433,224 8.7
United National Party 17 1,876,956 38.0
Federal Party 13 245.747 5.0
Communist Party 6 169,199 3.4
All-Ceylon Tamil Congress 3 115,567 2.3
Independents 2 225,559 4.6
Source: Ibid.
a. The SLFP, LSSP and CP campaigned together on the basis of 
a no-contest electoral agreement, under the name "United Front".
In terms of the agreement reached between the three parties, the 
United Front formed a government under Mrs.Bandaranaike and, with 
a parliamentary majority of more than three-quarters in the House 
of Representatives, pledged itself to implement the Common prog­
ramme. On 14 June 1970, the Governor-General in his Speech from 
the Throne reminded members that:
By their vote democratically cast the people have given 
you a clear mandate to function as a Constituent Assembly 
to draft, adopt and operate a new constitution which will
1. Joint Election Manifesto of the United Front, 1970 
(Colombo: M.D.Gunasena S« Co.Ltd, 1970).
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declare Ceylon to be a free, sovereign and independent 
Republic pledged to realise the objectives of a social­
ist democracy including the securing of the fundamental 
rights andJreedoms of all citizens. In terms of this 
mandate, My Government calls upon you to draft and adopt 
a new constitution which will become the fundamental 
law of this country, superseding both the existing 
Constitution in the drafting of which the people of 
Sri Lanka had no share and also other laws that may 
conflict with the new Constitution you will adopt. -*■
On 24 June 1970, the Address of Thanks was passed in the House of
Representatives without a division.
The Constituent Assembly
On 11 July 1970, the Prime Minister addressed a letter to
2
each of the 157 members of the House of Representatives inviting
3
them to attend a meeting at the Navarangahala, Royal Junior 
School, Colombo on 19 July to consider and adopt the following 
resolution:
We the Members of the House of Representatives in 
pursuance of the mandate given by the People of Sri 
Lanka at the General Election held on the 27th day 
of May 1970 do hereby resolve to constitute declare 
and proclaim ourselves the Constituent Assembly of 
the People of Sri Lanka for the purpose of adopting 
enacting and establishing a Constitution for Sri 
Lanka which will declare Sri Lanka to be a free 
sovereign and independent Republic pledged to realise 
the objectives of a socialist democracy including 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of all citizens 
and which will become the fundamental law of Sri 
Lanka deriving its authority from the People of Sri 
Lanka and not from the power and and authority 
assumed and exercised by the British Crown and the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom in the grant of 
the present Constitution of Ceylon nor from the said 
Constitution and do accordingly constitute declare 
and proclaim ourselves the Constituent Assembly of 
the People of Sri Lanka and being so constituted 
appoint the 29th day of July at 10.00 a.m. as the
1. Ceylon Today, Vol.XVIII, Nos.1-6, p.22.
2. The 157 members included the six nominated members. This 
appeared to conflict with the manifesto which sought a mandate to 
permit the members "you elect" to function as a constituent 
assembly. Their inclusion, however, may be justified on the ground 
that they represented important interests which were otherwise "not 
represented" or were "inadequately represented" in the House and, 
therefore, in the constituent assembly. These included three 
minority castes among the Sinhalese and a "depressed community" 
among the Tamils, in addition to the Indian Tamil community.
3. "The new theatre".
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date and time when the Constituent Assembly shall 
next meet in the chamber of the House of Repres­
entatives for carrying out the said mandate under 
the Presidentship of Wanniarachige Don Stanley 
Tillekeratne M.P. or in his absence of Ibrahim 
Adham Abdul Cader M.P. and to consider business 
introduced by or on behalf of the Minister of 
Constitutional Affairs. 1
After some hesitation, both the United National Party and the
Federal Party decided to respond to the Prime Ministers's
invitation. The latter were perhaps influenced to do so by an
appeal which the Prime Minister broadcast on 15 July in which
she promised that the new constitution would:
. . . serve’to build a nation ever more strongly 
consciousness of its oneness amidst the diversity 
imposed on it by history. Though there are among 
us several races such as Sinhalese, Tamils, Moors,
Burghers, Malays and others; and several religious 
groups such as the Buddhists, Hindus, Christians 
and Muslims, we are one nation. 2
Indeed, if the Government was so inclined, the opportunity was 
about to present itself to resolve finally the grievances of the 
Tamil minority community. The UNP, on the other hand, was 
concerned that the new constitution would be seeking to commit 
itself to the objectives of a socialist democracy, which they 
equated with increasing state control and governmental inter­
ference in the private sector. They also questioned the validity
of the mandate which, they argued, was from less than 50 per cent
3
of the electorate. Finally, however, the Leader of the Opposition,
J.R.Jayewardene,^ having stated the objections, expressed himself
thus in the discussion on the resolution:
If, however, the victors and the vanquished - the 
vanquished on this side - in a Legislature powerless 
to replace the source of its own authority agree 
to make common cause in enacting a new basic law by
1. Birth of a Republic (Colombo, Dept, of Govt.Printing, 1972),
p.7.
2. Ceylon Daily News, 16 July 1970.
3. The United Front polled 2,415,302 out of a total of 4,949,616 
votes; i.e. 48.8 per cent.
4. The leader of the UNP was Dudley Senanayake, After the
defeat of his Government, he declined to serve as Leader of the
Opposition and agreed to his deputy performing that task. It soon
became apparent that there was a sharp divergence of opinion between 
Senanayake and Jayewardene on many matters, including the question 
of participating in the constituent assembly. Before the work of
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means of a 'legal revolution', there is no law 
that says you cannot do so. The law we create 
together if accepted by the people will become 
the full expression of the hopes, desires and 
aspirations of the present generation. 1
2
On 21 July 1970, the resolution was passed unanimously.
The unanimity displayed at the Navarangahala and the senti­
ments expressed there by the representatives of all the political 
parties were most heartening as the business of constitution 
making got under way. But the indications as far as the prepara­
tion of an effective bill of rights was concerned were scmewhat 
less encouraging. What was it that the Constituent Assembly was 
committed to achieve ? The manifesto promised a constitution 
which will "secure fundamental rights and freedoms to all citizens". 
The Speech from the Throne anticipated a constitution which will 
declare Ceylon to be a republic "pledged to realise the objectives 
of a socialist democracy including the securing of the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of all citizens". The resolution establishing 
the Constituent Assembly aspired to a republic "pledged to realise 
the objectives of a socialist democracy including the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of all citizens". The mandate was unmistakably 
clear: to secure fundamental rights and freedoms to all citizens.
The mission was becoming obscured, and appeared to be imperceptibly 
shrinking in both scope and content.
That some doubt should exist as to whether a bill of rights 
designed to secure the fundamental rights and freedoms of all 
citizens would in fact be produced was inevitable, although few 
gave expression to it at the time. In the first place, the Consti­
tuent Assembly assumed the authority not only to draft and adopt 
a new constitution, but also to operate it. In other words, the 
draftsmen were also to be the beneficiaries. It was not intended 
that the constitution drafted by the Constituent Assembly should be 
submitted to the people for approval; nor was it intended that once
of the constituent assembly was completed, Senanayake attempted to 
expel Jayewardene from the UNP; the latter reacted by obtaining an 
injunction from the District Court. In April 1973, on Senanayake's 
death, Jayewardene was elected leader of the party.
1. Proceedings of a meeting of Members of the House of Repres­
entatives on 19 July 1970 (Colombo: Dept, of Govt.Printing, 1970), 
col.57.
2. For a detailed description of the procedure adopted by the 
constituent assembly, see Cooray, Constitutional Law, ch. 3.
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the constitution had been drafted and adopted by the Constituent 
Assembly, it would be brought into operation following a general 
election held in terms of that constitution. In either of these 
eventualities, the people would have had an opportunity of 
pronouncing judgment upon the work of their delegates; and the 
delegates, in turn, would hardly have failed to consider that 
prospect. A bill of rights is necessarily a limitation on both 
legislative and executive power. The members of the Constituent 
Assembly in whom would be vested both legislative and executive 
power under the constitution which they were drafting, had to 
determine what limitations ought to be placed on the exercise by 
them of that power. It was as if at Runnymede, almost to the day 
755 years earlier, the Barons had invited King John to draft the 
Magna Carta. Secondly, the resolution stated explicitly that 
the Constituent Assembly would "consider business introduced by or 
on behalf of the Minister of Constitutional Affairs". In other 
words, the Government would take the initiative at all times in 
guiding the Assembly in its deliberations, and it would do so 
through a Minister specially appointed for that purpose. The 
constitutional proposals would be government proposals approved 
by the Cabinet and therefore in accord with its own political 
philosophy.
A 17-member Steering and Subjects Comnittee, consisting of 
representatives of all the political groups in the Assembly but 
with an overwhelming government majority, was established on 
12 August 1970. Its function at that stage was to prepare reso­
lutions embodying the basic principles according to which the 
constitution was to be drafted and to cause such resolutions to 
be placed on the order book in the name of the Minister. Its 
personnel were:
Sirimavo Bandaranaike (SLFP): Chairman 
M.Senanayake (SLFP)
T.B.Illangaratne (SLFP)
B.Mahmud (SLFP)
F.R.Dias Bandaranaike (SLFP)
H. Kobbekaduwa (SLFP)
T.B.Subasinghe (SLFP)
G.Rajapakse (SLFP)
T.B.Tennekoon (SLFP)
1. See S.Nadesan, Some Comments on the Constituent Assembly and 
the Draft Basic Resolutions (Colombo: Nadaraja Press, 1971).
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N.M.Perera (LSSP)
Colvin R.de Silva (LSSP)
P.G.B.Keuneman (CP)
J.R.Jayewardene (UNP)
IXidley Senanayake (UNP)
S.J.V.Chelvanayakam, Q.C. (FP)
C.Arulampalam (TC)
C.X.Martyn (Ind.).
This committee was most unrepresentative of the people on whose
behalf it was seeking to act. It was a predominantly Sinhalese-
Buddhist-Goyigama body (ten of its members belonging to this
dominant group), with more Kandyans than Low-country Sinhalese.
Only two caste groups among the Sinhalese were represented: Goyi-
gama and Salagama; there was no Catholic member at all. The
Indian Tamil community was also not represented although A.Aziz,
leader of the Ceylon Workers Congress, was a nominated government
MP representing their interests in Parliament. Twelve of its
members were Ministers of the Cabinet; the Tamil Congress and
Independent representatives were also members of the government
parliamentary group. Its composition, therefore, assured quick
and easy approval for the basic resolutions placed before it by
the Minister of Constitutional Affairs.
The draft basic resolutions were initially prepared by a
Drafting Committee of thirteen (including four non-lawyers) which
functioned in the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs under the
chairmanship of the Minister.^ These were then independently
vetted by a group of senior SLFP Ministers and by the leadership
of the LSSP and the CP. They were channelled through a 12-member
2
Ministerial Sub-Committee to the Cabinet for formal approval
before being tabled at a meeting of the Steering and Subjects 
3
Committee. There could have been no doubt that, as the Minister
1. The lawyers in the drafting committee were drawn from both 
the official and unofficial Bar, and included lawyers serving the 
Government such as the Director of Cabinet Affairs and the Perm­
anent Secretaries to the Ministries of Information and Justice. The 
non-lawyers included a professor of political science and a linguist.
2. This sub-committee consisted of the 12 Ministers who were 
members of the steering and subjects committee.
3. According to M.S.Alif, Secretary to the Cabinet, there were 
in all: 46 meetings of the constituent assembly; 21 meetings of the 
steering and subjects committee; 114 meetings of eleven sub-committees 
of the assembly at which nearly 3000 memoranda from the public were 
considered; 18 meetings of the cabinet; 22 meetings of the cabinet
committee on the constitution; and 278 meetings of the drafting 
committee: Birth of a Republic, p.36.
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himself claimed, the basic resolutions were "completely in accord 
with the United Front and Government policy".^ It could not have 
been otherwise since the Constituent Assembly was conmitted to 
drafting a constitution which would declare Sri Lanka to be a 
republic "pledged to realise the objectives of a socialist demo­
cracy". To accommodate this ideological objective, the Government 
believed that the scope of a bill of rights would necessarily have 
to be circumscribed. In a letter to the Minister of Constitutional 
Affairs, the Prime Minister expressed herself thus:
I am myself of the view that there should be no impedi­
ment in the new Constitution to the realisation of 
socialistic objectives. If it is anticipated that the 
inclusion of any particular fundamental rights will 
stand in the way of implementing socialistic policies, 
decisions should be taken in regard to each one of 
such fundamental rights; that is, as to whether a 
particular right should find a place in the Constitution, 
and if so, whether it should be circumscribed in any 
way. 2
She appeared to be echoing an objection expressed in Tanzania by the
presidential commission on the establishment of a democratic one-
party state to the inclusion of a bill of rights in the constitution
of that country:
Tanganyika has dynamic plans for economic development.
These cannot be implemented without revolutionary 
changes in the social structure. In considering a 
Bill of rights in this context we have had in mind 
the bitter conflict which arose in the United States 
between the President and the Supreme Court as a 
result of the radical measures enacted by the 
Roosevelt Administration to deal with the economic 
depression of the 1930s. Decisions concerning the 
extent to which individual rights must give way to 
the wider considerations of social progress are not 
properly judicial decisions. They are political 
decisions best taken by political leaders responsible 
to the electorate. ^
1. Ceylon Daily News, 18 January 1971. In fact, a three-party 
committee for constitutional affairs under the chairmanship of Dr. 
Colvin R.de Silva had already held 32 meetings before the United 
Front manifesto was issued in 1970. This comnittee had discussed 
several alternative proposals for a future constitution: Birth of 
a Republic, p.36.
2. Letter dated 9 December 1970 (unpublished). The full text 
of this letter is reproduced in Appendix 1.
3. Op.cit., para. 103.
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Whether or not a particular right should be circumscribed or 
excluded in order that the realisation of socialist objectives 
could proceed unimpeded would depend very much on one's conception 
of a socialist democracy. S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike, who founded the 
Sri Lanka Freedom Party and whose policies the United Front Govern­
ment professed to follow, had no difficulty in distinguishing a 
socialist democracy. Addressing the Convocation of the University 
of Ceylon on 8 November 1957, he said:
There are experiments going on all over the world, 
experiments in government: here a fascist state; 
there a communist state; here a semi-fascist state; 
there a semi-communist state; and various varieties 
of democracies ranging from capitalist democracies 
such as that of the United States to liberal demo­
cracies such as that of England to socialist demo­
cracies such as those of the countries of northern 
Europe. 1
His concept of socialism, therefore, was the concept of socialism
as understood in the welfare states of northern Europe and not the
Marxist concept of socialism adopted in eastern Europe. Addressing
the first annual conference of his party in December 1952, he said:
As the term 'democracy' is very often loosely used, 
it may be as well for us to have a clear idea of what 
it really means. It consists of an agglomeration of 
freedoms - not only the individual freedoms in the 
classic definitions, e.g. freedom of speech, freedom 
of expression and public meeting, freedom from 
arbitrary arrest, freedom of the press, and freedom 
of the vote, but also certain collective freedoms 
recently enunciated, e.g. freedom from fear, freedom 
from ignorance, freedom from disease, freedom from 
want; in a word, freedom to be really free. That is 
the true spirit of democracy and this is the democracy 
for which our party stands. 2
Addressing the Indian Council of World Affairs on 4 December 1957,
he clarified his thoughts further:
Coming to the modem conception of democracy 
(democracy is defined in various ways today), even 
the totalitarian regimes of the communist countries 
claim that their's is the true democracy; they claim 
that democracy, as we know it, is not true demo­
cracy, that their's is the true democracy because 
the people really rule. But if I may say so, our 
conception of democracy is somewhat different.
1. Bandaranaike, Speeches, p.333.
2. Ibid., p.154.
3. Ibid., p.407.
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Perhaps the most comprehensive description of 
modern democracy in effect would be that it 
consists of the combination or the agglomera­
tion of a number of individual liberties and 
collective liberties. 1
When on 5 March 1959, shortly before he was assassinated, he
actively sponsored a draft bill of rights in the Joint Select
Committee of Parliament, he did not believe that that would be
an impediment to the realisation of the objectives of a socialist
democracy to which he, too, was committed; nor did he consider it
necessary to exclude or circumscribe a particular fundamental 
2
right in any way.
Why then did Mrs.Bandaranaike concede that a particular 
right may be excluded or circumscribed ? Her letter when examined 
in its entirety tends to show that already the Prime Minister and 
her Minister of Constitutional Affairs were on divergent paths, 
and her concession on this point appears to have been in the nature 
of a sop in exchange for concessions from him on more basic and 
crucial political issues. The answer, therefore, lies in the 
dominant personality of the doctrinaire politician she chose to 
be her minister in charge of constitutional affairs. This was the 
third reason for doubting whether an enforceable bill of rights 
would eventually find its way into the new constitution. When 
the Cabinet was appointed immediately after the general election, 
no ministry of constitutional affairs was created, nor was that 
subject assigned to any other ministry. The 1946 Constitution 
required the Minister of Justice, to whom logically the subject 
ought to have been assigned, to sit in the Senate. Not being a 
member of the House of Representatives, he would have had no seat 
in the Constituent Assembly. In the Cabinet there were several 
lawyers, at least three of whom had been in active practice until 
they accepted ministerial portfolios: George Rajapakse, the SLFP 
Minister of Fisheries; Felix R.Dias Bandaranaike, the SLFP 
Minister of Public Administration, Local Government and Home 
Affairs; and Colvin R.de Silva, the LSSP Minister of Plantation 
Industries. It was the latter who, sometime in early June 1970,
1. Ibid., p.407.
2. For a fuller discussion of this aspect of his political 
philosophy, see Nadesan, Comments, ch.2.
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was sworn-in as Minister of Constitutional Affairs. Colvin R.de
Silva, who held a doctoral degree in history from the University
of London, was one of the country's leading criminal lawyers. He
was also an avowed Trotskyite, having pioneered the left movement
in Ceylon in the depression-ridden 'thirties. And he did not
believe in an entrenched bill of rights."*' As he himself told the
Constituent Assembly:
Those who asked for and received a section on fundamental 
rights and freedoms in the coming constitution have 
wanted it because they feel that some special protection 
is needed in certain matters. Now, I may hold the 
view that such protection is not necessary. I may also 
hold the view that to endeavour to give such special 
protection can be an obstruction in the way of the 
progress of . . .  an under-developed country. But at 
the same time, in the light of the fact that a const­
itution when it is constructed should receive the widest 
acceptance, it seemed much wiser that one should allow 
those worries and anxieties that are still in the 
country to prevail, but not to prevail absolutely.2
That the constitution, if it was to receive the widest acceptance,
should contain some statement of fundamental rights, is apparent
from the Minister's response to Felix Dias Bandaranaike who
wondered whether it was necessary to spell out the fundamental
rights in detail in the basic resolutions:
Increasing public interest on this subject, apparent 
from memoranda received from various sections of the 
community and from newspaper reports of public 
utterances, makes me think that it would hardly be 
possible ultimately to resist the demand for funda­
mental rights. Like the language question, this 
question too is charged with emotion: and here too 
it would, I think, be wise to remove suspicion at 
the earliest possible opportunity by spelling out 
in the basic resolutions the content of the proposed 
fundamental rights. 3
Finally, it became clear that the passage of government 
business in the Constituent Assembly would be ensured by applying 
the party whip. It is interesting to note that during the entire 
discussion of the basic resolutions relating to fundamental rights
1. Supra, p.75.
2. Constituent Assembly Debates, 4 July 1971, col.2891.
3. Letters dated 4 November and 16 November, 1970. This 
correspondence was circularised to the members of the cabinet 
sub-committee on the constitution.
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and allied matters, the only speaker on behalf of the government
was the Minister of Constitutional Affairs. An opposition member
who alleged that the party whip had been applied on a government
backbencher who had wanted to move certain amendments was not
contradicted either by the member concerned or by the party
leadership.^ Therefore, the members of the government parliamentary
group functioned in the Constituent Assembly as party members
shackled by the party manifesto. This was in sharp contrast to
the attitude adopted by Jawaharlal Nehru, former Prime Minister of
India who,in inviting members to participate in the Indian
Constituent Assembly, said:
I should like to make it clear, on behalf of my coll­
eagues and myself, that we do not look upon the 
Constituent Assembly as an arena for conflict or 
for the forcible imposition of one viewpoint over 
another. That would not be the way to build up a 
contented and united India. We seek agreed and 
integrated solutions with the largest measure of 
goodwill behind them. We shall go to the Consti­
tuent Assembly with the fixed determination of 
finding a common basis for agreement on all contro­
versial issues. And so, in. spite of all that has 
happened and the hard words that have been said, we 
have kept the path of co-operation open and we 
invite even those who differ from us to enter the 
Constituent Assembly as equals and partners with 
us with no binding commitments. It may well be that 
when we meet and face common tasks, our present 
difficulties will fade away. *
A suggestion that when the Constituent assembly met, the members
should not sit in their usual seats, but that they should sit in
alphabetical order, so that by their sitting together the necessary
psychological climate may be created for compromise and rapport,
3
was not accepted. Instead, they sat facing each other and 
between them lay an unbridgeable gap which was particularly 
evident when the highly charged and emotional issue of language 
rights was taken up for discussion.
On 17 January 1971, 38 draft basic resolutions submitted 
by the Minister of Constitutional affairs to the Steering and 
Subjects Committee were published. Basic Resolution 5 dealt with 
fundamental rights and freedoms. In February 1971, these
1. Gamini Dissanayake (UNP) made this reference to certain 
amendments which were sought to be introduced by Prins Gunesekera 
(SLFP): Constituent Assembly Debates, 10 June 1971, col.1298.
2. Quoted by Nadesan, Comments, p.19.
3. Ibid., p.7.
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resolutions were unanimously adopted by the Steering and Subjects 
Committee, and on 14 March 1971, the Constituent assembly began its 
discussion of them. After a two-day debate, Basic Resolution 5 
was adopted in the form in which it had been proposed by the 
Minister. Amendments which were moved by the United National Party 
and by the Federal Party were rejected. On 10 July 1971, the 
Constituent Assembly adjourned in order that a draft constitution 
in accordance with the basic resolutions might be prepared and 
placed before the Assembly. A draft constitution was presented 
by the Minister to the Steering and Subjects Committee on 24 Dec­
ember 1971, and to the Constituent Assembly on 29 December 1971.
It was published in the Ceylon Government Gazette on that day as 
a government notification. On 3 January 1972, the Assembly met 
and adopted the following resolution:
This Assembly is of the view that the Draft Constitution 
prepared by the Steering and Subjects Committee which 
was presented on 29.12.71 is in accordance with the basic 
principles adopted by the Assembly.^
The Assembly then divided itself into eleven committees for the
purpose of examining the draft constitution in greater detail.
The public were assured that any proposals for amendment would be
considered by the appropriate committee provided that they were in
conformity with the basic principles adopted in the form of basic
resolutions by the Assembly. This meant that only questions of
form and detail and not of principle would be considered at this
stage. The committee which examined the chapter on fundamental
rights perused a large number of memoranda from the public and
heard oral representations from individuals and organisations at
2
sixteen meetings which it held. However, in its report to the 
Assembly, it only recommended that the marginal title be amended 
and that the Sinhala version of that chapter be further examined 
by a special committee of experts "with a view to imparting
3
greater clarity and elegance in respect of language". The reports
1. Constituent Assembly Debates, 3 January 1972.
2. This committee was chaired by B.Mahmud, Minister of Education, 
who was a non-lawyer. Of its 14 members, only two were lawyers.
There were no members of the opposition: Reports of the Committees
of the Constituent Assembly Appointed to Consider the Draft 
Constitution (Colombo: Dept, of Govt. Printing, 1972), p.90.
3. Ibid., p.93.
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of the committees and a draft revised constitution were placed 
before the Steering and Subjects Committee on 4 May 1972, and
before the Assembly on 8 May 1972. On 22 May 1972, the Constituent
Assembly adopted the draft constitution by 119 votes to 16, and 
adjourned to the Navarangahala where, at the auspicious time of 
12.43 a.m., the President of the Assembly certified the adoption 
and enactment of the new Constitution by the Constituent Assembly.
The Protected Rights 
The major portion of the fundamental rights which were 
sought to be protected by the 1972 Constitution were contained 
in section 18(1) which read as follows:
In the Republic of Sri Lanka -
(a) all persons are equal before the law and are entitled 
to equal protection of the law;
(b) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
security of person except in accordance with the law;
(c) no citizen shall be arrested, held in custody, 
imprisoned or detained except in accordance with the 
law;
(d) every citizen shall have the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. This right shall 
include the freedom to have or to adopt a religion 
or belief of his choice, and the freedom, either 
individually or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching;
(e) every citizen has the right by himself or in 
association with others, to enjoy and promote his 
own culture;
(f) all citizens have the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and of association;
(g) every citizen shall have the right to freedom of 
speech and expression, including publication;
(h) no citizen otherwise qualified for appointment in 
the central government, local government, public 
corporation services and the like, shall be 
discriminated against in respect of any such 
appointment on the ground of race, religion, 
caste or sex:
Provided that in the interests of such services, 
specified posts or classes of posts may be reserved 
for members of either sex;
(i) every citizen shall have the right to freedom of 
movement and of choosing his residence within Sri Lanka,
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The rights relating to politics and democracy were sought to 
be protected by the inclusion of the following principles:
1. The National State Assembly to consist of elected representat­
ives of the people (section 29)
2. Every Assembly, unless sooner dissolved, to continue for a
period of six years and no longer, and the expiry of the period
of six years to operate as a dissolution (section 40(1))
3. The Assembly to be summoned to meet at least once in every
year (section 41(1))
4. The Assembly not to be prorogued for any period longer than
four months (section 41(2))
5. The election of members of the Assembly to be held within a
period of four months of a dissolution (section 41(7))
6. The Assembly not to abdicate, delegate or in any manner alienate
its legislative power (section 45(1))
7. Every citizen of the age of 18 years and over, unless disquali­
fied in terms of the Constitution, to be qualified to be an 
elector (section 66)
8. Every person who is qualified to be an elector to be qualified
to be elected as a member of the Assembly unless disqualified
in terms of the Constitution (section 69)
9. The election of members to the Assembly to be free and by
secret ballot (section 72).
The right to an independent and impartial tribunal was sought 
to be protected in the following principles:
1. Judges of the Court of Appeal and of the Supreme Court to
be appointed by the President (section 122(1))
2. Such judges to hold office during good behaviour and not be
removable except by the President upon an address of the 
National State Assembly (section 122(2))
3. The term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeal to be as
provided by the Court of Appeal Act, and the age of retirement
of a judge of the Supreme Court to be 63 years (section 122(3))
4. The salaries of such judges to be determined by the Assembly
and charged on the Consolidated Fund (section 122(4))
5. The salary payable to, and the age of retirement of, such judge
not to be reduced during his term of office (section 122(5))
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6. Every person who, without legal authority therefor, interferes
or attempts to interfere with the exercise or performance of 
the judicial powers or functions of any judge to be guilty of 
an offence (section 131)
7. Every person who immediately prior to the commencement of the
Constitution held judicial office to continue to hold such
office under the same terms and conditions (section 132).
The protection accorded to these rights and principles by the
Constitution was that their amendment or repeal required a special
majority of two-third of the whole number of members of the National
State Assembly voting in favour.'*' During a state of public emergency,
regulations made by the President in the interests of public security
2
could not derogate from any of these provisions.
The Constituent Assembly undertook the task of preparing a 
bill of rights at a time when substantial progress in defining 
standards for the protection of human rights had been made elsewhere. 
Apart from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which the 
Government of Ceylon had acknowledged at the International Confer­
ence on Human Rights at Teheran in 1968 as constituting "an obli-
3
gation for members of the international community", work had been 
completed on several other international and regional standard- 
setting instruments, including the two Covenants. The European 
Convention on Human Rights had been in force for nearly twenty 
years and had already been supplemented by five protocols. In 
Central and South America, the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man of 1948 had been articulated in a more justiciable 
form in the American Convention on Human Rights. In the Constitu­
tions of several Commonwealth countries from the Caribbean Sea to
the Pacific Ocean, efforts had already been made to secure funda- 
/|
mental rights. In other words, there was then in existence a body 
of law relating to human rights which had almost universally been 
accepted by the international community which Sri Lanka was seeking 
to enter as a free, sovereign and independent Republic.
1. S.55(5).
2. S.45(4).
3. "The Proclamation of Teheran, 1968", Human Rights - A Compil­
ation of International Instruments of the United Nations (New York: 
United Nations, 1973).
4. For example, the Constitutions of Tonga (1875), India (1949), 
Nigeria (1960), Cyprus (1960), Jamaica (1962), Zambia (1964), Malta 
(1964), Barbados (1966), Guyana (1966), Botswana (1966), Lesotho
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At first glance it is apparent that the 1972 Constitution
did not contain a comprehensive statement of rights. Nor did each
right, when looked at separately, appear to be comprehensively
defined. Indeed, orfy the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion appeared to possess all the attributes of that right.
It existed, of course, alongside a directive to the Republic to
"give to Buddhism the foremost place" and to "protect and foster
Buddhism while assuring to all religions the rights granted by
section 18(1)(d)". Short of declaring Buddhism to be the State
Religion, such a provision was inevitable when considered in the
context of over four hundred years of missionary activity in the
country. As the Prime Minister explained to her Marxist Minister
of Constitutional Affairs:
I have glanced through a summary of representations 
received by your ministry from the public. I find 
from these andxther sources that there appears to be 
a considerable demand in the country for Buddhism as
a state religion, and for the protection of its
institutions and traditional places of worship. Some 
provision will have to be made in the new constitution 
regarding these matters without, at the same time, 
derogating from the freedom of worship that should 
be guaranteed to all other religions.
It is now proposed to examine and contrast the rights protected in
the Constitution against the internationally accepted standards.
The Inadequately Protected Rights 
The right to life is an "inherent" right which "shall be 
protected by law", and no one may be "arbitrarily deprived of his 
life". The death penalty is recognised as an exception if it has 
not already been abolished; but it may be imposed only by a "final 
judgment" of a "competent court" for the "most serious crimes" in 
accordance with a non-retroactive law. Its imposition on persons 
below eighteen years of age (or over seventy, under the ACHR) and 
its execution on pregnant women are both prohibited. A person 
sentenced to death has the right "to seek pardon or commutation",
2
and amnesty, pardon or commutation "may be granted in all cases". 
ACHR adds a further element by prohibiting capital punishment for 
"political offences or related common crimes", and seeks to
(1966), Mauritius (1968), Uganda (1967), Nauru (1968), Swaziland 
(1968), Kenya (1969), Fiji (1970) and The Gambia (1970).
1. Op.cit.
2. ICCPR, Art.6.
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encourage the progressive reduction of the death penalty by 
prohibiting its extension to new crimes as well as its re­
establishment once it has been abolished.^ Section 18(1) (b), 
however, provided merely that no person shall be deprived of 
life except in accordance with law. In other words, the 
legislature was not limited in any way from extending the 
death penalty, even retroactively, to new offences; nor indeed,
from attempting to enact a law similar to the abortive Death
2
Penalty (Special Provisions) Bill of 1962.
Liberty is a concept which is capable of an expansive inter­
pretation or a narrow definition. The United States Supreme
3
Court considered it to be a "broad and majestic term". The 
Indian Supreme Court has regarded it as one of the widest amplitude,
4
including within its ambit the right to travel abroad. But the 
expression "liberty and security of person" in ECHR has been 
narrowly defined; the institutions of Strasbourg being of the 
view that "liberty" contemplated the physical liberty of the 
person, while "security" meant only freedom fron arbitrary arrest 
and detention.^ Since no White Paper was issued in explanation 
of the constitutional proposals, and the Minister himself did not 
elucidate the statement of rights which he introduced in the 
Constituent Assembly, it remained a matter of conjecture as to 
what was meant or intended by section 18(1)(b) when it provided 
that no person shall be deprived of liberty or security of person 
except in accordance with the law. No assistance was forthcoming 
from the fact that the next clause, section 18(1)(c), provided 
that "no citizen shall be arrested, held in custody, imprisoned 
or detained except in accordance with the law"; a meaning usually 
ascribed to the term "security of person" which was already provided 
for. Did "liberty" encompass a wide variety of interests not 
otherwise provided for such as the right to a fair trial, liberty
1. ACHR, Art.4.
2. Supra, p.68.
3. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 US 564.
4. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) S.C.R. 312.
5. Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom (7050/75), Report: DR 19,5; 
Guzzardi v. Italy (7367/76), Judgment: 6 November 1980;
X v. United Kingdom (6998/75), Judgment: 5 November 1981.
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to pursue any livelihood or lawful vocation, freedom of personal 
choice in matters of marriage and family life, the right to privacy, 
the right to travel abroad and the liberty of parents to direct 
the upbringing and education of children under their control; or 
did it have a much narrower content ? Whatever might have been 
intended, neither of the clauses guaranteed specifically even the 
attributes which had been assigned to the concept in the inter­
national instruments. Articles 9, 10 and 11 of ICCPR identifies 
the rights of persons whose liberty has been infringed by the 
State. Article 5 of ECHR specifies exhaustively what the grounds 
of deprivation of liberty may be, and thereby effectively forbids 
arrest or detention on any other grounds, even if established by 
law. Provisions such as these give substance and meaning to 
otherwise airy concepts. When entrenched in a constitution, they 
offer protection to the citizen against social and political 
vicissititudes. They were, unfortunately, lacking in the 1972 
statement of fundamental rights. Instead, the National State 
Assembly was vested with a plenitude of power to legislate at will 
on matters affecting the liberty of the individual without providing 
any indication as to where the perimeter of state authority lay.
The freedom of movement falls into six distinct categories:
(1) freedom to choose a residence within the territory of a state,
(2) freedom to move about within the borders of a state, (3) freedom 
to leave a state, (4) freedom to enter a state, (5) freedom frcm 
expulsion from a state, and (6) freedom from exile.'*' The Const­
itution protected only the first two categories, omitting altogether
the freedom to leave the country. The latter freedom existed even
2
in the Hellenic age, was recognised in 1215 in the Magna Carta,
3
had been claimed as a part of the Indian tradition and of the 
American heritage, and has been described as the freedom which
1. ICCPR, Arts. 12, 13; ECHR P4, Arts. 2, 3, 4; ACHR, Art.22.
2. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, supra, Krishna Iyer J noted 
that it is recorded that Socrates, in his dialogue with Crito, spoke 
thus: "We further proclaim to any Athenian by the liberty which we 
allow him, that if he does not like us when he has become of age and 
has seen the ways of the city, and made our acquaintance, he may go 
where he please and take his goods with him. None of our laws will 
forbid him, or interfere with him. Anyone who does not like us and 
the city, and who wants to emigrate to a colony or to any other city 
may go where he likes, retaining his property", (at para.99).
3. Ibid., per Bhagwati J.
4. Kent v. Dulles, 357 US 116, per Douglas J.
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makes all other rights meaningful.'*' Even in Ceylon, four years
previously, T.S.Fernando J had asserted that:
Speaking for myself, I think it appropriate to add 
that the right to freedom of movement is an important 
right of a citizen, and our courts may not be found 
unwilling on a proper occasion and in appropriate 
proceedings to consider whether executive discretion 
can be equated to executive whim or c a p r i c e . 2
The freedom of expression extends beyond the liberty to
express one's own opinions, and includes the "freedom to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form
3
of art, or through any other media of his choice". It is a two- 
way flow, both outbound and inbound. Section 18(l)(g), however, 
protected only the "right to freedom of speech and expression, 
including publication"; the right to seek and receive information 
and ideas was not expressly recognised. In its absence, it was 
possible to argue that what was contemplated was a one-way flow 
of material. This argument would have gained strength from the 
fact that in all the international instruments it has been 
considered necessary to state explicitly that this right includes 
the freedom to seek and receive information and ideas.
Section 18(1)(f) stated that all citizens had the right to 
peaceful assembly and of association, but made no reference to 
the right to form and join a trade union. Although the former is 
the overall concept, with the latter as an element in that concept 
rather than a separate distinct right,^ the omission in that 
section of a specific reference to "the right to form and join 
trade unions for the protection of his interests" could well have 
had a debilitating effect, if not on the overall concept, at least 
on the nature and scope of trade union freedom.
Equality before the law, equal protection of the law, and 
non-discrimination are three related concepts. Section 18(1)(a) 
contained the first two concepts. But section 18(1)(h) which 
sought to protect citizens from discrimination in the exercise by 
them of their rights and freedoms, did so only in respect of one 
single right, namely, the right of access, on general terms of
1. Ibid.
2. In Re Ratnagopal (1968) 70 N.L.R. 409.
3. ICCPR, Art.19; ECHR, Art.10; ACHR, Art.13.
4. Young, James and Webster v. United Kingdom (7601/76,7806/77), 
Report: 3 EHRR 20.
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equality, to the public service. Furthermore, it proscribed 
discrimination only on the grounds of "race, religion, caste or 
sex", leaving out the sensitive and no less relevant classifi­
cations in Sri Lankan society of "language", "political or other 
opinion", "national or social origin", and "birth or other status", 
all of which were grounds on which discrimination was prohibited 
in the international instruments.'*' Similarly, section 18(1)(e) 
which presumably sought to give effect to Article 27 of ICCPR 
relating to the rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic 
minorities, recognised the right of a citizen only "to enjoy and 
promote his own culture", and specifically omitted his right, in 
comnunity with the other members of his group, to use his own 
language. These provisions would have contributed very little to 
reassure the minorities of equal treatment in the new Republic. 
History of language legislation
The right of a minority community "to use their own language" 
is a fundamental right. Before examining the provisions in the 
1972 Constitution relating to language, it would be useful to 
examine briefly the history of language legislation in Ceylon 
since Independence. The Senanayake Governments of 1948 and 1952 
were committed to the progressive replacement of English with 
Swabasha, i.e. Sinhala and Tamil, but took no tangible action to 
give effect to this commitment. The only practical step was the 
appointment in 1951 of an Official Languages Commission for the 
purpose of determining the procedure to be followed in adopting 
Sinhala and Tamil as official languages. This apparent apathy 
on the part of the Government soon gave rise to a suspicion that 
the English-educated Sinhalese, who held the positions of power, 
were quite content to let the status quo remain. The movement 
for Swabasha received an impetus with the resignation of S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike from the Cabinet in July 1951. The immediate cause 
for his resignation had been a resolution of the Sinhala Maha Sabha, 
which he then led, changing the Government with procrastination and 
delay on the language question. In September 1951, the Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party which he founded announced that:
It is most essential that Sinhalese and Tamil be adopted
as official languages immediately so that the people of
1. ICCPR, Arts.2(1), 26; ECHR, Art.14; ACHR, Art.l.
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this country may cease to be aliens in their own 
land; so that an end may be put to the inequity 
of condemning those educated in Sinhalese and Tamil 
to occupy the lowliest walks of life.-*-
The Swabasha movement in its first phase was clearly a protest
against the privileges maintained by the small and exclusive
English-educated elite and the dearth of opportunities available
to the Swabasha-educated. It was essentially a class, rather than
a communal, issue. The Swabasha movement was also chiefly a
Sinhalese movement since the Tamils, who had received a good
grounding in the English language in the Christian missionary
schools in the north, had no compelling reason to wish a change
from that language.
In 1953, in a rider attached to the final report of the
Official Languages Commission, chairman Sir Arthur Wijewardene
expressed the view that:
The replacement of English by Swabasha would have 
been very much easier if instead of two Swabasha 
languages as Official Languages one alone had been 
accepted. 2
In the next year, Wijewardene as chairman of the Commission on 
Higher Education in the National Languages, in a rider to a report 
of that commission, warned of grave disadvantages faced by Sinha­
lese students because few educational materials existed in Sinha­
lese, while materials in Tamil were available from South India.
He concluded:
Of course, this difficulty will not arise, if there 
is only one official language. 3
Wijewardene, who was a retired chief justice, was clearly stepping
outside his terms of reference to give quasi-official expression
to a view rapidly gaining ground among the Sinhalese that the
size of the Tamil minority was not sufficient to justify equal
treatment for the Tamil language.^ Having regard to the fact
that both in the civil service and in the judicial service, there
were nearly half as many Tamils as Sinhalese, parity of status
was seen by many as a device for perpetuating that position of
1. Bandaranaike Speeches, p. 141.
2. Final Report of the Official Languages Commission, S.P.XXII 
-1953, p.26.
3. Interim Report of the Commission on Higher Education in the 
National Languages, S.P.XXI-1954, p.6.
4. For a fuller account, see Robert N. Kearney, Communal ism and 
Language in the Politics of Ceylon (North Carolina: Duke University 
Press, 1967).
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advantage and for securing an unwarranted place for the Tamil 
minority vis-a-vis the Sinhalese majority. The SLFP re-examined 
its language policy and, in 1955, changed it to Sinhala only with 
a reasonable use of the Tamil language. The LSSP and the CP 
remained committed to parity. As the Sinhala-only movement 
gathered momentum in the country, the UNP led by Prime Minister 
Kotelawela, in an abrupt volte-face, abandoned its "national" 
stance, adopted Sinhala-only without any concessions for Tamil, 
and announced a premature dissolution of Parliament to obtain a 
mandate to implement its language policy.
In the wake of his decisive victory in April 1956, Prime
Minister Bandaranaike encountered considerable difficulty in
preparing draft legislation to give effect to his policy of
Sinhala-only "with a reasonable use of Tamil". Extreme chauvinist
elements within his coalition objected to any reference to the
Tamil language in the proposed legislation, and a university
lecturer began a fast-unto-death on the steps of parliament house
to ensure that no such reference would be made. Consequently, the
Official Language Act, which was passed in July 1956 amidst scenes
of unprecedented communal violence in many parts of the country,
merely provided that "the Sinhala language shall be the one official
language of Ceylon". Bandaranaike admitted that his bill was
defective in that the reasonable use of the Tamil language was not
provided for. But, he urged:
Let us all discuss round round-tables, or any other 
method, the practical difficulties that arise not 
merely in the implementation of this bill as it 
stands, but the practical difficulties that arise 
even apart from that. Let us discuss all these 
matters in a quieter atmosphere after the passage of 
this bill. 1
In August 1956, the Federal Party issued an ultimatum to the
Government and gave it one year to resolve the language question.
As this year drew to a close and the Federal Party prepared for its
threatened Satyagraha campaign, Bandaranaike began discussions with
FP leaders and, on 26 July 1957, entered into a formal agreement
o
which became known as the Bandaranaike -Che 1 vanayakam Pact. Under
1. Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 14 June 
1956, col.1922.
2. Logos, Vol.16, ed. Tissa Balasuriya,o.m.i. (Colombo: Centre 
for Society and Religion, 1977), pp.66-69.
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this pact, it was agreed that Tamil would be recognised by law 
as the language of a national minority, and that the language of 
administration in the northern and eastern provinces would be Tamil. 
It was also agreed to establish Regional Councils with powers over 
specified subjects including agriculture, co-operatives, lands 
and land development, colonisation, education, health, industries 
and fisheries, housing and social services, electricity, water 
schemes and roads. The Federal Party withdrew its proposed 
satyagraha, and Bandaranaike addressing the next annual sessions 
of the SLFP announced that "an honourable solution" had been 
reached:
The campaign which certain small elements of the 
Sinhalese started after my discussions with the 
Federal Party with the object of creating trouble 
and embarrasing the Government, as you all know, 
proved an ignominious failure. You will thus see 
that communal harmony has been restored to a great 
extent with honour and self-respect. Such harmony 
and friendship is absolutely necessary if we were 
to solve the grave economic problems that face our 
country.1
Far from having been an ignominious failure, the campaign against 
the pact grew in intensity. Bandaranaike was accused of having 
betrayed the Sinhalese community; the UNP led by J.R.Jayewardene 
organised a 72-mile march from Colombo to the Temple of the Tooth 
in Kandy "to save the Sinhala race"; and the Eksath Bhikku Peramuna 
(United Front of Buddhist Monks) threatened a satyagraha of their 
own if the pact was not repudiated. Meanwhile, the Federal Party 
made its own contribution to inflame Sinhalese passions by launching 
a campaign in the north to obliterate with tar the Sinhala letter
K  a  • •
eg (Sri) which, in a supreme act of thoughtlessness, had been 
used to replace the English alphabet on the licence plates of motor 
vehicles. Finally, in April 1958, besieged in his own residence 
by demonstrating Buddhist monks, Bandaranaike announced the 
abrogation of the pact.
The next few weeks saw an outbreak of comnunal violence, the 
like of which had not been seen before. A state of emergency was
declared, and both Federal Party leaders as well as militant
Sinhalese politicians were detained. As soon as the disturbances
subsided, but while the FP Members of Parliament were still under
1. Bandaranaike, Speeches, pp.165-166.
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detention, Bandaranaike introduced the Tamil Language (Special 
Provisions) Bill which sought to define the "reasonable use of 
Tamil". This Act provided for the use of Tamil as a medium of 
instruction in schools and in the universities, and as a medium 
of examination for admission into the public service. It also 
provided for the use of the Tamil language for "prescribed 
administrative purposes", and authorised the appropriate Minister 
to make the necessary regulations for the purpose. "The language 
issue", declared Bandaranaike, "can now be considered as settled, 
and it is not likely that serious communal disturbances will recur 
in the future".  ^ At the time of his death in September 1959, no 
regulations had, however, been made to prescribe the administrative 
purposes. Nor were any such regulations made by the Government of 
Mrs.Bandaranaike between 1960 and 1964. Instead, the Language of 
the Courts Act, enacted in 1961, provided for the progressive 
introduction of Sinhala-only in those courts in which it was 
practicable to do so.
The Federal Party agreed to support, and in fact joined, the 
UNP Government of Dudley Senanayake in 1965 on the express under­
standing that, inter alia, regulations would be framed under the
2
Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act. On 11 January 1966, while
the SLFP and the left parties demonstrated outside, and a state of
emergency was declared following the shooting of a Buddhist monk
who was participating in these demonstrations, Parliament approved 
3
the regulations. They provided that the Tamil language shall also 
be used: (1) in the northern and eastern provinces for the trans­
action of all government and public business and the maintenance of 
public records, (2) for correspondence between persons educated in 
Tamil and government officials, and (3) for correspondence between 
local authorities in the northern and eastern provinces and the 
central government. They also provided for the translation and the 
publication in Tamil of notifications, forms and other publications 
issued or used by public bodies, including the Government Gazette.
1. Message to the SLFP Seventh Annual Number, 1959, quoted by 
Kearney, Communal ism, p. 88.
2. Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact, 24 March 1965, reproduced in 
Logos, op.cit., at pp.71-72.
3. Government Gazette 14653 of 2 March 1966, reproduced in Logos, 
op.cit., at pp.69-70.
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The regulations, of course, asserted that the use of the Tamil 
language in the manner prescribed was "without prejudice to the 
operation of the Official Language Act, No.33 of 1956, which 
declared the Sinhala language to be the one official language of 
Ceylon". These regulations, however, were not implemented.
This, then, was the position in law in regard to the use of
the Tamil language when the Constituent Assembly met in 1970.
English was the mother tongue of the dwindling Burgher conmunity,
who accounted for 0.3 per cent of the total population in that
year, but no government since Independence had considered it
necessary to take note of that fact; and the strength of that
conmunity dwindled further as the Burghers continued to emigrate
to Australia and Canada. Noting that the draft basic resolutions
dealt with the language question in considerable detail, the
Prime Minister informed her Constitutional Affairs Minister that:
There is already ordinary legislation covering this 
topic and I doubt whether it would be wise to open 
this matter for debate again at this stage. The 
better course would appear to be to let those laws 
operate in the form in which they are. 1
Felix Dias Bandaranaike thought differently. He asked:
Must there not be some provision in this basic reso­
lution for the Sinhala law to be the authentic law ?
Is it not necessary to provide in the basic resolution 
the idea that Sinhala is to be the language of admin­
istration throughout the country, subject to the Tamil 
Language (Special Provisions) Act of 1958 ? ^
Having presumably made these comments in his capacity of Minister
of Public Administration, he then donned his other hat and as
Minister of Justice observed that:
These resolutions deal with the language of the courts.
They constitute an important departure from the 
Language of the Courts Act. It seems to me that this 
matter is more appropriately left.to the National 
Assembly to decide upon what rules should be made for 
the future. If some resolution is needed, would it 
not be sufficient to state in general terms that 
'Sinhala shall be the language of record in the courts 
in such areas as may be determined by the National 
Assembly; provided that facilities shall be provided 
for translations for witnesses, accused persons and 
parties, both oral and documentary, whenever nece­
ssary! . 3
1. Letter dated 9 December 1970, op.cit.
2. Letter dated 4 November 1970, op.cit.
3. Ibid.
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Colvin R. de Silva intended, however, to "follow as closely as
possible the terms of the United Front manifesto" on the subject
of language. He believed that if the language provisions were
spelt out explicitly at that stage it may be possible "to achieve
the co-operation of Tamil speaking people at the earliest possible
stage of our proceedings".'*'
Dr.de Silva's optimism was not justified. How could the
co-operation of the Tamil community have been achieved when, very
early in the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, a Federal
Party proposal for the establishment of an autonomous Tamil State
within the framework of a Federal Republic of Ceylon was summarily
rejected without discussion. The Government's attitude appeared
to be that the language issue, which it believed to be basic to
the Tamil question, had been satisfactorily resolved and no further
discussion or compromise was necessary at that stage. This
unrealistic, and unsympathetic, appraisal not only led to the
withdrawal of the Federal Party from the Constituent Assembly;
it was to lead very shortly to the transformation of the Federal
Party into the Tamil United Liberation Front, comnitted to finding
solutions to the problems of the Tamil community within the context
2
of a separate Tamil State altogether.
The 1972 Constitution recognised Sinhala as the official
language of Sri Lanka, and as the language of legislation and the
3
language of the courts. The use of the Tamil language was 
recognised to the following extent:
1. In accordance with the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act,
4
but without having regard to the regulations made thereunder
2. By requiring that every law should be "translated" into Tamil^
3. By providing that parties to legal proceedings and their pleaders, 
as well as judges, may participate in such proceedings in Tamil, 
and by requiring the State to provide interpretation facilities 
to enable them to do so.
1. Letter dated 16 November 1970, op.cit.
2. Resolution of the TULF National Convention at Pannakam, 
Vaddukoddai, on 14 May 1976, Logos, op.cit., p.5.
3. Ch. III.
4. S.8.
5. S.9(2).
6. S.11.
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By refusing to recognise the Tamil Language Regulations made in 
1966, the Constitution in fact guaranteed to the Tamil speaking 
people less than what was already provided for by law. By 
references to Tamil "translations" of laws and by specifically 
providing that the Tamil Language Regulations "shall be deemed 
to be subordinate legislation", not only was the superior position 
of the Sinhala language repeatedly asserted, the Tamil community 
was also unnecessarily humiliated.
The provisions in the Constitution which sought to protect
the right of every citizen to "take part in the conduct of public
affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives", and
to "vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by
secret ballot"  ^were, but for two exceptions, immaculate.
Firstly, in the delimitation of electoral districts, the number
of "residents" and not "citizens" continued to be the determining 
2
factor. Consequently, in the central highlands where the large 
majority of "stateless" persons of Indian origin continued to 
reside, a vote was of greater value than elsewhere. Secondly, the 
Constitution provided that the Constituent Assembly which became, 
by operation of law, the first National State Assembly shall, 
unless sooner dissolved, "continue for a period of five years 
commencing on the date of the adoption of the Constitution by the
3
Constituent Assembly". The members of the Constituent Assembly 
were those who had been elected to the House of Representatives at 
the general election held in May 1970. At that time, the life of 
Parliament was five years. Since no mandate was sought at the time 
to extend that period, it must be presumed that the people intended 
to delegate their legislative and executive authority only for 
that period. When the Constitution was adopted on 22 May 1972, 
two years of that period had already elapsed. Therefore, when the 
Constitution provided that the first National State Assembly shall
4
continue for a period of five years, the elected representatives were 
unilaterally giving themselves authority to continue to exercise
1. ICCPR, Art.25. See also ECHR PI, Art.3; ACHR, Art.23.
2. S.78(2).
3. S.42(5).
4. The usual term of a National State Assembly was six years. 
Hence, this term of five years appeared to have been arbitrarily 
fixed.
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power for an additional two years. It was an indefensible 
position and was in conflict with the spirit of the right which 
the Constitution was seeking to guarantee.'*'
The Omitted Rights
If the rights which were sought to be protected in the 1972 
Constitution were deficient in many respects, the statement of 
fundamental rights and freedoms was also a remarkably incomplete 
document. Several rights which are almost universally accepted 
in contemporary society were omitted. For instance:
1. The prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degra-
2
ding treatment or punishment. It could not have been contended
that these forms of treatment were non-existent in Sri Lanka. One
year before the Constituent Assembly met, a commission of inquiry
which investigated the police had reported, inter alia, on police
excesses in the following terms:
The Police do not enjoy the goodwill of the public.
The public image of the Police is not at all what it 
should be. The fear of battery by the Police is in 
every citizen. Several cases of torture have come 
to light in the courts . . . Even after public att­
ention has been focussed on a number of incidents in 
which the Police have belaboured the public, reports
of Police violence still continue to appear in the
Press. 3
2. The prohibition of slavery, the slave trade, servitude/j f - I r -r .11
and forced or compulsory labour. While slavery, in the conven­
tional sense, had been abolished in 1844, some of the "institutions 
and practices similar to slavery" were perhaps not altogether non­
existent either in the paternalistic south or in the caste-ridden 
north of Sri Lanka. These included debt bondage, serfdom, forced 
marriages and exploitation of child labour.^ The concept of "forced 
or compulsory labour" was also no longer understood solely in terms
of the literal meaning of the words. In interpreting it, in the
light of relevant ILO Conventions, it included other elements such
1. For a legal justification of the "extension", see Colvin 
R.de Silva, "The Right to Rule till 1977", Ceylon Observer, 21 May 
1974; and "JR and the Constitution", Ceylon Daily News, 20 May 1975.
2. ICCPR, Arts.7, 10(1); ECHR, Art.3; ACHR, Art.5(2).
3. Final Report of the Police Commission, S.P.XXI-1970, para.54.
4. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the 
Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 1956, 
Art.l.
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as that the work or service is performed by the worker against his 
will, that the requirement that the work or service be performed is 
unjust or oppressive, or that the work or service itself involves 
unavoidable hardship.'*'
3. The right to a fair trial. In the determination of his
civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
a person is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
2
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
Only the last mentioned element of this right was sought to be 
protected by the Constitution.
4. The rights of accused persons. Everyone charged with a
3
criminal offence is entitled to the following minimum rights:
a) to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law;
b) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and 
in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
c) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his 
defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;
d) to be tried without undue delay;
e) to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or 
through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not 
sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it 
free when the interests of justice so require;
f) to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to 
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf 
under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
g) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot 
understand or speak the language used in court;
h) not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess 
guilt;
i) not to be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any 
act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence 
under national or international law at the time when it was 
committed, and not to have imposed on him a heavier penalty 
than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence 
was committed;
1. Iversen v. Norway (1468/62), CD 12, 80; X v. Federal Republic 
of Germany (4653/70), CD 46, 22. See also ILO Convention No.29 
concerning Forced Labour, 1930, and ILO Convention No.105 concerning 
the Abolition of Forced Labour, 1957.
2. ICCPR, Art.14(1); ECHR, Art.6(1); ACHR, Art.8(1).
3. ICCPR, Arts. 14, 15; ECHR, Arts. 6, 7; ACHR, Arts. 8, 9.
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j) to have his conviction and sentence reveiwed ny a higher 
tribunal according to law; 
k) not to be tried and punished again for an offence for which 
he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accor- 
with the law;
1) to be compensated in accordance with the law if he had been 
sentenced by a final judgment through a miscarriage of 
justice.
Some of these rights were provided for, in varying degree, in the 
nineteenth century Criminal Procedure Code and Evidence Ordinance. 
But being ordinary statutes, they have sometimes been ignored or 
expressly superseded in later special legislation. Some, like the 
prohibition of retroactive criminal legislation and the right to 
compensation, were not provided for anywhere. In any event, the 
Constitution did not seek to protect any of these principles.
5. Family Rights. There are six distinct family rights,'*' 
namely:
a) the right to marry;
b) the right to found a family;
c) the right not to marry without the free and full consent of 
the parties;
d) equal rights of the spouses to, in, and after, marriage;
e) the family's right to protection;
f) the right of the child to registration at birth, a name and 
a nationality, and to necessary protection.
Some of these rights arose by implication in the regulatory laws 
relating to marriage, divorce and the registration of births and 
deaths, but none were guaranteed in the Constitution.
6. The right to privacy, honour and reputation. Everyone 
has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence, as well as to protection by law against 
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. This right assumes 
particular importance in the context of interferences made possible 
by modem scientific and technical devices which are now at the 
disposal of the State. Therefore, the protection afforded by the 
nineteenth century statutes regulating the activities of postal 
and telecommunication authorities was hardly adequate.
1. ICCPR, Arts.23, 24; ACHR, Arts.17, 19.
2. ICCPR, Art.17; ECHR, Art.8; ACHR, Arts. 11, 14.
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7. The rights relating to property. Without prejudice to 
the right of the State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary 
to control the use of property in accordance with the general 
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions 
or penalties, every natural or legal person may be said to be 
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, and the 
right not to be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by 
the general principles of international law.-*- In the Constituent 
Assembly, the UNP moved the inclusion of the following provision:
(a) No person shall be deprived of his property save by law.
(b) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requi­
sitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority 
of a law which provides for reasonable compensation
for the property so acquired or requisitioned and 
fixes the amount of the compensation or specifies 
the principles on which, and in the manner in which, 
the compensation is to be determined and given. 2
This amendment was sponsored very eloquently and at length by J.R. 
Jayewardene, but it was rejected and no reasons were given for the 
rejection. The United Front manifesto, however, recognised the 
concept of private ownership. It promised, inter alia, to "redeem 
rural indebtedness", "develop land holdings", "consolidate frag­
mented holdings", "distribute land among landless peasants", "make 
it easier for persons to build houses for themselves and their 
children by providing and extending facilities for clearing title 
to land and making land, material and low interest loans available 
for this purpose", "to actively pursue the policy of Ceylonisation 
of ownership in the private sector", and to assist "small indus­
trialists". ^
One more observation remains to be made on the statement of 
fundamental rights contained in the 1972 Constitution. Apart from 
the concepts of equality before the law and equal protection of 
the law, and the rights to life, liberty and security of person, 
every other right was guaranteed only to citizens of Sri Lanka. 
There were in Sri Lanka in 1971 a total of 1,195,368 Indian Tamils. 
Of them, 134,316 had obtained Ceylonese citizenship. In 1964 
agreement had been reached between the Governments of India and 
Ceylon that, of an estimated 975,000 who were "stateless",
525,000 would be returned to India over a fifteen year period,
1. ECHR PI, Art.l; ACHR, Art.21. See also UDHR, Art.17.
2. Constituent Assembly Debates, 20 May 1971, col.1154.
3. Op.cit.
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while 300,000 would be granted Ceylonese citizenship.'*' The fate 
of the remainder was to be examined on a later occasion. Therefore, 
there was in Sri Lanka in 1972 a very substantial body of persons 
who were not citizens of Sri Lanka, but whose continued presence 
was vital for the economic development of the country. They were 
virtually permanent residents who lived and worked on the tea 
plantations of the central highlands. But in the new Republic, 
to them was not guaranteed the right to freedom of thought, consc­
ience or religion; the right to enjoy or promote their own culture; 
the right of peaceful assembly or of association; the right to 
freedom of speech or expression; the right to freedom of movement; 
or the right not to be arrested, held in custody, imprisoned or 
detained except in accordance with the law.
Limitations on the Exercise and 
Operation of the Fundamental 
Rights
The statement of rights was, of course, not absolute. In the 
formln which they were guaranteed, and in regard to their future 
exercise and operation, they were subject to the following limi­
tations ;
1. Section 18(3) declared that all existing law shall operate
notwithstanding any inconsistency with any of the rights. In other
words, the guaranteed rights were to operate subject to the entire
body of laws, written and unwritten, which already existed in the
country. However archaic such a law might have been, and however
inconsistent such archaic law might be with a right considered
fundamental in the last quarter of the twentieth century, that
archaic law was to prevail in order to determine the rights of
citizens and other persons in the Republic. This was the opposite
of what the Governor-General had exhorted the Members of Parliament
to do when they functioned as a Constituent Assembly. The 1970
Throne Speech promised that the new Constitution will become the
fundamental law of the country, superseding both the 1946 Const-
2
itution "and also other laws that may conflict" with it. The
1. W.T.Jayasinghe, Tamils in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Dept, of Govt. 
Printing, 1976), pp.12-19.
2. Supra, pp.78-79.
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Indian Constituent Assembly achieved this result by providing in
Article 13(1) of the Constitution that:
All laws in force in the territory of India before 
the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as 
they are inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, 
be void.
Thereafter, it was the duty of the Indian Supreme Court, whenever 
its jurisdiction was invoked in that regard, to determine whether 
or not an earlier law conformed to the new standards.
2. Section 18(2) provided that:
The exercise and operation of the fundamental rights 
and freedoms provided in this Chapter shall be subject 
to such restrictions as the law prescribes in the 
interests of national unity and integrity, national 
security, national economy, public safety, public 
order, the protection of public health or morals or 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others 
or giving effect to the Principles of State Policy 
set out in section 16.
In other words, the National State Assembly was authorised to make
laws that conflicted with fundamental rights if it considered that
to do so would be in the interests of one or other of the enumerated
grounds. While it is necessary that the limitations on the exercise
and operation of certain rights should be clearly set out in a bill
of rights, the weakness in an omnibus escape clause such as this
is easily discernible. For instance, the right to life may have
to be restricted to the extent necessary to protect the right to
life of others. This is usually done by enabling one to exercise
his right of self-defence even to the extent of causing the death
of an aggressor if he had reason to believe that his own life was
in danger. But when the legislature is empowered to restrict the
right to life in the interests of "national unity", "national
economy" or "for the protection of public morals", not only does
the right cease to exist altogether, but a whole new hitherto
untraversed and sanctified territory is laid bare at the feet of
a ravaging legislator. That is, the legislature is expressly
authorised to extend its legislative power into areas which it
would not otherwise have dared to enter. Again, certain rights may
have to be restricted on grounds peculiar to them. For instance,
the right to freedom of expression may have to be restricted by
Ill
by law to prevent the disclosure of information received in confi­
dence, or to maintain the authority and impartiality of the judi­
ciary. Therefore, the effect of inserting an omnibus escape 
clause such as this, particularly one so wide and extensive,wis to 
detract altogether from the guaranteed rights. Indeed, if section 
18(2) had merely stated that "the exercise and operation of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms shall be subject to such restrictions 
as may be prescribed by law", the result may perhaps have not been 
very different.
In the Constituent Assembly, the Minister assured that 
whether a law
is in the interests of national unity, etc., is ^
subject to what we lawyers call an objective test.
But it is possible to argue that section 18(2), by using the words 
"as the law prescribes" made the legislature the sole judge as to 
whether it was necessary to transgress a right. Support for this 
contention is found in comparable provisions in foreign instruments. 
For instance, the Indian Parliament was empowered to "impose
2
reasonable restrictions" on the exercise of particular rights. 
Similarly, ECHR contemplated "restrictions as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society". The ICCPR speaks of 
restrictions which "are provided by law and are necessary" for the
4
protection of certain interests. There can be no doubt that where 
qualifying words such as "reasonable" or "necessary" are used, it 
is only by applying an objective test that a court can, in each 
case, determine whether or not the legislature has acted within 
its authority. But where the exercise and operation of a right is 
not subject to considerations which are capable of being objectively 
assessed by a court, it would appear that the question whether or 
not a restriction ought to be prescribed in the interests of one 
or other of the specified grounds might well be entirely within the 
subjective determination of the legislature. At most, if a 
petitioner had succeeded in showing that an impugned bill was
1. Constituent Assembly Debates, 10 June 1971, col.1328.
2. Art.19(2).
3. See, e.g. Art.11.
4. See, e.g. Art.12.
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prima facie inconsistent with section 18(2), the onus would 
probably have shifted upon the State to show that the proposed 
legislative measure was "in the interests" of one of the purposes 
described in that subsection; "in the interests", of course, 
being words of great amplitude, as the Constitutional Court was 
shortly to hold.'*'
3. Section 52 provided that:
(1) The National State Assembly may enact a law, 
which, in some particular or respect, is 
inconsistent with any provision in the Const­
itution without amending or repealing such 
provision of the Constitution provided that 
such law is passed by the majority required 
for the amendment of the Constitution.
(2) A law passed under the provisions of sub­
section (1) of this section shall not be 
interpreted as amending the provisions of 
the Constitution with which such law is 
inconsistent.
In the Constituent Assembly, the Minister explained that this
section meant what it said:
There can be cases - they are extremely rare cases 
but they can, in fact, happen in practice . . . - 
where a bill or a provision thereof may be repugnant 
to the Constitution, which the House wishes never­
theless to accept and pass into law without thereby 
changing the Constitution. We may wish to preserve 
the Constitution in its generality completely, but 
we may wish to pass in one particular way a special 
law that may offend the Constitution. 2
Therefore, under section 18(2), a bill which was in conflict with
a fundamental right could nevertheless be passed by a simple
majority if it was possible to fit that bill into one of the slots
created by that subsection. But if that bill fell outside the
ambit of that subsection, in that it could not be legitimised by
reference to a single of the many grounds on which the legislature
was permitted to transgress a fundamental right, it could yet be
passed by a two-third majority under section 52. Meanwhile, the
bill of rights remained inviolate in all its virginal purity.
4. Section 48(2) provided that:
No institution administering justice and likewise 
no other institution, person or authority shall 
have the power or jurisdiction to inquire into, 
pronounce upon or in any manner call in question 
the validity of any law of the National State 
Assembly.
1. Sri Lanka Press Council Bill, (1973) DCC Vol.l, p.l, at 15.
2. Constituent Assembly Debates, 4 July 1971, col.2849.
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Accordingly, it was possible for a bill which was in conflict with 
a fundamental right, and to which section 52 should have applied, 
to find its way into the statute book with a simple majority, and 
to remain there. Subsection (1) of this section provided that a 
bill passed by the National State Assembly shall become a law when 
the certificate of the Speaker is endorsed upon it. But if the 
question of its inconsistency was not raised within the prescribed 
time and in the prescribed manner, the Speaker would not be alerted 
to any possible inconsistency and the bill would receive his 
certificate upon its passage with a simple majority. Thereafter, 
however patent the inconsistency might be, and however seriously 
it might derogate from a fundamental right, the law inadvertently 
passed with an inadequate majority will continue to remain on the 
statute book. For instance, section 55 of the 1946 Constitution 
required judicial officers to be appointed by the Judicial Service 
Commission. Section 41 of the Bribery Act, No.11 of 1954, as 
amended by the Bribery (Amendment) Act, No.40 of 1958, empowered 
the Governor-General, acting on the advice of the Minister of 
Justice, to appoint members of a bribery tribunal. These members 
were judicial officers within the meaning of that expression in 
the Constitution. The amending Act had not been passed by the 
special majority required for bills which sought to amend any 
provision of the Constitution. The Privy Council held that the 
amending Act was invalid and that the provisions of the Constitution 
prevailed."^  But if this situation had arisen under the 1972 
Constitution, both the fundamental law as well as the offending 
law would have been regarded as valid and would co-exist with 
each other.
The Enforcement of Fundamental Rights 
The United Front manifesto promised a constitution which would 
"secure fundamental rights and freedoms to all citizens". The 
ordinary dictionary meaning of the term "secure" in this context 
is "to guarantee". When a right is guaranteed, there would immedi­
ately arise a corresponding duty on the part of the relevant state 
agencies to observe and respect that right; a duty which would be 
capable of being enforced at the instance of a person who is entitled
1. Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe, supra.
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to enjoy that right. Without the power to enforce, a statement 
of fundamental rights merely serves as an adornment or as a piece 
of political rhetoric. In 1959, the Joint Select Comnittee of 
Parliament headed by Prime Minister Bandaranaike, which examined 
the question of guaranteeing fundamental rights in the Constitution, 
recognised:
The right to move the highest tribunal by appropriate 
proceedings for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights 
and to obtain suitable redress, for which purpose such 
tribunal shall be vested with the power to issue the 
necessary directions or orders or writs requisite for 
the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. 1
Since the question of declaring Ceylon to be a Republic was also
under consideration at that time,
The Committee . . . were of the opinion that appeals 
to the Privy Council should be discontinued, but that 
a new judicial tribunal should be set up to adjudicate 
on constitutional issues as well as to entertain 
appeals from the Supreme Court.2
When fundamental rights are guaranteed in a constitution, one of the 
agencies which is placed under a duty to observe, respect, and not 
to transgress them, is the legislature. Since the legislature 
speaks and acts through laws made by it, the jurisdiction of a court 
to enforce fundamental rights must necessarily include the power to 
examine and test the validity of laws by reference to the guaranteed 
statement of fundamental rights. There is no reason to believe that 
in 1959 the Joint Select Committee understood the concept of "enfor­
cement" in any other way.
Eleven years later, all the political parties which had been 
represented on that committee, including some of the members who 
had actually served on it, appeared to have undergone a dramatic 
change of attitude. In the Constituent Assembly, on the proposal 
of the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, it was unanimously 
agreed that:
No institution administering justice, nor any other 
institution, person or authority, shall have the power 
to inquire into or pronounce upon the validity of any 
law enacted by the National Assembly.^
Before this basic resolution was discussed in the Assembly, the
ministry of constitutional affairs explained to members of the
government parliamentary group, many of whom were laymen unfamiliar
1. Supra.
2. Supra.
3. Basic Resolution 22, Constituent Assembly Debates, 4 July 1971, 
col.2895.
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with legal concepts and principles that:
If we must have justiciable rights and freedoms and 
if we must at the same time move, without hindrance, 
towards the establishment of socialism, we have no 
option but to adopt a procedure ensuring that the 
implementation of laws passed by the Assembly is not 
held up by court actions relating to the validity 
of laws.
It would be foolish not to take heed of what 
happened in India. There, the implementation of 
progressive legislation was held up for years by 
court proceedings challenging the validity of prog­
ressive laws mostly upon the pretext that they were 
inconsistent with justiciable rights and freedoms.
In the first fifteen years after the commencement 
of the new Constitution, a vast number of consti­
tutional cases were instituted; and of these, about 
8000 cases, reported in the law books, are generally 
available in Ceylon to members of the legal profession.
The problem arising out of uncertainty as to the 
validity of laws is bad enough under the present 
Constitution. It is sufficient to refer to a few 
instances. It is now fifteen years since the 
enactment of the Official Language Act was passed 
/¥ic7 and the ordinary courts of the land have still 
not decided whether this important piece of legislation 
is good law or not. The utter confusion and the 
consequent injustice that arose as a result of the 
uncertainty as to the validity of laws relating to 
Labour Courts and Tribunals is another example.
The Citizenship Act, the validity of which was 
challenged in the courts of Ceylon as well as in 
the Privy Council, is still another.
Under the new Constitution, which will contain a 
statement of justiciable rights and freedoms, the 
position will be immeasurably worse. Reactionaries 
of every kind will exploit to the limit the normal 
judicial processes to oppose and delay social progress 
if no adequate constitutional safeguard is provided.1
The Prime Minister, at least initially, appears to have had a
different perspective of the problem. In her letter to the Minister
2
of Constitutional Affairs three months previously, she made the
following observation which "represents not only my own thinking,
but also that of my party":
The resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly 
contemplates the establishing of a Constitution 
which will be the fundamental law of Sri Lanka. To 
give effect and meaning to this resolution, the new 
Constitution should provide that even the Legis­
lature should be bound by this fundamental law.
There appears to be no better way of securing this
1. Comments on Basic Resolutions submitted to the Steering and 
Subjects Committee, 3 February 1971.
2. Op.cit.
116
result than by giving power to an independent body 
like an established court to examine whether any 
piece of legislation is contrary to such fundamental 
law. The arrangements contemplated for this 
purpose in the basic resolutions proposed by you do 
not appear to be satisfactory. To give the power 
of judicial review to the courts is not to establish 
the superiority of the courts over the legislature.
It only proceeds on the assumption that the power 
of the people is superior to both the judiciary and 
the legislature; it means that where a law conflicts 
with the will of the people as enshrined in the 
Constitution, the courts ought to give effect to the 
Constitution rather than to the law which is in 
breach of it. If, however, the will of the people 
as contained in the Constitution subsequently under­
goes a change, the provisions for amendment of the 
Constitution should be sufficient to meet such a 
situation.
Dealing specifically with the question of securing fundamental
rights, the Prime Minister added:
The concept of fundamental rights as I understand it 
when incorporated in a Constitution is intended 
primarily to be a limitation on legislative and 
executive abuses of power. Here again I think that 
the new Constitution should give a sufficient 
assurance to the citizens of this country that 
legislatures and governments of the future will be 
bound to observe the fundamental rights written 
into the Constitution, and that they will not remain 
mere declarations of intent which can be departed 
from by any future legislature if it were so minded.
The dichotomy in the coalition Cabinet was clear. The LSSP Minister 
of Constitutional Affairs believed that enforceable rights consti­
tute road blocks on the march towards socialism. The Prime Minister 
and the SLFP majority believed that fundamental rights constitute 
the limits of state power, and should necessarily be enforceable 
in every respect. The liberal optimism of the SLFP was, however, 
short-lived.
On 3 July 1971, the Minister of Constitutional Affairs
introduced in the Constituent Assembly the basic resolution which
sought to deprive the courts in Sri Lanka of the power to examine
and pronounce upon the validity of legislation. He explained that:
This is a principle which is a direct application of 
the principle that prevails in respect of the sover­
eignity of Parliament in Britain. I suggest the equi­
valent sovereign National Assembly should be in the 
same position.
1. Constituent Assembly Debates, 3 July 1971, col.2831.
117
He did not explain, nor did any member from the opposition benches 
observe, that the United Kingdom had neither a written constitution 
nor a bill of rights; and that the supremacy of the Parliament of 
that country rested on two principles: that no Parliament is bound 
or limited by Acts of its predecessors or by its own earlier Acts, 
and that the statutes enacted by Parliament and in force at any 
time are the highest law in that they alter or nullify any common 
law rules or earlier statutory provisions that are inconsistent 
with them.'*’ Neither of these principles appeared to have any 
relevance to the constitutional scheme envisaged in the United Front 
manifesto, to implement which the people's mandate had been sought 
for and obtained. Indeed, they ran counter to that scheme.
In support of his basic resolution, and to illustrate the
urgent need for it, the Minister cited three cases. The first of
2
these was Kodeswaran v. The Attorney-General which was concerned 
with the highly emotional subject of language. The plaintiff was 
a Tamil officer in the general clerical service of the government 
who had been denied an increment, on the authority of a treasury 
circular, for having failed to obtain proficiency in Sinhala. In 
the District Court of Colombo, he successfully argued that the 
Official Language Act of 1956, in pursuance of which the circular 
had been issued, was ultra vires on the ground that in enacting it 
Parliament had transgressed the prohibitions against discrimination 
contained in section 29 of the 1946 Constitution. The District 
Judge, in entering judgment for the plaintiff, held the Act to be 
void on that ground. On appeal, the Supreme Court held, on 30 Aug­
ust 1967, that the provisions of the covenants and rules governing 
the public service were not enforceable by action. Accordingly, 
the judgment of the District Court was set aside. The Supreme Court 
did not examine or pronounce upon the validity of the Official 
Language Act; it noted the principle observed by both the United 
States and Indian Supreme Courts that if a case could be decided on 
one of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question and the 
other a question of statutory construction or general law, the 
court will decide only the latter. On further appeal, the Privy 
Council, on 11 December 1969, held that a civil servant in Ceylon
1. J.E.S.Fawcett, "Bills of Rights: Some Alternatives", Do We 
Need a Bill of Rights ? ed. Colin Campbell (London:Temple Smith,1980), 
p.134.
2. D.C.Colombo 1026/Z.
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did have a right of action against the Crown for arrears of salary. 
It did not consider it proper to express an opinion on the consti­
tutional question "without the assistance of the considered 
judgment of the Supreme Court". Accordingly, the case was remitted 
to the Supreme Court for that purpose.
Explaining this case to the Constituent Assembly, the Minister
said:
It will astonish most people in this country to hear 
that what has been considered the most vital law that 
was passed in 1956 by the Government of the late Mr.
Bandaranaike is still in issue in the courts . . . Can 
you imagine a situation like that ? Here is a basic 
law oftur country, and by reason of the power given 
to the courts to sit in judgment on the validity of 
the law as distinct from the interpretation of the 
meaning of the law, we do not know where we are and 
we are rightly acting on the footing that the law is 
a good one until it is set aside. But, just imagine, 
how do you run this country in that situation ? . . .
If the courts do declare this law invalid and unconst­
itutional, heavens alive ! The chief work done from
1956 onwards will be undone. You will have to restore 
the egg from the omlette into which it was beaten and 
cooked. 1
The Minister omitted to point out that the 1946 Constitution 
expressly limited the legislative power of Parliament and prohibited 
it from making certain types of laws. If, therefore, a court dec­
lared a particular law to be invalid, it was because Parliament in
purporting to make that law had exceeded its powers. In fact, when 
the Official Language Bill was presented to Parliament, several 
members submitted that the Bill sought to confer on the Sinhalese
comnunity a privilege or advantage which was being denied to persons
2
of other communities, and it was precisely on that ground that 
the law was later challenged in court. If, on the other hand, the 
Minister's complaint was of delay, and the consequent uncertainty 
as toihe state of the law, there were other options available 
which were not presented to the Constituent Assembly. For instance, 
jurisdiction on constitutional questions could have been vested 
exclusively in the highest court, as had been done under several 
Commonwealth constitutions and as was contemplated by Bandaranaike 
in 1959. Additionally, such court could have been directed to 
give priority to such matters. It could have been clarified that
1. Constituent Assembly Debates, 3 July 1971, col.2832.
2. Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 5 June 1956, 
cols.735-746.
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the decision of a court on the validity of a law should not affect 
past acts done under that law. If provisions such as these had been 
included in the 1946 Constitution, the question of the validity of 
the Official Language Act might have been examined and determined 
in the same year in which it was preferred, and there would have 
been no reason to fear that sometime in the dim uncertain future 
the eggwauB have to be restored from the omlette into which it had 
been beaten and cooked.
The second case cited by the Minister was Walker Sons & Co.Ltd 
v. Fry'*' which was instituted during the upsurge of "judicial power" 
consciousness in the early 1960s. Section 55 of the 1946 Consti­
tution required judicial officers to be appointed by the Judicial 
Service Conmission. The Industrial Disputes Act, as amended by 
Act No.62 of 1957, provided for the appointment of Presidents of 
Labour Tribunals by the Public Service Caimission. The function of 
a Labour Tribunal was to entertain applications by workmen for 
relief or redress in respect of matters relating to the terms of 
employment or the conditions of labour. These included questions 
arising out of the termination of the workman's services and 
relating to gratuities or other benefits payable on termination.
On such matters, the Tribunal was empowered to make such order as 
may appear to it to be just and equitable. The workman had to 
make his choice between the remedy afforded by this Act and any 
other legal remedy he may have. The Tribunal's order was final, 
subject to an appeal to the Supreme Court on a question of law.
Any sum of money ordered by a Tribunal to be paid to a workman 
could be recovered summarily through a Magistrate's Court in the 
same manner as a fine. In 1962, it was argued before the Supreme 
Court that the President of a Labour Tribunal was a "judicial 
officer" and that, not having been appointed in the manner required 
by the Constitution, he had no jurisdiction to make any order. On 
30 November 1965, in Walker Sons St Co.Ltd v. Fry, three judges of 
the Supreme Court, with two others dissenting, held that a Labour 
Tribunal exercised judicial power and that it had no jurisdiction
to exercise that power unless it had been appointed by the Judicial
2
Service Commission. On 16 May 1966, in Moosajees Ltd v. Fernando, 
a bench of five judges of the Supreme Court, by a majority of four
1. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 73.
2. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 414.
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to one, interpreted the judgment of the Privy Council in Liyanage 
v. The Queen  ^as precluding officials whose powers and functions 
are mainly administrative from exercising judicial power. Accor­
dingly, it held that an Industrial Court appointed by the Minister 
of Labour under the Industrial Disputes Act, or an Arbitrator 
appointed by the Commissioner of Labour under the same Act, was 
not entitled to exercise judicial power and therefore had no juris­
diction to adjudicate upon existing rights of parties. On appeal, 
the Privy Council held, on 9 March 1967, that the powers and duties 
of an Arbitrator, an Industrial Court and of a Labour Tribunal were 
the same, namely, arbitral, and that none of them were judicial
offices. The judgment of the Privy Council was by a majority of 
2
three to two.
The Minister referred to this series of cases as an illus­
tration of "the utter disorganisation that flows from the principle 
that the courts can sit in judgment on the validity of a law". He 
said:
Another major contribution of the late Mr.S.W.R.D.
Bandaranaike1 s Government to the legal system of this 
country, for the solution of problems pertaining to 
industrial relations, was the bringing in of an amend­
ment which added a whole chapter to the Industrial 
Disputes Act creating the labour tribunals . . . The 
labour tribunals functioned for a time until there 
came a stage at which the employers of the country 
found the labour tribunal system extremely trouble­
some because, rightly, the presidents thereof brought 
a non-judicial attitude - not a merely judicial 
attitude - to bear. Ultimately there was an appli­
cation for a writ taken to the Supreme Court . . . 
on the ground that the labour tribunal that decided 
a particular case was illegal, unconstitutional, in 
that the provisions of the Constitution had not been 
observed and the Judicial Service Commission had not 
appointed the president of the tribunal.
Now what happened ? The matter went before three 
judges. Then it went before five judges, and given 
half the chance, it would have gone before seven or 
nine. It was discussed from every point of view.
The judges were divided among themselves as to the 
grounds on which they came to their conclusions.
No two judgments were alike or agreed on what they 
said was the law, except that three judges for three 
different sets of reasons came to the conclusion here 
that . . . the Judicial Service Commission should 
have appointed the president . . . and two judges 
said otherwise.
1. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265.
2. United Engineering Workers Union v. Devanayagam (1967) 
69 N.L.R. 289.
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The matter went to the Privy Council, and in the 
Privy Council we had the unusual situation where the 
judges permitted themselves to publish their division.
Three judges of the Privy Council said: 'No, this is 
correct'. Two said: 'This is wrong'. So three 
judges here and two there said one thing, and three 
judges there and two here said another . . . the view
of the three judges there prevailed. 3
The Minister was not complaining of the ultimate outcome of this
case:
What they held was a very important decision: that 
the labour tribunals are not courts in the sense of
the usual court, and that their function is that of
settling disputes, not just sitting in judgment upon 
people - a very valuable judgment of the utmost 
social importance on the country.3
Nor did he think that judges in Ceylon lacked social consciousness.
In 1968, speaking from the opposition front bench he had paid tribute
to them:
It is to my knowledge the endeavour of our courts 
to march with the times. It is so. There are 
plenty of judges of that spirit and outlook in the 
field, for instance, of industrial law. Permit me 
to say this here. One should not be speaking of 
the judges before whom one practises. On the other 
hand, one should not be inhibited in respect of 
them when a general point can be illustrated. I say 
with all respect and without any possibility of 
others misunderstanding that, for instance, contem­
porary judges from the Chief Justice downwards 
have in respect of certain matters of industrial 
legislation concerning trade unions and so forth 
made pronouncements from the bench which indicate 
clearly that the contemporary spirit is being 
sought to be applied in the courts . . . Contem­
porary judges from the Chief Justice downwards have 
in judgments, in the very industrial fields I have 
spoken of, shown that they are infused with anxiety 
to bring the spirit of the times into play in that 
field.3
What then was he complaining of ? Was it that this particular point 
of constitutional law had been raised, whether because "the employ­
ers of the country found the labour tribunal system extremely 
troublesome" or, more probably, because a sharp-witted lawyer 
sensed that the current trend of judicial reasoning might well 
apply to the brief he had in hand ? Or was it that there was a 
lack of uniformity in the thought processes of judges ? These are
1. Constituent Assembly Debates, 3 July 1971, col.2834.
2. Ibid., at col.2835.
3. Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives) 6 November 
1968, col.1845.
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all features of a free, democratic and open society. But if the 
Minister was complaining of the disorganisation that resulted from 
the judgment of the Supreme Court in November 1965, the respon­
sibility ought to have been placed squarely on the government of 
the day. It was incumbent on the government to have taken imme­
diate action either to amend the Industrial Disputes Act to bring 
it into conformity with the Constitution, or to amend the Consti­
tution so as to exclude from the jurisdiction of the Judicial 
Service Commission those institutions and offices created under 
the Industrial Disputes Act.^
The third case on which the Minister relied in support of 
his proposition was an unusual one. He said:
In the 1940s when the first Parliament of this Island 
was elected there were several election petitions. And 
in connection with them there were matters taken to 
the Supreme Court in appeal in regard to the question 
of deposits. There was a decision arrived at by three 
judges about 19 or 20 years ago which had remained 
there; and there had been neither occasion nor need to 
challenge a point in respect of which I think all of 
us as lawyers have advised our clients. Then as a 
result of the Bandaragama by-election an appeal came 
up before three judges in modem, or more accurately, 
in contemporary times, and after tremendous argument 
it was held that what had been decided some 19 years 
ago in one direction was obiter in character or open 
to be revised, and there was an exactly opposite 
decision given.3
The Minister was referring to the 1969 case of David Perera v.
3
Peries. The question which arose was whether, upon an appeal 
from the decision of an Election Judge, a report of the Supreme 
Court that a corrupt practice had been committed by a person, was 
effective to disqualify that person from membership of the House 
of Representatives. It had been argued, by Dr.Colvin R.de Silva 
himself, that the expression "report of an Election Judge" in 
section 13(3)(h) of the Constitution did not include a report of 
the Supreme Court on appeal. He relied on a 1948 decision of the
4
same court in Thambiayah v. Kulasingham which contained a 
statement to that effect. H.N.G.Fernando CJ, however, held that
1. The Industrial Disputes Act was amended only in September 
1968 by Act No.37 of 1968 which had retrospective effect from
9 March 1967.
2. Constituent Assembly Debates, 3 July 1971, col.2836.
3. (1969) 70 N.L.R. 217.
4. (1948) 50 N.L.R. 25.
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this statement in Thambiayah was both obiter and per incuriam: the 
attention of that court not having been drawn to the principle that 
a court will not pronounce upon the constitutional validity of a 
statute unless a decision as to validity was essential for the 
purposes of the case actually before it. He proceeded to examine 
the matter afresh, and held that the report of the Supreme Court 
on appeal was as valid and effective as that of an Election Judge.
If the course adopted by the Chief Justice was objectionable, the 
remedy lay with the legislature: it could have provided, as Dr.de 
Silva argued on that occasion, that when the Supreme Court has 
once declared a provision of an Act of Parliament to be ultra vires, 
the court must not again review the correctness of its previous 
declaration. Whether it is desirable that a court should stubb­
ornly adhere to previous error is, of course, another relevant 
aspect of the matter.
Having excluded the judicial review of legislation, what 
other machinery existed for the enforcement of fundamental rights ? 
A memorandum issued by the ministry of constitutional affairs 
stated thus:
The fundamental rights and freedoms, assured to all 
citizens, are protected in three ways under the 
proposed constitution:
(a) No law /sicT" can be passed by the National State 
Assembly in the way that laws are ordinarily 
passed if the law infringes any fundamental right 
or freedom;
(b) Review by the Supreme Court of administrative 
action infringing fundamental rights and 
freedoms; and
(c) Judicial acts being subject to correction by 
the superior courts if fundamental rights and 
freedoms are infringed. 3
The references were to the special procedure prescribed in the
Constitution for the examination of bills; the writ jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court; and the right of appeal. The Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction was defined by law. It extended only to
the correction of errors of law or fact, conmitted in the course
of civil or criminal proceedings by original courts, and which
were apparent on the face of the case record. It is difficult to
visualise how a fundamental right could have been invoked by either
1. Op.cit.
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party at the stage of appeal if such right was not relevant to the 
matters in issue at the trial. The other two methods, of course, 
need to be examined more closely.
Review of Bills
The Constitution created a Constitutional Court consisting 
of five members appointed by the President for a term of four years. 
They would enjoy security of tenure to the extent that they could 
be removed by the President only "on account of ill-health or 
physical or mental infirmity". Prior to their appointment, the 
National State Assembly was required to fix the remuneration to 
be paid to them; the remuneration so fixed would remain unaltered 
and be charged on the Consolidated Fund. Whenever occasion arose 
for the determination of any matter, three members of the Court
were to be chosen in accordance with the rules of the Court. The
Court would have no permanent head; the chairman for each occasion 
being also chosen in accordance with the rules. The intention was 
clearly to create a special institution for the purpose of examining 
bills in order to determine whether they contained any provisions 
inconsistent with the Constitution.
Gamini Dissanayake (UNP), himself a lawyer, welcomed this
proposal in the Constituent Assembly:
It is, I think, very desirable and necessary that when 
laws are being challenged, not ex post facto but in the 
process of legislation, that a very expeditious, cheap 
and quick method is devised where the validity or not
of a particular law is to be determined. Now, if one
were to go and repose that function in the regular 
courts of law, in my view, it is going to be a very 
tedious,cumbersome and very expensive procedure, and it 
will make matters very difficult both for the subject 
who goes to the court and for the judges who are called 
upon to determine the validity of those laws. Therefore, 
it is in that context that I welcome the proposal of the 
Hon.Minister that the function of testing the validity 
of legislation be given to a specialised tribunal indep­
endent of the regular courts of law.3
Whether a matter could be disposed of expeditiously would often
depend on the procedure prescribed in respect of that matter. In
Ceylon, the laws relating to criminal and civil procedure had
remained unamended for nearly a century. Consequently, there
were enormously heavy backlogs in the original courts, and a delay
1. Constituent Assembly Debates, 4 July 1971, col.2883.
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of several years between the institution of an appeal and its
final determination. Therefore, if an "expeditious, cheap and
quick method" of subjecting bills to scrutiny by the Constitutional
Court had been devised, perhaps a regular court, such as the Court
of Appeal which was then in the process of being constituted to
replace the Privy Council, may well have been able to perform
that task in the same exemplary manner. Indeed, the leader of the
UNP, J.R.Jayewardene, gave expression to this view:
What better institution than the judiciary can be 
given the power to decide, adopting the procedure 
that the Hon.Minister has set out ? That is, before 
a bill becomes law . . . why not the judiciary or, 
say, the highest court, the Supreme Court, or some 
other higher court, sit as the constitutional court ?
Why not an institution of trained judges, independent 
judges, within the two weeks you have mentioned 
here, motivated by the very people who you say 
should bring this matter before a court, decide the 
validity of the law ? That is the suggestion I wish 
to make because, we feel, the country will be happy, 
even the critics of this method will be happy, if 
they know that the judiciary in which they have 
confidence, in which the Hon. Minis ter has confidence, 
has that power. ^
Why the Minister did not accept this proposal was not merely because
he wanted a different "court"; he also intended that it should be
manned by different people. "Some people have expressed horror",
he said, "that one can even leave room for people other than members
of the judiciary to be members of the Constitutional Court". He
referred to the French Constitutional Council and the Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany, to both of which non-lawyers had
been appointed, and urged two reasons why it ought to be possible
to do likewise in Sri Lanka:
If you bring the judges of a regular court with their 
regular position - career judges, that is to say - into 
a place like a Constitutional Court, they become 
involved in the ordinary everyday matters of political 
issues in the political arena. That would do no good 
for judges . . .
There is also one other thing. In the matter of this 
question of the constitutional Court, it must be realised
1. Ibid., col.2868.
2. The Constitutional Council of France consisted of nine 
members, three of whom were appointed by the President of the 
Republic, three by the President of the National Assembly, and 
three by the President of the Senate. They were appointed for 
nine years and their terms of office were not renewable. In 
addition, former Presidents of the Republic were members ex
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that expertise in legalism alone is not enough.
For instance, supposing we had an equivalent to 
Sir Ivor Jennings here, would we not consider 
him a suitable member of the Constitutional Court ?
But if you say it shall be just a portion of the 
Supreme Court bench or a division thereof, all 
such men are shut out. We have professors of 
constitutional law, we have men of goodly position 
and expertise; and what has to be brought in is 
not only the legal expertise but proper attitudes.1
Ceylonese courts had hitherto exercised a variety of jurisdictions. 
These included the determination of disputed elections, allegations 
of breach of privilege of Parliament, charges of criminal defama­
tion of government personalities, applications for writs in matters 
affecting individual liberty and, of course, questions relating to 
the validity of legislation. Strong political under-currents 
flowed through many, if not all, of these cases. Yet the judges 
who tried them often emerged with their reputations undiminished, 
and the institutions continued to enjoy the confidence of the large 
majority of the people of the country. Ceylon did not have a 
professional judiciary. Judges of the superior courts were usually
drawn from the Bar, the bench and the legal departments of govem- 
2
ment. No academician had yet been appointed, but judges sometimes
3
ventured into academic life either concurrently or after retirement.
Therefore, it would not have been accurate to say, in 1971, that
"legalism" was the dominant characteristic of the Ceylonese judi- 
4
ciary. The question of "proper attitudes" is, however, a different 
matter, and perhaps a subject for a separate study. It would suffice 
to note at this stage that the Minister, in common with at least the
officio for life: see The French Constitution, 4 October 1958, Title 
VII. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, however, was a 
regular court exercising judicial power. It consisted of federal 
judges and other members, half of whom were elected by the Bundestag 
and half by the Bundesrat: see Basic Law for the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 23 May 1949, Arts.92-98. Both these institutions examined 
the constitutionality of proposed legislation, in addition to other 
functions assigned by the respective constitutions.
1. Constituent Assembly Debates, 4 July 1971, col.2894.
2. Infra, ch. IV.
3. For example, Sir Francis Soertsz (visiting lecturer at the 
Ceylon University College), H.W.Tambiah and N.Tittewella (visiting 
lecturers at the University of Colombo), C.G.Weeramantry (Professor 
of Law at Monash University, Australia), M.F.S.Pulle and S.R.Wije 
tilleke (Principals of the Ceylon Law College).
4. Cf. views expressed by Colvin R.de Silva in 1968 on "the 
the endeavour of our courts to march with the times", supra, p. 121.
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other members of his political party, shared a deep distrust of
the judiciary. Expression was given to this fear, though not in
the Constituent Assembly, in a memorandum on the appointment of
judges which was prepared by the ministry of constitutional
affairs and distributed to members of the government parliamentary
group. Dealing with an impractical and perhaps hypothetical^
proposal that judges, and not the executive, should have the power
of making appointments to the judiciary, the memorandum observed:
The suggested procedure would be comforting to the 
privileged classes, since it would provide a means 
of perpetuating the class composition of an insti­
tution which, they could hope, might operate as a 
bastion of conservatism against the common man's 
demand for a egalitarian society and for progress 
towards socialism. The suggestion is an example 
of the natural attitude of those who fear the people 
and their representatives.
It is hardly necessary to labour the point that 
this suggestion is fraught with social and political 
danger. The Supreme Court would in time tend to be 
out of sympathy with the people and their aspirations.
In a changing world, an explosive situation is bound 
to arise if privilege is entrenched in this way.
The above criticism does not involve the view that 
the Supreme Court, generally speaking, is capable of 
dishonesty. But it does involve two propositions: 
firstly, that the judges of the Supreme Court are, 
generally speaking, drawn from the strata of society 
that can be described as privileged; and secondly, 
the proposition that judgments are not purely object­
ive, particularly in cases where the State or the 
conflict of interest of classes are involved.
Decisions often depend upon a judge's personal view 
of what is far or what is reasonable; and this in 
turn must, generally speaking, depend upon the 
judge's personal philosophy and social background.
It is clear that laws can never be made so as to 
eliminate this personal factor.2
The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court would be invoked 
in the following manner. Every bill will be published in the 
Gazette at least seven days before it was placed on the agenda of 
the National State Assembly. Any question as to whether any prov­
ision in a bill was inconsistent with the Constitution will be 
referred by the Speaker to the Court. This reference will be made 
by him if: (1) he was of the view that there was such a question;
1. The memorandum did not identify the source from which this 
proposal originated. It was not proposed by any of the political 
parties.
2. Op.cit.
3. S.46(1).
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(2) he received from the Attorney-General a communication that in 
his opinion the question whether any provision in a bill cannot be 
validly passed except by the special majority prescribed by the 
Constitution should be referred to the Court; (3) he received 
within a week of the bill being placed on the agenda a written 
notice raising such a question signed either by the leader in the 
Assembly of a recognised political party, or by at least such 
number of members of the Assembly as would constitute a quorum; or 
(4) the Court on being moved by any citizen within a week of the 
bill being placed on the agenda, had advised him that there is 
such a question.^ "
The Attorney-General was under a duty to examine not only
2
every bill, but also every amendment proposed to a bill. Presumably, 
therefore, the Attorney-General and the Speaker could form the view 
that there was a question which ought to be referred to the Consti­
tutional Court at any stage right up to the final voting on the 
bill. But both these officers were in a rather unenviable position. 
The Speaker, being not necessarily a lawyer, would depend on his 
own legal adviser, the Attorney-General. The latter, being the 
legal adviser to the Government as well, would probably have been 
consulted before or in the course of the drafting of the bill, and 
may have committed himself to a particular view long before he 
entered upon the constitutional duty of examining the bill. If 
that view was that the bill was inconsistent with the Constitution, 
and the Government had disregarded his advice, he would now find 
himself compelled by law to take the extraordinary step of taking 
his Government to Court. As far as the citizen was concerned, it 
was required of him that he should be vigilant enough, first to 
follow all bills published in the Gazette and then presented in 
the National State Assembly, and then to discover that a provision 
in a particular bill, which may or may not have a relevance in his 
life, contravened a fundamental right. He would have to make this 
discovery by examining the proposed law in the abstract. The price tn 
be paid for negligence, ignorance or inadvertence, was the diminution 
of one's rights and freedoms.
1. S.54.
2. S.53.
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Not every bill could be canvassed in this manner. As the
Minister explained:
There comes once in a way, very rarely, but it comes, 
as came for instance in this Parliament in the case 
of the demonetization law, the need for a government 
in the national interest urgently to pass a law in 
the shortest possible time before people can make 
preparations against that law.l
Section 55 exempted a bill which was, in the view of the Cabinet,
urgent in the national interest, and bore an endorsement to that
effect, from being published in the Gazette. It would be referred
by the Speaker to the Constitutional Court which was required to
comnunicate its advice to the Speaker within 24 hours of assembling.
Such advice would be that: (1) the provisions of the bill were
consistent with the Constitution; (2) the bill or any provision
therein was inconsistent with the Constitution; or (3) that it
entertained a doubt that the bill or any provision therein was
inconsistent with the Constitution. By the device of the appropriate
endorsement, whether made bona fide or not, it was, therefore,
possible for a government to avoid subjecting a bill either to
public scrutiny or to legal arguments thereon, in regard to its
constitutional validity.
The Attorney-General had the right to be heard on all matters
■ - - ..............................................2............
before the Constitutional Court. When an "urgent bill" was being 
examined, none other than the Attorney-General had the right to be 
heard. On other occasions, the Court had the discretion to grant
3
to any person such hearing as would appear to it to be necessary. 
Therefore, a citizen who was questioning the validity of a bill 
could not, as of right, insist on being heard. The practice and 
procedure of the Court was not prescribed in the Constitution, but 
was left to be regulated by rules of Court which required the 
approval of the National State Assembly.^ All hearings before the 
Constitutional Court were open to the public.^ Every decision 
would be by a majority vote, and no member was permitted to refrain 
from voting. While decisions on "urgent bills" were required to 
be comnunicated to the Speaker within 24 hours,^ other decisions
1. Constituent Assembly Debates, 4 July 1971, col.2856.
2. S.63(1).
3. S.63(2).
4. S.59.
5. S.62.
6. S.61.
7. S.55(1).
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were required to be given, together with the reasons, within two
weeks of the reference.^ Excluding weekends, this would leave ten
days for the parties to be summoned, for written submissions to be
filed, for oral arguments to be made, and for the judgment of the
Court to be written and despatched. If more than one party had
raised questions of inconsistency, and if the Court decided to
grant to all such persons a hearing, the proceedings might have
2
become uncomfortably tight.
Review of Administrative Action
Section 121(3) of the Constitution provided that the highest
original court shall have "the power to issue such mandates in the
nature of writs as the Supreme Court is empowered to issue under
existing law". These were the writs of habeas corpus, mandamus,
certiorari, quo warranto, prohibition and procedendo. In the
Constituent Assembly, the Minister explained that:
It is precisely this mandate issuable from the Supreme 
Court that is the means by which these matters concer­
ning fundamental rights can and would be enforced.-
He added that if a person "wishes to go to the ordinary courts by
way of a normal every-day action such as those filed in the District
Court, he can do so". He was presumably referring to the declaratory
action and the application for an injunction.
These remedies had existed in the normal law for over a 
hundred years. They had been introduced for the ordinary purposes 
of adjudication and dispute settlement. Over the years, their 
scope and applicability had been defined by courts. Without any 
express provision to that effect in the Constitution or in any other 
law, they were now intended to be invoked for the enforcement of 
fundamental rights. The Indian Constituent Assembly appears to 
have believed that these ancient remedies may not only be inadequate, 
but may also require special authority in order to be adapted and 
utilised for this purpose. Accordingly, the Indian Constitution, 
while guaranteeing the right to move the Supreme Court by appro­
priate proceedings for the enforcement of rights, provided that:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to issue 
directions or orders or writs, including writs in 
the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, 
quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appro­
priate, for the enforcement of the rights . . .
1. S.65.
2. Infra, pp. 241 - 260.
3. Constituent Assembly Debates, 10 June 1971, col.1302.
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The constitutions of other Commonwealth countries which have 
sought to protect fundamental rights also contain similar 
provisions. For instance, the Constitution of Fiji, which 
came into operation on 10 October 1970 while Ceylon's Consti­
tuent Assembly was in session, contained the following 
provision for the enforcement of fundamental rights:
(1) If any person alleges that any of the prov­
isions of this chapter has been, is being, or 
is likely to be contravened in relation to 
him (or, in the case of a person who is det­
ained, if any other person alleges such a 
contravention in relation to the detained 
person), then, without prejudice to any other 
action with respect to the same matter which 
is lawfully available, that person (or that 
other person) may apply to the Supreme Court 
for redress.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have original juris­
diction -
(a) to hear and determine any application 
made in pursuance of the preceding 
subsection;
(b) to determine any question which is 
referred to it in pursuance of the next 
following subsection /i.e. by a 
subordinate court_7;
and may make such orders, issue such writs 
and give such directions as it may consider 
appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or 
securing the enforcement of any of the prov­
isions of this chapter. 1
In April 1972, while the final draft of the constitution was
receiving its finishing touches, the House of Representatives
2
amended the Interpretation Act. This amending law, which was 
introduced by the Minister of Justice, Felix Dias Bandaranaike,
"to facilitate the acquisition of land for village expansion and 
other public purposes" and which preceded the new Constitution by 
eleven days, seriously eroded the remedies upon which the new 
Constitution relied for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
The declaratory action was made inapplicable in respect of statutory 
decisions and orders; the issue of injunctions against the State 
was prohibited; and the writ jurisdiction (other than habeas 
corpus) was emasculated by confining it only to ex facie errors 
of law. Consequently, the fundamental rights were rendered almost 
unenforceable.
1. Art. 17.
2. Interpretation (Amendment) Act, No.18 of 1972. For a fuller 
discussion of its implications, see infra, pp.362-370.
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The 1978 Constitution
At the general election held on 21 July 1977, 86.68 per cent 
of the electorate polled to produce the following result:
TABLE 16
THE 1977 GENERAL ELECTION RESULT
Party Seats Votes Percentagewon polled polled
United National Party 140 3,179,221 50.9
Tamil United Liberation Front 18 421,488 6.7
Sri Lanka Freedom Party 8 1,855,301 29.7
Ceylon Workers Congress 1 62,707 1.0
Independents 1 353,073 5.6
Source: Ceylon Daily News, Parliament of Sri Lanka 1977 (Colombo: 
Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd, 1977).
For the first time since Independence, neither the Lanka Sama Samaj 
Party (225,317 or 3.6 per cent) nor the Communist Party (123,856 or 
1.9 per cent) were represented in the legislature. Following the 
implementation of the Indo-Ceylon Agreements of 1964 and 1974, the 
Indian Tamil community was able to elect one of its own represent­
atives for the first time in nearly thirty years. The leader of the 
UNP, J.R.Jayewardene, was appointed Prime Minister, and the leader 
of the TULF, A.Amirthalingam, was elected Leader of the Opposition.
In its manifesto'*’ the UNP had sought a "mandate to draft,
adopt and operate a new Republican Constitution in order to achieve
the goals of a democratic socialist society":
We shall include in the Constitution the Basic Princi­
ples accepted by the 1975 Party Sessions with reference 
to Religion and Language and among them being the 
guaranteeing to the people their Fundamental. Rights 
Privileges and Freedoms, re-establishing the indep­
endence of the Press and the Judiciary and freeing it 
from political control and interference. We will ensure 
in the Constitution that every citizen, whether he 
belongs to a majority or minority, racial, religious 
or caste group enjoys equal and basic human rights
1. "A Programme of Action to Create a Just and Free Society", 
(Colombo, 1977).
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and opportunities. The decisions of an All-Party 
Conference which will be summoned to consider the 
problem of non-Sinhala speaking people will be 
included in the Constitution. Executive power 
will be vested in a President elected from time 
to time by the people. This will ensure stability 
of the executive for a period of years between 
elections. The Constitution will also preserve 
the parliamentary system we are used to, for the 
Prime Minister will be chosen by the President 
from the Party that commands a majority in Parlia­
ment and other Ministers of the Cabinet will also 
be elected Members of Parliament.
Within less than two months of assuming office, the new Government 
took steps to introduce the concept of an executive presidency.
On 14 September 1977, a bill for this purpose was certified by 
the Cabinet as being "urgent in the national interest". It was 
neither discussed in the government parliamentary group nor publi­
shed in the Gazette for public information. But, curiously, after 
the Prime Minister had introduced the bill in the National State 
Assembly, the debate on it was adjourned for two weeks, and it was 
thereafter debated and approved in one day after the two opposition 
parties had walked out in protest. On 20 October 1977, the Speaker 
certified the Second Amendment to the Constitution which combined 
in the President the powers of both the constitutional Head^of 
State and of the Prime Minister. It was announced that the law 
would come into operation nearly four months later, on 4 February 
1978, when, in terms of it, the Prime Minister would assume office 
as President.
Select Committee
On the same day on which the Second Amendment was certified
by the Speaker, the National State Assembly resolved to appoint a
Select Committee from among its members "to consider the revision
of the Constitution of the Republic of Sri Lanka and other written
law as the Committee may consider necessary". The TULF declined to
serve on this conmittee. Its leader explained that:
We felt that the Government itself had not set about 
the question of solving the problem of the Tamil- 
speaking people in the way in which they said they 
were going to solve it. In their election manifesto 
as well as in their Policy Statement they said that 
they would find a solution on the basis of a consensus 
and that they would summon an all-party conference 
as stated earlier and implement its decisions. In
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fact, even in the paragraph dealing with the 
Constitution in their manifesto they said that 
the decisions of an all-party conference which 
would be summoned to consider the problem of 
the non-Sinhala speaking people would be 
included in the Constitution. So, if the 
Government had either summoned an all-party 
conference or started negotiations with us 
with a view to evolving a formula as a basis 
for the solution of this problem, we could have 
gone into the Select Committee in order to work 
out a scheme of government - a Constipation 
embodying that as one of its aspects.-*-
The SLFP agreed to serve on the Select Committee in the belief
"that a Third Amendment was to be introduced making further changes
in the Constitution, including changes consequent on the Second
Amendment":
Our objects in participating in the deliberations 
of the Select Committee were (a) to restore the 
supremacy of the National State Assembly, and (b) 
to prevent the transfer of any substantial power 
into the hands of one individual who was already 
not only above but also beyond the control of the 
legislature and of the c o u r t s . ^
Also from the opposition benches, the leader of the CWC, which had
"been always sidetracked" and "ignored" whenever constitutions were
framed, decided to participate. As he too explained later:
I am glad to say that my participation in the 
Select Committee helped me not only to understand 
other people's points of view, but also to make 
both the Government and the SLFP leaders under­
stand our problems.^
Accordingly, on 3 November 1977, the Speaker nominated the following
to serve on the Select Committee:
J.R.Jayewardene (UNP): Chairman ^
R.Premadasa (UNP)
L.W.Athulathmudali (UNP)
R.J.G.de Mel (UNP)
Gamini Dissanayake (UNP)
K.W.Devanayagam (UNP)
M.H.M.Naina Marikar (UNP)
S.Thondaman (CWC)
1. National State Assembly Debates, 2 August 1978.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. After Jayewardene assumed office as President on 4 February 
1978, Prime Minister Premadasa functioned as chairman on this comm­
ittee. Jayewardene, however, was invited to be present and in fact 
actively directed its proceedings.
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Sirimavo R.D.Bandaranaike (SLFP)
Maithripala Senanayake (SLFP).
The committee was heavily weighted in favour of the Government.^
The Select Committee held 16 meetings between 18 November 
2
1977 and 7 June 1978. It caused to be published in the national 
newspapers a questionnaire seeking the views of the public on a 
variety of matters including the following:
3. What are the other "fundamental rights which 
you would like to see guaranteed in the revised 
Constitution ?
4. What procedure do you suggest for dealing with 
any infringement of such rights ? In particular, 
what safeguards do you suggest in respect of 
legislation which is alleged to contravene the 
provisions of the Constitution ?
10. What do you consider should be done to preserve 
and foster the independence of the judiciary ?
18. What are your views in regard to the function­
ing of the Constitutional Court under the 
present Constitution ? Do you favour the 
testing of the constitutionality of any act of 
the legislature in the normal courts ?
19. What provisions and safeguards would you wish 
to have included in the Constitution to solve 
the problems faced by the minorities ?
The TULF and the two left parties, the LSSP and the CP, ignored the
questionnaire. The lack of public interest or enthusiasm in this
second attempt in six years to draft a new constitution was
evidenced by the fact that of 1400 persons who obtained copies
3
of the questionnaire, only 281 replied. The committee then invited 
political parties, associations and other groups, and individuals 
who had made "substantial submissions" in their written replies 
to give oral evidence in amplification of the views expressed by 
them. Of those who responded, nearly all spoke at length on the
1. Five of the government members were lawyers. At the request 
of the two non-lawyer representatives of the SLFP, two lawyers - 
the former Speaker of the National State Assembly and the former 
Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Justice, were invited to be 
present at meetings of the committee. In attendance on behalf of 
the government were J.A.L.Cooray and M.Sanmuganathan, both of whom 
had helped to draft the 1972 Constitution; and attorney-at-law 
Mark Fernando who, together with Gamini Dissanayake, had prepared 
a constitutional scheme for the UNP when it was in opposition.
2. Report of a Select Committee of the National State Assembly 
appointed to consider the revision of the Constitution (Parliament­
ary Series, No.14, 22 June 1978).
3. Ibid.
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on the subject of fundamental rights, and urged not only that the 
scope of the protected rights be widened, but also that the restr­
ictions be reduced and that proper machinery be established for 
their enforcement. Meanwhile, in December 1977, at a government- 
sponsored seminar attended by members of the legal profession, the 
subject of fundamental rights was further examined. It was agreed 
at this seminar that the rights protected in the 1972 Constitution 
were "not sufficiently exhaustive and explicit"; that the National 
State Assembly should not have the power to enact with a two-third 
majority a law which was inconsistent with the Constitution; that 
if a bill had not been examined for constitutionality by the highest 
court, the citizens should retain the right to challenge the consti­
tutionality of such legislation within a period of six months of 
its enactment; and that the right to a remedy should be specifically 
provided for in the Constitution. The seminar, however, could not 
agree on which rights ought to be guaranteed to all persons and 
which only to citizens.'*'
The SLFP, freed from the constraints of office and unencumbered
by the doctrinaire politics of its erstwhile allies, expressed itself
2
quite expansively on the subject of fundamental rights. However, 
to the extent that the SLFP considered that it "would not be so 
naive as to participate in an exercise to repeal the Constitution 
we ourselves have promulgated", the process of self-criticism was 
inhibited. On the subject of the scope of the rights, it had this 
to say:
The Second Amendment vested supreme state power in 
the hands of one individual who is superior to the 
National State Assembly and outside the jurisdiction 
of the Courts. In this situation, it is essential 
that adequate protection should be accorded to the 
citizen against the abuse of state power. This can 
only be done by strengthening the provisions relating 
to fundamental rights. The concept of fundamental 
rights was first introduced into our Constitution 
in 1972. Since then, many significant developments 
in the field of human rights have taken place at the 
international level, and a more elaborate definition 
of fundamental rights is now almost universally 
accepted. We are of the view, therefore, that a
1. Seminar on the Administration of Justice, Fundamental Rights 
and Freedoms: Report of the Proceedings of 28 December 1977.
2. The memorandum of the SLFP to the select comnittee is publ­
ished in the Report of the Select Committee, op.cit., at p.165.
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more comprehensive statement of fundamental rights 
should be formulated for incorporation in the 
Constitution by reference, in particular, to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, both of which came 
into force in 1976.
While the reason implied in the above paragraph for the sketchy 
statement of rights in the 1972 Constitution does not bear exam­
ination since the two covenants were already in existence in 1972 
though not in force, it was significant that the SLFP had now 
re-committed itself, after eighteen years, to the liberalism of 
its founder. On the subject of minority rights,too, it had 
obviously reverted to its original views:
We recommend that Sinhala and Tamil be declared 
the national languages of Sri Lanka while Sinhala 
remains as the one official language. We also 
recommend that all the existing laws, regulations 
and rules relating to the use of the Tamil 
language be accorded constitutional status by being 
incorporated in the Constitution. These would 
include the Tamil Language (Special Provisions)
Act, No.28 of 1958 and the regulations made 
thereunder; and the Language of the Courts 
(Special Provisions) Law, No.14 of 1973 and the 
determinations and regulations made thereunder.
On the subject of the independence of the judiciary, while it 
considered the existing provisions adequate to secure the indep­
endence of the judges of the superior courts, it recommended that 
the Judicial Services Advisory Board with which it had experimented 
under the 1972 Constitution'*' be replaced by the Judicial Service 
Commission which had existed under the 1946 Constitution.
On the subject of legislation which contravenes any provision of 
the Constitution, the SLFP expressed itself categorically against 
the empowering clause in the 1972 Constitution:
We are of the view that it should not be possible 
for the National State Assembly to enact, even with 
a special majority, a law which in some particular 
or respect, is inconsistent with any provision in 
the Constitution without first amending or repealing 
such provision of the Constitution.
1. The Judicial Services Advisory Board consisted of the 
Chief Justice (ex officio) and four other members appointed by 
the President, of whom two were required to be state officers 
administering justice. For an evaluation, see N.Jayawickrama, 
"Security of Tenure of Judicial Officers - the Sri Lankan Exp­
erience", Commonwealth Judicial Journal, 1980.
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But on the subject of the enforcement of fundamental rights and 
the concept of a Constitutional Court for the review of bills, 
the SLFP remained rigidly comnitted to the 1972 Constitution.
While it had "no objection to any further remedies being provided" 
for canvassing the validity of administrative action, it strenu­
ously opposed the ex post facto review of legislation. By its 
inflexible attitude on this last-mentioned matter, the SLFP not 
only denied itself a forum to resist, in later years, the tyranny 
of a five-sixth legislative majority, but also offered the govern­
ment a lever with which to overcome the growing body of opinion 
within its own ranks which favoured a strengthening of the citizen’s 
rights in respect of legislative action.
There was reason to believe that a bill of rights drafted by 
the UNP Government would not only be comprehensive, but would also 
be properly enforceable. Firstly, the UNP did not suffer from any 
ideological inhibitions. It was a pragpiatic political party, 
committed to "dharmishta" - a free and just society, with the 
minimum of state control; to the expansion of the private sector 
and the dismantling of much of the bureaucratic apparatus which had 
grown enormously in recent years; to the lifting of curbs on travel 
and all other restraints on individual freedom. The party machinery 
had been streamlined and effective power lay in the hands of, and 
all decisions of consequence were taken by, its new leader, J.R. 
Jayewardene. One of the few surviving members of the State Council 
and of the Independence Cabinet of 1948, he was a lawyer who had 
abandoned the profession quite early in life to form a radical wing 
in the Ceylon National Congress. His own political philosophy had 
apparently metamorphosed from extreme right wing in the years of 
the Dullesian cold war into "indigenous socialism". But through it 
all, he remained a firm believer in constitutionalism. Secondly, 
the experience of the six-year state of emergency under the SLFP 
Government was fresh in the minds of the new legislators. Some of 
them who had been incarcerated for varying periods at the instance 
of the executive had personally experienced the sense of futility 
and frustration that must arise when confronted with absolute state 
power. Thirdly, the hard core of the new Government was the legal 
profession, many of whom while not actually sharing the burden and 
responsibilities of day-to-day government, nevertheless continued 
to be a powerful pressure group within the party. But many of the
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expectations were to remain unfulfilled. Once more, it was a 
government that was drafting this charter of citizens' rights.
It would be adopted by a legislature which was government- 
controlled, and not by the people at a referendum. It would be 
operated, in the first instance, by that same government for very 
nearly the entire period for which it had been elected. Accor­
dingly, the same constraints that operated on the Constituent 
Assembly were to apply to the Select Committee and the National 
State Assembly too.^
On 7 June 1978, the Select Committee, by a majority vote, 
adopted its report. To the report was annexed, inter alia, a 
draft constitution. The two SLFP members submitted a dissent in 
which, on the subject of the "free expression of the opinion of 
the people in the choice of a legislature", they observed that 
the concept of the cut-off point of 1/8 or 12 per cent in the 
proposed system of election by proportional representation was 
"utterly undemocratic and unreasonable"; and that the proposal 
to impose civic disability on, and move for the expulsion of, a 
member of the legislature on account of his political, as distinct 
from criminal, conduct, was a device which would enable a parlia­
mentary majority to eliminate its political opponents. The CWC 
leader, S.Thondaman, submitted a memorandum in which, apart from 
criticising the concept of the cut-off point as being likely to 
"wipe out the representation of several recognised political 
parties" as well as "cultural and ethnic interests", he observed 
that in respect of fundamental rights:
(a) the proposed limitations were "as extensive and vague" as 
section 18(2) of the 1972 Constitution, and
(b) the provisions with regard to urgent bills had already been 
abused and would continue to facilitate "vast inroads into
the fundamental freedoms of the people with no real judicial
11 2 scrutiny .
On 22 June 1978, Prime Minister Premadasa presented the report 
to the National State Assembly.
1. For a fuller discussion of the emergence and character of the 
UNP, see T.D.S.A.Dissananayake, J.R.Jayewardene of Sri Lanka (Colo­
mbo: Swastika Press, 1977), and Eamon Kariyakarawana, JR:The People's 
President (Colombo: State Printing Corporation, 1981).
2. The dissenting report and memorandum are both reproduced in 
the Report of the Select Committee.
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The bill containing the proposed new constitution was publi­
shed in the Gazette on 17 July 1978 and presented in the National 
State Assembly eight days later. On 2 August, when the Prime 
Minister moved its second reading, the two main opposition parties, 
the TULF and the SLFP, indicated that they did not propose to 
participate in the debate. In a statement which he made before 
walking out of the chamber with his party colleagues, TULF leader 
Amirthalingam described the struggle "for the liberation of our 
people" who had "been enslaved first by the Portuguese, next by 
the Dutch, next by the British, and now in the name of independence 
by our own brothers, the Sinhalese nation". On behalf of the SLFP, 
Mrs.Bandaranaike rejected the proposed constitution and withdrew 
from the chamber. In her statement, she protested that after the 
report of the Select Committee had been presented to the Assembly 
and published as a Sessional Paper, three new sections had been 
smuggled into the draft constitution:
These sections are so fundamental in nature and so 
draconian in character that had they even been 
suggested at a meeting of the Select Committee, the 
Sri Lanka Freedom Party would have immediately 
withdrawn, and disociated itself from further 
deliberations of the Select Conmittee. These 
three sections, in our view, constitute the most 
diabolical threat to the continued survival of the 
democratic process in Sri Lanka.
The three sections referred to by her were:
a) Section 157 which made it an offence to advocate the amendment
of the constitution otherwise than in accordance with the
prescribed procedure:
The punishment for speaking out one's thoughts, 
for expressing one's ideas on change, for seeking 
to assert one's freedom of speech, is imprisonment 
for ten years, an unlimited fine, forfeiture of 
all property, loss of one's seat in Parliament 
and the disqualification for all time and for all 
purposes, of all the candidates of the political 
party to which one belongs.2
b) Section 158 which prohibited Parliament from enacting a law in 
contravention of the provisions of a treaty or agreement 
relating to foreign investment in Sri Lanka which had been
1. National State Assembly Debates, 2 August 1978.
2. Ibid. This section was deleted before the National State 
Assembly was called upon to vote for the adoption of the draft 
constitution. H.W.R.Wade, in the course of his Hamlyn Lecture in
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approved by Parliament by a resolution passed with a two-third 
majority:
At the time when sovereign governments and inter­
national organisations are acting in unison to 
curb the corrupting tentacles of multinational 
corporations, you are seeking by means of your 
constitution to place our country at the dispo­
sal of foreign adventurers, and to make our 
people and our people's representatives impotent 
to act in the national interest should it become 
necessary to do so.^
c) Section 161 which provided that where a Member of Parliament
ceased by resignation, expulsion or otherwise, to be a member
of the political party to which he belonged at the time of the
commencement of the constitution, his seat would become vacant,
and that political party would be entitled to nominate another
person to fill that vacancy:
A Member of Parliament, having campaigned 
strenuously in his electorate, having faced 
the vicissititudes of a general election, 
having been elected by the free votes of an 
overwhelming majority of the voters, can now 
be summarily removed from Parliament and 
replaced by one more acceptable to the 
President by the simple device of expelling 
him from the party. Such a member would not 
have been found guilty of a corrupt or illegal 
practice, nor would he have become subject to 
any other disqualification. His only crime 
would have been to incur the wrath or the 
displeasure of His Excellency the President.
Parliament will soon comprise not members 
elected by the people representing their 
simple aspirations and sensitive to their 
daily problems, but the President's nominees 
reflecting his conception of a Sri Lanka as 
another Singapore or South Korea, sharing 
his dreams of an era of unbridled capitalism, 
and helping him reach his goal of absolute 
power.2
On the subject of fundamental rights, she objected to "the illusion'
which was sought to be created by the draft constitution:
In reality, some of the most fascist legislation 
of recent times, such as the Parliamentary (Powers 
and Privileges) (Amendment) Law, the Special Pres­
idential Commissions of Inquiry Law, the Criminal
1980, described this section as a "bizarre form of entrenchment"; 
see H.W.R.Wade, Constitutional Fundamentals (London: Stevens & Sons, 
p.40.
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
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Procedure (Special Provisions) Law, the Proscribing 
of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Other Similar 
Organisations Law, and the Local Authorities (Impos­
ition of Civic Disabilities) Bill . . . are being 
entrenched as "existing law".
On 16 August, the National State Assembly, with 137 voting in favour 
and none against, enacted the Constitution of the Democratic Social­
ist Republic of Sri Lanka. Mr.Thondaman voted in favour:
I do not for a moment say that this Constitution is 
perfect or ideal or that it provides equality of 
status for Tamils. But I definitely say that this 
is an improvement on what went before. Particularly 
for the sections of the people who have been kept 
out for the last thirty or forty years, anything 
given is an improvement;2
and a month later, accepted a portfolio in the Cabinet. On 31 Aug­
ust 1978, the bill was certified by the Speaker, and on 8 September 
1978, the new Constitution was brought into operation, thus estab-
3
lishing the Second Republic.
The Protected Rights 
Chapter III of the Constitution contains the substantial 
portion of the protected rights:
a) freedom of thought, conscience and religion
b) freedom from torture
c) the right to equality
d) freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention and punishment
e) the right to a fair trial
f) protection against the retroactivity of the criminal law
g) freedom of speech
h) freedom of peaceful assembly
i) freedom of association, including the freedom to form and 
join a trade union
j) freedom to engage in any occupation 
k) freedom of movement
1) freedom to enjoy own culture and use own language.
These rights are protected by the provision that their amendment or 
repeal requires the affirmative votes of not less than two-thirds
1. These laws are discussed in Ch.III.
2. National State Assembly Debates, 16 August 1978.
3. The expression "Second Republic" in used by A.J.Wilson in
his study of the 1978 Constitution, The Gaul list System in Asia
(London: Macmillans, 1980).
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of the total number of members of Parliament; in the case of the
first two rights enumerated above, approval by the people at a
referendum is also required.'*' Unlike in the 1972 Constitution,
the rights relating to, or arising from, the deprivation of
personal liberty, have been made applicable to "all persons",
while the others are confined to citizens. But what is more
significant and relevant, in the particular circumstances of Sri
Lanka, is the following provision which was included in the
Constitution at the insistence of the leader of the CWC:
A person who, not being a citizen of any other 
country, has been permanently and legally resident 
in Sri Lanka immediately prior to the commencement 
of the Constitution and continues to be so resident 
shall be entitled, for a period of ten years from 
the commencement of the Constitution, to the rights 
declared and recognised by paragraph (1) of this 
Article. 2
The "stateless" community of Indian Tamils, who remained unrecognised 
under the 1972 Constitution, were now guaranteed all the rights 
enjoyed by the citizens, for a period of ten years by when, hopefully, 
the Indo-Ceylon Agreements of 1964 and 1974 would have been fully 
implemented and the problem of statelessness no longer existed.
The Inadequately Protected Rights 
This statement of fundamental rights is more comprehensive 
than that contained in the 1972 Constitution, and has been formulated 
with a greater degree of care and precision. Yet, when examined and 
contrasted against international law, it is still deficient. For 
instance:
1. "Birth or other status" an expression capable of extending the
protection of fundamental rights to children who at birth are 
regarded as illegitimate, and therefore devoid of all the 
legal attributes of a "child", is not one of the prohibited 
grounds of discrimination.
2. The grounds on which a person may be deprived of personal 
liberty are not prescribed. The right of a person deprived 
of his liberty to trial within a reasonable time or to release
1. Arts. 82-84.
2. Art.14(2). Some others who gave evidence before the select 
committee also urged that fundamental rights be made applicable to 
the Indian Tamils who were not yet citizens of Sri Lanka. See, e.g., 
the evidence of Vajira Cabraal who was a member of the delegation 
from the Centre for Society and Religion: Report of the Select 
Committee, p.288.
144
on bail; the right to take proceedings before a court in order 
that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of 
his detention and order his release if the detention is not 
lawful; the enforceable right of a victim of unlawful arrest 
or detention to compensation; the right of juveniles and uncon­
victed persons to segregation and separate treatment in prison; 
and the right not to be imprisoned for inability to fulfil a 
contractual obligation, have all been omitted.
3. The right to a fair hearing "for the determination of his civil 
rights and obligations" is not protected.
4. The rights of accused persons which have been enumerated do 
not include:
a) the right to be informed promptly and in detail in a language 
which he understands of the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him;
b) the right to have adequate time and facilities for the prep­
aration of his defence and to communicate with counsel of 
his own choosing;
c) the right to be tried without undue delay;
d) the right to examine or have examined witnesses against him 
and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on 
his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
e) the right not to be compelled to testify against himself or 
to confess guilt;
f) the right, if convicted, to have his conviction and sentence 
reviewed by a higher tribunal;
g) the right not to be tried or punished again for an offence 
for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted;
h) the right to be compensated if he has been the victim of a 
miscarriage of justice.
5. The right to freedom of speech and expression does not include 
the freedom "to seek, receiveand impart information and ideas".
6. The right to freedom of movement does not include the freedom 
to leave the country.
The Omitted Rights 
As with the 1972 Constitution, a number of rights have been
omitted altogether. For instance:
1. The "inherent" right to life is not protected. While provision
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has been specifically made for the imposition of the death 
penalty, the concomitant duties not to impose sentence of death 
on persons below 18 years (or over 70 years) of age; not to 
execute such sentence on pregnant women; to confine such 
sentence only for the most serious crimes and pursuant to a 
final judgment rendered in accordance with a law enacted prior 
to the commission of the crime; not to extend such punishment 
to crimes to which it does not at present apply; not to re­
establish it once it has been abolished; and to recognise the 
the right to seek amnesty, pardon or commutation of sentence, 
are all omitted.
2. Slavery, the slave trade, servitude, and forced or compulsory 
labour are not prohibited.
3. The family rights are not provided for.
4. The right to privacy, honour and reputation is not guaranteed.
5. The rights relating to property, which the UNP had strenuously, 
but unsuccessfully, urged for inclusion in the 1972 Constitution, 
are omitted.
The rights relating to politics and democracy which were
2
contained in the 1972 Constitution have been repeated. The
inequality which then existed in regard to suffrage has been remedied
in the process of introducing the concept of proportional represent- 
3
ation. Hereafter, the value of a seat in Parliament will be
ascertained in the following manner:
The total number of electors whose names appear in the 
registers of electors of all the electoral districts 
is divided by 160. The whole number resulting from 
such division is referred to as the 'qualifying number'.
The total number of electors of each electoral district 
is then divided by the qualifying number, and each 
electoral district is entitled to return such number 
of members as is equivalent to the whole number resulting 
from the division of the total number of such electors 
in that electoral district by the qualifying number.
Accordingly, the number of votes required to win a seat will be the
same throughout the country. However, some distortion has been
1. The art of telephone tapping is now reportedly being perfec­
ted by the security arm of the state. A recent report claimed that 
the purchase of "sophisticated equipment" by the Intelligence Serv­
ices Division will enable that Division's "telephone surveillance 
unit" stationed at "the Telephone Tapping Roan at No.10 Cambridge 
Place, Colombo" to have "much wider access to telephone surveillance 
and will cover not only the city but the suburbs too": Weekend Sun,
9 January 1983, p.l.
2. Arts.62, 70, 76, 88, 90, 93. 3. Arts.98, 99.
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introduced into the scheme by the requirement that a further 36 
seats be allocated equally among the nine provinces."^  Consequently, 
province 'A' which has three electoral districts will return four 
additional members, while province 'B' which in itself constitutes 
just one electoral district will also return the same number of 
additional members. In other words, more votes would be required 
to secure a seat in the three electoral districts of province 'A' 
than in the single electoral district of province 'B'. To that 
extent, the right to "equal suffrage" is impaired.
Two other provisions appear to infringe upon the principle 
of the "free expression of the will of the electors":
1. Article 99 (5) (a) provides that:
Every recognised political party and independent 
group polling less than one-eighth of the total 
votes polled at any election in any electoral 
district shall be disqualified from having any 
candidates of such party or group being elected 
for that electoral district.
The votes polled by a disqualified party are deducted from the 
total votes polled at the election in that electoral district, 
and are thereafter not taken into account for any purpose what­
soever. In other words, even if a political party or independent 
group has polled a sufficient number of votes to secure at least 
one seat, such party or group will not be allocated that seat 
if it has polled less than one-eighth of the total polled by 
all the parties in that electoral district. Consequently, small 
political parties and interest or pressure groups, including 
minorities, will have little chance of being represented in the 
legislature.
2. Article 81 enables Parliament, by a resolution passed by two- 
thirds of its members, to impose civic disabilities on a person 
for a period of up to seven years, and to expel such person 
from Parliament if he is already a Member of Parliament. This 
power may be exercised only if a Special Presidential Commission 
of Inquiry has found that person guilty of abuse or misuse of 
power, political victimisation or corruption. None of -these 
concepts have been defined by law; nor are any of them criminal 
offences. In the exercise of this power, it would be possible
1. Art. 96(4).
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for a government to eliminate from the legislature some at
least of its political opponents for political conduct which
was hitherto judged, not by judges sitting as commissioners,
but by the people at a general election.^
The right to an independent and impartial tribunal has been
guaranteed in the usual manner by providing for the security of 
2
tenure of judges. In respect of judges of subordinate courts 
this has been done by re-introducing the Judicial Service Commi­
ssion which existed under the 1946 Constitution. For the first 
time, the jurisdiction of the superior courts has been set out in 
the Constitution, thus minimising the danger of any erosion of 
judicial power through legislative action. But while seeking to 
safeguard the independence and impartiality of the administration 
of justice in the years to come, the Constitution in its trans­
itional provisions dealt an almost irrecoverable blow at these 
very same concepts. While Article 164 provided that all persons 
who held office in subordinate courts and tribunals immediately 
before the commencement of the Constitution would continue to hold 
such offices under the same terms and conditions, Article 163 
provided that:
All Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts 
established by the Administration of Justice Law,
No.44 of 1973, holding office immediately before the 
commencement of the Constitution shall, on the 
commencement of the Constitution, cease to hold office.
This section applied to persons who already enjoyed constitutional
guarantees of security of tenure in terms no different to that
which their successors were to be offered by the new Constitution.
As Mrs.Bandaranaike warned in the National State Assembly:
Every Constitution has guaranteed the judges of our 
highest courts security of tenure and provided that 
they may be removed by Parliament for proved miscon­
duct. Every government has so far honoured this 
provision whenever it has sought either to amend or 
replace a Constitution. For the first time, the 
present Government is seeking to remove all the judges 
of the two highest courts in the country in order to 
constitute new courts of a particular flavour. This 
blatant and gross interference with the judiciary
1. Infra, p.226.
2. Infra, p.193.
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can only result in creating courts whose term of 
office would necessarily have to be limited to that 
of the government itself. ^
The right of the Tamil minority community "to use their own 
language" was more adequately protected than in the past. Ironi­
cally, the constitutional provisions were substantially those 
proposals which the SLFP had submitted to the Select Committee, 
but which, while in office, it had not found possible to offer.
While continuing to recognise Sinhala as the official language, the
Constitution accorded to both Sinhala and Tamil the status of
2
"national languages of Sri Lanka". A Tamil-speaking person was 
guaranteed the use of his language:
a) in Parliament or in a local authority;
b) as a medium of instruction in school and in university;
c) to correspond with officials;
d) to transact business with any official, and therefore, to
obtain from such official, documents, or copies of, or extracts 
from, any official register, record, publication or other 
document, in his language;
e) as a medium of examination for admission into the state services;
f) to institute, or to participate in, proceedings in any court or 
tribunal.
The State was required to make laws, subordinate legislation, orders, 
proclamations, notifications, etc.,and to publish the Gazette and 
all other official documents, including circulars and forms, in 
both national languages. While Sinhala continued to be the language 
of administration and of the courts throughout the country, Tamil 
was granted an equivalent status in the northern and eastern 
provinces. But in one field of activity, the Sinhala-speaking 
person continued to have an edge over his fellow Sri Lankan: while 
a Sinhala-speaking state officer was not required to have a know­
ledge of, or to acquire proficiency in, the Tamil language, a Tamil- 
speaking person may be required to have a sufficient knowledge of 
the official language as a condition for admission into a state
service, or to acquire such proficiency within a reasonable time 
3
after admission.
1. National State Assembly Debates, 2 August 1978. Cf. circum­
stances leading to the removal of some of the judges of the Court 
of Appeal in 1973, infra, p.
2. Art.19. 3. Art.12(2), proviso.
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Limitations on the Exercise and 
Operation of the Fundamental 
Rights
Existing Law
Article 16(1) provided that:
All existing written law and unwritten law shall be 
valid and operative notwithstanding any inconsis­
tency with the preceding provisions of this Chapter.
Accordingly, as in the 1972 Constitution, the protected rights
would operate subject to the entire body of existing law.^
Exemption and Restrictive Clauses
Apart from the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion, and the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment, the other protected rights
were subject to exemption and restrictive clauses. These clauses,
though drafted with greater circumspection than previously, were
sometimes as irrational as in the 1972 Constitution. For instance,
the right of a citizen to return to Sri Lanka is subject to:
such restrictions as may be prescribed by law in 
the interests of national security, public order 
and the protection of public health or morality, 
or for the purpose of securing due recognition and 
respect for the rights and freedoms of others, or 
of meeting the just requirements of the general 
welfare of a democratic society.2
The following is a table of the exemptions and restrictions:
TABLE 17
EXEMPTIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE 
EXERCISE AND OPERATION OF THE 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE 
1978 CONSTITUTION
Right . Restrictions
Thought, Conscience and Religion
Torture; Cruel, inhuman or degr- 
ding treatment or punishment
Equality before the law and equal 
protection of the law A B C D E K L
Discrimination A B C D E M L
Access to shops, etc. A B C D E N L
1. For a detailed examination of the effect of this provision, 
see Ch.III.
2. Art.15(7).
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Right Restrictions
Arrest A B C D E K L
Deprivation of personal liberty A B C D E K L V
Fair trial K
Punishment K
Presumption of innocence A K R L
Retroactive legislation A K L S T
Speech and Expression A B C D E F J K L
Peaceful assembly A B C D E F K L
Association A B c D E F H K L
Trade unions A B c D E K L
Worship A B c D E K L
Rights of minorities A B c D E K L
Occupation and Profession A B c D E G K L
Movement A B c D E H K L
Right of return A B c D E K L
A: Interests of national security
B: Interests of public order
C: Protection of public health or morality
D: Purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others 
E: Purpose of meeting the just requirements of the general
welfare of a democratic society 
F: Interests of racial and religious harmony
G: In relation to (a) the professional, technical, academic,
financial and other qualifications necessary for pract­
ising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade, 
business or enterprise, and the licensing and disciplinary 
control of the person entitled to such fundamental rights, 
and (b) the carrying on by the State, a State agency or 
a public corporation of any trade, business, industry, 
service or enterprise whether to the exclusion, complete 
or partial, of citizens or otherwise.
H: Interests of national economy
J: In relation to parliamentary privilege, contempt of court,
defamation or incitement to an offence 
K: In their application to the members of the Armed Forces,
Police Force and other Forces charged with the mainten­
ance of public order, to such restrictions as may be 
prescribed by law in the interests of the proper discharge 
of their duties and the maintenance of discipline among 
them
L: Derogable during a state of emergency
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M: Exemption relating to knowledge or proficiency in the
official language 
N: Exemption in favour of women, children and disabled
persons
P: Exemption in respect of the deprivation of liberty
pending investigation and trial 
R: Exemption in respect of proving particular facts
S: Exemption in respect of criminal acts in accordance with
general principles of law recognised by the comnunity 
of nations
T: Exemption in respect of a minimum penalty
V: Exemption in respect of the deprivation of personal liberty
pending deportation
As in the 1972 Constitution, the terminology in which the restr­
ictions are imposed is:
shall be subject to such restrictions as may be 
prescribed by law in the interests of . . .  1
Inconsistent Legislation
Article 84 provided that a bill which is inconsistent with any 
provision of the Constitution may be passed with a two-third majo­
rity, and may thereafter co-exist with the inconsistent provision 
of the Constitution. Where the amendment or repeal of such provision 
requires approval by the people at a referendum as well, such bill 
would have to comply with that requirement too. But finally, as
under the 1972 Constitution, a law which infringes a fundamental
2
right may validly be enacted and remain on the statute book.
Validity of Laws Not to be Questioned
Article 80(3) provided that:
Where a Bill becomes law upon the certificate of 
the President or the Speaker, as the case may be, 
being endorsed thereon, no court or tribunal shall 
inquire into, pronounce upon, or in any manner 
call in question, the validity of such Act on any 
ground whatsoever.
Accordingly, it was possible, as under the 1972 Constitution, for
a bill which was in conflict with a fundamental right, and to which
Article 84 should have applied, to find its way into the statute
book through a simple majority and to remain there, for the reason
that no question of inconsistency in relation to such bill was
3
raised within the prescribed time in the prescribed manner.
1. The scope of the exemption and restrictive clauses is examined 
in Ch.III.
2. For instances when such bills have been passed, see Ch.V.
3. For an example of such a bill, see p.312.
152
The Enforcement of Fundamental Rights 
Review of Bills
Apart from a few cosmetic changes, the procedure for the 
review of bills remained the same as under the 1972 Constitution. 
The Supreme Court replaced the Constitutional Court; the President, 
and not the Speaker, refers bills for examination by the Court; 
and the Supreme Court now has three weeks, and not two as in the 
past, to communicate its determination. In regard to urgent bills, 
the President may extend the 24-hour limit to a period not excee­
ding three days for the communication of the determination.^
Review of Administrative Action
In a radical departure from the previous constitution, 
provision was made in 1978 enabling a person to apply to the 
Supreme Court, in respect of the infringement or imninent infring­
ement, by executive or administrative action, of a fundamental 
right to which such person is entitled. An application for 
relief or redress is required to be made, with the leave of the 
Supreme Court first had and obtained, within one month of the 
action complained of. The Supreme Court is required to hear and 
finally dispose of such complaint within a period of two months, 
and for this purpose it is empowered to "grant such relief or 
make such directions as it may deem just and equitable in the 
circumstances''. ^
1. Arts. 118, 121-123. For a detailed examination of this 
method of enforcement, see Ch.V.
2. Arts, 17, 126. For the application of this remedy, see 
Ch.VI.
CHAPTER III
THE CONTENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
The 1978 Constitution describes itself in the preamble as the
"Supreme Law" of the Republic. Other Commonwealth Constitutions
which use this expression proceed to amplify it by stating that a
law inconsistent with any provision of the Constitution shall, to
the extent of such inconsistency, be void and of no effect.'*' This
Constitution, however, contains the very unusual and paradoxical
provision that "all existing written law and unwritten law shall be
as valid and operative notwithstanding any inconsistency" with the
2
statement of fundamental rights contained therein. In other words, 
the statement of fundamental rights in the Constitution, at least 
in regard to existing law, is not supreme; existing law in conflict 
with any attribute of a protected right, whatever its origin may be, 
prevails to the exclusion of that attribute. Such a law prevails 
whether or not it can be brought within the permissible grounds on 
which Parliament may further restrict the exercise and operation of 
fundamental rights.
It has already been noted that the legislature has failed to 
include within each definition of a right all the recognised attri­
butes of that right. It is now proposed to ascertain the actual 
content of the fundamental rights declared and recognised in the 
1978 Constitution after each has been subjected to the debilitating 
effect of existing written law. It is also proposed to examine the 
scope of Parliament's power to further restrict by law the exercise
3
and operation of these rights.
1. See, for example, the Constitution of Ghana, Art.1(2).
2. Art.16(1).
3. For the interpretation of the human rights concepts by 
independent international institutions and superior national courts, 
see Paul Sieghart, The International Law of Human Rights (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1983).
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THE RIGHTS
Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest
Article 13(1) states that:
No person shall be arrested except according to 
procedure established by law. Any person arrested 
shall be informed of the reason for his arrest.
This Article appears to contemplate the power of arrest
being exercised by the traditional law enforcement agencies, namely,
the courts and the police, according to well-established principles
of criminal justice.'*' But since this Article is read subject to
existing law, the protection offered is considerably less than what
it appears to be. Under existing law, an arrest may be made either
on a warrant or without a warrant. A warrant may be issued by a
2 3 4judge, a justice of the peace, a commission of inquiry, Parlia­
ment or a parliamentary committee,^ or a Minister of the Government. 
An arrest without a warrant may be made by a police officer,^ a
judge,® a headman,^ a revenue officer,^ a prisons officer,'*''*' an
12 13excise officer, an officer of the Ceylon Transport Board, a
14 15railway official, an officer of the Salt Department, a forest
16 17officer, a customs officer, a public officer authorised by the
18 19Government Agent, or by the Government Agent himself, or by a
20private person. A person making an arrest "may use all means
1. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950) SCR 88.
2. Administration of Justice Law, s.84; Excise Ord.,s.36; Civil 
Procedure Code, ss.298, 650; Mental Diseases Act, s.3.
3. Mental Diseases Act, s.7.
4. Bribery Act, s.34(2).
5. Parliamentary (Powers and Privileges) Act, S.27A.
6. Proscribing of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Other
Similar Organisations Law, s.11; Mental Diseases Act, s.6.
7. Administration of Justice Law, s.85; Official Secrets Act,
s.19; Stay-in Strikes Act, s.2(b); Excise Ord., ss.34,35; Police 
Ord., ss. 63, 69; Firearms Ord., s.38; Forest Ord., s.48; Parlia­
mentary (Powers and Privileges) Act, s.21; Houses of Detention Ord., 
s.10.
8. Administration of Justice Law, s.87; Firearms Ord., s.38;
9. Salt Ord., s.20; Firearms Ord., s.38.
10. Firearms Ord., s.38; Excise Ord., s.35.
11. Administration of Justice Law, s.88.
12. Excise Ord., ss.34, 35, 37; Salt Ord., s.20.
13. Motor Transport Act, S.84B.
14. Railways Ord., s.38.
15. Salt Ord., s.20.
16. Forest Ord., s.48.
17. Customs Ord., s.127; Excise Ord., s.35.
18. Firearms Ord., s.38.
19. Excise Ord., ss. 36, 37.
20. Administration of Justice Law, s.86; Police Ord., s.94.
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necessary to effect the arrest","*- including causing the death of
2
that person if he is accused of an offence punishable with death.
For the purpose of making an arrest, he may enter and search any
premises and may, if necessary, break open any outer or inner
3 4door to effect such entrance. A person arrested may be searched.
A person who is arrested shall be informed of the reasons for 
his arrest. The purpose of this requirement is to inform the 
detained person adequately of the reasons for his arrest so that he 
may judge the lawfulness of the measure and take steps to challenge 
it if he sees fit.^ Such an opportunity is afforded by Article 13(2).
The exercise and operation of this right may be restricted 
by law in the interests of national security, public order or the 
protection of public health or morality, or for the purpose of 
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of 
others, or of meeting the just requirements of the general welfare 
of a democratic society. Under international law, however, this 
right is absolute.^ On the one hand, the limitation clause appears 
to be irrelevant. The procedure of arrest already "established by 
law" is to be found in the Criminal Procedure Code, which is of 
general application, and in the special statutes referred to above.
If Parliament is to vary that procedure in the interests of, say, 
public security, and vest the power of arrest in respect of certain 
offences in a larger body of persons such as service personnel, it 
can do so only by means of a law, and as soon as it does so, that 
would also be a procedure "established by law". In other words, 
the right declared in Article 13(1) is such that a limitation clause 
is not necessary in order that the procedure established by law may 
be varied, from time to time, to meet the needs of changing condit­
ions and circumstances. On the other hand, the limitation clause
1. Administration of Justice Law, s.90(1).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., s.90(2).
4. Ibid., s.90(5).
5. See X v. United Kingdom (6998/75), Judgment: 5 November 1981; 
The Queen v. Gnanaseeha Thero (1969) 73 N.L.R. 154; Corea v. The 
Queen (1954) 55 N.L.R. 457; and the other cases cited in Sieghart, 
Human Rights, pp. 150-152.
6. Art. 15(7). See also Art.15(8) for additional restrictions 
in respect of service personnel, and Art.13(7) which exempts a 
"removal order" and a "deportation order" from the application of 
this Article.
7. ICCPR, Art.9(1); ECHR, Arts.5(2), 9(2); ACHR, Art.7(3).
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appears to be indiscriminately worded. The right of an arrested 
person to be informed of the reasons for his arrest may be restr­
icted, for instance, by not informing him of the "full reasons" 
for his arrest, or perhaps by delaying to inform him of such 
reasons. (To deny him reasons altogether may be a denial and not 
a restriction of the right). But it is incomprehensible how such 
a restriction can become necessary for the purpose of "meeting the 
just requirements of the general welfare of a democratic society", 
which is one of the grounds enumerated in the limitation clause.
The general welfare of a democratic society, as distinct from the 
interests of national security, ought to require that any member 
of that society who is deprived of his liberty should be informed 
promptly and in full why he has been so deprived of one of the 
essential characteristics of that society.
Freedom from Arbitrary Detention
Article 13(2) states that:
Every person held in custody, detained or otherwise 
deprived of personal liberty shall be brought before 
the judge of the nearest competent court according 
to procedure established by law, and shall not be 
further held in custody, detained or deprived of 
personal liberty except upon and in terms of the order 
of such judge made in accordance with procedure 
established by law.
The purpose of bringing an arrested person before a judge is
three-fold: firstly, to interpose a person who is independent both
of the executive and of the party concerned; secondly, to enable
such person to hear the individual brought before him; and thirdly,
to enable him to review the circumstances militating for and against
detention and decide, by reference to legal criteria, whether there
are reasons to justify detention and to order his release if there
are no such reasons.^ The object of this exercise is to give the
arrested person an opportunity of exculpating himself as soon as
possible. There is, therefore, implied a right to be heard either
2
in person or, where necessary, through some form of representation.
In other words, there is at that stage, a justiciable issue before 
3
a court.
1. Schiesser v. Switzerland (7710/76), Judgment: 2 EHRR 417.
2. Winterwerp v."Netherlands (6301/73), Judgment: 2 EHRR 387.
3. Kolugala v. Superintendent of Prisons (1961) 66 N.L.R. 412.
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Under existing law, a person arrested under the Customs
Ordinance or the Railways Ordinance is not brought before a judge,
but taken before the principal collector of customs or the station
master, as the case may be.^ Nor is a person arrested under the
Police Ordinance for being drunk in a public place brought before
2
a judge; he is held in police custody "until he gets sober".
Under the Parliamentary (Powers and Privileges) (Amendment) Law,
No.5 of 1978, a person arrested by order of Parliament or a parlia­
mentary committee is produced before Parliament or such committee, 
and no court has jurisdiction to examine the validity of, or the
3
sufficiency of reasons for, such arrest. Two statutes passed 
three months before the 1978 Constitution came into force took 
away altogether the court's power to examine the justification for 
certain arrests. The Criminal Procedure (Special Provisions) Law, 
No.15 of 1978, required every court before which any person is 
produced "on an allegation that he has committed or has been conc­
erned in committing, or is suspected to have committed or to have 
been concerned in committing" any one of a large number of scheduled 
offences under the Penal Code, to remand such person until the
conclusion of the trial, and in the event of an appeal following
4
conviction, until the determination of the appeal. The Proscrib­
ing of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Other Similar Organ­
isations Law, No. 16 of 1978, contained a similar injunction in 
respect of persons "suspected or accused of any offence" under that 
law.~*
The exercise and operation of this right may be restricted by 
law in the interests of national security, public order, or the 
protection of public health or morality, or for the purpose of 
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms
of others, or of meeting the just requirements of the general
£
welfare of a democratic society. The unduly wide scope of this
1. Customs Ord., s.127; Railways Ord., s.38.
2. S. 69(2).
3. S. 4.
4. S. 2.
5. S. 8.
6. Art.15(7). See also Art.15(8) for additional restrictions 
ir> respect of security personnel.
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limitation clause is immediately apparent. For instance, is it 
conceivable that "in the interests of the protection of public 
morality", someone other than a judge should determine whether 
and for how long a person should be held in custody; or that the 
concept of judicial supervision should be restricted "for the 
purpose of meeting the just requirements of the general welfare 
of a democratic society ? Under international law, this right is 
absolute.^
The Right to a Fair Trial
Article 13(3) states that:
Any person charged with an offence shall be entitled 
to be heard, in person or by attorney-at-law, at a 
fair trial by a competent court.
Article 13(5) adds:
Every person shall be presumed innocent until he is 
proved guilty:
Provided that the burden of proving particular facts 
may be placed on an accused person.
The four protected elements of this right, therefore, are:
1. The right to a competent court
2. The right to a fair trial
3. The right to be heard, in person, or by an attorney-at-law
4. The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty.
The concept "court" applies to an organ which can be said,
because of the way it is organised, to have a judicial character
in that it is independent of the executive and of the parties to
2
the case; it must also offer adequate procedural guarantees. The 
expression "fair hearing" means, generally, that the tribunal 
which adjudicates upon a person's rights must act fairly, in good 
faith, without bias and in a judicial temper, and must give such
3
person the opportunity adequately to state his case.
The Parliamentary (Powers and Privileges) (Amendment) Law, 
No.5 of 1978, which was certified seven months before the Const­
itution came into operation, provides for a trial to take place 
before an institution other than a court. Under that law, every
1. ICCPR, Art.9(3); ECHR, Art.5(3); ACHR, Art.7(5).
2. Eggs v. Switzerland (7341/76). Report: DR 15, 35.
3. Duke v. The Queen /19727 SCR 917.
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breach of privilege is an offence punishable summarily by Parlia­
ment; Parliament being deemed for such purpose to be the "competent 
court". However, no procedure has been prescribed by law for such 
trial and whether or not the elements of a "fair trial" would be 
afforded appears to depend very much on the mood of Parliament at 
the relevant time. On the occasion that this Law was first 
invoked, on the same day that- it was certified, the National State 
Assembly resolved shortly after 2 p.m. that two newspapermen be 
ordered to attend before the Assembly at 5 p.m. to show cause why 
they should not be punished for having published a defamatory stat­
ement concerning a Member of Parliament.'*' Upon their appearing, 
without lawyers, the 168-member Assembly formed itself into a 
Committee of the Whole Assembly and heard prepared statements in 
which the newspapermen admitted the facts alleged and apologised 
profusely._ Several members then proceeded to question them. 
Thereafter, they were asked to withdraw "in the custody of the 
Sergeant-at-Arms" while the Assembly deliberated on what action it 
should take. It was unanimously resolved that a fine be imposed, 
the actual quantum having given rise to some differences of opinion. 
The Prime Minister thought that the Assembly "has conducted itself 
admirably on the first occasion on which it is sitting in the 
capacity of a court", although he did confess that "we do not know
exactly what crime the two suspects have committed because we did
3not go into the details of it". In fact, the two accused had
neither pleaded, nor been called upon to plead. In proposing that
a fine of Rs.1000 be imposed on each accused, Prime Minister
Jayewardene explained:
The reason why we have decided to impose a fine is 
that, firstly, we want to give a donation to the Deaf 
and Blind School; secondly, we wish to show that this 
Bill is now a Law with teeth in it, and in future 
anybody who comes before this House may not escape 
with a fine; thirdly, the Associated Newspapers of 
Ceylon Ltd, of which I am a shareholder, is not an 
indigent organisation. It has enough money to pay 
the fine of both these editors.^
1. This matter arose out of an inadvertent mix-up of captions 
below two photographs, one of which was of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs being shown around an industrial complex in South Korea, and 
the other was of a man travelling in a launch accompanied by a woman.
2. For the proceedings of this "trial" see National State Assem­
bly Debates, 2 February 1978, cols. 943-946, 999-1037.
3. Ibid., col.1034.
4. Ibid., cols. 1034-5.
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Since the Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd was a government- 
controlled company in which the Public Trustee held 75 per cent 
of the shares on behalf of the Government, and it functioned as 
an institution under the charge of the Prime Minister, it is 
reasonable to assume that this "legal proceeding" was undertaken 
at such short notice, without affording the "accused persons" 
the basic rights of defence, and the penalty was determined in 
such perfunctory fashion, with some other objective in view. The 
objective probably was, in the words of the Prime Minister, "to 
show that this . . .  is a law with teeth in it". Another 
Minister expressed this idea more emphatically when he warned 
newspapermen to "take to heart and learn that hereafter they 
should not - they dare not - attack this Government in a low and 
unseemly manner".^
The right to be presumed innocent is, in popular terms, a 
way of expressing the fact that the prosecution has the ultimate 
burden of establishing guilt. If there is any reasonable doubt at 
the conclusion of the case on any element of the offence charged, 
an accused person must be acquitted. In a more refined sense, the 
presumption of innocence gives an accused the initial benefit of a
2
right of silence and the ultimate benefit of any reasonable doubt.
A rebuttable presumption of fact which the defence may, in turn, 
disprove (e.g. a statutory provision which states that when 
certain facts are proved by the prosecution, certain other facts 
shall be presumed) does not perhaps vitiate this presumption.
3
Existing law contains several such provisons. However, this form 
of provision could, if widely or unreasonably worded, have the same 
effect as a presumption of guilt. The European Commission has 
observed that it is not sufficient to examine only the form in 
which the presumption is drafted; it is necessary to examine its
4
substance and effect.
1. Cyril Mathew, ibid., col.1034.
2. The Queen v. Appleby /1972.7 SCR 303.
3. Protection of Produce Ord., s.4; Old Metal Ord., s.8; Forest 
Ord., s.52; Fisheries Ord., ss.23, 24; Excise Ord., s.53; Gaming 
Ord., ss.7, 8; Betting on Horse Racing Ord., ss. 18, 19; Food and 
Drugs Ord., ss. 8, 52.
4. X v. United Kingdom (5124/71), CD 42, 135.
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The proviso to Article 13(5) allows the burden of proving
particular facts to be placed, by law, on an accused person. This
principle is also enunciated in section 103 of the Evidence Ordinance,
and further amplified in section 105. That latter section states
that when a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving
the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the
general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special except -
tion or proviso contained in any other part of the same Code or in
any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the court shall
presume the absence of such circumstances. For example, where the
mitigatory plea of grave and sudden provocation is set up, the burden
of proving the facts giving rise to that plea falls on the accused.
In The King v. Chandrasekera, ^ a bench of seven judges held that
an accused person cannot discharge the burden required of him by
section 105 by merely adducing evidence, or by creating in the minds
of the jury a reasonable doubt whether the facts on which the
relevant exception is based, existed or not. That section requires
the accused not merely to lead evidence, but to ensure that the
effect of the evidence led is to persuade the jury that the facts
relied upon as the basis of the exception, actually existed.
The right to a fair trial by a competent court, including the
right to be defended, is, as in the international instruments,
absolute and non-derogable. The presumption of innocence, however,
which under international law is also absolute, may here be restr-
2
icted by law in the interests of national security.
Protection against Retroactivity of the Criminal Law
Article 13(6) states that:
No person shall be held guilty of an offence on account 
of any act or omission which did not, at the time of 
such act or omission, constitute such an offence, and no 
penalty shall be imposed for any offence more severe 
than the penalty in force at the time such offence was 
conmitted.
This Article also provides, as an exception to the rule enunciated 
therein, that a person may be tried and punished "for any act or 
omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal 
according to the general principles of law recognised by the
1. (1942) 44 N.L.R. 97.
2. See also Art.15(8) for additional restrictions on the 
presumption of innocence and for restrictions on the right to a 
fair trial in respect of security personnel.
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community of nations". This provision has been borrowed from 
ICCFR, Article 15(2), and ECHR, Article 7(2). It does not appear 
in later instruments such as the ACHR. In X v. Belgium,^  the 
European Commission explained, with reference to the travaux 
preparatoires, why that provision had been included in the ECHR.
It was to make it clear that ECHR, Article 7(1) "does not affect 
laws which, under the very exceptional circumstances at the end 
of the Second World War, were passed in order to suppress war 
crimes, treason and collaboration with the enemy". This provision 
was designed to meet objections such as those levelled against 
the war crimes tribunals that they applied retrospective legis­
lation. The Commission has applied this provision only in cases 
from countries occupied during the Second World War which subseq-
r
uently introduced retrospective legislation to punish collaborators.^
The apparently inadvertent inclusion of this provision in the
1978 Constitution suggests that it will be competent for a Sri
Lankan court to enforce the law of another State even where the
conduct concerned is not contrary to Sri Lankan law. In other
words, a person may be tried and convicted in Sri Lanka for an
act or omission which does not constitute a crime in Sri Lanka.
This is not only contrary to the principle of legality inherent in
the substantive Article; it is also in conflict with State practice
which excludes the enforcement of a foreign criminal judgment if
3
the act concerned in not an offence in the enforcing State.
Article 13(6) also states that it shall not be a contraven­
tion of the rule against retroactivity to require the imposition 
of a minimum penalty for an offence, provided that such penalty 
does not exceed the maximum penalty prescribed for such offence 
at the time such offence was committed. In the United States, the 
Supreme Court has held that in determining whether legislation 
increases the punishment for a prior offence, the key question is 
whether the new law makes it possible for the accused to receive 
a greater punishment, even though it is possible for him to 
receive the same punishment under the new law as could have been
1. 1038/61, YB 4, 324.
2. See, for example, De Becker v. Belgium (214/56), Judgment: 
1 EHRR 43, Report: 21 August 1961.
3. F.G.Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights 
(Oxford, 1975), p.123. See European Convention on the Inter­
national Validity of Criminal Judgments (European Treaty Series, 
No.70), Art.4(1).
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imposed under the prior law."*- If this test is applied, the third
paragraph of Article 13(6) contains, contrary to what is stated
therein, an exception to the substantive rule.
The third exception to the rule enunciated in Article 13(6)
is to be found in existing law. The Criminal Procedure (Special
Provisions) Law, No. 15 of 1978, which was certified on 23 May 1978,
four months before the Constitution came into operation, .requires
every court which convicts a person of a scheduled offence to:
notwithstanding its ordinary powers of punishment, 
impose on such person, in addition to any other 
punishment which it may lawfully impose for the 
offence, a sentence of imprisonment for a period 
of not less than one-third of the maximum period 
of imprisonment for which he may be sentenced for 
such of fence. 2
3
This additional punishment, which cannot be reduced even in appeal,
is clearly contrary to Article 13(6). In fact, on a number of
occasions, it has been held by the United States Supreme Court that
a law which imposes an additional punishment to that prescribed when
a criminal act was committed is an ex post facto law prohibited by 
4
the Constitution.
This right may be restricted by law only in the interests of 
national security. In international law, the protection against 
the retroactivity of the criminal law is absolute and admits of no 
restrictions, whatever the circumstances.^
Freedom from Arbitrary Punishment
Article 13(4) states that:
No person shall be punished with death or imprison­
ment except by order of a competent court, made in 
accordance with procedure established by law. The
arrest, holding in custody, detention or other dep­
rivation of personal liberty of a person pending 
investigation or trial, shall not constitute punish­
ment.
This Article does not deal with all forms of punishment but only 
with death and imprisonment. Existing law under which the forfeiture
1. Lindsay v. Washington, 301 US 397. See also Warden, Lewis- 
burg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 US 653.
2. S. 4(a).
3. S. 4(b).
4. Calder v. Bull, 3 US 386; Re Medley, 134 US 160. See also 
Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal (1954) SCR 30.
5. But see Art.15(8) for additional restrictions in respect of 
security personnel.
6. ICCPR, Art.15; ECHR, Art.7; ACHR, Art.9.
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of property may be imposed by a Minister of the Government,^ and
2
civic disabilities may be imposed by Parliament, do not therefore 
appear to be in conflict with it. However, the Proscribing of 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Other Similar Organisations 
Law, No. 16 of 1978, which was certified barely four months before 
the Constitution came into operation, empowers a Minister of the 
Government to make order detaining any person for a period of one 
year. The Minister's order may not be called in question in any 
court. Since a person so detained in not held "pending investig­
ation or trial", this provision of existing law is clearly an
3
exception to the rule enunciated in this Article. The other 
exception was also effected a few months before this Article came 
into operation. By an amendment to the Parliamentary (Powers and 
Privileges) Act, the National State Assembly gave itself concurrent 
jurisdiction with the Supreme Court to try any offence under that 
Act, and to impose, inter alia, punishment of imprisonment for a 
term extending to two years. Such punishment is enforced and 
carried out as if it were a punishment imposed by the Supreme Court.
Freedom from Torture
Article 11 states that:
No person shall be subjected to torture or to cruel 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
The prohibition contained in this Article appears to extend to
seven distinct modes of conduct:
a) torture ^
b) cruel treatment
c) cruel punishment
d) inhuman treatment
e) inhuman punishment
f) degrading treatment
g) degrading punishment.
1. Proscribing of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Other 
Similar Organisations Law, s.7.
2. Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Law, s.7. see 
also 1978 Constitution, Art.81.
3. Ss.ll, 13.
4. Law No.5 of 1978, ss.2, 5.
5. For definition of "torture", see Declaration on the Prot­
ection of All Persons from being subjected to Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted 
unanimously on 9 December 1975 (Res.3452(XXX))
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Under existing law, the following are among the punishments that 
may be inflicted:
a) death"*"
2
b) whipping
3
c) corporal punishment
4
d) forfeiture of property
e) deprivation of civic rights."*
If the permissible aims of punishment are considered to be 
deterrence, isolation and rehabilitation, the death penalty mayg
conflict with this Article. In Furman v. Georgia it was once held 
by the United States Supreme Court that the imposition of the death 
penalty was not necessary as a means of stopping convicted indivi­
duals from committing further crimes; that there was no reason to 
believe that the death penalty was necessary either to deter the 
commission of capital crimes or to protect society; that it could 
not be concluded that death served the purpose of retribution more 
effectively than imprisonment; and that it was likely that the 
death penalty could not be shown to be serving any penal purpose 
which could not be served equally well by some less severe punish­
ment. The fact that the imposition of the death penalty is mandat­
ory for certain offences only aggravates its objectional quality.^g
In Tyrer v. United Kingdom, the European Commission has 
already held that birching as a punishment, ordered by a court and 
administered as provided for in the Isle of Man, is an assault on 
human dignity which humiliates and disgraces the offender without 
any redeeming social value. Federal German courts have held that 
the deprivation of civic rights as a punitive measure constitutes
1. Penal Code, s.52; Criminal Procedure Code, s.308.
2. Penal Code, s.52; Criminal Procedure Code, ss.13-15, 308, 
315-319; Corporal Punishment Ord., ss.2-7; Knives Ord.,s.11.
3. Children and Young Persons Ord., s.29.
4. Penal Code, s.52; Proscribing of Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam and Other Similar Organisations Law, s.7.
5. Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Law, s.7; 
Local Authorities (Imposition of Civic Disabilities, No.l) Law; 
Local Authorities (Imposition of Civic Disabilities, No.2) Law.
6. 408 US 238.
7. Ibid.
8. 5856/72, 2 EHRR 1.
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degrading treatment.'*’ Referring to the similar penalty of denat­
ionalisation, the United States Supreme Court provided the 
rationale:
There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no 
primitive torture. There is instead the total dis- 
truction of the individual's status in organised 
society. It is a form of punishment more primitive 
than torture, for it destroys for the individual 
the political existence that was centuries in the 
development. The punishment strips the citizen of 
his status in the national and international poli­
tical community.2
3
The European Commission held, in Patel et al v. United Kingdom, 
that the general purpose of the prohibition of degrading treatment 
was to prevent interferences with the dignity of man of a parti­
cularly serious nature. Accordingly, any act which lowers a person 
in rank, position, reputation or character, can be regarded as 
"degrading treatment" if it reaches a certain level of severity. 
Viewed in this light, the forfeiture of all property of a person, 
with its attendant consequences on his family as well, would appear 
to infringe Article 11.
The Prisons Ordinance permits the use of "side cuffs with 
body-belts", handcuffs and other mechanical restraints for periods 
in excess of 24 hours, and the securing of groups of prisoners by
4
"gang chain and wrist cuffs". In Denmark, Norway,Sweden and
Netherlands v. Greece,^  the European Commission stated that the
notion of inhuman treatment covers at least such treatment as
deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical. It has
also held that securing a prisoner by fastening one hand and one
foot in the same handcuffs while he was being transported from one
6place to another could constitute inhuman treatment. The Austrian 
Constitutional Court has held that the unnecessary application of 
physical force in escorting an arrested man to the police station 
constitutes degrading treatment.^ Accordingly, the use of mecha­
nical restraints provided for in the Prisons Ordinance could conflict 
with Article 11.
1. Decision of 14 July 1971 of the Federal Supreme Court,
NJW 1971, 20.
2. Trop v. Dulles, 356 US 86, at p.101.
3. 4403-19/70, Report: 3 EHRR 76.
4. Ss. 89-91.
5. 3321-23/67, 3344/67, YB 12.
6. Wiechert v. Federal Republic of Germany (1404/62), YB 7,104.
7. Decision of 6 October 1977, JB 1978, 312.
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Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion
Article 10 states that:
Every person is entitled to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, including the freedom 
to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his 
choice.
Article 14(1)(e) guarantees to every citizen:
the freedom, either by himself or in association 
with others, and either in public or in private, 
to manifest his religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice and teaching.
Existing law derogates from the freedoms recognised by these
two Articles to the extent that a pupil in a government school is
required to be provided religious instruction in the religion of
the parent of such pupil.'*' Such pupil is also prohibited from
attending any place of worship or participating in any worship or
observance connected with a religion which is not that of his 
2parents.
The exercise and operation of the right protected by Article 
14(1)(e) may be restricted by law "in the interests of national 
security, public order, and the protection of public health or 
morality, or for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect 
for the rights and freedoms of others, or of meeting the just
3
requirements of the general welfare of a democratic society".
Article 10, however, remains non-derogable under any circumstances. 
But although these two Articles contain two concepts - freedom to
4
believe and freedom to act, the former concept is of very little 
practical value without the latter. Indeed, it has been suggested 
that freedom of thought or of conscience per se cannot be invaded 
since, short of "science fiction" incursions into the domain of 
private introspection, interference with this freedom is impossible.^ 
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is restricted, therefore, 
to the extent that the freedom to manifest such thought, conscience 
or religion is restricted.
1. Education Ord., s.35(l).
2. Ibid., s.35(2).
3. Art.15(7). Art.15(8) permits additional restrictions in 
respect of security personnel.
4. For a fuller discussion of these two concepts, see Cantwell 
v. Connecticut, 84 US 310; In re Places and Objects of Worship Bill, 
(1973) DCC, Vol.l, p.27. For a definition of the concepts, see 
Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 1981.
5. Morris B.Abram, "Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion", 
Journal of the ICJ, Vol.VIII, p.43.
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Freedom of Speech
Article 14(1)(a) states that every citizen is entitled to
"the freedom of speech and expression, including publication".
The right to freedom of publication means the freedom of
the press.'*' As early as 1784, Lord Mansfield defined the freedom
of the press as "printing without previous licence, subject to the
2
consequences of the law". In Sakai Papers (P) Ltd v. Union of
3
India, the Indian Supreme Court held that for propagating his
ideas, a citizen had the right to publish them, to disseminate
them, and to circulate them, either by word of mouth or by writing.
Existing law limits this right in many ways. The publication of
4
certain matter is prohibited: news relating to horse racing;
the contents of a Cabinet document;'* a Cabinet decision unless
6 7officially released; proceedings of a meeting of the Cabinet;
a proposal alleged to be under consideration by a Ministry, unless
8 9it is true; an official secret; matter relating to police or
service establishments, equipment or installations which is likely
to be prejudicial to the defence and security of the country;^
any statement relating to any monetary, financial or economic
measures alleged to be under consideration by the Government if its
publication is likely to lead to the creation of shortages or
windfall profits or otherwise adversely affect the economy;'*''*' or
any activity of a proscribed organisation, including any investi-
12gation into such activity. Publication is also regulated in a
1. For an early exposition of this freedom, see Blackstone, 4, 
Commentaries, 145 (1876).
2. The King v. Dean of the State Asaph (1784) 3 TR 428.
3. (1962) 3 SCR 842.
4 . Control of Publications on Horse Racing Act, s .15(1 )(c ).
5. Sri Lanka Press Council Law, s.16(2)(a).
6. Ibid., s.16(2)(b).
7. Ibid., s.16(1).
8. Ibid., 16(5).
9. Ibid., s.16(3).
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., s.16(4).
12. Proscribing of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Other 
Similar Organisations Law, s.5(1)(a).
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variety of ways. For instance, the Press Council may recover a
registration fee from the proprietors of newspaper s,"*- and obtain
2
information from editors and journalists; it may also censure
3
an editor or direct the publication of an apology or correction.
A newspaper may be published only after a declaration containing 
particulars of such newspaper has been delivered to the Registrar 
of Newspapers, to whom one copy of every edition of that newspaper 
signed by the printer and publisher is also required to be delivered. 
It is an offence to distribute any newspaper, whether printed in 
Sri Lanka or abroad, which contains any matter relating to the 
activities of a proscribed organisation."* 75 per cent of the shares 
of the principal national newspaper company are held by the Public 
Tims tee on behalf of the government, and by virtue of this share­
holding, the Public Trustee nominates a majority of the directors 
of that company.^
The right to freedom of speech and expression may be exer­
cised through different means. Motion pictures are within the 
ambit of this protection. As the United States Supreme Court has 
observed:
The beneficiaries of freedom of expression include 
the actor on the stage or screen, the artist whose 
creation is in oil or clay or marble, the poet whose 
reading public may be practically non-existent,the 
musician and his musical scores, and the counsellor, 
whether a priest, parent or teacher, no matter how 
small his audience.7
Existing law permits a stage entertainment or other public perfor­
mance to be exhibited only in a building previously licensed for
g
that purpose. A film, stage entertainment or other public 
performance also requires to be previously certified by the 
appropriate authority as suitable for public exhibition.^
1. Sri Lanka Press Council Law, ss. 19, 25.
2. Ibid., s.10.
3. Ibid., s.9.
4. Ibid., s.26; Newspapers Ord., s.7.
5. Proscribing of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Other 
Similar Organisations Law, s.5(l)(b).
6. Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd (Special Provisions) 
Law, ss.2, 6.
7. Paul Poe v. Abraham Ullman, 367 US 497.
8. Public Performances Ord., s.3.
9. Ibid., s.6.
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Speech is not stripped of its protection merely because it
appears in the form of a paid commercial advertisement.^ Existing
law prohibits any advertisement which is calculated to injure 
2
public morality.
A demonstration is a visible manifestation of the feelings
or sentiments of a group and is, therefore, a form of speech or 
3
expression. So is the activity of peaceful pamphleteering and 
4
picketing. An assembly or procession may, however, be conducted 
in any public place only with a prior licence from, or in accor­
dance with directions issued by, a police officer.^ Four copies 
of every pamphlet (or book) printed are required to be delivered 
to the Registrar of Books.
Streets are natural and proper places for the dissemination 
of information and opinions. One who is rightfully on a street 
which is open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere 
the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly 
fashion, and this right extends to the comnunication of ideas by 
handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word.^  However, 
music may be played on a street only with a prior licence from
Q
a police officer. The use in a public place of an instrument
which produces, reproduces or amplifies sound also requires a
9
prior permit from the police.
In Handy side v. United Kingdom, ^  the European Court held 
that ECHR, Article 10 was applicable "not only to information 
or ideas that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive 
or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, 
shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population".
In Termiliello v. City of Chicago,^ Douglas J thought that a
1. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 US 809; cf. Hamdard Dawakhana v. 
Union of India (1960) 2 SCR 671.
2. Sri Lanka Press Council Law, s .1 5 (1 ) ( c ) .
3. Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar (1962) Supp. 3 SCR 369;
Decision of 7 November1967, Hoge Raad, Netherlands, NJ 1968 199.
4. Police Department v. Mosley, 408 US 92.
5. Police Ord., s.78.
6. Printers and Publishers Ord., s.2.
7. Flower v. United States, 407 US 197; Talley v. California, 
362 US 60; Jamison v. State of Texas, 318 US 413.
8. Police Ord., s.TIT
9. Ibid., ss.80, 96.
10. 5493/72, Judgrnent: 1 EHRR 737.
11. 337 US 1.
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function of free speech under a democratic system of government
is to invite dispute. He elaborated:
It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it 
induces a condition of unrest, create dissatisfaction 
with conditions as they are, or even stirs people 
to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging.
It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and 
have profound unsettling effects as it presses for 
acceptance of an idea.
In Roth v. United States,^- Brennan J was of the view that free
speech encompassed "all ideas having even the slightest social
importance - unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion" This protection
has since been extended to "information and ideas regardless of
2 3their social worth"; to "opinions that are loathed"; and to
criticism of public men and measures made "foolishly and without
4
moderation". Even the advocacy of the use of force or of law 
violation as a means of securing a change of government, as 
distinguished from a conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the 
government, is within the protection accorded to speech and 
expression.^ Existing law, however, prohibits several forms of 
such expression on pain of severe punishment: that which bringsg
the President into contempt; that which excites or attempts to 
excite feelings of disaffection to the President or the Govern­
ment;^ that which excites or attempts to excite hatred to, or
g
contempt of, the administration of justice; that which excites 
or attempts to excite the citizens to procure, otherwise than
9
by lawful means, the alteration of any matter by law established; 
that which attempts to raise discontent or disaffection among the
1. 354 US 476.
2. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 US 557.
3. Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 US 265.
4. Cohen v. California, 403 US 15.
5. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 US 444; Eugene Dennis v. United 
States, 341 US 494.
6. Penal Code, s.118.
7. Ibid., s.120.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
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among the citizens;^ that which attempts to promote feelings of
2
ill-will and hostility between different classes of citizens;
3 4any obscene or indecent matter; any profane matter; subject to
certain exceptions, any imputation concerning any person with the
intention of harming the reputation of such person;"* an insultg
which is likely to provoke a person to break the public peace; 
and any statement concerning the conduct of a Member of Parliament 
which is defamatory in nature.^
The exercise and operation of this right may be restricted 
by law in the interests of racial and religious harmony, national 
security, public order or the protection of public health or 
morality; for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect 
for the rights and freedoms of others, or of meeting the just 
requirements of the general welfare of a democratic society; or 
in relation to parliamentary privilege, contempt of court, defama­
tion or the incitement to an offence. These grounds broadly fall 
within the grounds upon which, under the international instruments,
g
the exercise of this right may be restricted.
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
Article 14(1)(b) states that every citizen is entitled to the 
freedom of peaceful assembly.
The Police Ordinance contains provisions which authorise the 
police to regulate or prohibit the holding of processions in public 
places and the use of instruments which are capable of producing,
9
reproducing or amplifying sound in public places. Such procedures 
are generally necessary in order that the authorities may be in a 
position to ensure the peaceful nature of a meeting. Accordingly, 
existing law which prohibits an "unlawful assembly" is perhaps not
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., ss.285-287; Obscene Publications Ord., s.2; Sri 
Lanka Press Council Law, s.l5(l)(d).
4. Profane Publications Act, s.2; Sri Lanka Press Council 
Law, s.15(1)(a).
5. Penal Code, s.479; Sri Lanka Press council Law, s.l5(l)(b).
6. Penal Code, s.484.
7. Parliament (Powers and Privileges) Act, s.22.
8. ICCPR, Art.19(3); ECHR, Art.10(2); ECHR, Art.13.
9. Ss.78, 80, 96.
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inconsistent with this Article. Questionable, however, is a law 
which enables an assembly of five or more persons "likely to cause 
a disturbance of the public peace" to be dispersed by the use of 
force.^ Guidance on the exercise of such power has been provided 
by the European Commission which has observed that the possibility 
of violent counter-demonstrations, or the possibility of extrem­
ists with violent intentions, not members of the organising 
association, joining the demonstration cannot as such take away 
this right. Even if there is a real risk of a public procession 
resulting in disorder by developments outside the control of those
organising it, such procession does not for this reason alone fall
2
outside the scope of the protected right.
The exercise and operation of this right may be restricted
by law in the interests of racial and religious harmony, national
security, public order, or the protection of public health or
morality; for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect
for the rights and freedoms of others, or of meeting the just
3
requirements of the general welfare of a democratic society.
These grounds broadly correspond to those in international instru- 
4ments.
Freedom of Association
Article 14(1)(c) states that every citizen is entitled to 
the freedom of association. The term "association" presupposes 
a voluntary grouping for a common goal.^ ACHR, Article 16(1) 
specifies the purposes of association: ideological, religious, 
political, economic, labour, social, cultural, sports, and "other".
Under existing law, the Tamil separatist organisation styled 
as the "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam" is proscribed. Addit­
ionally, the President has the power to proscribe any other 
movement, society, party, association or body or group of persons
1. Administration of Justice Law, s.58.
2. Christians Against Racism and Fascism v. United Kingdom, 
8440/78, DR 21, 138; cf. Beatty v. Gillbanks (1882) 9 QB 308;
O'Kelly v. Harvey (1883) 14 LR.Ir. 105; Duncan v. Jones /T9367 
1 KB 218; Feiner v. New York, 340 US 315.
3. Arts.15(3), 15(7). See also Art.15(8) which permits 
additional restrictions in respect of security personnel.
4. ICCFR, Art.21; ECHR, Art.11(2); ACHR, Art.15.
5. Le Compte, Van Leeuven and De Meyere v. Belgium (6878/75,
7238/75), Judgment: 23 June 1981.
6. Proscribing of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Other
Similar Organisations Law, s.2(1). For consequences of proscr­
iption, see ss. 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11.
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if he is of opinion that such organisation "advocates the use of
violence and is either directly or indirectly concerned in or
engaged in any unlawful activity.^
The exercise and operation of this right may be restricted
by law in the interests of racial and religious harmony, national
economy, national security, public order, or the protection of
public health or morality; or for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others, or
of meeting the just requirements of the general welfare of a
2
democratic society. These grounds broadly correspond to those
3
recognised under international law.
Freedom to Form and Join a Trade Union
Article 14(1)(d) states that every citizen is entitled to
the freedom to form and join a trade union. Under existing law,
4
every trade union is required to be registered. This requirement 
of compulsory registration is not, by itself, incompatible with 
this Article.
The exercise and operation of this right may be restricted 
by law in the interests of national security, public order, or the 
protection of public health or morality; or for the purpose of 
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms 
of others, or of meeting the just requirements of the general 
welfare of a democratic society.^ These grounds broadly correspond 
to those recognised under international law.
Freedom to Enjoy Own Culture and Use Own Language
Article 14(1)(f) states that every citizen is entitled to:
the freedom by himself or in association with others 
to enjoy and promote his own culture and to use his 
own language.
In ICCFR, Article 27, this right is accorded to persons belonging 
to minority groups in those States in which ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities exist. Article 14(l)(f), however, draws no 
such distinction. But in regard to language, the Constitution 
has already regulated the use of the Tamil language, giving it a
1. Ibid., s.2(2).
2. Arts. 15(4), 15(7). But see Art.15(8) for further restr­
ictions which may be imposed in respect of security personnel.
3. ICCPR, Art.22(2); ECHR, Art.11(2); ACHR, Art.16(2).
4. Trade Unions Ord., s.8.
5. Art. 15(7). See Art.15(8) for further restrictions which 
may be imposed in respect of security personnal.
6. ICCFR, Art.22(2); ICESCR, Art.8; ECHR, Art.11(2).
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status inferior to that of the Sinhala language. The Constitution 
also ignores English, which is not only the language of the dwin­
dling Burgher comnunity, but is also the country's lingua franca.^- 
The exercise and operation of this right may be restricted 
by law in the interests of national security, public order, or 
the protection of public health or morality; or for the purpose 
of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedcms
of others, or of meeting the just requirements of the general
2
welfare of a democratic society. The limitation clause appears 
to be unnecessarily wide. The protected cultures and languages 
are those of Sri Lanka's citizens and form part of Sri Lanka's 
cultural heritage. After centuries of cultural co-existence, the 
intervention of the law appears hardly necessary at this stage to 
ensure continued co-existence. Moreover, it is incomprehensible 
how the use of a national language could possibly offend against 
"public health" or "public morality", or threaten or imperil 
"national security" or "public order", which are all grounds that 
comprise the limitation clause.
Freedom to Engage in Any Occupation
Article 14(1)(g) states that every citizen is entitled to:
the freedom to engage by himself or in association 
with others in any lawful occupation, profession, 
trade, business or enterprise.
A corporate body is not a "citizen", and is therefore not entitled
3
to invoke this right. But a citizen who, in association with
others, forms a company for the purpose of engaging in a business,
4
does not thereby become disentitled to invoke it.
Existing law already regulates the exercise of this right.
For instance, an importer of goods is subject to orders made by 
the Minister prohibiting the importation of certain types of goods 
into the country.^ Certain occupations may not be engaged in 
without a licence from the competent authority: e.g. as a trader,
1. 1978 Constitution, Ch.IV.
2. Art.15(7). For further restrictions in respect of security 
personnel, see Art.15(8).
3. State Trading Corporation of India v. Comnercial Tax Officer, 
AIR 1963 SC 1811.
4. In re Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd (Special Provisions) 
Bill (1973) DCC, Vol.l, p.35, at 49; In re Church of Sri Lanka 
(Consequential Provisions) Bill (1975) DCC, Vol.3, p.5, at 14.
5. Imports and Exports (Control) Act.
6. Licensing of Traders Act, s.2.
176
1 2 a manufacturer of weapons, or as a private broadcaster. Certain
areas of activity are totally prohibited even to citizens: e.g. the
3
provision of an omnibus service; the transaction of the business 
of life or other insurance;^ the establishment of a school for the 
education of persons between the ages of five and fourteen years;"* 
and the import, export, sale, supply and distribution of petrol,g
kerosene and diesel oil. On the other hand, a person graduating 
from a university in Sri Lanka may be required by the State to 
provide compulsory public service in his field of specialisation for 
a period of up to five years.^
The exercise and operation of this right may be further 
restricted by law in the interests of national economy, national 
security, public order, or the protection of public health or mora­
lity; or for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect 
for the rights and freedoms of others, or of meeting the just 
requirements of the general welfare of a democratic society. Restr­
ictions may also be imposed in relation to the professional, techni­
cal, academic, financial and other qualifications necessary for 
practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade, 
business or enterprise, and the licensing and disciplinary control 
of the person entitled to such right, as well as in relation to 
the carrying on by the State, a State agency or a public corporation 
of any trade, business, industry, service or enterprise, whether to
g
the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.
Freedom of Movement
Articles 14(1)(h) and 14(1)(i) state, respectively, that 
every citizen is entitled to the freedom of movement and of choosing 
his residence within Sri Lanka, and the freedom to return to Sri 
Lanka.
1. Offensive Weapons Act, s.2.
2. Ceylon Broadcasting Corporation Act, s.44.
3. Motor Transport Act, s.12.
4. Insurance Corporation Act, s.10.
5. Assisted Schools and Training Colleges (Supplementary 
Provisions) Act, s.25.
6. Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (Amendment) Act, s.4.
7. Compulsory Public Services Act, s.4.
8. Arts. 15(5), 15(7). For further restrictions which may 
be imposed in respect of security personnel, see Art.15(8).
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Existing law regulates the exercise of the former right by 
requiring the licensing of boats, motor vehicles, aircraft and
other vehicles before they can be used as a means of transportat-
1 2 ion. Tolls may also be levied on modes of transport. The Petrol
(Control of Supplies) Ordinance, when invoked, is capable of being
used to restrict movement within Sri Lanka through the control of
3
the supply and the conservation of the stocks of petrol. Under 
the Pilgrimages Ordinance, the Minister may restrict the number of 
persons who may proceed on any pilgrimage from any part of the 
country and the period of their stay at the place to which such 
pilgrimage is made.^
Under international law, the latter right may be exercised 
by a citizen whether or not he has a passport or other travel 
document, and no sanction, penalty, punishment or reprisal may 
attach to any person for exercising or attempting to exercise it.^ 
Existing law, however, provides that a citizen may not leave Sri
g
Lanka unless he has in his possession a valid passport. That 
passport may be cancelled or suspended by the competent authority 
at any time "in his absolute discretion", and the exercise of that 
discretion may not be called in question in any court.^ The 
competent authority may at any time and in his discretion, restrict 
the validity of such passport as regards its duration or as regards 
the countries of travel, or require the holder, if employed abroad, 
to remit in foreign exchange such amounts at such intervals as may
g
be determined by him. The question does arise whether a citizen 
who has forfeited his passport while being abroad will be permitted 
to enter the country without any valid travel documents.
1. Boats Ord., s.2; Motor Traffic Act, s.2; Air Navigation 
Act, s.15; Vehicles Ord., s.3.
2. Tolls Ord., s.2.
3. Ss. 4-7, 10.
4. S.2.
5. Principles on freedom and non-discrimination in respect of 
the right of everyone to return to his country, formulated by the 
UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution No. 1788 (LIV), 18 May 
1973. This Resolution is reproduced in ICJ Review (Dec. 1973), 
pp. 61-64.
6. Immigrants and Emigrants Act, s.35.
7. Passport (Regulation) and Exit Permit Act, ss. 3, 17. See 
also Immigrants and Emigrants Act, s.36.
8. Ibid., ss. 12, 14.
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The exercise and operation of these rights may be restricted
by law in the interests of national security, public order, or the
protection of public health or morality; or for the purpose of
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms
of others, or of meeting the just requirements of the general
welfare of a democratic society.'*' The exercise and operation of
the former right may also be restricted in the interests of 
2
national economy. Under international law, the freedom of a 
citizen to enter his own country is absolute and not subject to 
any restriction, except that ICCPR, Article 12(4), requires that
3
a citizen should not be ’’arbitrarily" deprived of that freedcm.
By authorising the legislature to restrict the right of a Sri 
Lankan citizen to return to his country, the Constitution envisages 
a most impracticable situation. If this strange and inexplicable 
limitation clause is actually implemented, a new class of people 
who, though not stateless, are condemned to spend part of their 
lives either in the atmosphere or on international waterways, 
would have been created.
Right to Equality
Article 12(1) states that all persons are equal before the 
law and are entitled to the equal protection of the law. Article 
12(2) states that no citizen shall be discriminated against on the 
grounds of race, religion, language, caste, sex, political opinion 
or place of birth. Article 12(3), contemplating primarily a 
problem peculiar to the northern province, states that no person 
shall, on the grounds of race, religion, caste or sex, be subject 
to disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to 
access to shops, public restaurants, hotels, places of public
4
entertainment or places of public worship of his own religion.
Three related concepts are enshrined in these paragraphs: equality 
before the law, equal protection of the law, and non-discrimination.
The exercise and operation of these rights may be restricted 
by law in the interests of national security, public order, or 
the protection of public health or morality; or for the purpose of
1. Art. 15(7).
2. Art. 15(6). For further restrictions on both rights in 
respect of security personnel, see Art. 15(8).
3. ECHR P4, Art.3(2); ACHR, Art.22(5). See also UDHR, Art.13(2).
4. See Prevention of Social Disabilities Act.
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securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms 
of others, or of meeting the just requirements of the general 
welfare of a democratic society.^
Additionally, the Constitution itself contains the following 
exceptions to the concept of equality:
a) a person may be required to acquire within a reasonable time
sufficient knowledge of any language as a qualification for
any employment or office in the public, judicial or local
government service or in the service of any public corporation,
where such knowledge is reasonably necessary for the discharge
2
of the duties of such employment or office;
b) a person may be required to have a sufficient knowledge of
any language as a qualification for any such employment or
office where no function of that employment or office can be 
discharged otherwise than with a knowledge of that language;
c) special provision may be made by law, subordinate legislation 
or executive action, for the advancement of women, children 
or disabled persons.
None of the international instruments admits of any exception
to, or restriction of, the concept of equality. Nor do they
3
authorise discrimination under any circumstances.
1. Art. 15(7). For further restrictions which may be imposed 
in respect of security personnel, see Art. 15(8).
2. Having regard to the fact that Sinhala is the one official 
language of the country, this and the following exception will be 
sufficient authority for requiring non-Sinhala-speaking persons
to acquire a knowledge of the Sinhala language within a prescribed 
time on pain of exclusion from the relevant public service.
3. ICCFR, Art.26; ECHR, Art.14; ACHR, Art.24. The concept 
of equality does not, however, prevent classification which rests 
upon reasonable grounds of distinction. See Opinion of Judge Tanaka 
in the South-West Africa Case, Reports of Judgments, Advisory 
Opinions and Orders of the International Court of Justice, 1966,
at pp. 284-316. But cf. warning of Subha Rao J in Lachhman Das v. 
State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 222, that overemphasis on the doctrine 
of classification may "end in substituting the doctrine of class­
ification for the doctrine of of equality".
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THE RESTRICTIONS
The exercise and operation of the fundamental rights 
declared and recognised in the 1978 Constitution are "subject 
to such restrictions as may be prescribed by law". The restrict­
ions may be prescribed "in the interests of", "in relation to", 
or "for the purpose of", a number of designated objectives. Law, 
in most instances, includes emergency regulations made by the 
President under the Public Security Ordinance.
Restrictions
Article 4(d) states that the fundamental rights declared 
and recognised by the Constitution shall be respected, secured 
and advanced by all the organs of government and shall not be 
abridged, restricted or denied, save in the manner and to the 
extent provided in the Constitution. To abridge, to restrict, 
and to deny are three distinct concepts. "Abridged" means to 
limit the scope of a right, to reduce its content. If the word 
"teaching" is deleted from Article 14(1)(e) which declares the 
freedom to manifest one's religion or belief, or the expression 
"and of choosing his residence within Sri Lanka" is deleted from 
Article 14(1) (h) which protects the freedom of movement, those 
two rights would have been abridged. "Denied" means to refuse, 
disallow or withhold from. A right may be denied by repealing it 
and thereby denying recognition to it under the Constitution, or 
by suspending its exercise or operation. If in Article 11, 
"citizen" was substituted for "person", the protection against 
torture would then have been denied to non-citizens. Between 
these two concepts of abridgement and denial is that of restrict­
ion. To "restrict" is to check, curb, impede, hamper, obstruct, 
keep within limits, regulate or control. The right to practise 
a profession may be restricted by requiring prior qualification; 
the right to carry on a trade, by requiring a prior licence; the 
right to travel, by requiring the possession of a travel document. 
What Article 15 authorises the legislature to do is not to abridge 
or to deny, but to restrict the exercise and operation of the 
fundamental rights.
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Prescribed by Law
A restriction is required to be prescribed by law. This 
expression appears in ECHR, Articles 9(2), 10(2) and 11(2), the 
equivalent in the French text being, in each case, prevues par la 
loi. In Times Newspapers Ltd v. United Kingdom,^  the European 
Court held that at least two requirements flow from this expression 
Firstly, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must 
be able to have an indication of the legal rules applicable to a 
given case that is adequate in the circumstances. Secondly, a 
norm cannot be regarded as a "law" unless it is formulated with 
sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: 
he must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, 
to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the conseq­
uences which a given action may entail.
There appears to be a third requirement that flows from this 
expression, namely, that the restriction must be prescribed by 
"law". A law must set out precisely the manner and extent to 
which a right is being restricted. If the law, without prescribing 
the restriction, authorises a person or body to do so, the restric­
tion would not have been "prescribed by law". For instance, if a 
law provided that a competent authority may prohibit, in the 
interests of the protection of public morality, the publication 
of such matter which he considers expedient to so prohibit, the 
exercise and operation of the freedom of speech and expression 
would not have been made subject to a restriction prescribed by law 
because the law would not have, with sufficient precision, formul­
ated the manner and extent to which that right is restricted.
A competent authority may make an order, but he cannot make a law; 
"law" as defined in the Constitution means an Act of a legislative 
body.
National Security
National security means the security of the nation. The 
security of the nation is generally threatened by war or rebellion; 
by external or internal aggression directed at the principal organs 
of the State. A restriction imposed in the interests of national
1. 6538/74, Judgment: 2 EHRR 245.
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security must bear some proximate relationship to, or be directed 
at, the prevention of either of these conditions, or must seek to 
facilitate governmental efforts to deal effectively with such 
conditions. In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras,^  the Supreme 
Court of India considered that the expression "security of the State1 
referred to "serious and aggravated forms of public disorder" and 
did not comprise ordinary breaches of "public safety" or "public 
order" which do not involve any danger to the State itself.
Public Order
The contravention of law may often affect order, but before 
it can be said to affect "public order" it must affect the community 
or the public at large. The playing of loud music at night may 
disturb public tranquility without affecting public order. Simil­
arly, when two drunkards quarrel and fight, there is disorder, but
2not public disorder. The Indian Supreme Court has explained this
distinction very succinctly:
One has to imagine three concentric circles, the 
largest representing "law and order", the next 
representing "public order", and the smallest 
representing "security of the State". An act may 
affect "law and order" but not "public order", 
just as an act may affect "public order" but not 
"security of the State". 3
Therefore, a restriction justified as being in the interests of
public order must bear a reasonable and proximate nexus to the
prevention of disorder of a grave nature, and not merely acts which
disturb the public tranquility or are breaches of the peace.
Public Health or Morality
Since the word "public" qualifies both health and morality, 
the restriction appears to be directed at the protection of the 
health and morality of the community.^ In Dudgeon v. United 
Kingdom,^  the European Commission interpreted the expression 
"protection of morals" in ECHR, Article 8(2), to refer primarily 
to the protection of the moral ethos of society, thus preserving
1. (1950) SCR 594.
2. Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740.
3. Ibid., at para. 52.
4. In X v. Netherlands (1068/61), YB 5, 278, the European Conm- 
ission held that compulsory membership of the Health Service may be 
required by the Government in the interests of the protection of 
health.
5. 7525/76, Report: 3 EHRR 40.
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to the individual an area of strictly private morality in which
the State may not interfere. The European Court, while agreeing
that this expression implied safeguarding the moral standards of
society as a whole, thought that it also covered protection of
the moral interests and welfare of particular sections of society,
e.g. schoolchildren.'*' In that case, it was held that a law which
prohibited homosexual acts committed in private between consenting
adult males was in breach of the applicant's right to respect for
private life and could not be justified on the ground of the
"protection of morals".
Does a majority have an unqualified right to impose its
standards of morality on the whole of society ? In Dudgeon, the
European Commission observed that "even if the majority of people
in Northern Ireland disapproves of homosexual conduct on moral
grounds, this does not mean that it is necessary to prohibit it
in order to protect morals in a democratic society". Account
must be taken of the effect which allowing the conduct in question
2
is likely to have on the moral standards of society as a whole.
Rights and Freedoms of Others
It is not made clear whether the "rights and freedoms" of 
others, for the recognition and respect for which the exercise 
and operation of a fundamental right may be restricted by law. 
are those which are specifically declared and recognised in the 
Constitution, or whether that expression is intended to include 
a variety of vague, undefined interests. As pointed out by 
Connelly:
The term 'the rights of others' is inherently vague.
Indeed, it is arguably so open-ended that a liberal 
interpretation could sweep away much of the protection 
ostensibly afforded the human rights which are the 
subject of the Convention. Put differently, the 
rights singled out for protection in the Convention 
could be subordinated to other rights not specified 
but 'read or written into' the Convention by the 
Commission and the Court. Surely it is not desirable 
that rights 'be picked out of a hat' according to 
the personal inclinations and preferences of the 
members of these bodies albeit with the laudable 
motive of securing justice in a particular case. 3
1. Ibid., Judgment: 22 October 1981.
2. Supra.
3. A.M.Connelly, "The Protection of the Rights of Others", 5 
Human Rights Review, 117 at 133.
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This expression has been borrowed from UDHR. In that
instrument, what is stated is that:
Everyone has duties to the community in which alone 
the free and full development of his personality is 
possible. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, 
everyone shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are determined by law solely for the purpose of 
securing due recognition and respect for the rights 
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requir­
ements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society.1
Having regard to the context in which it first appeared in UDHR, 
it seems reasonable to infer that what was contemplated was that 
individual rights and freedoms should, when necessary, be subor­
dinated to the general interests of the community. For instance, 
the right of a jazz enthusiast to enjoy his particular brand of 
music must necessarily be subordinated to the right of the comm­
unity to be spared loud raucous sounds at a time when most people 
sleep. Hence, a law which insists on a silent night. A Sri 
Lankan Buddhist family having the traditional overnight pirith 
ceremony in which drumming plays a significant role, will be 
required by law to obtain a permit from the local police station, 
which permit is usually issued with the consent of the immediate 
neighbours. Therefore, the "rights and freedoms" contemplated 
appear to be not those individual rights and freedoms which are 
already declared and recognised in the Constitution; nor are they 
some nebulous, unspecific, yet-to-be defined individual interests 
which a legislature is empowered to raise to a level even above 
the constitutionally protected rights. What is envisaged seems 
to be the broad collective interests of the community which, when 
applied, may have the effect of restricting the exercise and 
operation of individual rights and freedoms.
Just Requirements of the General Welfare of a Democratic Society 
This ground, which is also borrowed from UDHR, Article 29, 
permits a restriction to be placed in the interests of the general 
welfare which is just and such as would be compatible with a 
democratic society. A "democratic society" would have attributes 
other than the characteristics of democracy as a form of government.
1. Art.29.
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As Humphrey points out:
A society is not democratic simply because its 
government represents the majority, has the 
outward trappings of a democracy or because it 
calls itself a democracy.^
He proceeds to explain:
In a democratic society there are or should be 
some limits on the exercise of governmental powers 
including the powers of the legislature. This is 
sometimes achieved by entrenching a bill of 
rights in the constitution, by the separation of 
powers, or by some other system of checks and 
balances to restrain the powers of the various 
branches of government. These limits are 
imposed on the assumption that whoever possesses 
power, it is safer that power should be restrained.
In a democratic society there will be freedom 
of expression and of opinion, and public opinion 
will exercise some control over the imposition 
of restrictions on the enjoyment of freedom.
In brief, a democratic society may be described as one in which
2
the rule of law prevails. It is to meet the just requirements 
of the general welfare (i.e. the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number) of such a society that restrictions may be pres­
cribed by law.
Racial and Religious Harmony
Harmony means compatibility or concord. A restriction 
imposed in the interests of racial and religious harmony will be 
one directed towards preventing discord, unpleasantness or 
dissonance between racial and religious groups.
National Economy
This is a ground peculiar to Sri Lanka; it was first 
included in section 18(2) of the 1972 Constitution. It was 
successfully invoked by the State before the Constitutional 
Court in 1973 to justify the Associated Newspapers of Ceylon 
(Special Provisions) Bill. On that occasion, the Court applied 
this concept without actually explaining what it understood by 
the term. However, in setting out the circumstances that led 
to the Government's decision to convert a one-family newspaper 
business into a public company; in particular, the findings of
1. John P.Humphrey, "The Just Requirements of Morality, Public 
Order and the General Welfare in a Democratic Society", The Practice 
of Freedom (Toronto: Butterworths, 1979), p.137.
2. f'or essential requirements of a society under the rule of 
law, see The Rule of Law and Human Rights: Principles and Defini­
tions (Geneva: ICJ, 1966), pp.5-8.
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a commission of inquiry that the directors of the company had
contravened the exchange and import control laws of the land, the
Court expressed itself thus:
Since the dawn of independence the economy of our 
country has been to a great extent influenced by the 
foreign resources available to the country. Every 
developing nation in the world has had to fight the 
hard way to earn valuable foreign exchange for its 
development programnes. Sri Lanka is no exception.
The depletion of our foreign exchange resources has 
always caused an imbalance in our economy. Ways and 
means had been devised by the enactment of exchange 
control laws to prevent the trafficking in foreign 
exchange, but whatever preventive measures had been 
adopted, the designing mind had always found loop­
holes and gaps in the law to swindle the nation of 
foreign exchange which should legitimately have come 
to the State.
Every person or company which indulges in activities 
which deprive a nation of vitally needed foreign 
exchange is in fact waging an economic war against 
the State. The State is therefore both morally and 
in the interests of the nation justified in enacting 
laws which will serve to curb the powers and tendencies 
of those who are in commanding heights from which they 
could deprive the country of such foreign exchange.
The magnitude of the offences in relation to foreign 
exchange has attained such proportions that the State 
has even found that the normal laws of the land are 
inadequate to bring the offenders to justice. Special 
legislation in the form of the Criminal Justice Comm­
issions Act, No.14 of 1972, has been enacted in 
relation to offences of foreign exchange which 
endanger the national economy of the land.1
A restriction on the ground of "national economy" may, therefore,
be imposed only if the activity sought to be curbed or regulated
relates to an area such as foreign exchange or currency, and such
activity, if unchecked or unregulated, is likely to affect the
economy of the country.
Parliamentary Privilege
The Parliament (Powers and Privileges) Act, No.21 of 1953, 
as amended by Law No.5 of 1978, already contains a statement of 
restrictions imposed on the exercise and operation of the freedom 
of speech and expression. The rationale for this restriction is 
that Members of Parliament should, for the proper performance of
1. (1973) DCC, Vol.l, p.35, at 46.
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their functions, enjoy complete freedom of speech and debate 
within the chamber. Accordingly, no right of reply is available 
to a citizen in respect of statements made in Parliament;'*' the 
proceedings of Parliament or of a parliamentary conmittee may not
2
be published if such publication has been prohibited by Parliament;
the proceedings of a parliamentary committee may not, in any event,
3
be published before they are reported to Parliament; and the 
publication of any statement which Parliament considers to be
4
defamatory of itself or of a member, is prohibited.
Contempt of Court
The law of contempt is contained in decisions of the Supreme 
Court applying, in appropriate circumstances, English common law 
on the subject. Accordingly, the following forms of speech and 
expression are punishable as contempt of court:
a) that which scandalises the court or a judge thereof,^ or the
g
judiciary generally; i.e. any matter which is calculated to 
bring a court or a judge of the court or the judiciary into 
contempt or to lower his or its authority (e.g. by attributing 
dishonesty, impropriety or incompetence); or which is calcul­
ated to hold the court or the judge thereof up to odium or 
ridicule;^
b) that which is calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due
g
course of justice or the lawful process of the court (e.g. any 
comment on the proceedings of a pending case reflecting on the 
judge, jury, parties, their witnesses or counsel appearing in 
the case and which is calculated to prejudice the fair trial 
or influence the decision); or any matter affecting the 
proceedings of a pending case which has a tendency to prejudice
1. S.3.
2. Schedule, Part A, s.6.
3. Ibid., Part B, s.9.
4. Ibid., Part A, ss. 7, 8.
5. In the matter of Armand de Souza (1914) 18 N.L.R. 33; In the 
matter of a Rule on H.A.J.Hulugalle (1936) 39 N.L.R. 294; In the 
matter of a Rule on P.Ragupathy, Advocate (1945) 46 N.L.R. 297; 
Reginald Perera v. The King (1951) 52 N.L.R. 293.
6. In re S.A.Wickremasinghe (1954) 55 N.L.R. 511.
7. In the matter of the RuTe on De Souza (1914) 18 N.L.R. 41.
8. Abdul Wahab v. Perera (1936) 39 N.L.R. 475; Jayasinghe v. 
Wijeyesinghe (1938) 40 N.L.R. 68; Veerasamy v. Stewart (1941)
42 N.L.R. 481; Reginald Perera v. The King, supra; Attomey- 
General v. Vaikunthavasan (1951) 53 N.L.R. 558; In re Jayatilleke 
(1961) 63 N.L.R. 282.
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the public for or against a party.^
As early as 1899, the first category noted above had become 
obsolete in England since "courts are satisfied to leave to public 
opinion attacks or comments derogatory or scandalous to them"; it 
continued to be applicable, however, "in small colonies consisting 
principally of coloured populations" where it was "absolutely
2
necessary" to preserve "the dignity of and respect for the court". 
Nevertheless, courts of independent Sri Lanka have continued to 
commit persons for contempt on the ground that they have "scandal-
3
ised the court".
Defamation
4
Defamation, under existing law, is both a tort and an
offence. For the latter purpose, a person is said to have defamed
another if he:
by words, either spoken or intended to be read, or 
by signs or by visible representations, makes or 
publishes any imputation concerning any person, 
intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to 
believe that such imputation will harm, the repu­
tation of such person. 5 
The following matter is, however, excepted:
1. Imputation of any truth which the public good requires to be 
made or published
2. Opinion expressed in good faith on the conduct of a public
servant in the discharge of his public functions
3. Opinion expressed in good faith on the conduct of any person
touching any public question
4. Publication of reports of proceedings of courts of justice
5. Opinion expressed in good faith on the merits of a case decided 
by a court or on the conduct of witnesses or others concerned 
therein
6. Opinion expressed in good faith on the merits of a public 
performance
7. Censure passed in good faith by a person having lawful authority 
over another
1. The Queen v. Peries (1964) 68 N.L.R. 372.
2. McLeod v. St.Aubyn j_18997 AC 549.
3. Reginald Perera v. The King, supra; Attorney-General v. 
Vaikunthavasan, supra.
4. For a full exposition of the subject, see C.F.Amerasinghe, 
Defamation and other aspects of the actio iniurarum in Roman-Dutch 
Law (Colombo: Lake House Investments Ltd, 1968).
5. Penal Code, s.479.
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8. Accusation against a person preferred in good faith to a 
person having lawful authority over that person
9. Imputation on the character of another made in good faith by 
a person for the protection of his interests
10. Caution made in good faith intended for the good of the 
person to whom it is conveyed or for the public good.^
Incitement to an Offence
This ground on which the freedom of speech and expression
may be restricted by law is incitement to an "offence" and not
incitement to "violence". "Offence" is a very wide term, and
includes every act made punishable by law. Under existing law,
incitement to (or instigation of) an offence is already punishable
as "abetment"; the penalty attached being the same as provided for
2
the commission of the offence concerned.
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., s.100,
CHAPTER IV
THE COURT
The effective enforcement of fundamental rights presupposes 
the existence of a tribunal which is independent. This independ­
ence is acquired and possessed only when, and for so long as, the 
men who constitute such tribunal are free to make up their own 
minds. That is, a judge must be free to act according to his own 
knowledge and understanding of the law and to be guided by his own 
conscience. He will, of course, find it extremely difficult to do 
this if he is subjected to influences, inducements or pressures, 
direct or indirect, whether gratifying or distasteful, from what­
ever quarter and for whatever reason. All three Constitutions 
under review, as well as ordinary statute law, contained provisions 
designed to secure the independence of the judiciary. In this 
chapter, it is proposed to examine these legal safeguards, and 
the extent to which they have served their purpose. This examin­
ation will be confined to those superior courts within the island 
which are, or were, vested with jurisdiction in respect of the 
protected rights, namely, the Supreme Court and the Court of 
Appeal on the one hand, and the Constitutional Court on the other. 
The former were regular courts; the latter was a new institution 
outside the traditional court structure which was conceived of and 
experimented with as Sri Lanka emerged into republican status.
The Regular Courts
The Supreme Court which was in existence when the 1946 
Constitution came into force had been established by the Charter 
of Justice 1801, and been continued in existence by the subsequent 
Charters of 1810, 1811 and 1833, by the Administration of Justice 
Ordinance 1868 and by the Courts Ordinance 1889. The latter 
provided for a Chief Justice and eight Puisne Justices (later 
increased to ten'*'). Apart from an original criminal jurisdiction
1. Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act, No.l of 1962.
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and an appellate and revisionary jurisdiction, the Court had the 
power to grant and issue mandates in the nature of writs as well 
as injunctions of limited application.
The Government decided in 1970 that, independent of steps 
being taken to declare Ceylon a republic, a court of appeal 
sitting in Colombo should replace the Privy Council which sat in 
London as the country's highest appellate tribunal. A bill 
introduced in Parliament for this purpose received the Governor- 
General's assent on 28 October 1971 and was brought into operation 
on 15 November 1971. ^ The Court of Appeal thus established 
comprised a President and six other Justices of Appeal. An 
appeal lay, inter alia, from any judgment of the Supreme Court 
granting or refusing to grant a mandate in the nature of a writ, 
being an appeal on a question of law; and from any judgment of 
the Supreme Court on any question as to whether any written law 
was ultra vires the Constitution, or as to the interpretation of 
any constitutional provision. The Court was also vested with a 
consultative jurisdiction, in terms of which the Governor- 
General could seek its opinion on any question of law or fact of 
sufficient public importance.
The Administration of Justice Law, No.44 of 1973, which 
came into operation on 1 January 1974, replaced the existing 
courts structure with an entirely new judicial system based on 
the principle of a single appeal. The Courts Ordinance and the 
Court of Appeal Act were among the statutes that were repealed.
A new Supreme Court, consisting of a Chief Justice and twenty 
other Judges, was established as the only superior court of 
record. Its jurisdiction was substantially similar to that of 
its predecessor, except that its original criminal jurisdiction 
and the power to grant and issue injunctions was transferred to 
a new High Court.
A further break in continuity occured in 1978 when the new 
Constitution repealed the Administration of Justice Law and 
established two new superior courts and defined their jurisdiction. 
The higher of these was the Supreme Court, the final court of 
appeal, which was vested, inter alia, with jurisdiction to protect
1. Court of Appeal Act, No.44 of 1971. This Court which was to 
be the supreme court in the country was not so designated in order 
to avoid changing the designation of the existing Supreme Court and 
thus appearing to interfere with the terms and conditions of appo­
intment of the judges of that Court.
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fundamental rights and to examine bills for constitutionality.
With the principle of a second appeal restored, this Court was 
fashioned on the lines of the short-lived Court of Appeal of 
1971, with provision for not less than seven nor more than eleven 
Judges, including a Chief Justice.
The 1946 Constitution sought to guarantee the independence 
of Judges of the Supreme Court by providing that they shall be 
appointed by the Governor-General, shall hold office during good 
behaviour until they reach the retirement age of 62 years, shall 
not be removable except by the Governor-General on an address of 
the Senate and the House of Representatives, and that their 
salaries shall be determined by Parliament and be charged on the 
Consolidated Fund.'*' When the Court of Appeal was established, it 
was hoped that it would be possible to attract to that Court the 
best available talent in the country irrespective of age. Accor­
dingly, a fixed term of five years was fixed by the Court of Appeal 
Act for its Judges. In every other respect, the guarantees 
offered for security of tenure were the same as those contained 
in the 1946 Constitution; indeed, they were supplemented by the 
additional provision that the salary payable to a Judge may not 
be diminished during his term of office.
The inaugural session of the Court of Appeal took place on
2
9 March 1972 in surroundings at Hulftsdorp which bore a marked
resemblance to the Downing Street panelled chamber of the Judicial
Committee which it replaced. But even as the Attorney-General
rose "to welcome the new institution as a functioning body in the
3
appellate structure of our judicial system", the new Minister of
Justice was preparing his proposals for the re-structuring of that
judicial system; proposals which did not contemplate the continued
4
existence of the Court of appeal. Accordingly, the 1972 Constit­
ution, which came into force two months later, recognised the
1. S.52. The Governor-General was required to exercise his 
powers, authorities and functions "as far as may be in accordance 
with the constitutional conventions applicable to the exercise of 
similar powers, authorities and functions in the United Kingdom by 
His Majesty": s.4(2).
2. Hulftsdorp, named after a Dutch Governor who resided there, 
had been the seat of the superior courts since the beginning of the 
century. Its vicinity abounds with hundreds of Proctors' offices.
3. Ceylon Daily News, 10 March 1972.
4. Felix Dias Bandaranaike replaced Senator Jayamanne as Mini­
ster of Justice after the abolition of the Senate in January 1972. 
Unlike his predecessor, Bandaranaike was firmly committed to a 
single-appeal system.
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continued existence of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court
"unless the National State Assembly otherwise provides".^ The two
superior courts began to live on borrowed time, in the sense that
they were now liable to be abolished or replaced at any time by
ordinary legislation. Meanwhile, the Constitution guaranteed that
Judges shall be appointed by the President; that they shall hold
office during good behaviour and not be removable except by the
President upon an address of the National State Assembly; that
while the tenure of a Judge of the Court of Appeal shall be as
provided in the Act which created that Court, the age of retirement
of a Judge of the Supreme Court shall be 63 years (thus obviating
the need for them to depend on executive largesse for that extra 
2
twelve months); that their salaries shall be determined by the 
Assembly and be charged on the Consolidated Fund; and that neither 
the salary payable nor the age of retirement of a Judge shall be
3
reduced during his term of office. Despite protestations to the 
contrary, the ground had been prepared to base an argument that 
the Assembly could not only establish new courts in place of the 
existing ones, but that it could go further and prematurely termi­
nate the services of serving judges. Indeed, the Assembly asserted
the power to do precisely that, not once but on two separate 
4occasions.
The 1978 Constitution now declares that Judges of the Supreme 
Court are appointed by the President; that they hold office during 
good behaviour until they reach the age of 65 years; that they are 
not removable except by order of the President upon an address of 
Parliament presented for such removal on the ground of proved mis­
behaviour or incapacity (the procedure for the investigation and
1. S.121(2).
2. The 1946 Constitution provided that the Governor-General may 
permit a Judge who had reached the retirement age to continue in 
office for a period not exceeding twelve months: s.52(3). For the 
application of this provision, see infra, p.
3. S.122. The 1972 Constitution also required every judge to 
exercise his judicial powers and functions without being subject to 
any direction or other interference proceeding from any person, 
other than a superior court, and declared it to be an offence 
punishable with imprisonment or fine for any person to so interfere 
or attempt to interfere: s. 131. Under Roman-Dutch law, which was 
applicable in Sri Lanka in this respect, a judge was not liable
to be sued in respect of his acts unless he had been actuated by 
some indirect or improper motive: Voet, 5.1.88.
4. Infra, p. 211.
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proof of the alleged misbehaviour or incapacity being prescribed 
either by standing orders of Parliament or by law); and that their 
salaries are determined by Parliament and are not reducible.^-
To what extent have these constitutional safeguards in fact 
protected the judiciary from influence or interference by the 
executive and the legislature ?
Power of Appointment
Judges
While a legal training and a minimum period of actual 
practice were a sine qua non for appointment to the minor judiciary, 
no such qualifications were prescribed, either by law or regulation, 
for appointment to a superior court. Nevertheless, the appointing 
authority has not, during the period under review, looked outside 
the legal profession when making such appointments.
The 37 lawyers appointed as Puisne Justices in the original
Supreme Court were all drawn from the traditional sources: 17 from
the Judicial Service, 11 from the Ministry of Justice and the
3
Official Bar, and 9 from the Unofficial Bar. In respect of those 
who were already employed under the State, the twin principles of 
seriority and merit appears generally to have been the determining 
factor in their selection for higjh judicial office. The average 
age of the appointees was 54 years; somewhat higher in the case of 
judicial officers and lower in the case of legal officers. There­
fore, a Judge of that Court usually brought with him to the bench 
at least 25 years experience of judicial work in the original courts 
in different parts of the country or of intimate involvement as a 
lawyer in the executive and legislative branches of government.
It has not been one of the traditions of the Sri Lanka Bar for its 
leaders to make themselves available for judicial office. This is 
due to a number of reasons: the wide disparity between incomes at
4
the Bar and judicial salaries; the prohibition of private practice 
after retirement from the Court; and the increasing involvement of 
lawyers in political activity. Indeed, some of the appointments
1. Arts. 107, 108.
2. Under Rules formulated by the Judicial Service Comnission 
(and later by the Cabinet), only lawyers who had had at least six 
years practical experience at the Bar could be considered for app­
ointment to the Judicial Service. The term "Judicial Service" is 
used to describe District Judges and Magistrates. They are also some­
times described as "judicial officers" or as "members of the minor 
judiciary".
3. See Appendix 2. 4. Infra, p. 216.
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of successful middle-rung private practitioners were initially 
received with some scepticism; in particular, the appointment in 
1965 of thirty-nine year old C.G.Weeramantry shortly after having 
served as the counting agent of Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake, 
and in 1972 of Jaya Pathirana, an intensely vocal SLFP member of 
the 1960-64 Parliament.-^- Similar principles determined the choice 
of Judges for Ceylon's substitute for the Judicial Committee.
Two were retired Puisne Justices (one of whom was a Tamil), two 
(of whom one was a Roman Catholic) were among the four most senior 
functioning Puisne Justices, and the fifth was the Attorney-General.
The same traditionalist approach was adopted in the selection 
of personnel for the 1974 Supreme Court, seniority in service 
being the primary consideration. The re-constituted Court comprised 
two Judges of the former Court of Appeal, all nine Judges of the
2
original Supreme Court, the five serving Commissioners of Assize, 
the most senior District Judge, a deputy Solicitor-General, and 
three successful private practitioners. Vacancies on the Court were 
filled by the appointment in December 1974 of the Public Trustee; 
in June 1975 of the acting Attorney-General; and in January 1976 
of the senior High Court Judge. But the sudden expansion of the 
Court, from eleven to twenty-one, necessarily meant the appointment 
of a number of persons who, in normal circumstances, would probably 
not have been chosen. The pool of selection was transformed into 
the Court itself. A deterioration in standards was inevitable. 
Indeed, breadth of vision, versatility, and a commitment to the 
Rule of Law, which had been the hallmarks of a Supreme Court Judge 
and which distinguished him from the judicial officer of a subor­
dinate court, and gave him the confidence to act without fear even 
in highly contentious matters to which the State was a party, 
became less discernible.
1. Pathirana had declined an appointment as a Commissioner of 
Assize in October 1970 "as he desired to remain in active politics" 
(Private and confidential letter from Felix Dias Bandaranaike, 
Minister of Public Administration, to Senator Jayamanne, Minister 
of Justice, dated 4 October 1970, Records of the Special Presiden­
tial Commission of Inquiry 1978, marked P 160).
2. Commissioners of Assize were appointed to preside over 
criminal sessions of the Supreme Court in a particular circuit. Each 
such session usually extended for about three months. They were 
drawn from the same sources as permanent Judges of the Supreme Court, 
with leading criminal lawyers showing a greater willingness to 
accept these short-term assignments.
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A departure from these principles took place in 1978 when 
the Supreme Court was again re-constituted. The new Court was a 
much more compact body than its predecessor, but if the Government 
had so wished, all the outgoing nineteen Judges could conveniently 
have been accommodated in the two new superior courts - the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeal. Since the Government had not 
followed the 1971 precedent of designating the final appellate 
tribunal as the Court of Appeal, the most senior of the outgoing 
Judges (supplemented if necessary by other available talent) could 
have been appointed to the new Supreme Court, and their remaining 
colleagues to the new Court of Appeal which was to exercise subst­
antially the jurisdiction of the former Supreme Court. This course, 
however, was not adopted. Instead, eight of the Judges were 
excluded altogether, and the remaining eleven were re-appointed 
to the two Courts without regard to seniority, experience or age.'*' 
Of the seven Judges who were hand-picked for appointment to 
the Supreme Court, four were comparatively junior Judges of whom 
two had been chosen by the President earlier that year to be his 
commissioners for the purpose of probing the political acts and
conduct of the Prime Minister, Ministers and officials of the
2
previous government. The third member of that commission, a 
District Judge, by-passed the High Court to take a great leap on 
to the Court of Appeal. Other new appointees to the Court of Appeal 
included a High Court Judge who had left the bench soon after the 
general election of July 1977 to serve as Secretary for Justice, 
and three members of the Unofficial Bar who had been associated 
in political and legal work on behalf of the ruling United National 
Party. One of them, J.A.R.Victor Perera, a provincial Proctor, 
had stormed his way into the limelight only a month previously 
by making public a letter allegedly written by him to the former
3
Minister of Justice, Felix Dias Bandaranaike. This letter, which 
was read out in the National State Assembly by Prime Minister 
Premadasa, expressed "joy that the nefarious regime in which you 
played such a prominent role has come to an end". The letter went
1. For the movement of Judges, see p.215.
2. Infra, p.226.
3. Ceylon Daily News, 4 August 1978. Bandaranaike, however, 
denies having received it.
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on to allege, inter alia:
You have ruined our legal system and shattered the 
confidence we had in the judiciary and in state 
officers. Your doctrine of rule by the Party for 
the Party and with the Party alone created all the 
chaos, nepotism and corruption during the past 
seven years. The appointments you made during the 
past seven years of party stooges and sycophants 
to quasi-judicial tribunals and other offices of 
importance ruined the country and were responsible 
for your ignominious downfall.
Perera was appointed to the Court of Appeal barely a month after
this alleged letter had been made public. Very soon after, he was
also to adorn the Supreme Court, being preferred for appointment
over several senior colleagues including the President of the Court
of Appeal. Unmistakably, the process of politicising the Supreme
Court had been set in motion. Seniority and merit had given way
to that ambiguous criteria of "political acceptability".
Chief Justices
The selection of the Chief Justice has always been regarded 
as a matter entirely within the discretion of the Prime Minister.
In making that selection, existing seniority among Judges has 
sometimes been respected. At other times, seniority has been 
artificially created. On one occasion, at least, seniority was 
altogether ignored. Finally, the principle was established that 
the selection need not be made from within the judiciary at all.
In October 1947, when the 1946 Constitution came into force, 
the Chief Justice was Sir John Howard,K.C., an officer in the 
Colonial Legal Service. A.E.P.Rose,K.C., another expatriate, who 
had been appointed a Puisne Justice in January 1945 and had served 
as acting Legal Secretary from October 1954 until the State Council 
ceased to exist two years later, was appointed Attorney-General.
At the time of his appointment it had been agreed that the salary 
attached to his post would be higher than that of a Puisne Justice; 
that the status of the post would take precedence before that of 
Puisne Justices; but that the seniority of two serving Judges who 
had been appointed before him, Justices Wijewardene and Jayatilleke, 
would remain unaffected for purposes of promotion. ^ Accordingly, 
after Sir Arthur Wijewardene,K.C., and Sir Edward Jayatilleke,K.C.,
1. Letter of 13 October 1947 from the Secretary to the Governor 
to Hon.A.E.P.Rose, quoted in Parliamentary Debates (House of Repres­
entatives), 15 March 1955, col.2587.
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had each served as Chief Justice, Sir Alan Rose,K.C. was appointed, 
on 11 October 1951, to an office to which he would ordinarily have 
succeeded at that stage had he remained throughout on the Supreme 
Court.
Justice Basnayake succeeded Rose as Attorney-General. He was
third in seniority on the Supreme Court, but unlike on the previous
occasion on which this office was filled, no reservation was made
in regard to the seniority of Justices Dias and Nagalingam for
purposes of promotion. On the contrary, when occasion arose a few
months later to make an acting appointment to the office of Chief
Justice, Prime Minister D.S.Senanayake wrote thus in a strictly
confidential letter to the Governor-General:
Normally the Attorney-General who has much higher 
precedence than the Puisne Justices should act as 
Chief Justice, but I am not anxious that the work 
in the Attorney-General1 s Department should be 
disturbed by such an appointment, specially because 
the Solicitor-General is also functioning in some 
other capacity and is not in the Department. I, 
therefore, feel that the next senior Puisne Justice 
should act for the Chief Justice on the distinct 
understanding that it will in no way enhance his 
claims for permanent appointment to this post at 
some future date.l
Accordingly, Justice Nagalingam, the senior Puisne Justice, acted
as Chief Justice in March 1952, July 1953, October 1953 and February
1954; but it was not until the last occasion that he was informed
by the Governor-General that:
I have to add that neither this nor any previous 
acting appointment as Chief Justice confers any 
claim to the permanent office of Chief Justice. 2
Clearly, it had been decided that Basnayake should, by virtue of
his appointment to the office of Attorney-General, supersede
Justice Nagalingam who had been his senior in public service and
3
on the Supreme Court, and a principle was now being sought to be 
established. It was later claimed by Prime Minister Kotelawela 
that when Justice Basnayake was offered the post of Attorney- 
General, he had been given an assurance by the then Prime Minister
1. Letter of 16 January 1952, ibid., col.2594.
2. Letter of 26 February 1954 from the Governor-General to 
Justice Nagalingam, ibid., col.2558.
3. Nagalingam, who was nine years older than Basnayake, was 
Attorney-General from 15 January 1946. On his appointment as acting 
Puisne Justice, Basnayake succeeded him as acting Attorney-General. 
Nagalingam was appointed a Puisne Justice on 22 July 1947; Basnayake 
followed on 23 October 1947: Civil List 1955 (Colombo, Govt.Press,1955).
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that he would be appointed to succeed Sir Alan Rose as Chief
Justice.'*' Having regard to the fact that Rose was not due to
retire until 8 October 1962 (or 8 October 1961 if he had not
been granted the hitherto customary extension of an year), this
assurance, if in fact given, would have been of very little avail
or consequence to Basnayake who would have retired from the office
of Attorney-General on reaching his sixtieth year on 3 August 1962.
Whether a Prime Minister could have thus fettered the discretion
of his successors in the matter of recommending the appointment of
a suitable person whenever the office of Chief Justice fell vacant
is also an equally relevant question.
But events took quite a different turn. On 1 July 1954, the
"Trine”, a left-wing weekly newspaper issued a special edition in
which it alleged that the Governor-General designate, Sir Oliver
Goonetilleke, and the Governor of the Central Bank, N.U.Jayawar-
dene, were engaged in swindles on an international scale. On
5 July, the Prime Minister, Sir John Kotelawela, made a statement
in Parliament on a £ 5,000,000 loan which had been floated by the
Government and which was referred to in the newspaper article; he
denied any impropriety on the part of any official.'*' On the same
day, the Leader of the Opposition, S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike, moved in
the House of Representatives that the appointment of Goonetilleke
as Governor-General should not become effective until a cctimission
of inquiry into certain other charges of improper conduct by N.U.
2
Jayawardene, which was then sitting, had concluded its business.
On 17 July, the offices of the "Trine" were raided by the C.I.D.
3
and certain documents seized. Two weeks later, the passport of
Zj.
Mrs.Theja Goonewardene, the editor of the "Trine",was impounded. 
On 7 August, Attorney-General Basnayake filed an Information in 
the Supreme Court alleging that Theja Goonewardene had defamed 
Goonetilleke and thereby committed an offence punishable under 
section 480 of the Penal Code.^ On the same day, the Minister of 
Justice directed that the trial of Theja Goonewardene be held at 
Bar without a jury. On 26 October, the Trial at Bar commenced
1. Times of Ceylon, 5 July 1954.
2. Ceylon Daily News, 6 July 1954.
3. Ibid., 18 July 1954.
4. Ibid., 1 August 1954.
5. Ibid., 8 August 1954.
6. Ibid.
200
in the Supreme Court before three Judges: Chief Justice Rose,
Justice Gunasekera and Justice Pulle. The Attorney-General led
a formidable team for the Crown; the defendant was represented
by D.N.Pritt,Q.C.‘*' The trial was an acrimonious one. Epithets
were flung at each other across the Bar table. The usually
unruffled Attorney-General felt that this was "the result of
admitting to our Bar people who are untrained here; these
foreigners are untrained in the traditions of our BarV; Mr.Pritt
countered that "if my learned friend the Attorney-General is the
leader of this Bar, I thank God that I am not trained in its
2
traditions". The newspapers thought that counsel behaved like
3
peevish schoolboys. On 3 December, the Chief Justice delivered 
the Order of the Court, acquitting the defendant; the material 
adduced by the Crown to establish that the defendant had publis­
hed the issue of the newspaper in question with the necessary 
knowledge of its contents was insufficient to justify calling
4
upon her for her defence. A highly publicised, politically 
charged cause celebre had fizzled out.
Barely seven weeks later, on 22 January 1955, the Ceylon
Daily News carried the following official announcement:
The Governor-General has appointed Mr.H.H.Basnayake,
Q.C., Attorney-General, to act as the Chief Justice 
with effect from June 15, until the leave of Sir Alan 
Rose, the permanent Chief Justice, preparatory to 
retirement expires, and thereafter to be the Chief 
Justice.
It is understood that Mr.Justice C.Nagalingam,
Senior Puisne Justice, who was scheduled to retire 
on October 24 this year, has sent in his papers for 
retirement earlier than expected.
Mr.Basnayake's successor as Attorney-General has 
not yet been named. Mr.T.S.Fernando,Q.C., Solicitor- 
General, is now acting as Attorney-General as 
Mr.Basnayake is on leave.
There had been no prior intimation that Sir Alan Rose had any
intention of taking long leave, let alone retiring prematurely;
indeed, he had availed himself of six months leave abroad only
in the previous year. This bland announcement in the pro-
govemment newspaper also suggested that Justice Nagalingam, who
1. Ceylon Daily News, 27 October 1954.
2. Ibid.
3. "Heard in Hulftsdorp" by Lex, Times of Ceylon.
4. Ceylon Daily News, 4 December 1954.
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had acted for the Chief Justice on every previous occasion when 
that office was temporarily vacant, would not be available to do 
so in July as he had "sent in his papers for retirement earlier 
than expected". It cleverly suppressed the fact that Justice 
Nagalingam had actually walked out of his chambers in a huff and 
sent in his papers for retirement on the previous afternoon when 
he had heard the official announcement that he was being super­
seded.'*' Above all, what was unique in the announcement was that 
a permanent appointment was being made to an office one year before 
it became vacant and an acting appointment six months in advance, 
thereby binding any future administration which may have succeeded 
the present prior to either of those dates. As it turned out, 
Basnayake assumed office as Chief Justice on 1 January 1956; the 
Government that appointed him was decisively defeated at the polls 
three months later.
Why did Sir Alan Rose quit the office of Chief Justice
prematurely ? The "Guardian", a short-lived but independent
English daily newspaper, explained thus:
The immediate reasons which led to the resignation 
of Sir Alan are openly discussed in legal and parl­
iamentary circles today. These circles state that 
Sir John sent for Sir Alan and told him that he had 
been hard on Mr.Basnayake during the trial, that he 
could also have stopped Mr.Justice Gunasekera being 
hard on Mr.Basnayake and that Sir Alan had enter­
tained Mr.D.N.Pritt,Q.C., senior defence counsel in 
the Theja Goonewardene case, to l u n c h . 2
This report was not contradicted. In the House of Representatives,
the question was specifically asked:
Did or did not the Prime Minister summon Sir Alan 
Rose and charge him with misconduct in the Theja 
Goonewardene defamation case ? In particular, did 
he or did he not refer to the misconduct of Sir Alan 
Rose in reference to Mr.Basnayake ? Did he or did 
he not refer to Sir Alan Rose having entertained 
the senior defence counsel, Mr.D.N.Pritt, to 
lunch ? Mr.Speaker, we would like to have definite 
replies to these allegations.3
There was no immediate answer forthcoming from the Prime Minister
1. Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 15 March 
1955, col.2548. See also Morning Times, 23 January 1955, p.l.
2. 24 January 1955.
3. W.Dahanayake, Parliamentary Debates (House of Represent­
atives), 15 March 1955, col.2522.
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who was present in the House at the time. Later, in the course of
a prepared statement which was read out by him, Kotelawela explained
that Rose's premature departure was to facilitate the process of
"CeyIonisation" of the Supreme Court. He tabled a letter dated
15 January 1955 from the Chief Justice to the Governor-General which
stated, inter alia, that:
In view of the considered policy of Government 
that all key posts in the Island should be held 
by Ceylonese, my own position as Chief Justice 
naturally arises for consideration.
In order, therefore, to avoid any possible 
embarrassment to Government, I have discussed 
the matter with the Prime Minister and have 
informed him that I am placing in your hands my 
papers for retirement.1
In fact, the "Ceylonisation" of the Chief Justiceship had been
achieved as far back as 1949 with the appointment of Sir Arthur
Wijewardene. The more plausible and probable explanation was
either that the Government being displeased with the performance
of the Chief Justice in the Trine Case wished, in the words of a
2
Member of Parliament, to "shove him out"; or that, having regard
to the impending general election, it desired to reward a loyal
Attorney-General or secure a safe Chief Justice. Whatever might
have been the truth, the reaction of at least a section of the
public to this chess-board approach to the Supreme Court was
expressed in the following motion which was moved by the Leader of
the Opposition, S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike, and debated in the House of
Representatives:
That since the circumstances attendant on the 
retirement of the Chief Justice and the appoint­
ment of a successor to him on the advice of the 
Prime Minister have led to a loss of public 
confidence in the administration of justice and 
are calculated to undermine the independence of 
the Judiciary, this House has no confidence in 
the Government.^
Shortly after Basnayake assumed office as acting Chief Justice, 
in June 1955, influenced perhaps by the recently enunciated principle
1. Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 15 March 
1955, col.2591. For Prime Minister's reply, see col.2592.
2. Ibid., col.2552.
3. Ibid., col.2500. For proceedings of the debate, see cols. 
2500-2608. See also questions asked in the Senate by Senator S. 
Nadesan,Q.C., and the answers thereto by the Minister of Justice, 
Parliamentary Debates (Senate), 25 January 1955, col.931 and 8 March 
1955, col.988, respectively.
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that "the Attorney-General should not only act for the Chief 
Justice, but should also succeed him in the permanent office",^ 
Justice Gratiaen, the senior Puisne Justice, took the unusual 
step of applying to the Governor-General in writing for appoint­
ment as Attorney-General. His application was forwarded through 
the Minister of Justice who recommended it. The Governor-General 
very properly returned the application to the Minister, reminding 
him that appointment to that office is made on the advice of the
Prime Minister "who would, no doubt, tender such advice after due
2
consideration of all those who are eligible for that office".
In fact, no permanent appointment was made to that office until 
the next general election. T.S.Fernando,Q.C. continued to function 
in an acting capacity until his own appointment to the Supreme 
Court by the newly-elected Bandaranaike Government on 2 May 1956.
On the same day, Justice Gratiaen moved over to the Attorney- 
General 's Chambers.
When Chief Justice Basnayake, having survived three changes 
of government, retired from office on 3 August 1964 on reaching 
the age of 62 years, the Attorney-General was D.St.C.B.Jansze,Q.C.
He had held that office for six years, having reached it by pro­
motion within the department. But the principle enunciated in 1955 
was neither invoked by him, nor applied by the Government of Mrs. 
Bandaranaike. Instead, Justice Sansoni, the senior Puisne Justice,
who was then about to conclude the Trial at Bar arising out of the
3
alleged attempted coup d'etat of January 1962, was appointed 
Chief Justice. On his retirement, upon reaching the age of 62 
years on 18 November 1966, the Attorney-General was A.C.M.Ameer,Q.C., 
a former deputy Solicitor-General who after a spell at the Bar 
during which he had taken "silk", had been appointed chief law 
officer earlier that year. Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake did 
not apply the 1955 principle; he recommended the senior Puisne 
Justice, H.N.G.Fernando, for appointment as Chief Justice.
When the Court of Appeal was established in November 1971 as 
the country's highest appellate tribunal, Prime Minister Mrs.
1. Ibid., at col.2596, per Sir John Kotelawela.
2. Much publicity was given to this application in the Ceylon 
Daily News of 8 November 1955. For the circumstances in which such 
publicity came to be given, see J.L.Fernando, Three Prime Ministers 
of Ceylon (Colombo: Gunasena, 1963), pp.74-79.
3. Infra, p. 422.
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Bandaranaike's choice for the prestigious office of President of
that Court was not Chief Justice H.N.G.Fernando, but 65-year old
retired Puisne Justice T.S.Fernando,Q.C. who was then the President
of the Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists. His
appointment lent credence to the Government's professed desire
to establish an independent and competent tribunal which would
enjoy the confidence of all sections of the community. In an
editorial comment on his appointment, the pro-Opposition Ceylon
Daily News, several of whose directors had only recently been
found by a commission of inquiry headed by him to have been guilty
of wide-ranging offences under the exchange control laws of the
country, commented thus:
The independence of the Judiciary is not merely 
institutional. It is also personal. The calibre 
of judges, the integrity of the individual, is 
as vital as the guaranteed independence of the 
institution. It is in this perspective that we 
welcome the appointment of Mr.T.S.Fernando,Q.C., 
as the first President of Ceylon's Court of Appeal.
While congratulating him on this, the crowning 
glory of his judicial career, we warmly commend 
the Prime Minister for her impeccable choice of 
this internationally known jurist, scholar and 
man of high integrity and accept it as a token of 
the Government's respect for the vital principle 
of an independent judiciary.
In the view of the incumbent Chief Justice:
By reason of his distinguished career both at the 
Bar and on the Bench, by reason of his being a 
devoted exponent of the principles of the Rule of 
Law, and by reason of the high esteem he is held 
in, he is eminently qualified for his appointment.
We all wish to congratulate him and we welcome his 
return to Hulftsdorp.2
On 1 July 1970, Justice Tennekoon, who ranked fifth among the 
Puisne Justices, had accepted the invitation of the new Prime Mini­
ster, Mrs.Bandaranaike, to become Attorney-General. No reservation 
was made, for purposes of future promotion, of the seniority of 
Justices Silva, Sirimanne, Alles and Samarawickrema who ranked above 
him. In his letter of acceptance, 55-year old Tennekoon informed
1. Ceylon Daily News, 22 November 1971. For report of the 
comnission, see S.P.VIII-1971.
2. Speech made on the occasion of the unveiling of the bust of 
the late H.V.Perera,Q.C., at the Colombo Law Library: Ceylon Daily 
News, 27 November 1971.
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the Governor-General that he did not expect to serve in the office 
of Attorney-General for more than three years.^ In the course of 
a previous discussion he had had with the Prime Minister, no assur­
ance had been sought, nor given, in regard to the office of Chief
Justice which was due to fall vacant, in accordance with the Const-
2
itution, two and a half years later, in November 1972. But, having 
regard to the precedent established when a Puisne Justice last 
accepted office as Attorney-General, Tennekoon obviously hoped to 
succeed to the office of Chief Justice when that office next fell 
vacant.
Two events, however, supervened shortly thereafter. By the 
Court of Appeal Act, No.44 of 1971, a Court superior to the Supreme 
Court was established in November 1971. By the 1972 Constitution, 
which came into force on 22 May 1972, the retiring age of the Chief 
Justice was raised to 63 years. While the President of the Court 
of Appeal ranked above the Chief Justice, the position of the
3
Attorney-General in the new legal hierarchy remained undetermined. 
Meanwhile, in March 1972, the Minister of Justice submitted a 
Cabinet Memorandum on the proposed re-structuring of the superior
4
courts: one appeal and one appellate court was what was envisaged.
He also recommended that:
. . . all the existing Judges of the Supreme Court 
and of the Court of Appeal, and all the existing 
Corrmissioners of Assize, be offered appointments 
in the new Supreme Court even if some_of them are 
above the age limit suggested above /65 yeaxsf.
These persons could hold office in the new Court 
for the balance period of their current terms of 
office in their existing Courts. If their present 
salaries are higher than those of the new Court to 
which they are appointed, they could retain their 
present salaries as personal to them. There are 
at present 4 Judges of the Court of Appeal, 9 
Judges of the Supreme Court and 4 Commissioners 
of Assize.^
On 5 April 1972, the Cabinet approved these proposals, and on 
16 June 1972 a draft law to give effect to them was submitted to 
the Cabinet. On 3 July 1972, the Minister informed the President
1. Letter of 30 June 1970.
2. Private information.
3. In April 1973, the revised Precedence Table placed the 
Attorney-General below the Chief Justice, but above the Judges of 
both the Court of Appeal and of the Supreme Court.
4. Cabinet Memorandum No.112/72 of 20 March 1972.
5. Ibid.
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of the Court of Appeal, the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General 
of his proposals. The President of the Court of Appeal was further 
informed that he would be the President of the new Supreme Court, 
and he was requested to inquire from his colleagues on the Court 
of Appeal whether they would agree to seniority in the new Court 
being determined among them by reference to their respective dates 
of appointment to the existing Supreme Court.^ On 7 July 1972, the 
President of the Court of Appeal wrote to the Minister to say that 
his colleagues were agreeable to that arrangement. Accordingly, if 
the proposed law was passed in that form and brought into operation, 
the President of the new Supreme Court would be T.S.Fernando,Q.C., 
who, having been appointed President of the Court of Appeal on 20 
November 1971, would have been entitled to continue in office until 
the end of 1976.
Attorney-General Tennekoon was clearly faced with a dilemma.
If he remained as Attorney-General, he would have to retire on 
9 September 1974; if he reverted to the Supreme Court before that 
date as he had originally intended to, he would probably have been 
accommodated, following the principle agreed upon with the Judges 
of the Court of Appeal, at the point of his old seniority. On 26 
June 1973, shortly after the final draft of the Administration of 
Justice Bill had been approved by the Cabinet, Tennekoon wrote to 
the President of the Republic intimating his desire to retire from 
the public service "for reasons which are entirely personal" on 
reaching his 59th year on 9 September of that year, and applied 
for leave preparatory to retirement with immediate effect. On the 
next day, he withdrew his application for immediate retirement and 
applied for leave instead. In the twenty-four hours that inter­
vened between these two dramatic communications, Tennekoon had 
discussions with both the President of the Republic and the Prime
3
Minister. No record of either discussion, even if made, is avail­
able. However, at the first meeting held thereafter, the Cabinet 
reviewed the Administration of Justice Bill and decided, without 
any memorandum before it, that no person who was over 63 years of 
age should be appointed to the new Supreme court.^ On 2 August 1973, 
Tennekoon was appointed to the Court of Appeal.
1. Private information.
2. Letters dated 27 June 1973 to the Minister of Justice and to 
the Secretary for Justice.
3. Ibid.
4. Private information.
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On 17 November 1973, six weeks before the date fixed for the 
replacement of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court by the 
new Supreme Court, Chief Justice H.N.G.Fernando reached his retire­
ment age of 63 years. He was succeeded by the senior Puisne Justice,
G.P.A.Silva. Accordingly, of the Judges available for appointment 
to the new Supreme Court on 1 January 1974, G.P.A.Silva (60), who 
had been appointed a Puisne Justice in 1962, was the most senior.
Next in seniority were A.C.Alles (62) appointed in 1964, G.T.Samara- 
wickrema (57) appointed in 1966, and V.Tennekoon (59) appointed in 
1967. But it was to Tennekoon that the Government offered the 
highest judicial appointment in the country. The principle was thus 
established that the Prime Minister was free to choose a Chief 
Justice from among the existing Judges irrespective of, and on 
considerations unrelated to, seniority. It was an extension of the 
earlier principle that seniority may be artificially conferred on a 
favoured Judge by prior appointment to the office of Attorney- 
General .
In September 1977, when Tennekoon retired from the Supreme
Court, the most senior Judge was Samarawickrema who by then had
completed eleven years on the bench, during which period he had
acted as Chief Justice on several occasions, the most recent being
in August of that year. S.Pasupati had been Attorney-General for
two years, having succeeded to that office by promotion within the
department. Although Samarawickrema was widely expected to be
appointed Chief Justice, the choice of the newly-elected Prime
Minister, J.R.Jayewardene, was his own personal lawyer, N.D.M.
Samarakone,Q.C. 58-year old Samarakone was a leading civil lawyer
in the District Court of Colombo who had never previously held any
judicial office. As the President of the Bar Association remarked
at the ceremonial sitting held to welcome the new Chief Justice,
it was an "unprecedented step".'*' Samarakone himself said that he
was "deeply conscious of the departure from tradition" that his
2
appointment involved. The principle had been firmly established 
that a Prime Minister is completely free and unfettered in his 
choice of a Chief Justice.
1. Ceylon Daily News, 15 September 1977.
2. Ibid.
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Tenure
The age of retirement of Supreme Court Judges is fixed by law. 
Under the 1946 Constitution, however, the Governor-General could 
permit a Judge who had reached the retirement age to continue in 
office for a period not exceeding twelve months.'*' In 1949, the 
Government permitted the Chief Justice, Sir Arthur Wijewardene, who 
had been appointed to that office at the age of 61 years 10 months, 
to continue in office until he reached the age of 63 years. Similarly, 
in 1950, his successor, Sir Edward Jayatilleke, who was appointed 
Chief Justice at the age of 61 years 5 months, was permitted to 
function until he reached the age of 63 years. In June 1955, when 
Chief Justice Rose took six months leave preparatory to premature 
retirement, the Judge next in seniority to him was Justice Nagalingam 
who was due to reach his 62nd year in October. Had he been shown 
the same consideration and been granted an extension until he 
reached his 63rd year, it would have been possible for him not only 
to have acted as Chief Justice for six months, but also to have 
functioned in that office in a permanent capacity for a further ten 
months. But Nagalingam was not granted an extension.
In twenty-five years, only one Puisne Justice received the 
benefit of an extension: on 11 April 1971, Justice A.L.S.Sirimanne 
was permitted to continue in service for an additional year. Neither 
Justice Pandita Gunewardene, who reached his retirement age on 
10 February of that same year, nor Justice de Kretser, who reached 
that age on 20 January of the following year, received such favoured 
treatment from the same Government. It is no doubt the recognition 
that this provision was capable of being utilised to derogate from 
the independence of the judiciary that led the framers of the 1972 
and 1978 Constitutions to omit it altogether.
Parliament's constitutional power of requiring the removal of 
a Judge has, during the period under review, never been invoked. 
Although Bandaranaike, as Leader of the Opposition, had sought to 
censure the Government for the circumstances leading to the appoint­
ment of Attorney-General Basnayake as Chief Justice, he did not, 
after his own election as Prime Minister in April 1956, set in motion
1. S.52(3).
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the widely expected proceedings for the removal of the Chief Justice.
When the votes of the Supreme court were being discussed in August
of that year, the new Leader of the Opposition, Dr.N.M.Perera, who
had spoken in support of Bandaranaike' s censure motion in the previous
year, asked the new Prime Minister to:
give us some definite idea as to what he intends to 
do with regard to the present holder of the office 
of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, because if 
the Government does not intend to take action, we 
intend to take action of our own. We are intending 
to move a substantive motion. So far as this House 
is concerned, Members both on that side and on this 
side are thoroughly dissatisfied and there is not 
the slightest doubt in our minds as to the undesir­
ability of that person continuing in office.1
He asked for a "definite pronouncement on the subject”, and received
from Finance Minister Stanley de Zoysa the curt reply that:
once a Judge has been appointed, it is altogether 
undesirable for any Government to express an opinion 
on the merits or demerits of the man who holds the
office.2
Earlier, in reply to Colvin R.de Silva, the Finance Minister had 
been more explicit in clarifying the new Government's attitude to 
the Court:
I quite agree with the Hon.Member that it was 
incorrect for the previous Prime Minister to have 
made the appointment in advance which really implied 
a somewhat more than justified confidence in the 
continuance of himself in office. But I would like 
to say this, that as far as the administration 
is concerned, as far as the executive government is 
concerned, we would wish to interfere as little as 
possible in the affairs of the Supreme Court.3
Indeed, during Chief Justice Basnayake's nine-year term of office, 
although his judgments were often criticised, his own conduct as a 
Judge was beyond reproach, and the question of his removal was there­
after neither pursued by N.M.Perera nor raised by anyone else. The 
Opposition in Parliament did, however, give notice of a motion 
against his successor, "deploring" his conduct, but not calling for 
his removal.
1. Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 9 August 
1956, col.43.
2. Ibid., col.44.
3. Ibid., col.37.
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Sansoni had barely completed his first year in office as Chief 
Justice when he decided to hear the petition challenging the election 
of the new Prime Minister, Dudley Senanayake, to the Dedigama seat 
in the House of Representatives. This was a singularly unwise 
decision since the Chief Justice is perhaps the one member of the 
Supreme Court who has the closest contact with the Prime Minister; 
he probably meets the Prime Minister regularly in Colombo's diploma­
tic circuit and at official functions, and is invariably invited to 
state dinners where, by reason of the precedence he enjoys, he sits 
with the Prime Minister at the same table. The trial commenced on 
17 January 1966; judgment was reserved on 31 January. On 19 February, 
Dudley Senanayake left the country for medical treatment in the 
United States. On the following day, the Ceylon Observer carried 
a photograph of Senanayake being seen off at the airport by the 
Chief Justice."^  In the House of Representatives two days later, 
when questioned by an Opposition MP as to why usual protocol was 
not observed at the Prime Minister's departure, Minister of State 
J.R.Jayewardene explained that it was a private visit and that no 
one had been invited. "Some people heard of it and they came", he 
said. In the mistaken belief that the question had been inspired 
by the failure to invite Leader of the Opposition Mrs. Bandaranaike 
to the airport, the Minister added: "The fact that some people did 
not come would not be taken amiss by the Prime Minister. He was 
very considerate and really did not wish anybody to come . . .  It
would be ungentlemanly to disturb a lady at one o'clock in the 
2
morning". The implication was clear: the Prime Minister had left 
on a private visit and had been seen off only by his friends who, 
though uninvited, had braved a 25-mile journey in the middle of the 
night to wish him goodbye. The Chief Justice, who was in the process 
of deliberating whether or not Senanayake had committed a corrupt 
practice and thereby forfeited the right to hold office, was one of 
them.
It was inevitable that Sansoni should face the following 
Opposition motion in the House of Representatives; the first subst­
antive motion directed specifically against the conduct of a Judge
1. Ceylon Observer, 20 February 1966.
2. Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 23 February 
1966, col.2459.
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in Ceylon:
That this House deplores the action of the Hon. 
the Chief Justice in attending an unofficial 
gathering, for which no invitations were issued, 
at the Katunayake Airport to bid farewell to Hon.
Dudley Senanayake on his departure to the United 
States of America for a medical check-up and 
other purposes at a time when he was presiding 
over the hearing of an election petition chall­
enging Hon.Dudley Senanayake's election as 
Member of Parliament for the electoral district 
of Dedigama.-*-
The motion, however, lapsed with the prorogation of Parliament 
and was thereafter not seriously pursued. Meanwhile, the election 
petition was dismissed, the Chief Justice holding that Senanayake 
was not guilty of any of the corrupt or illegal practices alleged 
against him.^
Had that been the record of legislative and executive inter­
vention against the judiciary, there would have been no real cause 
for concern. Instead, three events, equally traumatic, all within 
a period of five years, appear to have set a pattern of conduct 
which makes the future appear very bleak.
The Administration of Justice Law 1973 which repealed both 
the Court of Appeal Act and the Courts Ordinance under which the 
two existing superior courts had been established, fixed the age 
limit for the new Supreme Court at 63 years, thus preventing the 
absorption into that Court of Judges above that age although their 
security of tenure was constitutionally guaranteed. On 1 January 
1974, when the new Supreme Court was constituted, the movement of 
Judges was as follows:
1. Sun (date not available).
2. Ceylon Daily News, 4 June 1966.
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TABLE 18
RE-CONSTITUTION OF THE 
SUPERIOR COURTS IN 
1974
1972 Constitution
COURT OF APPEAL 
President 
T.S.Fernando,Q.C. (OUT) 
Judges 
V.Sivasupramanium (OUT) 
A.L.S.Sirimanne (OUT)
G. T. Samarawickrema, Q. C. 
V. Tennekoon,Q.C.
SUPREME COURT 
Chief Justice
G.P.A.Silva (Retired) 
Judges
A.C.Alles 
S.R.Wijetilleke 
V.T.Thamotheram
H.Deheragoda
C. B. Walgampaya 
J.Pathirana
D.Wimalaratne 
T.W.Rajaratnam 
D.Q.M.Sirimanne
Comnissioners of
C.V.Udalagama /
T.A.de S.Wijesundera 
S.D.M.L.Perera /
I.M.Ismail /
J. G. T. Weer ar atne
SUPREME COURT 
Chief Justice 
V.Tennekoon,Q.C.
Judges
A.C.Alles
G. T. Samarawickrema, Q. C, 
S.R.Wijetilleke
V.T.Thamother am
H.Deheragoda
C.B. Walgampaya 
J.Pathirana
D.Wimalaratne 
T. W . Raj ar atnam
D.Q.M.Sirimanne
C.V.Udalagama 
T*A*de S-.Wijesundera 
S.D.M.L.Perera
I.M. Ismail
J. G. T. Weer ar atne
A. Vythi al ingam 
N.Tittewella 
S. Sharvananda 
S.W.Walpita 
W.D.Gunasekera
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Chief Justice Silva declined to serve on the new Court when
it became known that he would be superseded by a Judge who was five
years junior to him in service; he availed himself of retirement
benefits which are usually available in the public service upon
abolition of office. Of the three Judges who were omitted from the
new Court, T.S.Fernando (68) had served only two years of the five-
year term for which he had been appointed as President of the Court
of Appeal; V.Sivasupramanium (65) and A.L.S.Sirimanne (64) had
barely completed two years of the five-year term for which each
had been appointed to that Court. By repealing the Court of Appeal
Act, and thereby abolishing the Court of which these three Judges
were members, they were effectively removed from their judicial
offices. By subjecting them to a law which prescribed a lower age
of retirement, they were effectively excluded from re-appointment
to the new Court that was established. The Constitutional Court,
however, agreed with the Attorney-General that the "non-absorption
of these three Judges is consistent with section 122(3) of the
Constitution".^ That section read as follows:
Unless the National State Assembly otherwise provides, 
the term of office of a Judge of the Court of Appeal 
shall be as provided by the Court of Appeal Act, No.44 
of 1971, and the age of retirement of Judges of the 
Supreme Court shall be 63 years.
The Constitutional Court understood this section to mean "that the
term of office of the Judges of the Court of Appeal can be altered
2
by a simple majority of the National State Assembly". Dealing
thereafter with the salary reduction to which those Judges of the
Court of Appeal who were absorbed into the new Supreme Court would
be subjected to, the Constitutional Court expressed the view that
section 122(5) which provided that:
The salary payable to or the age of retirement of any 
such Judge shall not be reduced during his term of 
office.
had no application if "the office of Judge of the Court of Appeal
3
has been abolished under the Bill".
Unlike the Constitutions of most other Commonwealth countries, 
the 1972 Constitution did not expressly provide that an office of 
judge may not be abolished while there was a permanent holder
1. In re Administration of Justice Bill (1973) DCC, Vol.l, p.62.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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thereof.'*’ However, the effect of guaranteeing that a judge was 
irremovable during good behaviour and that his age of retirement 
was irreducible, was to achieve the same result. The power given 
to the legislature to establish a court in place of an existing 
one could not, in view of these two guarantees, have included a 
power to remove a judge from office. Indeed, it is doubtful 
whether, having regard to subsection (5) of section 122 referred 
to above, even the reduction of the term of office or the age of 
retirement of a judge would have applied to one who was already 
in office. Therefore, it would appear that the Constitutional 
Court erred in its decision on this provision of the bill. It did 
more. By its cursory and cavalier analysis of the bill, it gave 
the stamp of judicial authority to this new and simple device 
for circumventing constitutional guarantees and securing the 
removal of judges otherwise than in the manner provided for by law. 
Before long, the three members of the Constitutional Court who had 
legitimised the removal of judges by the substitution of one court 
for another were themselves to fall victims to this same device.
This happened when the 1978 Constitution provided, in its
transitional provisions that:
All Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts 
established by the Administration of Justice Law,
No.44 of 1973, holding office on the day inmediately
before the commencement of the Constitution shall, 
on the commencement of the Constitution, cease to 
hold office.2
3
As has already been noted, eight Judges whose security of tenure
until they reached the prescribed age of retirement was constitu­
tionally guaranteed were, in effect, prematurely removed from 
office. Five of them had abandoned the Unofficial Bar, and by 
accepting judicial office had forfeited the right of private 
practice for life; two had graduated through the Attorney-General's 
Department and reached the bench in the normal course of promotion; 
and one, a judicial officer, had been appointed to the Supreme Court, 
as many of his colleagues had previously been, at the end of a long 
career served in different parts of the country. The movement of 
Judges into the two new superior courts, as well as up, down and 
out, was as follows:
1. See, for example, the Constitution of Zimbabwe, Art.86(3) 
and the Constitution of Belize, Art.95(2).
2. Art.163.
3. Supra, p.196.
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TABLE 19
RE-CONSTITUTION OF THE 
SUPERIOR COURTS IN 
1978
1972 Constitution 1978 Constitution
SUPREME COURT
Chief Justice
N.D.M.Samarakone,Q.C. -
Judges
G.T. Samarawickrema, Q.C,
V. T. Thamotheram -----
J.Pathirana (OUT)
D.Wimalaratne 
T.W.Rajaratnam (OUT) 
C.V.Udalagama (OUT)
T.A.de S.Wijesundera 
S.D.M.L.Perera (OUT)
I.M. Ismail 
J.G.T. Weeraratne
A.Vythialingam 
N.Tittewella (O1 
S.Sharvananda 
S.W.Walpita (OUT) 
W.D.Gunasekera (OUT),
B.S.C.Ratwatte 
R.S. Wanasundera 
P.Colin Thome
HIGH COURT
J.F.A.Soza 
M.M.Abdul Cader 
J.R.M.Perera (OUT)
H.A.G.de Silva
C.N.de S.J.Goonewardene (OUT) 
L.H.de Alwis
T.J.Rajaratnam (OUT)
K. D. 0. S. M. Sene vi r atne 
K. A. P. Ranas inghe 
J.S.Abeywardene
A.A.de Silva (OUT)
C.L.T.Moonemalle 
S.Selliah
B.E.de Silva
G. R. T. D. Bandaranaike
D.G.Jayalath 
T.D.G.de Alwis
B.Senaratne
SUPREME COURT
Chief Justice
N. D. M. S amar akone, Q. C.
Judges
G. T. Samarawickrema ,Q. C, 
V.T.Thamotheram
I.M. Ismail 
J.G.T. Weeraratne
S. Sharvananda 
R. S .Wanasundera
COURT OF APPEAL
D.Wimalaratne
A. Vythial ingam
B.S.C.Ratwatte 
P.Colin Thome 
J.F.A.Soza 
M.M.Abdul Cader 
K. A. P. Ranas inghe 
K.C.E.de Alwis 
J.A.R.V.Perera
H.D.Thambiah
H.Rodrigo
DISTRICT COURT
K.C.E.de Alwis
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The third event took place shortly before the re-constitution 
of the Supreme Court in 1978. On 1 August, .the proceedings of the 
Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry3 commenced with an 
opening address by Counsel appearing for the State. In the course 
of his address, which contained many vitriolic comments oh officials 
of the previous administration, he referred to the conduct of 
certain Judges. One of them was Justice Pathirana whom he described
as "a political stooge introduced to the Supreme Court bench by Felix
2
Dias”. This address was broadcast on the State radio and published 
widely in the national newspapers. The headline on page one of 
one newspaper was "POLITICAL STOOGE ON SC BENCH - COUNSEL"; the lead 
story of another was captioned: "JUSTICE PATHIRANA ACTED ILLEGALLY: 
FELIX'S POLITICAL STOOGE IN SUPREME COURT: COUNSEL".3 The Supreme 
Court took no action either against State Counsel or against the 
newspapers;^ nor did the commission investigate and report on any 
of the several allegations made against the Judge. When the 
Supreme Court was reconstituted a month later, Justice Pathirana 
was one of the Judges who was excluded. It had been possible for 
the executive to have ignored the constitutional processes and to 
have caused a judge whom it did not appear to like or whose judicial 
conduct it obviously disapproved of, to be publicly abused in a 
forum in which no reply was possible and no defence was available.3
Conditions of Service
Salary
The constitutional guarantee that the salary of a judge will 
not be diminished during his tenure of office presupposes that such 
salary is, upon an objective assessment, sufficient. As a general 
rule, a judge of a superior court has always received a salary 
comparable with that of the highest paid state officers. For inst­
ance, in 1954, Judges of the Supreme Court, the Attorney-General 
and the Secretary to the Treasury all received a salary of Rs.27,000
1. Infra, p. 226.
2. Ceylon Daily Mirror, 11 August 1978.
3. Ibid; Ceylon Daily News, 11 August 1978.
4. For the Supreme Court’s powers of dealing with contempt, 
see p.187.
5. At the stage of the opening address, the proceedings were 
conducted ex parte and none of the persons whose conduct the commission 
was invited to investigate were permitted to be present or to be 
represented. Later, after evidence had also been recorded, notices 
were issued on certain persons . No inquiry was held in respect of 
Justice Pathirana.
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per annum, while the salary attached to the posts of Permanent 
Secretary was Rs.21,600-600-24,000.^ The relevant 1959 statistics 
were:
TABLE 20 
COMPARATIVE SALARY SCALES, 1959
Chief Justice
Attorney-General )
Secretary to the Treasury)
Judge of the Supreme Court
Permanent Secretary
Source: Ceylon Civil List 1959 (Colombo: 
Govt.Press, 1959).
and by the end of 1981 they had been increased to:
TABLE 21 
COMPARATIVE SALARY SCALES, 1981
Chief Justice 
Attorney-General
Judges of the Supreme Court ) 
President of the Court of Appeal)
Judges of the Court of Appeal) 
Solicitor-General )
Secretary to the Cabinet ) 
Secretaries to Ministries ) 
Auditor General )
Commissioner of Elections )
Source: Public Administration Circular, No.197 
of 29 December 1981.
The judges, in common with other state officers, were until 1977 
liable to pay income tax on their salaries and other income. In 
that year, the salaries of all state officers, including judges, 
were declared to be non-taxable. Other perquisites now enjoyed by 
judges include an official car and telephone, and a pension after 
retirement.
... Rs.78,000 
... Rs.67,000
... Rs.66,000 
... Rs.62,400
... Rs.54,000
... Rs.42,000
... Rs.36,000
... Rs.33,000 
... Rs.25,800
1. Ceylon Civil List 1954 (Colombo: Govt.Press, 1954).
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Judicial salaries, however, are not comparable with the 
earnings of lawyers engaged in private practice, and it is 
unrealistic to even attempt to do so. The fee of a successful 
lawyer in respect of an appeal brief in an ordinary civil appeal 
used to be about the same as the monthly salary of a Supreme Court 
Judge. In recent years, the gap between the two has assumed 
incredible proportions: in 1981, the fees paid in respect of a
single appeal brief by a state corporation was reported to be 
Rs.273,000 to senior counsel and Rs.196,000, Rs.183,000 and 
Rs.84,000, respectively, to the three junior counsel.'*'
Leave
Judges of superior courts are entitled to the facility of
leave, subject to the same terms and conditions as state officers
2
of comparable rank. An application for leave is made by the 
judge concerned directly to the President. When the President 
(or Governor-General) was a constitutional Head of State, such 
applications were referred to the Prime Minister for advice, and 
the latter, in turn, usually consulted the Minister of Justice on 
the nature of the advice to be tendered. There appears to have 
been only one instance of leave being refused.
By letter dated 27 August 1965, Justice T.S.Fernando 
requested the Governor-General to permit him to avail himself of 
15 days' vacation leave commencing on 10 September to be spent 
out of the island. The Judge wished to attend a conference of 
the World Peace Through Law Center scheduled to be held in Wash­
ington to which he had been invited. He had previously attended 
conferences of the same organisation held in Athens and in Tokyo. 
One week after the date from which he had requested that his 
leave be made effective, the Judge was informed by the Governor- 
General that:
I am advised that it is not possible to recommend 
the leave applied for by you.
By letter dated 20 September, addressed to the Governor-General,
the Judge requested that he be informed of the reasons for which
1. Parliamentary Debates, 3 November 1982, col. 1352. These 
fees were paid by the Bank of Ceylon to H.W. Jayewardene,Q.C., and 
his three juniors, J.W.Subasinghe, K.N.Choksy and L.C.Seneviratne.
2. Establishments Code 1971, ChvXII.
3. Letter dated 16 September 1965.
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the leave applied for had been refused:
The leave applied for was available. The work of 
the Court was in no way to be disrupted; the truth 
in regard to the work of the Court is that, at the 
moment, for the available work, there are too many 
judges in Colombo. I have reason to believe that 
the Honourable the Chief Justice had at no time 
taken up the position that a grant of the leave 
applied for by me will inconvenience the work of 
the Court.
He pointed out that:
Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948, which I have reason to hope the 
Government of this country does not intend wilfully 
to contravene, proclaims that 'Everyone has the 
right to leave any country, including his own, and 
to return to his country'. This is the first 
occasion on which I have been refused leave, and I 
trust Your Excellency will agree that I have a 
right, in a country which has only recently authori­
tatively proclaimed that it intends always to abide 
by the Rule of Law, to be informed of the reason or 
reasons for the refusal.
No reply having been received at the end of a month, the Judge, on
21 October, invited the Governor-General's attention to his letter.
Another four weeks were to elapse before the latter replied that:
I have the honour to inform that, lam advised that 
it is not considered necessary to disclose the 
reasons for the decisions conveyed to you.l
On 22 November, the Judge wrote to the Governor-General reminding
him that he had accepted office on well-understood conditions, and
leave from duties was one of them. He submitted that by depriving
him, without reason, of a right to leave to which he was entitled,
the executive had interfered with the independence of the judiciary.
In this case, the Judge concerned actually availed himself
of leave within the island (for which only the Chief Justice's
2
approval was necessary) during the relevant period. Therefore, 
the refusal of leave could not have been due to "exigencies of 
service". The implication is that the executive, for reasons which 
it was not prepared to disclose, had decided that the Judge should 
not be permitted, on this occasion at least, to pursue a legitimate 
private interest. Thereby, the executive was either "punishing" 
the Judge or expressing its displeasure with his conduct, and in so
1. Letter dated 17 November 1965. 
'2, Private information.
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doing was interfering with the independence guaranteed by law. The 
intervention of the executive appears to be hardly necessary in 
respect of trivial matters such as leave which are best left for 
the Judges to regulate among themselves.
Extra-Judicial Activity
Acting Head of State
The Ceylon (Office of Governor-General) Letters Patent 1947
provided that:
Whenever the office of Governor-General is vacant, or 
the Governor-General is absent from the Island, or is 
from any cause prevented from, or incapable of, acting 
in the duties of his office, then such other person as 
We may appoint under Our Sign Manual and Signet, or if 
there is no such person in the Island and capable of 
discharging the duties of the administration, then the 
person for the time being lawfully performing the func­
tions of Chief Justice shall, during Our pleasure, 
administer the Government of the Island.!
Similarly, the 1972 Constitution provided that during any period in
which the office of President was vacant, such other person as the
Prime Minister might nominate, or in the absence of such nomination,
the person for the time being lawfully performing the 
functions of the Chief Judge of the highest Appellate 
Court
2
shall act in that office. The 1978 Constitution, under which the 
President is also Head of the Government and Chairman of the Cabinet, 
provides, however, that in his absence either the Prime Minister or
3
the Speaker may, if so required by him, act in that office.
The assumption of office, either as Officer Administering the 
Government or as acting President, brought the head of the judiciary 
into direct contact with the executive government of the country. 
During such acting period, apart from meeting the Prime Minister 
regularly, the Chief Justice also received copies of all Cabinet
4
memoranda. Sometimes, an acting spell could prove more eventful.
For instance, in 1952 when Chief Justice Rose was administering the 
Government during the absence on leave of Lord Soulbury, the then 
Prime Minister fell off his horse and died. Rose was called upon 
to choose a new Prime Minister; a task which he avoided when informed
1. Art.7(1).
2. S.28(1).
3. Art.37.
4. J.L.Fernando, Three Prime Ministers, p.83.
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that Soulbury would be hurrying back. However, the delay in making 
an appointment, and the popular belief that the person whom 
Soulbury appointed on his return was not necessarily the person 
who would have been found acceptable to the Cabinet and Parliament 
five days previously had Rose duly performed his constitutional 
duty, exposed the Chief Justice to some political criticism at the 
time.^ In 1953, when Chief Justice Rose was next administering the 
Government, he was called upon to declare a state of public emer­
gency and legislate by emergency regulations to deal with violence
2
which followed a day of political agitation.
Whether or not a Chief Justice should be afforded the oppor­
tunity of acting as Head of State, even for a few days, was a
matter entirely within the discretion of the Prime Minister. For 
instance, in 1954, when Soulbury flew to London to be at the bed­
side of his wife who had been knocked down by a bus, Chief Justice
Rose was himself away in the United Kingdom on leave. Soulbury
suggsted to Prime Minister Kotelawela the names of two Europeans,
3
one of whom might be appointed to act for him. Kotelawela, however, 
declined to take any such step and permitted Justice Nagalingam, 
acting Chief Justice, to become the first Tamil to occupy Queen's 
House. In 1975, when it became known that President Gopallawa 
would be leaving the island on a ten-day visit to Nepal, the Speaker 
of the National State Assembly, Stanley Tillekeratne, wrote to the 
Prime Minister and argued that, since the National State Assemnbly 
was the supreme instrument of state power, "it will be the duty of 
the Prime Minister under the Constitution to consider the Speaker 
as the first choice when called upon to appoint a person to act for
4
the President". Mrs.Bandaranaike rejected this unsolicited advice
and decided not to make any nomination herself, thus enabling Chief 
Justice Tennekoon to assume that office upon the departure of the 
President.^
1. Ibid., pp.39-44. See also Sir John Kotelawela, An Asian 
Prime Minister's Story (London: Harrap & Co.Ltd, 1956), pp.77-83.
2. Infra, p.449.
3. Kotelawela, Asian Prime Minister, pp. 115-16.
4. Letter dated 14 February 1975 from the Speaker of the National 
State Assembly to the Prime Minister.
5. Letters dated 17 February 1975 from the Attorney-General to 
the Prime Minister and from the Secretary for Justice to the Sec­
retary to the Prime Minister.
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Thus, ordinarily, a decision by the Prime Minister to send 
the Head of State on a mission abroad or to grant him leave from 
his duties, together with a further decision not to make an acting 
appointment during the period of such absence or leave, were 
necessary before a Chief Justice could have assumed the highest 
office in the land. Of the eleven heads of the judiciary who have 
functioned since Independence, only four were afforded that privi­
lege by the executive.'*'
Commissions of Inquiry
1. The Commissions of Inquiry Act
The Commissions of Inquiry Act, No.17 of 1948, empowered the
Governor-General to appoint a commission consisting of one or more
members to inquire into and report on the administration of any
department of government or of any public or local authority or
institution, the conduct of any member of the public service, or
any matter in respect of which an inquiry would, in his opinion,
2
be in the public safety or welfare. It had been the general pre- 
Independence practice to request Judges of the Supreme Court to 
serve on such commissions. In 1950, two commissions were appointed 
to inquire into the procedure, practice and administration of the 
civil and criminal courts of Ceylon and to report on necessary 
reforms, including amendments to the Civil Procedure Code and the
3
Criminal Procedure Code, respectively. The former included two 
Judges, Justice Nagalingam (Chairman) and Justice Gratiaen; the 
latter consisted only of two Judges, Justice Gratiaen (Chairman) 
and Justice Pulle. Two years later, another commission was appoin­
ted under the chairmanship of Chief Justice Rose to examine and 
report on the question of the re-constitution of the Supreme Court. 
All three commissions dealt with technical aspects of the law.
In 1956, widespread rioting took place in Gal Oya, a colonist 
town, following the introduction of a bill designed to make Sinhala 
the one official language of the country. As a newspaper described 
it at that time, it was a major disturbance - a disturbance which 
resulted in the loss of more than twenty lives, which involved 
several communities, and which was preceded, accompanied and followed
1. Sir Arthur Wijewardene, Sir Alan Rose, H.N.G.Fernando and 
V.Tennekoon.
2. S.2.
3. S.P.XXIII-1955 and S.P.VI-1953 respectively.
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by the bitterest of communal controversies.'*' The Government wished 
to ascertain the cause of the riot so that it may take appropriate 
remedial measures. Prime Minister Bandaranaike invited Justice T.S. 
Fernando to be the one-man commission of inquiry for this purpose.
The Judge accepted this invitation, but changed his mind shortly 
thereafter when the Chief Justice unearthed a minute made by the 
Supreme Court Judges following the publication of the report of the 
Bracegirdle Coimission nearly two decades previously. That comm­
ission had been headed by the then Chief Justice Sir Sydney Abrahams, 
and consequent to severe public criticism of its report, the Judges 
had decided that "they do not wish to undertake inquiries in which 
there may be political implications and which may expose them to 
criticism".^
Two years later, in December 1958, following allegations in 
the House of Representatives of an attempted coup d'etat, Prime 
Minister Bandaranaike visited Hulftsdorp and addressed the Judges 
of the Supreme Court in an attempt to persuade one of them to serve 
as chairman of a commission of inquiry which he intended to const­
itute for the purpose of inquiring into and reporting on these 
3
allegations. The Judges requested that the Commissions of Inquiry
Act be amended by the inclusion of a new provision that:
Any person who makes any allegation of incompetence, 
or of partiality, bad faith or other misconduct 
against a Commission or any member or former member 
thereof, or who in any other manner brings or attempts 
to bring into contempt or disrespect such Commission 
or member or former member thereof, whether before 
or after such Commission is functus officio, shall be 
guilty of the offence of contempt or disrespect of the 
authority of such Commission.
They also asked that where a commission consisted solely of a Judge
or Judges of the Supreme Court, such commission shall, in addition,
have "all the rights, powers and privileges, and the immunities of
a Judge of the Supreme Court" so that:
Any such offence of contempt against or in disrespect 
of the authority of a Commission . . . may be punished 
under section 47 of the Courts Ordinance either by 
such Commission or by the Supreme Court or a Judge 
thereof as though it were an offence of contempt comm­
itted against or in disrespect of the authority of that 
Court.
1. Morning Times, 18 September 1956.
2. Quoted by S. W.R.D. Bandar anaike and reported in the Times of 
Ceylon, 7 July 1956.
3. Times of Ceylon, 7 December 1958; Ceylon Daily News, 12 Dec­
ember 1958.
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A substantial section of the government parliamentary group, led
by an influential member of the Cabinet, insisted that only
criticism "made without sufficient reason" should be punishable
as contempt. This was not acceptable to the Judges, and they,
therefore, declined to serve on the commission.^
On 28 June 1963, the Governor-General appointed a commission
of inquiry consisting of Justice T.S.Fernando (Chairman), Justice
Adel Younis, Judge of the Court of Cassation, United Arab Republic,
and Justice G.C.Mills-Odoi, Judge of the Court of Appeal, Ghana,
to inquire into and report on certain matters connected with the
2
assassination of Prime Minister Bandaranaike. These included 
matters such as whether any persons other than those found guilty 
by the Supreme Court were concerned in the conspiracy; whether any 
organised body of persons was involved in the plot, and if so, the 
underlying objectives or motives of such body; and whether any 
police officer or other person hampered the investigation or did 
any act to screen anyone involved. Justice Fernando had apparently 
taken the responsibility himself of deciding whether or not to 
accept the invitation of the Government to head this commission.
He had been the presiding judge at the trial of the persons accused 
of the murder of Bandaranaike, and perhaps felt obliged to lend his 
authority to the commission and to share his particular knowledge 
of the subject with the two other foreign commissioners in the 
investigation of the alleged cover-up which had, no doubt, created 
a crisis of confidence in the country. His colleagues on the 
Supreme Court, who had not been consulted by him on this matter, 
met to discuss its implications. They decided that, in future, 
if a direct invitation by the Government was made to a Judge of the 
Supreme Court to serve on a commission, the matter should be reported 
to the Chief Justice who would sumnon a meeting of all the Judges
3
to consider whether or not that invitation should be accepted.
1. Times of Ceylon, 15 December 1958 and 2 January 1959; Ceylon 
Daily News, 19 December 1958.
2. Bandaranaike had been shot in the verandah of his own home on 
25 September 1959; he died on the following day. Plaint had been filed 
in the Magistrate's Court against seven persons, five of whan later 
stood their trial before Justice Fernando and a special English- 
speaking jury. In May 1961, two of the accused were found guilty of 
conspiring to commit the murder and one of committing the murder; two 
were acquitted.
3. Ceylon Daily News, 17 August 1963.
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It was thirteen years later that a government next approached 
a Judge of the Supreme Court to serve on a commission of inquiry. 
Justice Wimalaratne was appointed on 23 November 1976 to inquire 
into and report on certain events that had taken place on the univ­
ersity campus at Peradeniya which had culminated in the shooting by 
the police of a university student. The Prime Minister's assass­
ination and the shooting of the undergraduate were both explosive 
situations, each of which had created a crisis of confidence. In 
each case, only the finding of a judge of irreproachable integrity 
could have diffused the situation. Both reports were accepted by 
the public, though not wothout some heartburning by the governments 
concerned.^
2. Delimitation Commissions
The 1946 Constitution required the Governor-General to estab-
a Delimitation Commission within one year after the completion of
2every general census. Such a commission was to consist of three
persons who "are not actively engaged in politics". It was the
function of a Delimitation Commission to divide each province of
the island into a number of electoral districts. In 1959, Prime
Minister Bandaranaike invited a senior Puisne Justice to function
as chairman of a Delimitation Commission which was then required to
be established. He argued that the report of the commission would
be final and binding on the Governor-General. The Judges discussed
this matter, but decided by a majority vote, on the basis of the
3
Bracegirdle Minute, against accepting the invitation. A similar 
invitation was extended in 1974 to Justice Tittewella, who accepted 
without any prior consultation with his colleagues. The delimita­
tion of electorates is essentially a political matter, and when 
existing boundaries are varied in order to create new electorates, 
some degree of political protest is inevitable. The reaction to the 
publication in October 1976, barely six months before the scheduled 
general election, of the commission's report was, therefore, not 
that of general acceptance. It was perhaps not entirely coincidental 
that, following the general election, Tittewella was one of the 
Judges excluded from the Supreme Court when that Court was re­
constituted in 1978.
1. S.P.III-1965 and S.P.1-1977 respectively. The former report 
had been handed over on 30 April 1964, but was published, after 
insistent public demand, only on 20 March 1965.
2. S.40. See also s.77 of the 1972 Constitution.
3. Times of Ceylon, 26 January 1959.
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3. Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Law.
The Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Law, No. 7 of 
1978, empowered the President to appoint a commission consisting of 
judges of a court not below a District Court, whenever it appeared 
to him to be necessary that an inquiry should be held and informat­
ion obtained as to the administration of any public body or local 
authority, the administration of any law or the administration of 
justice, the conduct of any public officer,'*' or any matter in respect 
of which an inquiry would, in his opinion, be in the public interest 
or be in the interest of public safety or welfare. The basic 
difference between a commission appointed under the Commissions of 
Inquiry Act and one appointed under this Law is that the latter is 
required to find and report to the President whether "any person 
has been guilty of any act of political victimisation, misuse or
abuse of power, corruption or any fraudulent act", and whether
2
such person should be made subject to civic disability. Any such
finding or report is final and conclusive, and may not be called in
3
question in any court or tribunal by way of writ or otherwise. A
special presidential commission of inquiry has many of the attributes
of a court except the power to punish; it being left to Parliament
to decide, on the recommendation of the Cabinet, whether or not to
4
impose civic disability on a person found guilty by a commission.
In introducing the Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry 
Bill in the National State Assembly, Prime Minister Jayewardene 
explained:
We want this law to be on the statute book for any 
government to use it against any previous govern­
ment, against any men in the government, against any
women in the government who need to be examined and 
dealt with.
1. Public officer includes the Prime Minister, a Minister, Mem­
ber of the National State Assembly, a state officer, and a chairman, 
director or employee of any public body. A public body includes a 
ministry or department of government, a public corporation, commiss­
ion or board, and a registered co-operative society.
2. S.9(1). Civic disability means disqualification from being 
an elector or a candidate at any election of the President of the 
Republic or of a Member of the National State Assembly or of any 
local authority; and from holding office or from being employed in 
the public sector.
3. S.9(2).
4. 1978 Constitution, Art.81.
5. National State Assembly Debates, 1 February 1978, col.872.
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Justifying the penalty clause, he said:
We are saying that such persons if found guilty 
have no right to exercise their civic rights or 
to sit in this House, that they have no right to 
be in a government in the future.
Therefore, a special presidential commission of inquiry would be 
called upon to perform a political function; that of inquiring 
into the administration of a previous government and of deciding 
whether the political leaders of that government should be removed 
from political life, a task hitherto performed by the electorate.
A Supreme Court Judge who agreed to serve on such a commission 
would immediately have become embroiled in political controversy.
In March 1978, President Jayewardene announced the appoint­
ment of a commission for the purpose of inquiring into the admin­
istration of his predecessor in office as Prime Minister, Mrs. 
Bandaranaike. The commission consisted of Justice Weeraratne and 
Justice Sharvananda, two members of the:ZL-member Supreme Court, and 
K.C.E.de Alwis, a District Judge. One of the first acts of the 
commission was to direct that the passports of a number of persons 
who had served the previous government be impounded. The commission 
commenced its public sittings on 1 August 1978, by permitting a 
lawyer member of the working committee of the ruling United National
Party to address the commission. He had been retained by the Govem-
2
ment to present the Government's case before the commission. His 
eight-day address was described by Mrs.Bandaranaike as "an orgy of
1. Ibid. Jayewardene also explained that: "This Bill became 
necessary, firstly, because our present Commissions of Inquiry Act 
does not make provision for certain types of matters to be inquired 
into, specific matters; secondly, because it provides no punishment 
flowing from the decisions of the commission; and thirdly, because 
it does not give enough power to the commission to admit certain 
types of evidence" : Ibid., col.809.
2. Prime Minister Premadasa stated in Parliament that the 
Government had retained A.C.de Zoysa to appear for the Government. 
He said: "Mr.Bunty Zoysa is a member of our committee and also a 
member of our party. He is one who has gone with us all over the 
country. He knows what we said when we went all over the country. 
But it is not he who will give the judgment. He will only appear 
for us, for the State" : Parliamentary Debates, 20 November 1978.
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character assassination".'*' Nevertheless, the commission allowed
it to be recorded by the State-controlled radio for broadcasting
2
to the nation at peak hour each day. Thereafter, for the next
four months, the evidence of witnesses was led by Counsel for the
State at ex parte proceedings, interspersed with political comments
3
and prejudicial remarks. Notices were eventually served on a
number of persons, together with a transcript of the evidence led
against them, and they were required to file statements in defence
and then appear for inquiry. By the end of 1981, the commission
had conducted only three inquiries, and at the conclusion of each
had found the person noticed guilty: a former Permanent Secretary,
of misuse and/or abuse of p o w e r a  former Minister, of corruption
and abuse of power; and the former Prime Minister, Mr s. Bandar anaike,
of misuse and/or abuse of power.^ On each of them, Parliament by
resolution imposed civic disability for the maximum period of seven
years; additionally, Mrs.Bandaranaike was also expelled from Parlia- 
6ment.
The participation of two Supreme Court Judges in this comm­
ission could not have helped to enhance the independence of that 
Court. Apart from the special preference shown by the executive 
to all three Judges and their rapid promotion in the course of the 
proceedings,^ the commissioners aroused bitter criticism from
g
counsel who appeared before them, and from the opposition benches 
9
in Parliament, for their disregard of the procedure hitherto 
observed by comnissions of inquiry. It was alleged, not without
1. Statement made by Mrs.Sirima R.D.Bandaranaike, Third Interim 
Report of the Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry (Colombo:
Dept, of Govt. Printing, 1980), Appendix A, p,158.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Second Interim Report of the Special Presidential Commission 
of Inquiry (Colombo: Dept, of Govt. Printing, 1979).
5. Second Interim Report, op.cit.
6. Parliamentary Debates, 8 January 1980, 11 January 1980, and
16 October 1980. Of the three persons, the first faced a full inquiry, 
the second did not choose to cross-examine any witnesses, and the 
third did not participate in the inquiry at all.
7. Infra, p.196.
8. See Opening and Closing Addresses of S.Nadesan, Q.C., senior 
counsel for Nihal Jayawickrama, Proceedings of the Special Presid­
ential Commission of Inquiry, January-July 1979.
9. Parliamentary Debates, 20 November 1978.
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basis, that the commission had abdicated its functions of investi­
gation and inquiry to counsel retained by the State, and allowed 
its platform to be used for the purpose of conducting political 
propaganda. Before it could complete its task, the commission had 
become a major political issue, and every opposition party was 
committed to its abolition and the restoration of the civic rights 
of the persons against whom it had reported.
Should a Judge undertake the task of investigating and ascer­
taining facts for the information of the executive ? In 1923, in 
Australia, Sir William Irvine, Chief Justice of Victoria, wrote
thus to the Attorney-General of that State in response to a request
that a Judge be made available to act as a Royal Commissioner to 
inquire into charges made in connection with the Warrnambool break­
water :
The duty of His Majesty's Judges is to hear and 
determine issues of fact and of law arising bet­
ween the King and the subject, or between subject 
and subject, presented in a form enabling judgment
to be passed upon them, and when passed to be
enforced by process of law. There begins and ends 
the function of the judiciary. It is mainly due 
to the fact that, in modem times, at least, the 
Judges of all British Communities have, except 
in rare cases, confined themselves to this function, 
that they have attained, and still retain, the 
confidence of the people.*
This letter, which has come to be known as the Irvine Memorandum,
2
has continued to be invoked in that State. Fifty years later,
Sir Garfield Barwick, Chief Justice of Australia, gave expression
to similar sentiments when he said:
Governments continue to request the services of 
judges to act as Royal Commissioners or as 
chairman in inquiries of diverse subject matter.
I quite understand that Governments realise that 
the community as a whole recognises the integrity 
of the judiciary and that the citizen is likely 
to feel confident of the correctness and honesty 
of a judge's conclusions. Thus, the appointment 
of a judge as a commissioner or chairman is pol­
itically attractive. But many of the matters 
into which commissioners or chairman are asked
1. Sir Robert Mclnerney has quoted the text of this letter in 
"The Appointment of Judges to Cormiissions of Inquiry and Other Extra 
Judicial Activities", Australian Law Journal, vol.52, p.540 at 541.
2. Ibid., at 549.
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to inquire are completely divorced from the law 
and all too frequently involve the formation of 
opinions on matters which are truly political in 
character. To require a judge to express a view 
on such questions is to my mind to do a disser­
vice to the judiciary itself.
This attitude has not been peculiar to Australia either. In 1973,
Britain's Lord Chancellor Hail sham warned that the independence of
the judiciary was being endangered by increasing demands for tribunals
of inquiry over which Judges were expected to preside. He added:
You cannot keep independent Judges in Britain if 
you constantly expose them to ordeal by public 
criticism, which is not only inevitable but legi­
timate and proper whenever you ask them to preside 
over tribunals of inquiry.
Four years later, he asked how it could be supposed that the reports
produced by a Judge presiding over an inquiry "will not affect a
Judge' s reputation for impartiality, or his chances of appointment
or promotion if he offended some powerful minority, influential
3
Minister, or popular prejudice or pressure group ?" Even in the
United States, the policy now adopted is that members of the Supreme
Court do not serve on committees or perform other services not
4
having a direct relationship to the work of the Court.
In Sri Lanka, it is unfortunate that the Special Presidential 
Commissions of Inquiry Law specifically included Judges of the Sup­
reme Court in that category of persons from whom the President was 
authorised to choose his commissioners,^ and that the 1978 Consti­
tution empowers the President to require a Judge of the Supreme 
Court to "perform or discharge any other appropriate duties or 
functions under any other written law". Despite these enabling 
provisions, it would have been preferable if the Supreme Court had 
insisted that its members scrupulously observe at least the minimum 
standards laid down in the Bracegirdle Minute, however tempted seme 
of them might have been to enjoy the benefits of political patronage 
by making themselves useful to the executive branch of government.
1. Sir Garfield Barwick, "The Use of Judges to Chair Commissions 
of Inquiry and Tribunals": a paper submitted to the Meeting of 
Commonwealth Chief Justices, Canberra, 1980.
2. Daily Telegraph, 18 July 1973, quoted by Mclnemey, op.cit.
3. Times, 25 May 1978, quoted by Mclnemey, op.cit.
4. Mclnemey, op.cit., explains that Warren CJ agreed to serve 
as chairman of the Kennedy assassination commission as a result of a 
request from President Johnson put to him in such terms that the 
Chief Justice felt himself unable to decline.
5. S.2. 6. Art.110(1).
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The Constitutional Court
The Constitutional Court established under the 1972 Consti­
tution was required to exercise a jurisdiction not previously 
exercised by the judiciary in Sri Lanka, namely, the review of 
bills. In the absence of the ex post facto review of legislation, 
which was expressly prohibited by that Constitution, the Constitu­
tional Court offered the only filtering process by which proposed 
legislation which infringed fundamental rights could be identified 
and then either rectified or excluded. Therefore, it was crucial 
that the Constitutional Court should not only be competent to 
perform that task, but that it should also be independent both of 
the executive and of the legislature. At its conception, it was 
intended to be "nothing but a court of the highest status in the 
land".'*' Accordingly, it was vested with many of the attributes of
such a court: security of tenure for its members, finality for its
2
determinations, and powers of contempt to maintain its authority.
But in the first six months of its existence, this novel institution 
was subjected to such interference both by the executive and by the 
legislature, and treated as if it were but a parliamentary committee, 
that eventually, in the form in which it emerged, it offered little
3
hope of being an effective protector of fundamental rights. The 
measure of success, if any, that attended the technique of antici­
patory review embodied in the Constitutional Court is examined in
4
a later chapter. At this stage, it is proposed to identify the 
factors and the circumstances that stultified its progress and 
impaired its credibility, despite the constitutional provisions which 
sought to facilitate its work and guarantee its independence.
1. Colvin R.de Silva, Minister of Constitutional Affairs, 
National State Assembly Debates, 22 June 1972, col.101. But see 
view of party and Cabinet colleague, N.M.Perera, that it is not 
"an independent court having independent rights", but "an advisory 
body only to give advice to the Speaker", National State Assembly 
Debates, 12 February 1972, col.1467.
2. Supra, p.124.
3. The Constitutional Court was, for instance, quite different 
in character and composition from the Senate Legal Committee which 
in Zimbabwe performs the same function. That committee consists of 
members who have held high judicial office but who serve in that 
comnittee in their capacity as Senators; it is, in fact, a parlia­
mentary committee and not a court. See Constitution of Zimbabwe, 
Arts. 36, 37.
4. Infra, Ch.V.
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Location
For the greater part of this century, Hulftsdorp has been the 
home of the superior courts of Sri Lanka, and as recently as 1971 
when the Court of Appeal replaced the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council, it was in Hulftsdorp that that Court sat. The Govern­
ment decided, however, that the Constitutional Court should sit in 
the premises of the National State Assembly, and a committee room 
which the government parliamentary group used for its meetings was 
cleared and re-arranged for this purpose.^ Parliamentary staff and 
equipment were provided on loan; even the Clerk to the Assembly 
doubled up as Registrar of the Court. One floor above the chamber 
of the National State Assembly, the Constitutional Court would meet 
to determine the propriety of what was proposed to be done below.
For the first time, the judiciary was being asked to function from 
premises which were entirely under the control of the legislature; 
a move which was perhaps symbolic of the new relationship between 
the supreme instrument of state power of the Republic and one of
its agencies, now exercising "not a separate power, but a part of
2
the power of the National State Assembly".
But whatever the philosophic justification for this unprece­
dented move may have been, it was a singularly unfortunate choice 
of location. At first, the Legislature looked upon the Court benignly 
but with a proprietorial eye, and hoped that it would provide
3
guidance in its deliberations. When, four days after it had first 
assembled, the Court indicated that it may have to deal with an
4
errant Member of Parliament for contempt, the first rumblings began 
to be heard.^ When, not very long thereafter, the Legislature began
1. Colvin R.de Silva, National State Assembly Debates, 12 Dec­
ember 1972, col.1526.
2. T.S.Fernando, at the inaugural session of the Court of Appeal, 
Ceylon Daily News, 10 March 1972.
3. See, for instance, Colvin R.de Silva, National State Assembly 
Debates, 22 June 1972, cols.105-111.
4. Dudley Senanayake, UNP MP for Dedigama, in respect of a state­
ment reported to have been made by him at a political meeting that 
"In the event of the Press Bill being implemented, the masses will 
rise against this undemocratic piece of legislation" : Ceylon Daily 
News, 25 November 1972.
5. For instance, J.R.Jayewardene, speaking on the votes of the 
National State Assenbly, pointed out that when the Court was in 
session, that part of the Assenbly building belonged to the Court, 
not to the Speaker. "The Court can send anyone to jail. I don't like 
that" : Ceylon Daily News, 5 December 1972.
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to be irritated by the tenor of the arguments presented by counsel 
as well as by the asides of the Court, the ground was being prepared 
for a confrontation. Finally, when the Assembly broke out in open 
conflict with the Court over the interpretation of the Constitution, 
and decided to assert what it mistakenly believed was its "sover­
eignty", the confrontation was complete.^ In its view, when the 
Court failed to give its decision on an impugned bill within fourteen
days of a reference, the Court ceased to exist. A Government member
2
argued that "we can throw the judges out", while an Opposition
3
member urged the Assembly to "find a way of closing that up". The 
Minister of Constitutional Affairs believed that "If you tell them 
to leave this room, which I beg of you not to, the three of them can 
go and continue purporting to be a court in the house of any of the
4
three of them", while the Deputy Minister of Planning asked the 
Speaker why he had failed to deal with the "unlawful group of men 
who have entered a room in this building and are continuing to occupy 
it ?"5
Remuneration
While the Constitution contemplated the payment of "salaries" 
to Judges of the Court of Appeal and of the Supreme Court, it required 
the National State Assembly to fix the "remuneration" to be paid tog
the members of the Constitutional Court. A section of the Assembly 
understood by this difference in terminology that what was intended 
was payment for each sitting of the C o u r t a  practice not uncommon 
in the country as far as industrial courts and such other inferior 
tribunals were concerned. The Government rejected this contention 
and, on 22 June 1972, secured the adoption of a resolution in terms 
of which members of the Constitutional Court would be remunerated on 
the same basis as Judges of the Supreme Court. But if a member of 
the Constitutional Court was already a Judge of the Supreme Court, 
he would receive no further payment; and if he was a retired public 
officer or judge, he would be treated as a re-employed state pensioner 
and would receive only the difference between his pension and the
g
salary of a Supreme Court Judge. Thus, a non-judge or a pensioner
1. Infra.
2. Mrs.V.Gunewardene, National State Assembly Debates, 12 Dec­
ember 1972, col.1519.
3. B.Neminathan, ibid., 4. Ibid., col.1518.
5. R.D.Senanayake, ibid.,col.1389. 6. S.57.
7. See, for instance, R.Premadasa, National State Assembly 
Debates, 22 June 1972, col.90. 8. Ibid., col.84.
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who was appointed to the Court would be precluded from undertaking 
any other work but would receive a monthly salary of Rs.3000 during 
his four-year panel membership, while a Judge of the Supreme Court 
who was called upon to exercise the jurisdiction vested in the 
Constitutional Court in addition to his usual duties, would receive 
no additional remuneration for his services. A Judge, therefore, 
could hardly be blamed if, as actually happened, he regarded his 
work on the Constitutional Court as ancillary to the duties of his 
sustantive office. The payment of a salary to one member of the 
Court and the denial of any remuneration to another who was required 
to perform the same services, was inconsistent with the principle 
that a Judge should receive at regular intervals remuneration for 
his services at a rate which is commensurate with his status and not 
diminished during his continuance in office.^
Composition
In the Constituent Assembly, the Minister of Constitutional
Affairs, in explaining the concept of a Constitutional Court, had
indicated quite clearly his view that persons other than Judges
2
should serve as members of this Court. A different view was, how­
ever, expressed by the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Justice, 
in a confidential minute addressed to the Prime Minister a few days 
before the Constitution came into force:
This institution has been severely criticised during the 
past one and a half years on the ground that it could 
well turn out to be a 'stooge court1 of the government 
in power. To allay any such fear or suspicion and criti­
cism of that type, I would suggest that the persons for 
appointment to the Constitutional Court be chosen, as 
far as possible, from among those already serving as 
Judges of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.
Should the Constitutional Court consist of Judges or of political
scientists and constitutional lawyers ? The Prime Minister sought
to effect a compromise between these two conflicting views: T.S.
4
Fernando,Q.C., President of the Court of Appeal; V.Siva Supramanium,
1. Draft Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary sub­
mitted for the consideration of the UN Sub-Commission on the Prot­
ection of Minorities and the Prevention of Discrimination, (1982)
8 CLB 715.
2. Supra, p.215.
3. Minute dated 15 May 1972. On 22 June 1972, a UNP member urged 
that the Judges of the Court of Appeal be appointed to this Court: 
N.Wimalasena, National State Assembly Debates, cols.91-94.
4. When the 1972 Constitution was being drafted, T.S.Fernando,Q.C. 
(then in retirement) together with S.Nadesan,Q.C., made represent-
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Judge of the Court of Appeal; and H.Deheragoda, Judge of the Supreme
Court,^ along with two nominees of the Minister of Constitutional
Affairs: K.D.de Silva, who had retired from the Supreme Court as 
2
far back as 1960; and J.A.L.Cooray, lecturer in constitutional law.
From this curious mixture of judges, ex-judges and non-judges, 
and from the fact that the Constitutional Court had no permanent 
head, nor any clearly defined principles for its constitution or 
procedure, there arose a number of operational problems which, in 
a very short time, led to a serious constitutional crisis.
Chairman
On being invited to serve on the Constitutional Court in 
addition to his other duties, the President of the Court of Appeal 
informed the Prime Minister that, while he had no objection to being 
a member of that Court, he held the view that a person holding office 
in one of the superior courts of the country should not in any way 
compromise the dignity of that office if and when he was called upon 
to accept or perform other assignments. Accordingly, it was his 
view that whenever a member who was a sitting Judge was chosen to 
serve on the Constitutional Court, that Judge should function as 
the chairman. He felt that it would help the members of the Court 
considerably in formulating an appropriate rule on that matter if, 
in making the first appointments, the President of the Republic 
would place the sitting Judges ahead of the others, instead of foll-
3
owing the alphabetical order. The Prime Minister acceded to this 
request, and the formal gazette notification announced the appoint­
ments in the following order:
Thusew Samuel Fernando,Esquire, President of the Court of Appeal; 
Veeravagu Siva Supramaniam, Esquire, Judge of the Court of 
Appeal;
Ekanayake Rajapakse Kodippili Dissanayake Mudiyanseralahamillage 
Hector Deheragoda, Esquire, Puisne Justice;
Kaludura Dhanrnikasiri De Silva, Esquire;
Joseph Anthony Leopold Cooray, Esquire.
ations to the Cabinet against the concept of a constitutional court 
and argued, inter alia, that it would be impractical to expect a 
court to determine a question relating to the validity of a bill 
within a period of fourteen days.
1. Deheragoda was a comparatively junior judge whose appointment 
was probably due to his familiarity with the statute law, acquired in 
his capacity as an assistant to the commissioner for the revision of 
the legislative enactments of Ceylon.
2. De Silva was 74 years old.
3. Letter dated 20 June 1972 from the Secretary for Justice to 
the Secretary to the Prime Minister.
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On 24 June 1972, the members of the Constitutional Court took their
oaths of office before the President in the same order.^
While the Constitution required the chairman to be chosen in
accordance with rules of court, it also stated quite explicitly that
such rules should be made by the Constitutional Court, published in
the gazette whereupon they came into operation, and then brought
before the National State Assembly for approval. However, on 24 June
at President's House, before the oaths were administered to the
members of the Court, each of them was presented by the Registrar
(who himself had not then taken his oath) with a cyclostyled copy
2
of draft rules complete with forms of application and warrants. In
respect of the chairmanship of the Court, the text of the relevant
draft rule was as follows:
Rule 12. When the Constitutional Court assembles on the 
date fixed for the commencement of the proceedings, the 
members of the Court shall by agreement decide which of 
them shall officiate as the Chairman of the Court, but 
where a retired Judicial Officer is a member of the Court, 
he shall officiate as Chairman. If a Court consists of 
more than one retired Judicial Officer, the most senior 
among them shall officiate as Chairman. If the majority 
of the members of the Court do not agree in the choosing
of the Chairman, the member of the Court whose name was
drawn first shall officiate as Chairman.
These draft rules had been prepared without any indications or guide­
lines being provided by the Court. On the Registrar being told by 
one member of the Court that rules should not have been thus framed 
by him, "I received no intelligible reply except that he was only
3
trying to be helpful". It is improbable that the Registrar, who was 
also the Clerk to the National State Assembly, would have had either 
the time or the inclination to have prepared this set of draft rules
by himself; it is more likely that they were prepared by the Ministry
of Constitutional Affairs. Indeed, the reference in the draft rule 
reproduced above to "retired Judicial Officers" suggested the 
absence of serving Judges on the Constitutional Court; the Ministry 
of Constitutional Affairs had consistently opposed the appointment 
of serving Judges.
1. See Gazette Extraordinary No. 13/11, 28 June 1972, Notification 
No.46/6 of 1972.
2. Letter dated 7 September 1972 from T.S.Fernando to the Min­
ister of Justice.
3. Ibid.
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Within three weeks of their appointment, the members of the
Constitutional Court had met and drafted all the necessary rules
except one."*" The sole exception related to the choosing of the
chairman. On this matter, a sharp difference of opinion existed.
The three serving Judges wanted the rule to be so framed that,
whenever a Judge of a superior court was one of the three members
chosen by lot to determine or advise on any matter referred to the
Gburt, such Judge (or if more than one such Judge were chosen, the
senior of such Judges) shall be the chairman. The other two members
wanted the rule to be framed to enable the three members chosen by
lot to decide by majority vote who shall be chairman. The three
Judges did not wish at that stage to make this rule by a majority
vote as they were entitled to; they preferred, if possible, to make
it without dissent. For instance, if there was some seniority
implicit in the order of their appointment, they felt it would be
possible to provide that the senior member among the three chosen
by lot shall be chairman. Accordingly, they addressed the President
and inquired whether or not seniority as among the five members was
2
as indicated in the gazette notification. The other two members 
also wrote to the President to "place the matter before Your Excel- 
lency for consideration and decision".
As required by the Constitution, the President referred these 
two communications to the Prime Minister for advice. On 1 August 
1972, the Secretary to the Prime Minister sought the advice of the 
Secretary for Justice. The simple reply ought to have been: (1) 
that seniority was implicit in the order of appointment of members, 
and (2) that it was not within the President's powers to take a 
"decision" on the disputed rule. Such a reply would have enabled 
the Constitutional Court to have proceeded to make its own rule.
But no such reply was sent. Instead, the Minister of Justice began 
discussions with the members of the court with a view to effecting 
a compromise. He suggested a rule which would provide that among 
the five persons appointed to the first Constitutional Court, sen­
iority should be determined according to the date of the first
1. Minute of 30 January 1973 from the Secretary for Justice to 
the Prime Minister.
2. Letter dated 19 July 1972 from T.S.Fernando, V.Siva Suprama- 
niam and H.Deheragoda to the President of the Republic.
3. Letter dated 19 July 1972 from K.D.de Silva and J.A.L.Cooray 
to the President of the Republic.
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appointment of each to the Supreme Court or any other Court with a 
parallel or higher jurisdiction.^ This compromise was acceptable 
to the three Judges, but was rejected by the other two members, one 
of whom was not, and had never been, a Judge in any Court.
Thereupon, the Minister of Justice forwarded all the relevant
papers to his colleague, the Minister of Constitutional Affairs.
The latter then sought to participate in the rule-making process by
adding the weight of his authority in support of the minority view,
which was "in keeping with the outlook and background of the Const- 
2
itution". He rejected the claim that the gazette notification, in
the making of which he had not been consulted, was intended to
indicate seniority:
There can be no doubt whatsoever that all members of 
the Constitutional Court are by the Constitution 
regarded as equals and that, apart from any convention 
or courtesies that may grow amongst them, no member 
of the Constitutional Court is entitled to any prece­
dence over the others qua members of the Constitu­
tional Court.
In any event, he considered the order in which the names appeared
in the gazette to be "a very tenuous basis for a contention of this
nature, if indeed it can provide a basis at all". He added:
I do not of course know whether there was any under­
standing between these gentlemen and the Prime 
Minister or the President; but I wish to state 
certain facts which have a decisive bearing on the 
question whether the Prime Minister comes into the 
picture in regard to this contention. It was I who 
contacted Messrs J.A.L.Cooray and K.D.de Silva on 
behalf of the Prime Minister to sound out their 
willingness to serve in the Constitutional Court.
At no time either before I contacted Messrs Cooray 
and De Silva or after I reported their willingness, 
did the Prime Minister tell me that she even 
contemplated the condition referred to in respect 
of the appointments she was considering. Nobody 
can persuade me that she would have failed to 
mention such a matter to me because, first of all, 
she would have known the need to communicate such 
condition to Messrs Cooray and De Silva before 
their appointment, and secondly, because it is hard 
to believe that the Prime Minister would have 
contemplated any arrangement which she was not
1. Minutes of 21 August 1972 from the Secretary for Justice to 
the Minister of Justice, and of 25 September 1972 from the Minister 
of Justice to the Secretary to the Prime Minister.
2. Letter dated 30 August 1972 from the Minister of Constitu­
tional Affairs to the Minister of Justice.
3. Ibid.
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empowered by the Constitution to make, After all, 
the express provision of the Constitution, by 
section 60, is:
'The Chairman of a Constitutional 
Court for any occasion shall be 
chosen in accordance with the rules 
of the Constitutional Court.'
These rules had to be made by the Constitutional 
Court itself under the provisons of section 59 of 
the Constitution.-*■
It is, no doubt, the knowledge that the Minister held this view
that prompted K.D.de Silva to make the remark at one of the meetings
of the Court that if the rule was framed as suggested by the three
Judges, they "could be sure that it will not be approved by the
2
National State Assembly".
On 4 September 1972, the Minister of Justice forwarded this
"secret" letter from the Minister of Constitutional Affairs to the
President of the Court of Appeal. In doing so, he also suggested
a new compromise formula:
I think upon a consideration of all the circum­
stances, it might be best if you could discuss 
with your colleagues the question of formulating 
a rule so that the Chairman of the Constitutional 
Court could be selected by lot or on a principle
of rotation in such a manner that none of the
members of the Court would be excluded from
functioning as Chairman.^
While the Ministers continued to offer unsolicited suggestions on 
how the relevant rule ought to be formulated, the question which 
the three Judges had raised with the President still remained 
unanswered. The appointments had been made by the latter after 
the receipt of advice from the constitutional authority. That 
authority presumably advised also the order to be observed in 
notifying the appointments. The order had not followed the familiar 
alphabetical pattern. The change could not have been fortuitous.
The three Judges wished to know whether it signified anything.
The answer to that question, the three Judges believed, would help 
them to perform their constitutional task of formulating an appro­
priate rule. But from the attitude of the Ministers, as evidenced 
from their communications, the three Judges appeared to have realised
1. Ibid.
2. Letter dated 7 September 1972 from T.S.Fernando to the Min­
ister of Justice.
3. Letter dated 4 September 1972 from the Minister of Justice 
to T.S.Fernando.
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that the form of the rule would ultimately be determined not by
them but by the Ministers. Accordingly, T.S.Fernando, having
asserted that he was unable to agree that the rule they intended
to make was repugnant to the Constitution, expressed himself thus:
We would like to state without reserve that if it 
is felt by the framers of the Constitution that a 
rule such as that we intend to make is against the 
spirit of the Constitution (of which spirit we can 
be but inadequate judges) we would like to seek His 
Excellency's permission to tender our resignations 
. . .  If equality in the sense Mr.de Silva speaks 
was the constitutional requirement, it is a pity 
that the draftsman of the still-born rule blatantly 
overlooked it. Indeed, that draft rule is a pointer 
to our belief that it was probably intended to 
appoint to the Constitutional Court persons who were 
not sitting judges at all. If that was the intention, 
whatever be the meaning of section 54, there would 
be an additional reason to induce us to request that 
we be pemitted voluntarily to tender our resig­
nations . 1
The Minister of Justice informed his colleague of what the
2
three Judges intended to do. Meanwhile, the Minister of Constitu­
tional Affairs had received "an important piece of information" from 
Cooray, one of the members of the Court:
He tells me that on the last occasion the Constitu­
tional Court members met, he found an important 
change of attitude in TS and the others; mainly that 
they were ready for the rule to be that each Court 
elects its Chairman. On'that basis, you may think 
that a reasonable arrangement is possible; for 
election would be by a majority of the three members 
and it is hard to believe that each one will vote 
for himself only. Provision could, of course, be 
made against that eventuality by stating that, in 
the event of there being no majority, the member 
whose name is first drawn when constituting the 
Court shall be the Chairman.
He suggested to his colleague a further discussion later in the 
week "if the above either does not appeal to you or proves to be 
unacceptable". The three Judges made no further move, and it is 
probable, therefore, that what Cooray had communicated to the Min­
ister was a misunderstanding of the situation. On 9 October 1972, 
the Prime Minister thought "that the Minister of Constitutional
1. Letter dated 7 September from T.S.Fernando to the Minister 
of Justice.
2. Letter dated 15 September 1972 from the Minister of Justice 
to the Minister of Constitutional Affairs.
3. Letter dated 18 September 1972 from the Minister of Consti­
tutional Affairs to the Minister of Justice.
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Affairs and yourself [the Minister of Justice] might go into this 
whole question and advise her in due course as to what might be 
done".'*' It was apparent that by now everyone had quite forgotten 
the specific matter on which the three Judges had sought, and were 
awaiting clarification from the President. The intervention of the 
Ministers of Justice and of Constitutional Affairs, without any 
legal authority therefor, had only confused the issue and contri­
buted towards a hardening of hearts all round.
On 7 November 1972, the Sri Lanka Press Council Bill was
2
presented to the National State Assembly by the Minister of Justice. 
On 8 November, a motion was filed in terms of section 54(2)(e) of 
the Constitution alleging inconsistencies between the provisions of
3
the bill and the Constitution. On the same day, the five members 
of the Constitutional Court met in the premises of the National 
State Assembly and adopted by a majority vote the rule relating to
4
the selection of a chairman as proposed by the three Judges.
The First Reference
On 15 November 1972, the Speaker referred to the Constitu­
tional Court a written notice raising a question of inconsistency 
in respect of the Sri Lanka Press Council Bill, signed by J.R.Jaye- 
wardene, the leader in the National State Assembly of the United 
National Party. On the next day, at the Assembly premises, the 
names of the five members of the Court were placed in a cylindrical 
container and, in the presence of two of them, the Registrar drew 
out the names of the three members who would constitute the first 
Court. They were T.S.Fernando,Q.C., H.Deheragoda and J.A.L.Cooray. 
The Court so constituted chose Fernando as its chairman. Six 
other motions filed by citizens, which were also referred by the 
Speaker upon the Court advising him that they raised questions of 
inconsistency, reached the Court on 21 November, on which day it 
held its public session. The Attorney-General, who alone had the 
right to be heard on all matters before the Court, was present in 
person, assisted by the Solicitor-General and three State Counsel.
The leader of the UNP was represented by his brother, H.W.Jaye-
1. Letter dated 9 October 1972 from the Secretary to the Prime 
Minister to the Minister of Justice.
2. Ceylon Daily News, 8 November 1972.
3. Ibid., 9 November 1972.
4. K.D.de Silva and J.A.L.Cooray requested the Registrar, when 
he sent the rules to the Assembly, to append a minute that they
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wardene,Q.C. Two of the petitioners, W.Dahanayake, MP and Prins 
Gunasekera, MP, appeared in person. The other four petitioners 
were represented by S.Nadesan,Q.C., H.L.de Silva, M.Tiruchelvam,Q.C., 
and H.W.Jayewardene,Q.C. ^
Very early in the proceedings, the question arose whether
section 65 of the Constitution, which required the Court to give
its decision within two weeks of the reference, was mandatory or
directory. The Court had no doubt as to its meaning; it informed
Counsel that it was prepared to sit even a month in order to enable
them to present a full argument on the question of inconsistency.
The Ceylon Daily Mirror chose to report this statement thus:
DECISION ONLY AFTER I HAVE MADE UP MY MIND - CHAIRMAN 
The Constitutional Court will not give its decision 
within 14 days even though the Constitution stipulates 
that it should do so. This was announced by the Chair­
man of the Constitutional Court, Mr.T.S.Fernando, 
yesterday.^
Other comments and asides made by the Chairman also received wide
publicity in the local newspapers. For instance:
I have not been bothered by the 14-day stipulation.
I have persuaded my brothers that we may have to go 
on for a longer time if necessary. If the National 
State Assembly is not satisfied with us, they have 
their remedy.3
This is a very important matter. In fact, it 
would have been better if it was possible for the 
whole Court to examine this question, but that is 
not possible.^
I accepted this office on the basis that I am 
not bound by the 14-day rule.^
This is not a matter of life and death. The 
Bill can wait.®
dissented in regard to the rule relating to the selection of a chair­
man. The Registrar was requested to have the rules approved by the 
Legal Draftsman, gazetted, and then presented to the Assembly. 
Although he undertook to "get it done in a day", it was not until 
two weeks later that the Legal Draftsman received a letter dated 
18 November 1972 from the Registrar stating that he was forwarding 
for approval the rules made by the Constitutional Court. The Legal 
Draftsman himself took his own time, and it was only on 15 January 
1973 that he returned the rules, approved by him, to the Registrar: 
Minute dated 30 January 1973 from the Secretary for Justice to the 
Prime Minister.
1. Communique issued by the Registrar of the Constitutional Court, 
Ceylon Daily News, 17 November 1972.
2. Ceylon Daily Mirror, 22 November 1972.
3. Sun, 24 November 1972. 4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. 6. Ibid.
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I hope the Bill is not here on the presum- 
tion that it is good. We have to express our 
views. I go on the basis that if the Consti­
tutional Court says that such and such a 
section of the Bill is in conflict with the 
Constitution, it would be accepted by the 
National State Assembly. I like to assume that 
the Assembly will respect our views and will 
not pass the Bill with a two-thirds majority.^
I was one of those who spoke against the 
concept of a Constitutional Court to examine 
Bills. I have, however, been made the Chairman 
of the Court. The bad boy has been made the 
monitor of the class.
One of the arguments presented to the Court was that section
52(1) of the Constitution, which enabled the Assembly to enact by a
two-thirds majority a law which was inconsistent with any provision 
of the Constitution without amending or repealing such provision, 
did not enable the Assembly to enact a law which was in conflict
3
with any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution.
On 29 November, the Speaker decided to express his view on this
argument. In the course of a discussion of a point of order raised
in regard to a bill under consideration, he made the following
pronouncement:
I want to tell you that some people have from time 
to time been advising this Assembly as to the course 
of action this Assembly should take. This Assembly 
is very hesitant to express opinions in obiter without 
deep and profound deliberation. I must say that this 
Assembly is a sovereign body which has the right even 
to pass a law which is inconsistent with the Consti­
tution under section 52(1). Even though it is incon­
sistent you can pass it by a two-thirds majority, and 
that law which is passed is not a constitutional 
amendment.
The Constitution enumerates three categories of bills 
which can be passed: firstly an ordinary bill which can 
be passed with a simple majority; secondly, an amendment 
to any section of the Constitution which requires a two- 
thirds majority; thirdly, a bill which, in some parti­
cular or respect, is inconsistent with any provision in 
the Constitution, which could be passed by a two-thirds 
majority. A law which is passed under this proviso 
shall not be interpreted as amending the provisions of 
the Constitution with which such law is inconsistent.
As Speaker of the National State Assembly, I should 
like to say, respectfully, that nobody outside this
1. Ceylon Daily News, 24 November 1972.
2. Sun, 27 November 1972.
3. Ceylon Daily News, 30 November 1972.
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Assembly , not even the judiciary, has the right 
to tell this body, which is sovereign, "We hope 
that the National State Assembly will not pass 
this bill by a two-thirds majority". *
The Minister of Justice thought that the Speaker "put it very
well" when he stated that "no outside body as far as you are
concerned can tell this sovereign legislature what it should
or should not do even in the way of advice". "I am entirely
2
in agreement with your position", he added.
T.S.Fernando was also the head of the country's highest 
appellate tribunal, the Court of Appeal. Its calendar was 
usually arranged at least a month in advance, and some of the 
matters awaiting adjudication included appeals from men languish­
ing in the condemned cells. In civil cases too it was desirable 
that the law should be clarified very early for the benefit of 
the subordinate courts. Although provision existed for seven 
Judges, the Government had appointed only four, of whom one was 
in poor health; three Judges were required to constitute the 
Court. Accordingly, having sat for five consecutive days on the 
Constitutional Court, including a Saturday, he sat on the Court 
of Appeal on the first two days of the following week, 27 and 28 
November. He returned on 29 November to the Constitutional Court 
which continued its sittings until Saturday 2 December, when it 
adjourned for a week, until Monday 11 December, to enable the 
Court of Appeal to complete its own work. The crucial fourteenth 
day was reached on Monday 4 December.
The question of the "14-day limit" by now appeared to be
causing some concern both to the Government and to the Speaker,
although the bill as such was not an urgent one. On 27 November,
the Minister of Justice addressed a "secret and confidential"
letter to his colleague, the Minister of Constitutional Affairs:
In two separate sections, the Constitution provides 
(a) that the Constitutional Court should tender its 
advice to the Speaker in 14 days, and (b) that no 
proceedings shall be taken on any Bill which is before 
the Constitutional Court, until the Court has tendered 
its advice, by the National State Assembly.
My own view is that (a) above is not directory, but 
imperative, and that, therefore (b) above can only
1. National State Assembly Debates, 29 November 1972, cols.2460-61.
2. Ibid., col.2475.
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apply for the period of fourteen days. Whether 
this view is correct or incorrect, it would be 
most unfortunate if we were placed in such a 
position in the very first case.
I should therefore like to suggest that if 
there is any problem over this, we should clarify 
the position at least for the future by an appro­
priate constitutional amendment.*
The Minister of Constitutional Affairs, however, preferred to
"wait on events". His reply on 8 December read as follows:
I have also been concerned by the statements 
reported to have been made by the Hon.T.S.
Fernando who is currently presiding over the 
deliberations before the Constitutional Court, 
that the Court is not obliged to give its 
decision within two weeks of the reference of 
a question by the Hon.Speaker and further, by 
the frequent adjournments of that Court. As you 
know, I have had occasion to discuss this 
matter with the Hon.Prime Minister, the Speaker 
and yourself.
As you know, I hold the same view as you that 
the Constitutional Court is obliged to give its 
decision within two weeks, and I honestly think 
that there is no doubt on this point. We also 
do not as yet know the views of the Constitu­
tional Court as distinct from those of Mr.T.S.
Fernando. You will perhaps agree, therefore, 
that we should wait on events. Moreover, the 
Speaker has now come into the picture, and it 
may be better to await the outcome of his inter­
vention before considering such a step as amend­
ing the Constitution.
Meanwhile, on the fifteenth day, 5 December, the Minister
of Justice, in consultation with his colleague, the Minister of
Constitutional Affairs, the Speaker and the Leader of the Opposition,
decided to speak to the members of the Constitutional Court in
2
regard to their interpretation of section 65 as "directory". He
felt that the Constitution ought to be interpreted in the "only
3
practical way of interpreting it"; namely, by treating section 65
as neither directory nor mandatory:
I quite realise that sometimes there may be circum­
stances in which the Court cannot finish its work 
in 14 days' time. With the best will in the world, 
without adjourning for the Appeal Court to sit or 
without adjourning for other tribunals to sit, even
1. This view was not expressed to the Court at any stage of the 
proceedings by the Attorney-General.
2. National State Assembly Debates, 12 December 1972, col.1354.
3. Ibid., col.1345.
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sitting non-stop for 24 hours a day, there might 
be circumstances in which a Court might find it 
difficult to finish it in 24 hours [sic] time.
I, therefore, communicated with the members of 
the Court and suggested to them that, perhaps as 
they were not able to finish their work in 14 
days, they might on the 14th day comnunicate with 
you, Mr.Speaker, inform the National State Assem­
bly that they have not been able to finish their 
work and ask you to make suitable arrangements 
for them to be able to continue their work beyond 
the 14-day limit. I suggested that in that event, 
you, perhaps, would put the matter to the National 
State Assembly and I would be prepared to move a 
resolution, seconded by my good friend, the plain­
tiff, the Leader of the Opposition, and by joint 
consent, with the consent of the whole Assembly, 
the ultimate residuary and authority of power 
under section 5, the National State Assembly could  ^
extend the time limit at the request of the Court.
The Minister had no doubt in his own mind that his view of the law
was correct. After all, as he later explained:
What the Constitution intended, what we intended, 
we collectively in this House, as the makers of the 
Constitution, know better than anybody else. *•
Therefore i
I thought I would express this point of view to 
the Chairman of the Court and tell him what I 
thought was perhaps a more reasonable interpret­
ation, and to commend it to him for his consid­
eration. ^
He telephoned the home of the Chairman of the Court; the Judge was 
not in. He managed, however, to contact the other two members of 
the Court.
I asked them to please communicate with Mr.T.S.
Fernando and to let me know. The Cabinet was 
meeting on Wednesday, the morning of the 14th 
day [sic], and I, therefore, requested that I ^ 
should like to be informed what the position was.
When the Chairman of the Court returned home from a social engagement,
he was informed of the Minister's telephone call; he was also informed
by his two colleagues of the Minister's proposal. He did not ring
back the Minister. In his view, section 65 was merely directory and,
therefore, there was no need for the Court to ask for an extension
1. Ibid., col.1354.
3. Ibid., col.1354.
2. Ibid., col.1347.
4. Ibid., col.1355.
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of time. If, on the other hand, section 65 was mandatory, the
Court could not ask, nor could the National State Assembly grant,
any extension at all in the absence of constitutional provision
to that effect.^
Justice Deheragoda telephoned the Minister on the following
morning, 6 December, and informed him that the members of the Court
were not agreed in regard to his proposal that they should ask for
an extension of time by writing to the Speaker. The Minister was
peeved. As he told the National State Assembly a week later:
I was then informed by Mr.Justice Deheragoda of a 
matter which I regretted very much. He informed me 
that Mr.T.S.Fernando, if he was writing a letter, 
insisted on saying that he was writing it at the 
request of the Minister of Justice. I indicated at 
that stage that it was wholly unsatisfactory. While 
I was certainly prepared to take the responsibility 
of informing the house and its members that I had 
certainly spoken to the Judges on a matter like this 
to make the Constitutional Court work, I did not 
want the Court to think on a statement like that, 
later when a judgment of the Constitutional Court 
comes the Judges will equally well create the imp­
ression: God, this damned judgment was written
at the dictation of the Justice Minister". This is 
not what we want. We want a fair judgment. We want 
the Constitution to work. But I considered that it 
was nothing more than an attempt to fix the Minister 
of Justice, to try to bring him into this operation
when all he had tried to do was to make the Consti­
tution work and to be helpful.
Later in the morning, the Registrar of the Constitutional Court
wrote to the Clerk to the National State Assembly in the following
terms:
I am directed by the majority of the Constitutional 
Court to inform you that the proceedings in respect 
of the above questions which have been referred to 
the Constitutional Court are still continuing and that 
a decision would be given as soon as p o s s i b l e . ^
The Minister of Justice was not satisfied.
It is merely a piece of information. There is no 
request. "Majority of the Court"; not the Court by 
a majority. A majority of the Court, that is, two 
members of the Court had told Mr.Sam Wijesinha some­
thing which he has told himself and then told you, 
that a decision would be given as soon as possible.
"As soon as possible" may mean, if necessary, sitting 
for four years or till doomsday.
1. Interview with T. S. Fernando.
2. National State Assembly Debates, 12 December 1972, col.1356.
3. Ibid., col.1358.
4. Ibid.
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The Minister made another attempt. He spoke to the two members of
the Court who were in contact with him and told them: "No use of
being abject, no use of using words, no use of using anything.
Merely request the Speaker to enable you to continue your sitting".^
If they did, he promised to "get a unanimous agreement from the 
2
Assembly". The Chairman, however, refused to comply with the 
request.
At the weekly meeting of the Cabinet held on that day, it
was decided "to uphold the Constitution, quite independent of other
3
persons elsewhere". In the National State Assembly that afternoon, 
replying to questions asked by a Federal Party member and by the 
Deputy Minister of Planning, the Minister of Justice said that he 
doubted very much whether there could be "an institution or court
4
which can be over and above this Assembly". But if the Constitu­
tional Court, even at that stage, requested the Assembly to grant 
it further time to submit its determination on the Press Council 
Bill, "some arrangement could be worked out to grant such an exten­
sion".^
Mr.Prins Gunasekera: The 14 days have already lapsed.
Mr. Bandaranaike : I do not know. I have not counted
the days. I do not even know how
the 14 days should be counted. °
When the National State Assembly met at 10 a.m. on 7 December, 
the Speaker announced that since the Constitutional Court had not 
given its decision within the stipulated period of two weeks, the 
proceedings in relation to the Sri Lanka Press Council Bill "will 
now proceed in accordance with the Standing Orders of the National 
State Assembly and the provisions of Chapter IX of the Constitution."^ 
Thereupon, the Leader of the House informed the Assembly that the 
bill will be taken up for second reading "at the earliest oppor­
tunity".^
At an emergency meeting of the Opposition, it was decided to
request the Speaker "to permit today a debate on a matter or urgent
public importance expressing opposition to the decision of the 
Government to proceed with the second reading of the Press Council
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. 4. Ceylon Daily News, 7 Dec­
ember 1972.
5. Ibid. 6. Ibid.
7. National State Assembly Debates, 7 December 1972, col.760.
8. Ibid.
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Bill while important constitutional issues raised before the Consti­
tutional Court are still undecided".^ A meeting of party leaders 
was fixed for the next day to discuss the request.
Meanwhile, on the adjournment motion in the Assembly, the
Deputy Minister of Planning was permitted by the Speaker to make
2
references derogatory of the Court and its members. For instance, 
the Deputy Minister asked the Speaker what action he intended to 
take against the "illegal" Court which, if it assembled on Monday, 
would by so assembling constitute an "unlawful assembly" within the 
meaning of the Penal Code; whether the members of the Court who had 
failed to perform their duties should not be removed or whether they 
would themselves take the initiative and resign; whether he would 
take steps to have the Constitution amended to prevent the President 
of the Court of Appeal, who was an officer of an institution subor­
dinate to the "supreme" National State Assembly, from acting for the 
President of the Republic should the need arise in the future.
Having permitted these references to be made, the Speaker concluded 
the proceedings by making the following observation:
In respect of the matter raised by the Deputy Minister 
of Planning, I have to say that the Constitutional 
Court sits in the premises of the National State Assembly 
as a result of the courtesy extended to it by me. That 
courtesy will always be extended to them by me, and the 
officers of this House who are now in the service of 
this Court will render the same assistance as required.
At 7 p.m. on 10 December, the Speaker met the Minister of
Justice at the latter's residence. The Attorney-General and the
acting Secretary for Justice, B.S.C.Ratwatte, were also present.
The purpose of the meeting, according to the Minister, was:
to review the situation and to try to work out some 
formula to prevent a situation of deadlock and to 
find out ways and means even at that point of time 
to save this country [sic], to help us out of the 
embarrassment of our Constitution being brought to 
nought by an arbitrary opinion expressed by the 
members of the Constitutional Court.3
At the end of the discussion it was decided, on the Minister's
suggestion, to "invoke the President of the Republic of Sri Lanka
as the ultimate authority to try and help to solve this matter, to
1. Sun, 8 December 1972.
2. National State Assembly Debates, 8 December 1972, cols.963-976.
3. Ibid., 12 December 1972, col.1360.
250
try to find a solution which we have not been able to find ourselves". 
It was, of course, not within the competence of the President to act 
as an appellate court or even as an arbitrator on the matter in 
dispute which was one entirely within the jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court. Therefore, what was being sought was obviously 
the opportunity as well as a neutral ground for the two Ministers 
and the Speaker to meet and talk to the members of the Constitutional 
Court in an effort to persuade them to accept their interpretation 
of the constitutional provision in question.
At about 11 p.m. that night, the President telephoned all five
members of the Constitutional Court and invited them to President's
House "to discuss an important matter".^ When they arrived, the
Speaker, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Constitutional
Affairs, the Attorney-General and the acting Secretary for Justice
were already with the President. The two Ministers and the Speaker
argued forcefully that section 65 of the Constitution was mandatory,
but that even at that stage if the Constitutional Court were to make
a request to the Speaker for an extension of the period of fourteen
days specified therein, they "could get together and consider the
matter of granting an extension of time in such a way as to make
2the Constitutional Court to continue". K.D.de Silva agreed with
this view. But, as the Minister of Justice later explained to the
National State Assembly:
Our deliberations concluded in a deadlock. The Chairman 
of the Court took up the categorical position at that 
discussion - and I must tell the Assembly that - that 
they had no difficulty whatsoever. 'We are clear in our 
own minds about the interpretation of this section. We 
do not admit that anybody has the right to give an ^
extension of time or that we are obliged to ask for time.
The other three members of the Constitutional Court, including V.Siva
Supramaniam, agreed with the Chairman that section 65 was directory.
It was 4.30 a.m. on Monday when the abortive discussion at President's
House was concluded.
When the Constitutional Court assembled on 11 December, which
was the twenty-first day, the Attorney-General was not present; nor
were any of his juniors present. The Attorney-General had been
1. Evidence of H.Deheragoda before the Special Presidential Comm­
ission of Inquiry, Ceylon Daily News, 29 August 1978.
2. National State Assembly Debates, 12 December 1972, col.1360.
3. Ibid., col.1361.
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directed by the Minister of Justice to withdraw "from the proceedings 
of the body of people who are now sitting on the third floor".^ By 
complying with this directive, without even seeking the leave of 
the Court to do so, the Attorney-General failed to perform the const­
itutional duty he owed the Court. When Tiruchelvam rose to continue 
his submissions, the Chairman addressed him thus:
Let us say what we think is the present position.
It is the duty of us all, whether we be judges or 
not, to uphold the Constitution. To uphold the Const­
itution we as judges must first understand the meaning 
of the relevant provisions of the Constitution. For 
that understanding we have to rely on our own judgment 
assisted, if need be, by the opinions of learned 
counsel. Any other course of action involves, in our 
opinion, an abdication of our functions.
We have expressed to you on the very first day 
itself our meaning of the relevant provisions, princi­
pally sections 65 and 54(4). Such further consideration 
as we have so far given to the matter only confirms, 
in our opinion, the correctness of our earlier view.
We will therefore hear you, the other Counsel and 
the Attorney-General in that order.2
In the National State Assembly, the Speaker announced that the party
leaders had agreed to hold a full day's debate on the constitutional
situation.^
On 12 December, it was apparent that the proceedings in the 
Constitutional Court were drawing to a close, in so far as the 
submissions of the petitioners were concerned. However, a motion 
had been filed seeking a summons oh the Minister of Information.
The application was made under section 63(3) of the Constitution 
which empowered the Court to summon or hear witnesses if it thought 
it necessary or expedient to do so. The Chairman indicated that 
the Court would make its order on that application on the following 
day.^
Meanwhile, on the floor below, the debate on the Appropriat­
ion Bill was interrupted and the motion for adjournment was moved 
by the Leader of the House, barely ten minutes after that body had
1. Ibid., cols.1361, 1371, 1448. The Minister explained to the 
Assembly that he issued this direction to "my counsel" ("the rep­
resentative whom I sent to express my point of view": col. 1347) 
since "I am not prepared to participate in a mock trial". This was 
a misunderstanding of the Attorney-General1 s role vis-a-vis the 
Constitutional Court. He appeared before that Court in his own right 
and not on behalf of the Minister of Justice or of the State. See
s.63(1).
2. Ceylon Daily News, 12 December 1972.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 13 December 1972.
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assembled, to enable its members to discuss "the Constitutional 
Court and the Sri Lanka Press Council Bill".^ For ten hours 
thereafter, members from both sides of the House indulged in an 
unprecedented public attack on the Constitutional Court and its 
Chairman. Comments made by the Chairman in the course of the 
proceedings were often taken out of context, misquoted or miscon­
strued, and were then used to support the argument that the Consti­
tutional Court was seeking to usurp the "sovereignty" of the 
National State Assembly.
The Minister of Justice posed the question in simple terms:
Are we going [therefore] to accede to the position 
that there is any other institution superior to this 
National State Assembly and capable of frustrating 
and avoiding the express terms of the Constitution 
upon which we have all agreed and which we have 
adopted on behalf of the very people of Sri Lanka ?
That is the question before us.
Or, as he put it in other words:
The question is, Who has the power ? Have they the 
power to arrogate to themselves the right to sit 
for four years at their will and pleasure, or must 
they subordinate themselves to this Assembly ?
He explained the effect of conceding that the Constitutional Court’s
interpretation of section 65 was correct:
If we once concede to the Constitutional Court the 
right to determine its own time limit . . . please 
remember that what you are doing is establishing 
an institution higher than the National State 
Assembly and, quite apart from the merits or de­
merits of the Bill that is being discussed, creating 
an issue far bigger than that. The entire legislative 
programme of a government can be brought to nought 
by this procedure.
The Minister insisted that the Constitution contemplated a decision
being given within fourteen days:
You ask me, how can this be done ? I agree, if you 
decide to give each person a chance to speak for 
five to six days through his counsel without time 
limits; if you decide to sit for a few hours only 
for a day; if you decide to postpone the case every 
time you decide that you prefer a change of atmos­
phere in Hulftsdorp or sit in the Court of Appeal; 
then, of course, you will never be able to finish 
your work in fourteen days time.
1. The full proceedings are published in National State Assembly 
Debates, 12 December 1972.
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The Minister said that he knew of no case which is so complicated
in its effects that one could not arrive at a decision within
fourteen days:
What we have here is a court conducting a dialogue.
The newspaper reporters are there. Political views 
are expressed. Legal views and all kinds of other 
views are expressed. It is quite a different sit­
uation that I should have expected. If you have got 
to do this work within 14 days, give the various 
persons a time limit of a few days to make their 
submissions in writing and take time to study them.
If you have any questions to ask, send for the 
people concerned. It is a tragedy when lawyers go 
on talking for hours and hours.
When an Opposition member intervened to point out that the Attorney-
General had remained seated and said nothing while the Court had
repeatedly expressed its views on section 65, the Minister replied:
The Attorney-General may choose to remain silent 
when irrelevancies or rubbish are being spoken by 
anybody in his presence. It is not the duty of the 
Attorney-General to jump up and start interrupting.
How many times have I remained silent while the 
Member for Nintavur made inane remarks.
The Minister did not think that the Constitution needed amendment.
"I take the view", he said, "that there is no question of the
Constitution requiring amendment. I think it is as plain as a
pikestaff". He added:
If you ask me whether the Constitution is defective.
I would repeat, no, no, and no again. The Consti­
tution is perfectly correct in every line and word 
of what it says. Merely because you choose to give
the Constitution meanings to satisfy the vanity of
any one individual who wants to set himself above 
the Constitution, I repeat that is not a possible 
way of testing the validity of the Constitution.
The Minister thought that:
If . . . with all the panoply of what was the Consti­
tutional Court on Friday, the same three people
continue to sit, not as a Constitutional Court but 
as a mock trial on Monday, the people of this country 
will not see that distinction and will wonder why the 
Assembly is in fact stulifying itself.
Therefore:
If the Constitutional Court is not prepared to 
respect the wishes of this House, there is no alter­
native, the Constitutional Court will have to go.
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As for himself:
I shall not shift an inch in surrendering our rights 
under the Constitution; nor am I prepared to partici­
pate in a mock trial.
He asked the Assembly:
Are you prepared to accept a subordination of the 
position of the National State Assembly ?
Members: No, no !
That is the question.
The Minister of Constitutional Affairs was indignant that 
the Court should have heard Counsel who argued that certain prov­
isions of the Constitution, which he had drafted, were unamendable 
even with a two-third majority:
No Court should have tolerated that for one minute . . .
The Court that was so sure about its 14 days might have 
been sufficiently aware of the constitutionality even to 
tell that Counsel at once that he is talking through the 
back of his head . . .  It is laid down in black and 
white . . . Everybody in this country knows that this 
Assembly by a two-thirds majority has the right to 
change the Constitution, amend this Constitution, repeal 
the provisions of this Constitution, and to substitute 
another Constitution for this Constitution if it wishes.
He knows it. If the Court did not know it, I take this 
opportunity of saying that it is not fit to sit there.
The Minister of Finance, Dr.N.M.Perera, was "surprised" at the lati­
tude allowed to Counsel:
In that place, the whole Constitution is being dis­
cussed. That Court has no power to do that. Those 
people have no power to discuss the rights and wrongs 
of our Constitution. All they have to do is to tell us 
whether any provision of a Bill is inconsistent with 
the Constitution. Can that not be done in 14 days ?
But if they begin to indulge in irrelevancies and 
unnecessary talk, if they start examining all the 
constitutions in the world, not only will 14 days not 
be sufficient; even four years will not do. That 
gentleman has spoken of four years. He is right.
I believe that the Prime Minister should send for the 
members of the Constitutional Court and tell them 
that before they start lecturing to us what the law is 
or is not, they should perform the duty which the law 
has cast on them. She has the power to do that.
The Finance Minister referred to the Chairman's statement that "the 
bad boy has been made the monitor of the class". He recalled that 
the Chairman, in the company of S.Nadesan,Q.C., had made represent­
ations to the Cabinet, at the time the Constitution was being drafted,
1. Six years later, Colvin R.de Silva himself argued before the 
Constitutional Court that a bill inconsistent with a "fundamental 
provision" could not be proceeded with even by a two-third majority: 
(1978) DCC, Vol.6, at p.33.
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against the concept of a Constitutional Court:
I thought he took up the position of an independent 
judiciary. .1 think he may have conceived of a judi­
ciary which was above the National State Assembly.
He believed in the separation of powers, I think.
. . .  I do not think he will misunderstand if I were 
to say that it was his duty to have told the Prime 
Minister: 'At the outset I was opposed to the concept 
of a Constitutional Court; I have different views on 
it; I will find it difficult to do this job; there­
fore, it would not be proper to entrust me with this 
task.' But without saying any of this, he undertook 
the task. Having done so, it was his duty to have 
abandoned his previous views and entered upon his 
duties with an independent mind. By not doing so, he 
has done himself a disservice.
He countered the argument that the Government had appointed T.S. 
Fernando in full knowledge of all this by explaining that "we appoint 
Judges, with the best of intentions, considering all the circumst­
ances as to their honourable qualities, their independence, their 
capacity, and so on". He pleaded:
We do not know at what time mental aberrations may 
arise. Some kind of infirmities sometimes arise 
suddenly. We cannot always be sure of the people we 
appoint, but as far as we possibly can. As the Mem­
ber for Jaffna would say, it is human to err. So, in 
the choice of persons also it is human sometimes to 
appoint a wrong person.
The view of the Opposition, as expressed by J.R.Jayewardene, 
was that "provision should be made by an amendment to the Consti­
tution, for the Speaker, with the consent of the House, to grant 
time, if he is satisfied that the request for time to exceed the 
two weeks is bona fide". In regard to the present impasse, he 
suggested that the government withdraw the bill from the agenda of 
the Assembly and present it again; thus bringing the proceedings 
of the Constitutional Court to an end. The problem, as he saw it, 
was not to find out who was responsible for the impasse that had 
occured, nor to attach blame to anyone; not to decide whether the 
decision of the Court should have been given within two weeks of 
the reference or not. These, he said, cannot be decided in that 
debate.
1. Opposition members also took this opportunity to hurl a few 
brickbats themselves. Gamini Dissanayake (UNP) wondered whether 
Fernando could be sued for non-performance of his duties. Prins 
Gunasekera (Ind.) berated him for a judgment which he had delivered 
in a labour tribunal appeal some twelve years previously. But cf. 
R.Premadasa (UNP) and M.M.Mustapha (UNP) who paid tribute to the 
Chairman's "independence" and "integrity".
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Dissolution of the Court
The debate concluded when the Assembly adjourned at 8.43 p.m. 
About an hour later, Deheragoda received a telephone call from 
Hector Kobbekaduwa, Minister of Agriculture and Lands. According 
to Deheragoda,^ Kobbekaduwa told him that unless he resigned from 
the Constitutional Court, there was a strong likelihood of an 
address in the National State Assembly for Deheragoda fs removal 
from the Supreme Court. He immediately met the President of the 
Republic who told him that it was a matter for decision by. him and 
that since "they might not give in", it was safer to resign. He 
also met the Chief Justice, H.N.G.Fernando, and the Chairman of the 
Constitutional Court, T.S.Fernando, both of whom advised him to
resign frcm the office of member of the Constitutional Court.
2
According to T.S.Fernando, Deheragoda visited him late that
night. He said that he had received a telephone call from Kobbe­
kaduwa; the latter was speaking from the office of the Clerk to the 
National State Assembly. "Kobbekaduwa said that the Government had 
decided to remove the three members of the Constitutional Court 
from office. The Constitution would be amended to give the National 
State Assembly the power to do so. Kobbekaduwa said that he was 
not concerned about Fernando or Cooray, but that he was deeply 
concerned about me since there was also the likelihood that, foll­
owing my removal from the Constitutional Court, I might also have 
to be removed from the Supreme Court. Kobbekaduwa said that the 
Minister of Justice was also with him, and then handed the telephone 
over to Felix Dias Bandaranaike who confirmed what Kobbekaduwa had 
just said." Deheragoda told Fernando that he had no private 
income, and that Kobbekaduwa had reminded him that in the event of 
his removal from the Supreme Court he would probably forfeit his 
pension in respect of nearly thirty years of public service.
Fernando told Deheragoda that in this situation he should not 
consider himself bound by a decision taken by the three members of 
the Court earlier that day that they would complete the hearing, 
submit their decision to the Speaker, and then resign their offices
1. Evidence of H.Deheragoda before the Special Presidential 
Commission of Inquiry, Ceylon Daily News, 29 August 1978. See also 
Order of the Commission, Ibid., 28 November 1978.
2. This version of the events was provided by T.S.Fernando on 
1 January 1973.
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on the Court. This was a matter on which Deheragoda should advise 
himself after discussion with his wife and other members of his 
family.
There was no provision in the Constitution for the removal of 
a member of the Constitutional Court by an address of the National 
State Assembly. There was no suggestion made in the course of the 
debate that the Constitution should be amended to enable this to be 
done. According to the Prime Minister, Mrs.Bandaranaike, the 
Cabinet had not taken a decision to introduce such an amendment.^ 
Therefore, it is safe to assume that the Government had no intention 
of removing the members of the Constitutional Court. Fernando and 
Deheragoda were both Judges of superior courts who held office 
"during good behaviour" and could be removed from their offices by 
the President upon addresses of the National State Assembly. But 
their removal from other Courts for conduct unrelated in any way 
to their work on such Courts would not only have been an abuse of 
constitutional powers; their tenure on the Constitutional Court 
would have remained unaffected. Therefore, it may also be assumed 
that the Government had no intention of removing either Fernando or 
Deheragoda from the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court, as the 
case may be. Why then did the Minister of Agriculture and Lands 
tell his friend, Deheragoda, that "there was a strong likelihood 
of an address in the National State Assembly for his removal from 
the Supreme Court ? The answer probably lies in what the Minister 
of Justice had publicly declared earlier that day: "The Consti­
tutional Court will have to go". Cooray had held office on the 
Constitutional Court only for six months and may not have minded 
going back to teaching and to the Bar; in fact, he had already
decided to do so after he had signed the decision. Fernando, then
head of Sri Lanka’s judiciary, had weathered many storms during a 
long and distinguished career on the bench; in any event, he had 
been unapproachable even on the telephone and it was only through 
the intervention of the President that the Ministers had been able 
to communicate with him. Deheragoda, on the other hand, had just 
commenced, at the tail end of a perfectly ordinary and uneventful
career in the public service, what he must have hoped would be an
1. This information was provided by Mrs.Bandaranaike in January 
1973.
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equally uneventful tenure of office as a Judge; retirement on full 
pension with the occasional invitation to head a commission of 
inquiry lay but three years ahead. He was clearly the weakest link. 
If the Court was determined not to resign until it had concluded 
its task, despite the battering it had been subjected to earlier 
in the day; if the Court were to make a determination on the bill 
and forward it to the Speaker; if the National State Assembly had 
by then taken action on that bill which was inconsistent with such 
determination, the Government would be faced with a most awkward 
and embarrassing situation. If, as the Minister of Justice had 
declared, "the Constitutional Court will have to go", it had to be 
done now and it could only be done by breaking one of the links 
that held the Court together."^
Early in the morning, Deheragoda wrote the following letter 
to the President and handed over copies of it to his two colleagues 
on the Court:
In view of recent developments, I, Ekanayake Raja- 
pakse Kodippili Dissanayake Mudiyanseralahamilaye 
Hector Deheragoda, do hereby tender my resignation 
with effect from today from my membership of the 
Constitutional Court in terms of section 56(1)(b) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Sri Lanka.
I might incidentally mention that my officiating 
as a member of the Constitutional Court so far has 
interfered with the expeditious hearing of the 
inquiry now before the Criminal Justice Commission.
I take the liberty of writing in English as the 
matter is urgent and confidential.
With his resignation, the Constitutional Court became instantly
immobile. There was no provision for the other two members to
sit by themselves; nor was there any provision for substituting
another member. At 9.30 a.m., the Registrar told Counsel who had
assembled in the court premises: "I have been informed that the
2
Court is not sitting". Later that morning, T.S.Fernando called
1. In a statement filed in the Special Presidential Commission 
of Inquiry, Kobbekaduwa admitted the telephone call from his house 
to a "personal friend" whose "interest he had at heart". His 
intention was to "apprise him of the mood prevalent among Members 
of Parliament" that evening. It was "furthest from my mind to 
threaten him in any way". Kobbekaduwa said that, following the 
debate in the National State Assembly, "he was alarmed, on the one 
hand, that precipitate action might bring the judiciary into ridi­
cule and thereby harm the image of the Government". He was alarmed, 
on the other hand, in regard to the possible consequences such an 
action might have on Deheragoda: Ceylon Daily News, 28 November 1978.
2. Ceylon Daily News, 14 December 1972.
259
on the President and handed over the following letter of resig­
nation:
Mr.H.Deheragoda, member of the Constitutional Court, 
has informed me this morning that he has tendered to 
Your Excellency his resignation from membership of that 
Court.
Even at the time of adjournment of Court last after­
noon it was the intention of all three members of the 
Court, in view of our opinion as to the meaning of the 
relevant sections of the Constitution, to continue the 
hearings and give a decision. The resignation of Mr.
Deheragoda leaves only two members to continue the 
hearings, and it is not possible for the Court to 
continue in the present matter.
In view of what I have stated in the paragraph above, 
and having regard to statements made in the National 
State Assembly on the 7th and the 12th December 1972, 
it has become apparent to me that duty, self-respect 
and conscience combine to compel me to avail myself of 
the relevant provision of section 56(1) of the Consti­
tution and tender to your Excellency my resignation 
of the membership which I have held in the Constitu­
tional Court since the 23rd June 1972. That resignation 
I hereby tender.
You Excellency will permit me to add that I am 
satisfied that I have done everything to uphold the 
true meaning of section 65 of the Constitution, a 
meaning with which my two colleagues agreed on the 
morning of the commencement of the hearings on the 
Press Bill. This resignation would have been tendered 
immediately after the 7th December had we not consid­
ered it our duty to continue till sre gave our decision.
Shortly thereafter, Cooray wrote to the President in the following
terms:
Messrs T.S.Fernando and H.Deheragoda have informed 
me this day that they have tendered to Your Excellency 
their resignation from membership of the Constitutional 
Court.
As a result of these resignations it is obviously 
not possible to continue the present Court proceedings, 
and give a decision on the questions referred to the 
Court by the Speaker.
In view of these developments and certain statements 
made in the National State Assembly recently with 
regard to the Court and its proceedings, I consider 
it my duty to tender to Your Excellency my resignation 
from membership of the Constitutional Court - which 
I hereby do in terms of section 56 of the Constitution.
Perhaps oblivious of the fact that the Court no longer existed, 
the Deputy Minister of Planning rose in the National State Assembly 
at 8 p.m. to speak on "the unconstitutional court". He asked what 
steps would be taken to remove "the jokers" on it. He wished to
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know whether the Constitution would be amended to enable the 
President to remove a member of the Constitutional Court for 
misbehaviour. If the illegal court continued to sit after the 
fourteenth day, who would meet its expenses ? Since the Court 
had failed to make its rules, will steps be taken to recover the 
entire expenditure of the illegal sessions from the remuneration 
paid to its members
Reconstitution of the Court
The Chief Justice, H.N.G.Fernando, made it known to the
other Judges of the Supreme Court that, in his view, having regard
to the treatment meted out to one of them, they should not agree
2
to serve on the Constitutional Court. Consequently, when Justice
Wimalaratne was invited by the Minister of Justice to be a member
of the Constitutional Courtr he declined to do so. D.Q.M.Sirimanne,
a District Judge serving as a Commissioner of Assize and about to
be appointed as a Puisne Justice, was then invited by the Minister;
he felt that as the most junior judge, his appointment to the
Constitutional Court coupled with his appointment to the Supreme
Court at the same time might be open to the criticism that he was
being appointed for the purpose of hearing a particular case in
3
which the Government had an interest. Finally, on 22 January 1973, 
nearly six weeks after the three vacancies had occured, the President 
announced the appointments of Justice Pathirana; C.V.Udalagama, a 
District Judge; and T.A.de S.Wijesundera, a Deputy Solicitor- 
General; both of whom were then officiating as Commissioners of 
Assize. Not only the renewal of their short-term commissions, but 
also the question of their eventual promotion to the Supreme Court, 
were matters which were entirely in the discretion of the executive. 
Five days later, rules made by the Constitutional Court were 
gazetted. The reconstituted Court had been quite willing to 
formally approve a set of rules which had been prepared by the 
Legal Draftsman on the instructions of the Minister of Justice even 
before their appointment to the Court.^
1. National State Assembly Debates, 13 December 1972, col.1919.
2. Private information.
3. Letter dated 8 January 1973 from the Minister of Justice to 
the Prime Minister.
4. By letter dated 17 December 1972, the Minister of Justice 
forwarded to the Minister of Constitutional Affairs a copy of draft 
rules prepared by him. On 15 January 1973, the Legal Draftsman sent
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The terms of office of the original appointees to the 
Constitutional Court and of the successors of some of them 
expired on 22 June 1976. The Minister of Justice, whose advice 
was sought by the Prime Minister, thought that "it is desirable 
that appointments be made as far as possible from among the 
serving Judges of the highest Court".^ As he pointed out, this 
"will also represent a considerable saving of money to the State 
because, as serving Judges, they would not have to be remuner­
ated separately for their services". He recommended the re-
2
appointment of Justices Pathirana, Udalagama and Wijesundera.
In place of retired Judges K.D.de Silva and V.Siva Supramaniam, 
he recaimended the appointment of Justice Tittewella, who had 
served as Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Constitutional 
Affairs and Secretary to the Constituent Assembly, and Justice 
Vythialingam, since "it is very desirable to have on the Consti 
tutional Court a Tamil member to watch over special minority 
interests that may come up for consideration from time to time by 
the Constitutional Court". These five members were appointed on 
23 June 1976 and held office until the Constitutional Court ceased 
to exist in September 1978. It was perhaps more than a coincidence 
that they were all removed from office when the Supreme Court was 
reconstituted that month in terms of the 1978 Constitution.
the Registrar of the Constitutional Court, with copy to the 
Minister of Constitutional Affairs, these draft rules duly 
approved by him. They were further amended on the suggestion 
of the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, and the final draft, 
also approved by the Attorney-General, was placed before the 
reconstituted Constitutional Court. See Letters dated 25 Jan­
uary 1973 from the Minister of Constitutional Affairs to the 
Minister of Justice; 30 January 1973 from the Minister of 
Constitutional Affairs to the Minister of Justice; and 23;Jan­
uary 1973 from the Secretary for Justice to the Prime Minister.
1. Letter dated 10 May 1976 from the Minister of Justice 
to the Prime Minister.
2. The two last named were appointed to the Supreme Court 
on 1 January 1974.
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An Assessment
The legal safeguards designed to secure judicial independ­
ence are now more exhaustive than ever before; for the first 
time, there is even a chapter in the Constitution actually headed 
"Independence of the Judiciary". But these legal safeguards 
have not in the past prevented the executive from securing the 
removal or resignation of Judges; nor the legislature from 
proceeding to subject the judiciary to public attack; nor even 
the Prime Minister from ensuring the appointment, whenever he 
wished, of persons known to be politically sympathetic to him.
Unlike under earlier constitutional arrangements in Sri 
Lanka, the President is now both Head of State and Head of Govern­
ment, and when he appoints Judges, he does so in his absolute 
discretion. Under the 1972 Constitution, the President acted on 
advice, and in tendering that advice in regard to judicial appoint­
ments, the Prime Minister invariably consulted the Minister of 
Justice. There was, therefore, several opportunities for the 
exercise of caution and restraint. The Constitutions of a number 
of Commonwealth countries which have presidential executives, do 
not leave the matter of judicial appointments in the absolute 
discretion of the President. For instance, in Guyana, the Chan­
cellor of the Court of Appeal and the Chief Justice of the High 
Court are appointed by the President "acting after consultation 
with the Minority Leader",^ while the other Judges of these
Courts are appointed by him "acting in accordance with the advice
2
of the Judicial Service Commission". In Nigeria, the Chief
Justice is appointed by the President in his discretion "subject
to confirmation of such appointment by a simple majority of the 
3
Senate", while other Judges are appointed by him "on the 
advice of the Federal Judicial Service Commission subject to
4
approval of such appointment by a simple majority of the Senate".
In Ghana, the President appoints the Chief Justice "acting in 
consultation with the Judicial Council","* and the other Judges
1. Constitution of the Co-operative Republic of Guy ana 1980, 
Art.127(1).
2. Ibid., Art.128(1).
3. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, Art. 
211(1). The Senate consists of five members elected from each 
State and one from the federal capital territory.
4. Ibid., Art.211(2).
5. Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1979, Art.126(1).
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"acting on the advice of the Judicial Council"^ and with the
approval of Parliament. Even where the President is empowered
to appoint the Chief Justice in his discretion, some of the
Conmonwealth Constitutions require the President, when making
other appointments to the Court, to act either on the advice of,
or in consultation with, the Chief Justice or the Judicial Service 
2
Commission. If the 1978 Constitution had contained a provision 
which required the President to consult the Leader of the Oppo­
sition before making judicial appointments, that might have served 
not only to caution the President to seek only "individuals of 
integrity and ability, well-trained in the law and its applicat-
3
ion", but also to induce prospective judges and aspirants to
higher judicial office to be more circumspect in their own conduct.
Influenced, no doubt, by British traditions, all three
Constitutions under review have required an address of Parliament
for the removal of a Judge. However, no resolution for the
presentation of such an address may now be entertained by the
Speaker unless notice of such resolution is signed by not less than
4
one-third of the total number of Members of Parliament. Having 
regard to the fact that in the 168-member present Parliament the 
total strength of the Opposition is only 26, no such resolution 
can, in fact, be submitted against any Judge by the Opposition,
1. Ibid.
2. See Constitutions of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977,
Art.61(2): "after consultation with the Chief Justice"; Republic 
of Seychelles 1979, Art.67(2): "shall consult the Chief Justice"; 
Republic of the Gambia 1970, Art.90(2): "acting on the advice of 
the Judicial Service Commission"; Republic of Uganda 1967, Art.84(2) 
"acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service 
Commission"; Republic of Botswana 1966, Art.97(2): "acting in 
accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission"; 
Republic of Mauritius 1968, Art.77(3): "acting in accordance with 
the advice of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission"; Republic 
of Sierra Leone 1978, Art.113(2): "in accordance with the advice
of the First Vice-President"; Republic of Kenya 1969, Art.61(2): 
"actirg in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service 
Commission"; Republic of Zambia 1973, Art.110(2): "acting in 
accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission".
3. Draft Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, 
op.cit.
4. Art.107(2).
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however legitimate its grievance against such Judge may be. For 
instance, the three superior court Judges who served on the Presid­
ential Commission of Inquiry could, in the course of that extra­
judicial activity, have proceeded to castigate the political 
leaders of the Opposition with impunity, secure in the knowledge 
that the victims were powerless to retaliate. On the other hand, 
Parliament's power to remove Judges from office and the privilege 
it enjoys of commenting on their conduct, have both been misused 
and abused in the recent past, and it would today require 
extraordinary moral courage on the part of a Judge to free his 
mind of all but the clear stream of reason.
None of the Sri Lankan Constitutions have contained a 
provision which prohibited the abolition of a judicial office 
while there was a substantive holder thereof. The recent Consti­
tution of Zimbabwe provides that:
The office of a judge of the High Court shall not, 
without his consent, be abolished during his tenure 
of office. 1
The even more recent Constitution of Belize provides that:
The office of a justice shall not be abolished while 
there is a substantive holder thereof. 2
Provisions similar to these are found in several other Cotimonwealth 
Constitutions as well. Had such a provision existed in the 1972 
Constitution, it is possible that the course of Sri Lanka's 
judicial history might have taken a different turn. If such a 
provision is included in the present Constitution, it may assist 
Judges of the future in acquiring and retaining some of the essen­
tial attributes of judicial office.
The path to judicial independence, however, is not a single 
carriageway. If the Judges were to turn the searchlight inwards, 
would they not see, not only the beam in the eye of the executive, 
but also the mote in the eye of the judiciary ? for instance, it 
is essential if judicial independence were to be maintained, that 
"judges can and should decline to sit in cases where their indep­
endence may properly be called into question, whether or not so 
requested by one of the parties". This principle, though scrupu-
1. Art.86(3).
2. Art.95(2).
3. Draft Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, op.cit.
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lously observed in the early years, has tended to be ignored in 
more recent times, particularly in matters to which the State is 
a party. In 1960, acting Justice Tambiah heard an application for 
a special jury made on behalf of the five persons accused of the 
murder of Prime Minister Bandaranaike. On the day on which he was 
due to make his order, Queen's Counsel appearing for two of the 
accused submitted that the Judge should refrain from dealing with 
the matter "as His Lordship was one of the speakers at a meeting 
held on the Bandaranaike Commemoration Day", two months previously. 
The Judge agreed that justice must not only be done, but must also 
appear to be done. Accordingly, he directed that the application 
be argued again before another Judge.'*' But in June 1973, when one 
of the petitioners questioning the constitutionality of the Assoc­
iated Newspapers of Ceylon (Special Provisions) Bill before the 
Constitutional Court, submitted that the Chairman of that Court, 
Justice Pathirana, was disqualified from sitting on the ground of 
bias or the likelihood of bias, this principle was not applied.
It was submitted that the Judge had, between 1960 and 1964, as a 
Member of Parliament, actively supported the introduction of legis­
lation to either broadbase or take over this particular newspaper 
company. The Judge, however, insisted on sitting, and later held 
that the bill was not inconsistent with the Constitution inasmuch
as it sought, inter alia, to give effect to the Principles of 
2
State Policy. More recently, in January 1979, a Special Presid­
ential Commission consisting of two Supreme Court Judges and one 
Judge of the Court of Appeal insisted on proceeding to hear evidence 
relating to a number of charges laid against the person noticed 
in respect of which they were the virtual complainants. Rejecting 
a plea of bias, the commissioners observed that since they were
3
all Judges, they were quite capable of being "objective".
1. Ceylon Daily News, 8 December 1960.
2. Affidavit of R.S.Wijewardene, dated 12 June 1973, filed in 
the Constitutional Court of Sri Lanka (Proceedings in the matter 
of Bill No.42 of 1973).
3. Proceedings of the Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry, 
January - July, 1979. See also Second Interim Report, op.cit.,
pp.132-134.
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In the final analysis, it is not legal safeguards that 
secure the independence of the judiciary. The Government must 
have the strength of purpose and the will to respect the 
integrity of the Court, without seeking to make it conform to 
its own judgment of men and matters. A Judge must have the 
capacity, consciousness and inclination to act uninfluenced by 
fear and unbiassed by hope in matters concerning the rights and 
freedoms of the individual. When these attributes are present, 
the legal safeguards serve to buttress them. In their absence, 
the law serves as nothing more than an empty shell.
CHAPTER V
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Judicial review of legislative action is an important element
in the enforcement of fundamental rights. In the current debate in
the United Kingdom on whether or not a bill of rights should be
enacted, two alternative forms of review have been suggested.'*' One
is to enable the judiciary to declare a law invalid which it holds
to be repugnant to a protected right. This is a jurisdiction now
being exercised by the Supreme Court in India and in the United
States and by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in respect
of several Commonwealth countries. The other is to enable a bill
to be examined for repugnance before it is enacted. This function
of anticipatory review was entrusted to the Federal Constitutional
Court in Germany by the 1949 Basic Law; to the Constitutional
Council in France by the 1958 Constitution; to the Minister of
Justice in Canada by the 1960 Bill of Rights; and to the Senate
Legal Committee in Zimbabwe by the 1980 Constitution. One of the
suggestions made in the United Kingdom is that perhaps the Parlia-
2
mentary Commissioner (or Ombudsman) could perform this task. In 
Sri Lanka, provision has existed, under different Constitutions, 
for the ex post facto review of legislation as well as for the 
examination of bills for constitutionality. In this chapter it is 
proposed to examine the effectiveness of these two forms of review 
in ensuring the inviolability of fundamental rights.
1. For the debate in the United Kingdom, see Selected Biblio­
graphy, infra.
2. The Earl of Arran's Bill of Rights provided that: "The 
Parliamentary Commissioner shall examine every Bill introduced in 
or Statutory Instrument laid before either House of Parliament, 
in order to ascertain whether any of the provisions thereof are 
inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of this Part of this 
Act, and he shall report any such inconsistency to both Houses at 
the first convenient opportunity": (Clause 3).
Ex Post Facto Review of Legislation
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General Observations
Assumption of Jurisdiction
The 1946 Constitution did not specifically declare the right
of a Court to inquire into and pronounce upon the validity of an
Act of Parliament. Section 29(2), however, prohibited Parliament
from legislating in respect of certain subjects; and any law made
in contravention of that prohibition was declared by section 29(3)
to be void. Section 29(4) required a bill for the amendment or
repeal of any provision of the Constitution to bear a certificate
under the hand of the Speaker that the number of votes cast in
favour thereof in the House of Representatives amounted to not less
than two-thirds of the whole number of members of that House;
presumably, such a bill which did not bear this certificate was
also void.^  Section 29(1) which authorised Parliament to make laws
for "the peace, order and good government of the Island" was not
regarded as a limitation clause; it denoted rather the plenitude
2
of sovereign legislative power. The Supreme Court did not consider
itself competent to examine a statute to decide whether it was
actually for the peace, order and good government of the country
and if it was not, to pronounce it void. As it explained:
To do so would be to negative the Sovereignty of Parlia­
ment which is limited only in the manner set out in the 
other subsections of section 29. To extend the scope of 
judicial review beyond that would be to place in the 
Courts a new power unrecognised by the Constitution at 
the expense of a power vested in Parliament by the Const­
itution.^
As early as 1951, a magistrate functioning as a revising 
officer of electoral registers refused to apply a law enacted by 
Parliament on the ground that it purported to deal with one of the 
subjects prohibited by section 29. He held that the Ceylon (Parlia­
mentary Elections)(Amendment) Act, No.48 of 1949, which prescribed 
citizenship of Ceylon as a necessary qualification of an elector, 
and the Citizenship Act, No.18 of 1948, were invalid as offending 
section 29(2) of the Constitution, and that the operative law was
1. In Thambiayah v. Kulasingham (1948) 50 NLR 25 a pronounce- 
was made that a provision in the Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) 
Act, No. 19 of 1948, was in conflict with s.l3(3)(h) of the Constitu­
tion but had not been passed in the manner required by s.29(4) and 
was, therefore, void.
2. Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe (1964) 66 NLR 73.
3. The Queen v. Liyanage (1962) 64 NLR 313, per T.S.Fernando J.
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that contained in the original Order in Council of 1946 as it stood 
before it was amended. When the Attorney-General applied to the 
Supreme Court to have that order quashed, it was assumed by every­
one concerned in that proceeding that the Court undoubtedly had 
jurisdiction to examine and pronounce upon the question whether a 
statute offended against section 2 9 ( 2 ) Ten years later, in Sena- 
dhira v. Bribery Comnissioner, the Supreme Court asserted its 
jurisdiction to strike down a law which offended against any other 
provision of the Constitution. In that case, it was held that the 
power given to a Bribery Tribunal appointed by the Governor-General 
on the advice of the Minister to convict, fine and imprison persons 
charged before it was unconstitutional inasmuch as such power being 
exclusively a judicial power, could be exercised only by a judicial 
officer appointed by the Judicial Service Commission in terms of 
section 55 of the Constitution.
Impugned Laws
The 1938 revised edition of the Legislative Enactments of 
Ceylon, which was in force at Independence, contained 337 statutes. 
Between its publication and Independence, a further 568 Ordinances 
had been enacted by the Governor with the advice and consent of the 
State Council. Accordingly, at Independence, approximately 905 
statutes were in force. Between January 1948 and May 1972, Parlia­
ment enacted 1002 Acts. Therefore, under the 1946 Constitution, 
approximately 1907 statutes were in operation. Of these, only 26 
statutes (or 1.3 per cent) were impugned during the twenty-five 
years that that Constitution remained the supreme law of the 
country. They were:
TABLE 22
STATUTES IMPUGNED UNDER THE 
1946 CONSTITUTION
Statute Number
Criminal Procedure Code 
Income Tax Ordinance 
Workmen's Compensation Ordinance 
Co-operative Societies Ordinance
15 of 1898 
2 of 1932
19 of 1934
16 of 1936
1. Mudannayake v. Sivagnanasunderam (1951) 53 NLR 25.
2. (1961) 63 NLR 313.
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Statute Number
Public Security Ordinance 25 of 1947
Commissions of Inquiry Act 17 of 1948
Citizenship Act 18 of 1948
Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Act 19 of 1948
Army Act 17 of 1949
Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Act 48 of 1949
Industrial Disputes Act 43 of 1950
Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act i3 of 1954
Bribery Act 11 of 1954
Immigrants and Emigrants Act 16 of 1955
Prevention of Social Disabilities Act 21 of 1957
Motor Transport Act 48 of 1957
Industrial Disputes (Amendment)Act 62 of 1957
Official Language Act 33 of 1956
Bribery (Amendment) Act 40 of 1958
Ceylon Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Act 72 of 1961
Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act 1 of 1962
Imposition of Civic Disabilities (Special Prov­
isions) Act 14 of 1965
Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act 12 °f 1966
Industrial Disputes (Special Provisions) Act 37 of 1968
The Privy Council invalidated almost the entirety of the Criminal 
Law (Special Provisions) Act on the ground that it "constituted a 
grave and deliberate interference with the judicial power of the
judicature".^ The Supreme Court held that certain provisions of the
2 3Bribery Act, Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act, Licensing of
4 5Traders Act, and the Co-operative Societies Act were ultra vires
section 55 of the Constitution. A District Court judgment of 1964,
which was yet in appeal when the 1946 Constitution was superseded,
found the Official Language Act to be in contravention of section
1. Liyanage v. The Queen (1965) 68 NLR 265.
2. Senadhira v. Bribery Commissioner, supra; Piyadasa v. Bribery 
Commissioner (1962) 64 NLR 385; Ranasinghe v. Bribery Commissioner
(1962) 64 NLR 449.
3. Jailabdeen v. Danina Umma (1962) 64 NLR 419.
4. Ibrahim~vT Government Agent, Vavuniya (1966) 69 NLR 217.
5. Karunatilleke v. Abeywira (1966) 68 NLR 503.
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29(2) of the Constitution.^ Apart from the last-mentioned, the 
legal validity of which was never authoritatively determined, none 
of the invalidated statutes were of any real social or economic 
significance in the life of the country.
Method of Challenge
Since no express power to pronounce upon the validity of 
legislation was conferred by the Constitution on a particular court, 
the aggrieved party was left to his own ingenuity in locating a 
suitable forum in which to ventilate his grievance and in choosing 
the manner of invoking the jurisdiction of that forum. Of the 
reported cases (excluding the instance of the revising officer 
already referred to), in all but one the forum chosen was the 
Supreme Court; the single exception being an application for a 
declaration filed in the District Court of Colombo. The unpopular­
ity of the declaratory judgment was probably due to the fact that 
though a safe all-purpose remedy, it could only be obtained after 
a dilatory and protracted original court proceeding. The majority 
of the petitioners invoked the prerogative writ jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court; certiorari being preferred to all the others. A few 
raised the issue of vires as a ground of appeal or by way of a 
defence in a criminal prosecution or election petition. The adequ­
acy or otherwise of these remedies for this purpose is examined in 
the next chapter. However, the perils which some of the petitioners 
who relied on traditional or antiquated remedies such as these had 
to face may be noted at this stage.
2
In Don Anthony v. Bribery Commissioner, the Supreme Court 
pointed out to an appellant who challenged the constitutionality 
of the Bribery Act that, while the argument presented by him was 
"not without attraction", it was not competent for him to attack 
as invalid the very Act of Parliament which alone conferred on him 
the right of appeal. It was the Court's view that "any relief on 
the ground of the invalidity of the Act must be found by a process 
other than appeal". Six months later, the Supreme Court ignored 
its earlier decision and upheld an appellant's submission that a 
Bribery Tribunal established under the Bribery Act was an unconsti-
3tutional body and that all proceedings before it were null and void.
1. Kodeeswaran v. Attorney-General, D.C.Colombo 1026/Z.
2. (1962) 64 NLR 93.
3. Piyadasa v. Bribery Commissioner, supra.
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Shortly thereafter, one of the two Judges who participated in the 
Don Anthony decision declared that he "no longer adheres to the 
opinion I had formed when Don Anthony's case was decided".^ He 
explained that "it was through a misconception" that the Court 
assumed that a questioning of the power of a Bribery Tribunal to 
adjudicate upon a charge of bribery involved a questioning of the 
validity of the entire Act under which the tribunal was established. 
He clarified that although counsel for the appellant in Don Anthony 
thought he was challenging the validity of the entire legislation, 
or rather that he had to make such a wholesale challenge, "he could 
well have been content to challenge merely the constitution of the 
particular tribunal which tried the case, on the quite narrow 
ground that the persons functioning as the 'judges' on that tribunal
had not been duly appointed to judicial office".
2
In Suntheralingam v. Inspector of Police, the Privy Council 
refused to permit the appellant to raise an argument on vires which 
he had not previously taken in the Supreme Court since "so fundamen­
tal a question as one which concerned the constitutional validity 
of the 1957 Act under the 'free exercise of religion' provision of 
the Constitution, could not be entertained in the absence of any 
consideration of it by the Courts of Ceylon, and without the nece­
ssary evidence as to what is comprised in Ceylon within the phrase 
'the free exercise of religion' ".
3
In Weerasinghe v. Samarasinghe, the brother of a detenue 
held in custody under emergency regulations applied for a writ of 
mandamus on the chairman of the advisory committee established under 
those regulations, directing him to inform the detenue of the 
grounds on which he was detained and to furnish the detenue with 
such particulars as would be sufficient to enable him to make his 
objections against the detention order. The petitioner also moved 
for a writ of habeas corpus and submitted that the emergency regu­
lations were invalid inasmuch as the Public Security Ordinance 
under which they were made was ultra vires the power of Parliament 
under the Constitution. The Court examined the constitutional 
arguments and held the impugned Ordinance to be intra vires. But,
1. Ranasinghe v. Bribery Commissioner, supra, per H.N.G.Fernando J.
2. (1966) 68 NLR 361.
3. (1971) 74 NLR 457.
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as the Court pointed out:
Regulation 26(10) takes away the power of this Court 
to issue a writ of habeas corpus during the emergency 
and that is the final answer to the application for 
that writ.
In regard to mandamus, the Court pointed out that the petitioner 
"has no status to make the application, because no duty is owed to 
him by the chairman of the advisory committee”.
In Attorney-General v. Kodeeswaran,^  a public officer who 
successfully impugned the Official Language Act in the District 
Court in an action instituted against the Attorney-General for a 
declaration that he was entitled to be paid an increment denied to 
him because he had not passed a test in the official language, had 
his action dismissed by the Supreme Court on the ground that in 
Ceylon a public servant had no right to sue the Crown for recovery
of wages claimed to be due for service under the Crown.
2
In Kariapper v. Wijesinghe, the substantive question before 
the Supreme Court was the validity of the Imposition of Civic 
Disabilities (Special Provisions) Act in terms of which the petit­
ioner, a Member of Parliament, forfeited his seat in Parliament.
He was one of six persons named in the schedule to the Act to whom 
alone the Act applied, being persons who had previously been found 
guilty of bribery by a commission of inquiry. The petitioner 
brought the question before the Supreme Court by praying for a writ 
of mandamus against the Clerk to the House of Representatives, 
ordering him to recognise him as a Member of Parliament and to pay 
him his remuneration and allowances as such member. The Privy 
Council observed:
The unusual procedure which the appellant adopted to 
obtain a decision upon the validity of the Act - which, 
not surprisingly, has turned out to be a source of 
difficulty - was followed because, strangely enough, it 
seemed the only way to bring the question of the 
validity of the Act directly before the Supreme Court.
But the Supreme Court and the Privy Council both felt obliged to
uphold the preliminary objection that "a person cannot ask for
mandamus against a public officer to pay him money which the latter
holds as a servant of the Crown".. Accordingly, the procedure adopted
was considered "inappropriate".
1. (1967) 70 NLR 121.
2. (1966) 68 NLR 529.
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Principles of Interpretation
The Supreme Court agreed that in the interpretation of the 
Constitution, special considerations had to be applied. For 
instance, if the question arises whether a term in the Constitution 
should be read in a narrow sense or should be given a broader inter­
pretation, the Court should be inclined to use it in the latter 
sense unless there is something in the context which militates 
against such view.^ Although the Constitution had been "framed in 
the light of existing legislation and the constitutional development
of the country as it existed in 1947", it was intended to apply to
2
varying conditions brought about by later developments. Alles J
explained that "this does not mean that the meaning of the legal
expression changes, but having regard to its generic form it is
3
capable of being adapted to new situations". He cited with approval
the language of Lord Wright who tendered the advice of the Privy
Council in James v. The Commonwealth of Australia:
It is true that a Constitution must not be construed 
in any narrow and pedantic sense. The words used are 
necessarily general and their full import and true 
meaning can often only be appreciated when considered, 
as the years go on, in relation to the vicissititudes 
of fact which from time to time emerge. It is not that 
the meaning of the words changes, but the changing 
circumstances illustrate and illuminate the full import 
of that meaning.^
But the Court was cautious. In applying the provisions of the
Constitution, a presumption was always recognised in favour of the
validity of a legislative enactment; the Court would not rule such
enactment to be ultra vires unless the invalidity was clear beyond 
5
doubt. Often quoted with approval was the principle set out by
Isaacs J in Federal Comnissioner of Taxation v. Munro:
It is always a serious and responsible duty to declare 
invalid regardless of consequences, what the national 
Parliament, representing the whole people of Australia, 
has considered necessary or desirable for the public 
welfare. The Court charged with the guardianship of the 
fundamental law of the Constitution may find that duty 
inescapable. Approaching the challenged legislation 
with a mind judicially clear of any doubt as to its
1. Peiris v. Perera (1968) 71 NLR 481, at 490.
2. Ibid., at 491.
3. Ibid.
4. [1936] AC 478.
5. per Alles J in Peiris v. Perera, supra. See also Sirimanne J 
in Tuckers Ltd v. Ceylon Mercantile Union (1970) 73 NLR 313, at 316.
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propriety or expediency - as we must, in order that 
we may not ourselves transgress the Constitution or 
obscure the issue before us - the question is: 'Has 
Parliament, on the true construction of the enactment, 
misunderstood and gone beyond its constitutional 
powers ?' It is a received canon of judicial constr­
uction to apply in cases of this kind with more than 
ordinary anxiety the maxim Ut res magis valeat quam 
pereat. Nullification of enactments and confusion of 
public business are not lightly to be introduced.
Unless, therefore, it becomes clear beyond reasonable 
doubt that the legislation in question transgresses 
the limits laid down by the organic law of the Consti­
tution, it must be allowed to stand as the true expre­
ssion of the national will.-*-
Another principle which the Supreme Court enunciated was that
a pronouncement upon the constitutional validity of a statute should
not be made unless a decision as to validity was essential for the
purposes of the case actually before it. H.N.G.Fernando CJ not only
2
applied this principle in Attorney-General v. Kodeeswaran, to
avoid examining the vires of the Official Language Act; in Perera v.
3
Peiris, a previous pronouncement of a Divisional Bench made twenty- 
one years previously with which he disagreed was declared to be 
obiter and made per incuriam for the reason that the attention of
that Court had not been drawn to this principle. In other words, if
a case could be decided on one of two grounds, one involving a const­
itutional question and the other a question of statutory construction 
or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.
A third principle of general application was that in examining 
an enactment with reference to any alleged constitutional invalidity, 
the Court must strive to reach a conclusion which will render the
4
will of the legislature effective, or as effective as possible.
As a corollary, the Court would be entitled to sever an "offending" 
provision from the remaining provisions of the Act.^
Within this threshold, the Supreme Court was willing to search 
for the "pith and substance" or the "true nature and character" of
a statute, rather than adopt a "blind adherence to a strictly
1. (1926) 38 CLR 153, at 180.
2. Supra.
3. (1969) 72 NLR 217, at 222.
4. Senadhira v. Bribery Commissioner, supra; Kariapper v. 
Wijesinghe, supra; Peiris v. Perera, supra; Suntheralingam v. 
Inspector of Police, Kankesanturai (1970) 74 NLR 457.
5. Thambiayah v. Kulasingham, supra; Ismail v. Muthu Marliya
(1963) 65 NLR 431. --------  ---- --------
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verbal interpretation"/
In considering whether a particular piece of legis­
lation is within the permitted field it is I think 
the duty of the Courts to look at the substance of 
what has been done and not merely at the form which 
particular subsections have taken.2
For this purpose, the Court was prepared to look at the background
to legislation, including White Papers and other matters extraneous
to the legislation itself; in other words, at the general legislative 
3
scheme. The Privy Council thought that judicial notice ought to
be taken of such matters as the reports of parliamentary commissions
and of such other facts as must be assumed to have been within the
contemplation of the legislature when the impugned Act was passed:
There may be circumstances in which a statute though 
framed so as not to offend directly against a consti­
tutional limitation of the power of the legislature 
may indirectly achieve the same result. In such cir­
cumstances, the statute would be ultra vires.
The fact that the legislature had no intention to violate the Consti­
tution, or that it was beset by a grave situation and it took grave
measures to deal with it, thinking that it had the power to do so
and was acting rightly, would be irrelevant and would give no vali­
dity to Acts which infringed the Constitution/
Nevertheless, the Court was always conscious that the legis­
lature must not be unduly hampered in the performance of its own 
functions. It was prepared to look at the statute as a whole and 
not at a particular section isolated from its other provisions.
It was not prepared to declare a statute void because it was said 
to offend against the spirit of the Constitution/ It recognised 
that the Court's sole function was to interpret a constitutional 
description of power or restraint upon power and to say whether a 
given measure fell within one side of a line or on the other and 
had nothing whatever to do with the merits or demerits of that 
measure. When invited to say that once a provision of an Act of
1. Kodakkan Pillai v. Mudannayake (1953) 54 NLR 433; Meera v.
Dias (1957) 58 NLR 571; Liyanage v. The Queen, supra; Ranasinghe 
v. Bribery Commissioner, supra; Walker Sons & Co Ltd v. Fry (1965)
68 NLR 73.
2. Tuckers Ltd v. Ceylon Mercantile Union, supra, per Tennekoon J.
3. Ibid., per Weeramantry J.
4. Kodakkan Pillai v. Mudannayake, supra. See also Senadhira v. 
Bribery Commissioner, supra; Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe
(1964) 66 NLR 73; Anthony Naide v. Ceylon Tea Plantation Co Ltd 
(1966) 68 NIH 558.
5- Liyanage v. The Queen, supra. 6. Tuckers Ltd v. CMU, supra.
7. Kartapper v. W i j e s i n g h e , supra.
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Parliament had been declared to be ultra vires, the Court would
not again review the correctness of its previous decision, H.N.G.
Fernando CJ emphasized that:
If accepted, the proposition will tend to place the 
Judiciary in a position of obstructive opposition 
to the Legislature, which is not the position which 
the Judiciary in my understanding occupies under 
our Constitution.
These then were the rules of interpretation which the Supreme 
Court would apply to a statute which was alleged to have infringed 
a group right protected by the Constitution. It was not a daringly 
assertive approach; nor was it unduly conservative. The Court was 
prepared to enforce the provisions of the Constitution in a manner 
which would not seriously disrupt the orderly conduct of governmen­
tal business.
Enforcement of Fundamental Rights 
Freedom of Religion
Section 29(2) (a) of the Constitution provided that no law
shall prohibit or restrict the free exercise of any religion, while
section 29(2)(d) provided that no law shall alter the constitution
of any religious body except with the consent of the governing
authority of that body. To the extent that Parliament's legislative
power was thus limited, freedom of religion was protected. The
Prevention of Social Disabilities Act, No.21 of 1957, sought to
prevent, particularly in the northern province, the imposition of
social disabilities on persons by reason of their caste. Any person
who imposed any social disability on any other person on the ground
of such other person's caste was guilty of an offence punishable
with imprisonment or fine (s.2). A person was deemed to impose a
social disability on any other person if he, inter alia:
prevents or obstructs such person, being the follower 
of any religion, from or in entering, being present in, 
or worshipping at any place of worship to which foll­
owers of that religion have access (s.3(b)).
Entry into the Hindu temple at Maviddapuram had always been 
determined by usage and custom. Accordingly, Hindus of inferior 
castes were denied entry into or beyond the inner courtyard and 
worshipped only from outside. Attempts by them to secure religious
1. Perera v. Peiris (1969) 72 NLR 217, at 223.
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equality with Hindus belonging to higher castes invariably led to 
violent caste confrontations. On 1 July 1968, C.Suntheralingam, 
a former professor of mathematics and ex-cabinet minister, acting
with the authority of the high priest, prevented one Sinniah, also
a Hindu by religion but socially of a lower caste, from entering 
the inner courtyard for the purpose of worshipping. He was charged 
with, and convicted of, an offence under section 2 (read with 
section 3(b)), of the Prevention of Social Disabilities Act.
On appeal, Suntheralingam argued that his intervention was
necessary to prevent defilement of the temple by the entry of a
person of low caste; if there had been such defilement, poo j as could
not thereafter be performed in that temple. Accordingly, he argued
that section 3(b) had the effect of altering the constitution of a
religious body. This submission appeared to have been misconceived.
As H.N.G.Fernando CJ pointed out:
The question whether some person may or may not enter, 
or be prevented from entering, premises controlled by 
a religious body, is not one which relates to the
'constitution' of that body. Section 29(2)(d) would,
in my opinion, apply only to a law which purports to 
alter the mode by which a religious body is elected, 
appointed or otherwise set up, or to comnit any power 
or function of such a body to some other person, or to 
change the principles governing the relationship inter 
se of members of the body.l
But did section 3(b) constitute a restriction on the free
exercise of the Hindu religion in accordance with its usages and
customs by requiring high-caste Hindus to kneel and pray on the same
courtyard with those of inferior castes ? A "religion" is not merely
a doctrine or belief; it includes rituals and observances, ceremonies
2
and modes of worship. Therefore, if the mode of worship at Mavi- 
ddapuram temple, as regulated by usage and custom, entitled only 
high caste Hindus to enter the inner courtyard, would not the insis­
tence on the entry of Hindus of inferior castes to that inner court­
yard restrict the free exercise of religion in that temple ? 
Amerasinghe submits that a provision similar to section 3(b) would 
be in keeping with the needs of public morality and should be regar­
ded as outside the prohibition of section 29(2) (a) on the basis that
1. Suntheral ingam v. Herat (1969) 72 NLR 54, at 55.
2. Commr. ,H.R.E.,Madras v. Swamiar, AIR 1954 SC 182, at 290.
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there is implied in the latter section a power of Parliament to 
interfere with the exercise of religion in the interests of public 
order, morality and health.'*' But whether such an implied power 
ought to have been read into section 29(2) (a) which was a mid­
twentieth century enactment in clear and absolute terms, on the 
authority of the interpretation placed by the United States Supreme 
Court on the American Constitution which contains one of the 
earliest formulations of fundamental rights, or whether the "free 
exercise of religion" meant that
with man's relations to his Maker and the obligations 
he may think they impose, and the manner in which an 
expression shall be made by him of his belief on those 
subjects, no interference can be permitted,2
were questions which were not judicially examined or pronounced upon
since Suntheral ingam's belated attempt to base an argument on section
29(2)(a) at the final stage of appeal was disallowed by the Privy
Council.
Freedom from Discrimination
Sections 29(2)(b) and (c) prohibited Parliament from conferring 
any privilege or advantage, or from imposing any disability or rest­
riction, on persons of any community or religion, which was not 
conferred or imposed on persons of other communities or religions.
To the extent that Parliament was thus limited in the exercise of 
its legislative power, freedom from discrimination was sought to be 
achieved. These two provisions were invoked only in respect of the 
three subjects which are examined below.
1. Citizenship and Franchise. At Independence, persons living 
in Ceylon were either British subjects or aliens. At the first 
general election conducted under the 1946 Constitution, which pre­
ceded Independence by approximately six months, a British Subject 
who had reached the age of twenty-one years and who had resided in 
an electoral district for a continuous period of six months in the 
immediately preceding eighteen months, was entitled to vote in that 
electoral district:
a) if he was domiciled in Ceylon: in the case of a person who did 
not possess a Ceylon domicile of origin, domicile was deemed to 
have been acquired by a total period of five years' residence; or
1. C.F.Amerasinghe, The Doctrines of Sovereignty and Separation 
of Powers in the Law of Ceylon (Colombo: Lake House Investments Ltd, 
1970), pp.47-8.
2. Davis v. Beason, 133 US 333, at 342, per Field J.
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b) if he satisfied a basic literacy and property qualification; or
c) if he was in possession of a certificate of permanent settlement 
which was issued upon proof that a person had been continuously 
resident in the island for a period of not less than five years 
(exclusive of temporary absences not exceeding a total of eight 
months during such period) with intent to settle therein or was 
permanently settled.
These enabling provisions were contained in sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 
of the Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Order in Council 1946.^
They were applied, for the purpose of determining the electorate, 
on a total population comprised as follows:
TABLE 23 
TOTAL POPULATION 1946
Race Population Percentage
Low Country Sinhalese 2,903,000 43.6
Kandyan Sinhalese 1,718,000 26.0
Indian Tamils 781,000 11.7
Ceylon Tamils 734,000 11.0
Burghers and Eurasians 42,000 0.6
Indian Moors 36,000 0.5
Malays 23,000 0.4
Others (including Europeans 
and Veddhas) 49,000 0.6
Total 6,657,000 100.0
Source: Panasirgjne, A.G., Census of Ceylon 1946 (Colombo: Government 
Press, 1951).
Of the major communities resident in Ceylon, the Indian Tamils
were the most recent in origin. Their presence was inextricably
linked with the plantation economy of the country.
Plantations organised on rational economic lines generally 
called for a regular and disciplined labour force to pre­
pare the land for the crop, to nurture it, and to gather 
it. To the vast majority of the Sinhalese, being proletar­
ian workers of this sort was unpalatable. Such an occupat-
1. Government Gazette, 26 September 1946. For relevant extract, 
see G.P.S.H.de Silva, A Statistical Survey of Elections to the Leg- 
latures of Sri Lanka 1911-1977 (Colombo: Marga Institute, 1979),pTl5.
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ion carried low status in the Sinhalese value system 
. . . The wage inducements offered by the planters 
were rarely sufficient to overcome their aversion to 
serving as mere hired labourers. At the outset, how­
ever, during the period dating from about 1820s to 
the early 1840s, the coffee planters were able to 
employ some local labour, both that of Kandyan Sinh­
alese and that of migrant low-country Sinhalese. But 
it was fitful in supply. And this meagre supply soon 
petered out. [Therefore] for their regular crop- 
bearing and crop-gathering labour force, the planters 
began, for the most part, to look to South India.-*-
At first, the South Indian estate labourers were migrants rather 
than inmigrants. The maximum supply of labour was needed only during 
the two-to-four month coffee harvest season; at other times, the 
plantations needed only one-half to one-third the labour force.
With the rapid decline of the coffee industry and the establishment 
of tea plantations which required a constant supply of labour 
throughout the year, the Indian population increased to approxim­
ately 123,000 by 1871, 195,000 by 1881, and 235,000 by 1891.
By that stage, if not earlier, some of the labourers 
were tending to settle down. More women were joining 
the inflow. The economy was buoyant. There was reason 
to turn immigrant.^
The importation of South Indian labour continued into the twentieth
century and throughout the first three decades of that century, during
which instead of seasonal arrivals, the trend was towards permanent
4
or semi-permanent settlement.
If the influx of South Indian labour upset the equilibrium of 
Ceylonese society in the central highlands by introducing a foreign 
element that either refused or failed or was not permitted to 
assimilate, the opening of large and extensive plantations also 
created other problems. Through legal devices, such as the Crown 
Lands Encroachment Ordinance No. 12 of 1840, the Temple Lands 
Registration Ordinance No.10 of 1856, the Partition Ordinance No.10 
of 1863, and the Grain Tax, vast tracts of land were placed at the 
disposal of British planters, and the Kandyan peasantry was either 
hemmed in or forced out to the periphery of the expanding plantations.^
1. Michael Roberts, "Export Agriculture in the Nineteenth 
Century", History of Ceylon, at p.98.
2. Ibid., at 100.
3. Ibid., at 101.
4. Ibid.
5. For a detailed account, see Michael Roberts, "Land Problems 
and Policies, C.1832-C.1900", History of Ceylon, Vol.3, pp.119-145.
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The plight of the peasant was expressed very graphically by Hector
Kobbekaduwa, himself a Kandyan, when he introduced the Land Reform
Bill in the National State Assembly:
To the peasant the presence of the White Sahib in his 
neighbourhood was an earthquake in his life. It was 
an era of living horror. The heart of the village 
became bits of merry England. Secured with gates and 
fences, armed with guns and bullets and with horses 
and whips, the White Sahib became a king and acted on 
the maxim that the king can do no wrong. He denied 
access to the villager and on anyone who trespassed 
was inflicted the most brutal punishment. Government 
servants were at his beck and call and they trembled 
in his presence. The White Sahib lived a life of noisy 
debauchery in our country and the neighbouring vill­
ages were repositories of his excess sensuality and 
are today living monuments of European bastardy.^
The problems created by the importation of South Indian labour,
whether social, economic or political, were equally sensitive and
emotional. They survived until Independence. As Kobbekaduwa was-
to exclaim, as recently as 1975:
With political agitation in 1931 and with universal 
franchise, the constitution makers thought that the 
inarticulate peasantry should have their own repre­
sentatives. But unfortunately in the hill country, 
the change was from clay to fire. The Peri Sunderams,
Vythial ingams, Natesa Iyers and Fell owes-Gordons, 
and later the Thodamans and Jesudasans and other 
political adventurers, were swept into power in our 
areas through the Indian votes. It was a hopeless 
situation for us. We screamed for justice. Our appeal 
fell on deaf ears and our written petitions went 
into the dust b i n s . ^
He was referring to the 1947 general election. At that 
election, of a total electorate of 3,048,145 (of whom, 211,915 
were Indians resident on estates), 1,887,364 voted to elect 95 
members to the first House of Representatives. The distribution 
of seats by communities was as follows:
Sinhalese ... 68
Ceylon Tamils ... 13
Indian Tamils ... 7
Muslims ... 6
Burghers ... 1
The votes polled and the candidates returned by the political
1.National State Assembly Debates, 10 October 1975. 
2.Ibid.
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parties are indicated in Table 9.^  A closer analysis of those 
figures is more revealing. The 211,915 registered Indian Tamil 
voters constituted more than 10 per cent of the total number of 
voters in as many as 28 electorates. In six of them, essentially 
Kandyan electorates, where the Indian Tamils accounted for more 
than 50 per cent, all but one returned candidates of the Ceylon 
Indian Congress. In the remaining twenty-two Sinhalese consti­
tuencies, the Indian Tamil vote helped to elect fifteen left- 
wing opposition members (six LSSP, one BLP, one CP, one CIC and 
six Independents) as against eleven who eventually supported the 
UNP Government (eight UNP, one LP and two Independents):
TABLE 24
IMPACT OF INDIAN TAMIL VOTE 
AT 1947 GENERAL ELECTION
Electorate Percentage of Indian Tamil 
voters
Party elected
Talawakele 79.5 CIC
Maskeliya 60.6 CIC
Nuwara Eliya 59.0 CIC
Haputale 57.0 UNP
Kotagala 53.6 CIC
Mawalapitiya 51.1 CIC
Badulla 42.2 CIC/LSSP
Bandarawela 26.6 Ind.
Gampola 26.1 UNP
Minipe 25.6 Ind.
Balangoda 23.8 UNP
Maturata 22.9 UNP
Alutnuwara 21.1 Ind.
Gal aha 18.4 UNP
Dehiowita 18.0 LSSP
Matale 17.9 Ind.
Niwitigala 17.7 LSSP
Ruwanwella 17.2 LSSP
Welimada 17.1 Ind.
Colombo Central 15.6 LP/UNP/CP
Dambulla 13.8 Ind.
Buttala 13.0 UNP
Agalawatte 12.2 LSSP
Kiriella 12.2 LSSP
Matugama 11.5 Ind.
Mannar 10.8 Ind.
Colombo South 10.6 UNP/BLP
Kandy 10.4 UNP
1. Supra, p.50.
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It is against this background that the laws relating to citizen­
ship and franchise were enacted.
The Citizenship Act, No.18 of 1948, which received the Royal 
Assent on 21 September 1948, created the status of citizen of 
Ceylon which could be acquired by right of descent or by virtue of 
registration in the following manner:
1. A person bom in Ceylon before the appointed date (15 November 
1948) was a citizen by descent if -
(a) his father was bom in Ceylon, or
(b) his paternal grandfather and paternal great-grandfather 
were bom in Ceylon.'*'
2. A person bom outside Ceylon before the appointed date was a 
citizen by descent if -
(a) his father and paternal grandfather were born in Ceylon, or
(b) his paternal grandfather and paternal great-grandfather
2
were bom in Ceylon.
3. A person bom in or outside Ceylon on or after the appointed
date was a citizen by descent if at the time of his birth his
3
father was a citizen of Ceylon.
4. A person may be registered as a citizen if -
(a) he is of full age and of sound mind, and
either (b) his mother is or was a citizen by descent or would
have been if she had been alive on the appointed 
date, and
(c) he, being married, has been resident in Ceylon 
throughout the immediately preceding seven years, 
or being unmarried, has been so resident for a 
period of ten years 
or (d) he is the spouse or the widow or widower of a
citizen, and
(e) he has been resident in Ceylon throughout the 
immediately preceding one year;^  
or (f) he is a person who ceased to be a citizen by descent
upon acquiring citizenship of another country and 
has thereafter renounced that citizenship;^
1. S.4(1) 2. S.4(2).
3. S.5, provided that such birth is registered at the appropriate 
consular office or at the office of the Minister in Ceylon.
4. S.11(1)(b). For further enabling provisions, see s.4 of the 
amending Act, No.40 of 1950.
5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. Repealed by Act No.40
of 1950.
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or (g) he is a person who has rendered distinguished public 
service or is eminent in professional, commercial, 
industrial or agricultural life, but is otherwise 
ineligible to apply for citizenship by registration ;"*■ 
and (h) he is, and intends to continue to be, ordinarily 
resident in Ceylon.
The citizenship law was extremely rigid. Firstly, there was 
no provision for citizenship to be acquired by birth within the 
country. The Constitution of India which came into force on 26 Jan­
uary 1950 but which was being drafted at the same time as the 
Citizenship Act, contained the following provision:
At the commencement of this Constitution, every person
who has his domicile in the territory of India and -
(a) who was bom in the territory of India; or
(b) either of whose parents was bom in the territory 
of India; or
(c) who has been ordinarily resident in the territory 
of India for not less than five years immediately 
preceding such commencement,
shall be a citizen of India.
Such a provision, if incorporated in the Citizenship Act, would have 
granted the status of citizen of Ceylon to practically everyone who 
enjoyed the franchise at Independence. Secondly, the concept of 
"Commonwealth Citizen" was not recognised as it is today in most 
Commonwealth Constitutions. No distinction was drawn between 
citizens of other Commonwealth countries, including India and Pakis­
tan, and aliens, and an equally stringent and almost insurmountable 
barrier was placed in the way of such persons seeking citizenship 
by registration. Finally, while the status of a citizen of Ceylon 
was accorded to a citizen by descent as well as a citizen by regis­
tration, the latter was a less secure category than the former. For 
instance, a citizen by registration who had renounced his citizenship 
was not entitled to resume his citizenship; he also ceased to be a 
citizen if he resided outside Ceylon (except for certain specified 
purposes) for five consecutive years. Additionally, citizenship by 
registration might be terminated by the Minister in specified circum­
stances . ^
1. S.12. 2. Art.5.
3. Ss.8, 23, 24. For other differences between the two categories 
of citizens, see L.L.T.Peiris, The Citizenship Law of the Republic of 
Sri Lanka (Colombo: Dept, of Govt. Printing, 1974), pp. 45-46.
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W.T.Jayasinghe, who was for many years Secretary of the ministry 
in charge of citizenship, conceded the stringency of the qualifi­
cations for Sri Lankan citizenship, but adds:
This was inevitable in the context of the special 
political situation confronting Sri Lanka. It must 
be kept in mind that Sri Lanka had to deal with the 
special problem arising from the Indian immigrant 
labour, who constituted as much as one-eighth of 
the total population of the Island.1
L.L.T.Peiris, a former assistant secretary in the citizenship divi­
sion of the ministry, is of the same view:
The restrictive nature of the Ceylon law is attri­
butable to the fact that, at the time the Act was 
passed, nearly one million persons living in Ceylon, 
out of the total population of approximately ten 
million, were persons who had immigrated to Ceylon 
in recent times and their absorption would have 
adversely affected the interests of the indigenous 
population. It was apparently for this reason that 
no provision was made for the acquisition of citi­
zenship by birth and acquisition by descent was 
restricted to persons who could show their ties 
with the country for at least two generations.^
It is clear, therefore, that the Citizenship Act was designed to 
exclude from its purview as many of the persons of Indian origin 
living and working in Sri Lanka as was possible.
The Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act, No.3 of 
1949, received the Royal Assent on 28 February 1949 and was brought 
into operation on 15 August 1949. It resulted from discussions 
held between the Prime Ministers of Ceylon and India and was descri­
bed in its long title as "An Act to make provision for granting the 
status of a citizen of Ceylon by registration to Indians and Pakis­
tanis who have the qualification of past residence in Ceylon for a 
certain minimum period". The main requirements for the grant of 
citizenship under this Act were:
(a) the applicant should be of Indian or Pakistani origin and have
3
emigrated therefrom and permanently settled in Ceylon;
1. W.T.Jayasinghe, Tamils in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Dept, of Govt. 
Printing, 1976), p.14.
2. Peiris, The Citizenship Law, supra, at p.6.
3. The rigour of this requirement was to a great extent minimised 
by the Supreme Court which held that although the concept of "perm­
anent settlement" involved two elements - the fact of residence and 
the intention permanently to remain in Ceylon - the requisite inten­
tion was satisfactorily established by the applicant's positive
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(b) the applicant, if married, should have been uninterruptedly 
resident in Ceylon since 1 January 1939, or if married, since
1 January 1936. Resident in Ceylon, notwithstanding occasional 
absence, was deemed to have been uninterrupted only if such 
absence did not on any one occasion exceed twelve months in 
duration;
(c) in the case of a married male applicant, his wife and minor 
children, if any, should also have been ordinarily resident 
in Ceylon;
(d) the applicant should have possessed an assured income of a 
reasonable amount or had some suitable business or employment 
or other lawful means of livelihood; and
(e) the application should have been made within the period of two 
years specified, i.e. between 15 August 1949 and 14 August 1951.
Although about 90 per cent of the Indian estate population applied 
for registration under this Act, only 134,316 were granted citizen­
ship; 975,000 remained "stateless".^
The coup de grace was administered by the Ceylon Parlia­
mentary Elections (Amendment) Act, No.48 of 1949 (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Franchise Act"), which received the Royal Assent 
on 24 November 1949. It provided that only a citizen of Ceylon 
shall be entitled to the franchise. As Gratiaen J observed, this 
Act "had the effect of disfranchising many Indian Tamils (and 
indirectly their descendants) in spite of their long residence in 
Ceylon".^
In July 1951, a revising officer appointed under the Franchise 
Act upheld a submission made on behalf of an Indian Tamil that both 
the Franchise and Citizenship Acts were invalid as offending against 
section 29(2) of the Constitution. In September of that year, in
3
the case of Mudannayake v. Sivagnanasunderam, the Government 
brought before the Supreme Court the order of the revising officer
decision to claim registration with a "clear understanding" of its 
implications. Once the practical tests prescribed by the Act had 
been satisfied, it was not necessary to decide inferentially 
whether or not the applicant might be presumed to have acquired a 
domicil of choice in Ceylon: per Gratiaen J in Duraiswamy v. Comm-
issioner for Registration of Indian and Pakistani Residents (1955) 
56 NLR 313.
1. Jayasinghe, Tamils, supra, pp.14-15.
2. Duraiswamy, supra, at 316.
3. X1951) 53 NLR 25.
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and sought, by way of certiorari, to have it quashed. As the bench 
of three Judges observed in their judgment, Mthe substantial quest­
ion" to be decided was whether the Franchise Act read with the Citi­
zenship Act, "is void as offending section 29" of the Constitution.
It would be void only if it discriminated against or in favour of 
one community to the exclusion of the other communities in the 
island. It was not disputed that the Indian Tamils were a contem­
plated "community"; nor that the Citizenship Act conferred a "privi­
lege" or an "advantage" on those who are or became citizens of Ceylon.
The Supreme Court rejected as irrelevant three affidavits
tendered on behalf of the Indian Tamil, Kodakkan Pillai, which dealt
with the history of Indian immigration into Ceylon and the position
of Indian residents under the two impugned statutes. In the view
of the Court, the substance or the true nature and character of a
statute ought not to be searched for among State papers and other
political documents when the language of the statute was clear and
unambiguous and could speak for itself. Accordingly, the Court held
that the two statutes in question did not upon their faces make the
Indian Tamil community liable to any disability to which other
communities were not liable. Jayatilleke CJ observed thus:
When the language of sections 4 and 5 is examined it 
is tolerably clear that the object of the legislature 
was to confer the status of citizenship only on per­
sons who were in some way intimately connected with 
the country for a substantial period of time. With 
the policy of the Act we . are not concerned, but we 
cannot help observing thatit is a perfectly natural and 
legitimate function of the legislature of a sovereign 
country to determine the composition of its nationals.
. . . Can it be said that these two provisions, the 
words of which cannot in any shape or form be regarded 
as imposing a communal restriction or conferring a 
communal advantage, conflict with section 29 of the 
Constitution ? This is the simple question for our 
decision. 1
Did the Court direct itself properly when it reduced the 
"substantial question" for decision down to such simple terms ?
The legislative power of Parliament was limited by section 29(2) 
of the Constitution. Therefore, if, as the Court found, the object 
of the Citizenship Act was to confer the privilege of citizenship
1. Ibid., at 44.
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only on persons who were able to establish an intimate connection 
with the country "for a substantial period of time", it is submitted 
that the relevant question the Court should have asked itself was 
whether that requirement would result in making persons of any 
community already resident in the country liable to a disability 
to which persons of other communities were not made liable; if it 
did, for the reason that a particular comnunity would not have been 
able to establish the specified two-generation link with the country, 
section 29(3) required that provision of law to be invalidated. It 
would be naive to expect the answer to that question to be apparent 
on the face of the law.
The Supreme Court asked:
When an enactment is put into force one community may 
be affected by it more adversely than another. A high 
income or property qualification may affect more adv­
ersely the voting strength of one community than anot­
her. Would that be discrimination ?-*■
It is submitted that if the high income or property qualification 
had the effect of excluding persons of one community from the elect­
oral register, it would indeed be discriminatory. In fact, in this 
case, the record contained an uncontradicted affidavit to the effect 
that:
9. The vast majority of the present Indian immigrant 
population came to Ceylon long after the year 1852 
and though a large number of the members of the comm­
unity have been bom in Ceylon yet their parents were 
not bom in Ceylon. In the case of the Indian commu­
nity, unlike in the case of the Sinhalese and the 
Ceylon Tamil communities, the fathers of the persons 
who belong to this community have not been bom in 
Ceylon as immigration of Indian labour commenced only 
in 1852. Hence the Ceylon Citizenship Act while it 
confers the status of a Ceylon citizen on all members 
of the Sinhalese and Ceylon Tamil communities fails 
to confer that status on by far the vast majority of 
the members of the Indian community settled in Ceylon,
But the Supreme Court thought that:
To embark on an inquiry, every time the validity of 
an enactment is in question, into the extent of its 
incidence, whether for evil or for good, on the var­
ious communities tied together by race, religion or 
caste, would be mischievous in the extreme and throw 
the administration of Acts of the legislature into 
confusion.
However inconvenient individual Judges may have found that task,
1. Ibid., at 46.
2. Ibid.
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section 29(2) required the Supreme Court, when its jurisdiction was
properly invoked, to embark on precisely such an inquiry and to
determine whether a law made persons of one community liable to a
disability or restriction to which persons of other communities were
not made liable. For that purpose, if it was necessary to do so,
the Court should have travelled outside the language of the impugned
statute and taken evidence as to whether or not, in its ultimate
effect, it was of a discriminatory character. But Jayatilleke CJ
thought that to do so would be "a fundamental error". Instead, he
simply looked at the face of the statute and concluded that:
the facts which qualify or disqualify a person to be 
a citizen or voter have no relation to a community as 
such but they relate to his place of birth and to the 
place of birth of his father, grandfather or great 
grandfather which would equally apply to persons of 
any community.
On appeal, the Privy Council looked for the "pith and substance"
or the "true character" of the impugned statutes. When read along
with the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act, the Privy
Council thought that the three statutes constituted a "legislative
plan", and when that plan was looked at as a whole it was evident
that "the legislature did not intend to prevent Indian Tamils from
attaining citizenship provided that they were sufficiently connected
with the Island". The Privy Council asked the question whether what
was before it was legislation on citizenship or legislation intended
to make and making Indian Tamils liable to discrimination to which
other communities were not liable, and answered thus:
It is . . .  a perfectly natural and legitimate function 
of the legislature of a country to determine the compo­
sition of its nationals. Standards of literacy, of pov­
erty, of birth or of residence are as it seems to their 
Lordships standards which a legislature may think it 
right to adopt in legislation on citizenship and it is 
clear that such standards though they may operate to 
exclude the illiterate, the poor and the immigrant to 
a greater degree than they exclude other people do not 
create disabilities in a community as such since the 
community is not bound together as a community by its 
illiteracy, its poverty or its migratory character but 
by its race or its religion. The migratory habits of the 
Indian Tamils are facts which in their Lordships opinion 
are directly relevant to the question of their suitabi­
lity as citizens of Cpylon and have nothing to do with 
them as a community.
It is true that neither the "illiterate" nor the "poor" constitute
1. Kodakkan Pillai v.Sivagnanasunderam (1953) 54 NIH 433, at 439.
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a community within the meaning of section 29. But a community may 
well be identified by its migratory character. In Ceylon, in 1948, 
what distinguished the Indian Tamil comnunity from the other res­
ident communities, were primarily its migratory habits. Yet, as 
the Supreme Court held, the Indian Tamils were a contemplated 
community, entitled to the protection of section 29, notwithstanding 
its migratory character. Therefore, if a law conferred a "privi­
lege" or "advantage" only upon the existence of certain facts, and 
those facts were incompatible with migratory habits, would not that 
privilege or advantage be denied to a community which was essentially 
migratory in character ?
It would appear that both Courts were unduly influenced by 
the fact that the impugned legislation related to citizenship of a 
newly independent country. But it is precisely in respect of such 
vital matters that a community requires to be protected against 
discriminatory treatment. On this occasion, both Courts failed to 
accord that protection and thereby rendered nearly a million people 
stateless.
2. Immigration. The Immigrants and Emigrants Act, No.20 of 
1948, which received the Royal Assent on 6 October 1948 and came 
into operation on 1 November 1949 (the appointed date), in effect, 
prohibited the entry of a non-citizen into Ceylon unless he had in 
his possession a passport and a visa or a residence permit.
Residence permits were of two categories: permanent residence 
permits for indefinite periods and temporary residence permits for 
definite periods exceeding six months.^ Section 14(3)(b) declared 
that:
No temporary residence permit shall be refused in the 
case of a person who, being a British subject, was 
ordinarily resident in Ceylon for a period of at least 
five years immediately preceding the appointed date.
The Immigrants and Emigrants (Amendment) Act, No. 16 of 1955, repealed
the entirety of section 14 and substituted for it a new section
which provided only for the issue of visas to persons seeking to
enter Ceylon. A visa would ordinarily be granted for a period not
exceeding two years, but could, with the approval of the Minister,
be granted for up to five years. The amending Act contained no
provision of any description corresponding to section 14(3)(b).
1. S.14.
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In Meera v. Dias,^  an Indian Tamil who, having held a temporary 
residence permit for several years was denied an extension in 
February 1956, challenged the validity of the amending Act on the 
ground that it imposed upon the "Indian community" a disability to 
which members of other communities were not made liable or conferred 
on members of other communities a privilege not conferred on the 
members of the Indian community.
H.N.G.Fernando CJ examined the "pith and substance" of the
amending Act and found that:
The Legislature has controlled the entry into Ceylon 
of non-citizens by a system of visas, conferring on 
an executive authority the discretion to refuse an 
entry document. The discrimination, if any, there­
fore, which ensues from the legislation is a discri­
mination between citizens and non-citizens, a feature 
not in any way rare in legislation of a similar type 
enacted by other Sovereign Legislatures. If it was 
proper for the Legislature of Ceylon to deny the 
franchise to non-citizens, it clearly follows that 
it was not improper for the same Legislature to deny 
rights of entry to non-citizens. Indeed . . . the 
Legislature is free to confer rights or privileges 
exclusively on citizens or to impose restrictions or 
disabilities applicable solely to non-citizens.^
Section 14(3) (b) of Act No.20 of 1948 must be viewed in the 
context of the Citizenship Act which preceded it by two weeks.
Having prescribed the qualifications for citizenship, the legislat­
ure conferred a right of residence on "British subjects" who had 
been "ordinarily resident" in Ceylon from prior to November 1944. 
This meant that those ordinarily resident in the country who did not 
qualify for citizenship acquired the right to continued residence.
In 1955, at the time of the repeal of this section, it must have 
been a matter of common knowledge that the beneficiaries of the 
right conferred by section 14(3) (b) were primarily the members of 
the Indian Tamil community who had failed to satisfy the stringent 
requirements for citizenship. Accordingly, when that section was 
repealed, Parliament in effect denied that community alone the 
right to reside in Ceylon; a right which other communities 
continued to enjoy by virtue of citizenship. Section 29(2) of the 
Constitution did not contemplate "citizens" and "non-citizens"; it
!• (1957) 58 NIR 571
2. Ibid., at 573.
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sought to protect certain rights of "communities" and "religions", 
whether they be citizens or not. Therefore, it is submitted that
H.N.G.Fernando J, acting within the constraints imposed by the 
Privy Council in Kodakkan Pillai, erred when he held that the 
legislature was free to impose restrictions or disabilities appli­
cable solely to non-citizens.
3. Language. The Official Language Act, No.33 of 1956, which 
received the Royal Assent on 7 July 1956, provided that the Sinhala 
language shall be the one official language of Ceylon. Where, how­
ever, the Minister considered it impracticable to commence the use 
of only the Sinhala language for any official purpose immediately, 
the language hitherto used for that purpose, namely English, was 
authorised to be so used until the necessary change was effected 
not later than 31 December 1960. The Minister was authorised to 
make regulations for the purpose of giving effect to the principles 
and provisions of the Act. No such regulations were made, but a 
Treasury Circular No.560 issued on 4 November 1961 provided, on pain 
of suspension of increment falling due, that public officers must 
pass three proficiency tests in Sinhala.
Kodeeswaran, a Tamil, had been appointed to the General 
Clerical Service in 1952. In 1959, he was promoted to the executive 
class of that service on a salary scale of Rs. 1,600 to Rs.3,780 per 
annum with annual increments of Rs.120. In terms of the relevant 
minute, he was required to pass a proficiency test in one national 
language before proceeding beyond the stage of Rs.3,180; he had the 
option of choosing his own language, Tamil, for this examination.
An increment of Rs.10 per month fell due on 1 April 1962, but was 
not paid since he had not presented himself for the Sinhala exam­
ination in which he was required to qualify by the new Treasury 
Circular No.560. Kodeeswaran thereupon instituted an action in the 
District Court of Colombo seeking a declaration that the new Circular 
was unreasonable and/or illegal and not binding on him, and that he 
was entitled to payment of the increment which fell due on 1 April 
1962. It was submitted on his behalf that the Official Language 
Act was ultra vires on the ground that in enacting it Parliament 
had transgressed the prohibition against discrimination contained 
in section 29(2) of the Constitution, and that accordingly, the 
Circular which was issued to implement that Act and which purported
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to vary the existing terms of his appointment was also void and 
ineffective to disentitle him to the increment to which he would 
have been entitled under those terms. The Attorney-General raised 
a preliminary issue, viz. whether a public servant had any right 
of action against the Crown for salary due in respect of services 
which he had rendered. The District Judge decided the preliminary 
issue in favour of the plaintiff.
The Crown argued, as it did in respect of the Citizenship 
Act, that it is the legitimate exercise of the function of a State 
which is independent to decide what its official language should be 
and that it is perfectly fair in making that decision to choose the 
language spoken by the overall majority of persons in the country.
The District Judge rightly pointed out that if that decision invol­
ved the passing of an Act, then whether the Act was valid or not in 
law depended on whether it did or did not offend section 29 "subject 
to which safeguard independence was given and received".^
To the submission that a community was not bound together by 
its literacy or illiteracy, but by its race or religion, the Judge 
pointed out that in Ceylon the language of the Sinhalese community 
was Sinhala; the language of the Tamils, Moors and Malays and Indians 
was Tamil; and the language of the Burghers and Europeans was English:
Now if the members of each community were able to speak, 
read and write the language of each of the other commu­
nities, then it is obvious that the selection of the 
language of one community as the official language . . . 
could not cause any handicap to the members of the 
communities whose language was not chosen, however much 
they resented the fact that their own language was not 
given pride of place. But every community in Ceylon is 
not literate in the language of the other communities, 
and . . . the selection of the language of one community 
must cause at least inconvenience, if not disability, 
to the communities who are not literate in that parti­
cular language.
He referred to the evidence:
We have the uncontradicted evidence of Mr.Thondman that 
the cases of Indian Tamils able to read and write Sinhala 
are so few that they may be regarded as exceptional.
We have the uncontradicted evidence of Mr.Seyd Mohamed
1. It is interesting to note this reference by De Kretser DJ 
on 25 April 1964. It was on 5 May 1964 that Lord Pearce made the 
controversial obiter dicta (supra,p.65) that s.29(2) "represent the 
solemn balance of rights between the citizens of Ceylon, the funda­
mental conditions on which inter se they accepted the Constitution
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that in the Muslim communities in Batticaloa no one 
knows Sinhala, and we have the evidence of Mr.Siva- 
sithamparam of the difficulties the Tamil people in 
the North have when a communication comes to them 
in Sinhala and recourse has to be had to the Sinh­
alese baker to understand what it is all about for 
no one else there is able to read or write Sinhala.
Nr.Nesiah, whose evidence is uncontradicted, gives 
evidence that the handicap of having to use a lang­
uage other than the one which is one's mother 
tongue is one that is never overcome . . . Where one 
is not a linguist, the difficulties of trying to 
learn a language after one has grown to man's estate 
in order to compete with men who have known the 
language all their lives is manifest.
On the face of the statute, the Official Language Act did not 
confer an advantage on any community which it denied to others. But, 
as the Privy Council pointed out in Kodakkan Pillai, there may be 
circumstances in which legislation though framed so as not to offend 
directly against a constitutional limitation, may indirectly achieve 
the same result. While an Act declaring an official language may 
seem quite innocuous, the circumstances that obtain in the country 
at the relevant time may operate to place one community at an advan­
tage over the others. As De Kretser DJ noted:
At the time it was passed one has to presume that 
those voting for it were aware of the numbers lit­
erate in Sinhala among the Sinhalese and among the 
non-Sinhalese communities. They must be presumed to 
know that those literate in Sinhala were going to 
have a tremendous advantage in at least the matter 
of appointments and promotions in the public service 
over those who were not. They had to know that over­
night the hitherto efficient non-Sinhalese officer 
would lose his value while even the otherwise ineff­
icient Sinhalese officer would have his utility 
value doubled. They had to know that Sinhala is the 
language of the Sinhalese community which had an 
overall majority in numbers over all other communities.
It is hard to resist the correctness of the submis­
sion that under the cloak that it was a legitimate 
function for a Parliament to decide in what langu­
age the official business should be carried on and 
that in making that decision the language spoken by
and these are therefore unalterable under the Constitution". De 
Kretser was of the view that s.29 was included in the Constitution, 
on the initiative of the Board of Ministers, because, as the Soul- 
bury Commission pointed out, "the near approach of the complete 
transference of power and authority from neutral British hands to 
the people of this country is causing in the minds of the Tamil 
people, in common with other minorities, much misgiving and fear".
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the largest number of people should be the choice, 
a legislative act has been passed which gave adv­
antage to one community which the others did not 
have, for the purpose of an Act must be found in 
its natural operation and effect.
Accordingly, he held that the Official Language Act was ultra
vires section 29(2) of the Constitution.^
On appeal, a bench of two Judges of the Supreme Court
confined its attention to the preliminary issue and held that a
public servant in Ceylon had no right to sue the Crown for the
2
recovery of his wages. The Court did not call upon the Attor­
ney-General to submit his arguments on the question of the validity 
of the Official Language Act, a question of "extraordinary impor­
tance and great difficulty" which would warrant reference to a
3
bench of five or more Judges. H.N.G.Fernando CJ explained that 
if a case could be decided on one of two grounds, one involving a 
constitutional question and the other a question of statutory con­
struction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.
On further appeal, the Privy Council reversed the Supreme Court 
decision on the preliminary issue.^ But the Board too heard no 
argument and expressed no view upon any of the other issues 
raised in the action and dealt with in the judgment of the District 
Judge. As Lord Diplock explained, "They would not think it proper 
to do so without the assistance of the considered judgment of the 
Supreme Court".^ Consequently, an authoritative decision on this 
question was never given. In May 1972, the impugned Act was 
incorporated in the new Constitution. Kodeeswaran himself was 
compensated by the new Republic, whereupon he discontinued his 
litigation against the State.
Right to an Independent and Impartial Tribunal
The right to an independent and impartial tribunal was 
protected by the provisions of Part VI of the Constitution. In 
particular, section 52 provided that Judges of the Supreme Court 
shall hold office during good behaviour; that their salaries shall 
not be diminished; and that they shall not be removable except by
1. The judgment of the District Court is not reported.
2. Attorney-General v. Kodeeswaran (1967) 70 NLR 121.
3. Ibid., at 139.
4. Kodeeswaran v. Attorney-General (1969) 72 NLR 337.
5. Ibid., at 339.
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the Governor-General on an address of the Senate and the House of
Representatives. In Senadheera v. Bribery Commissioner,^  Sansoni J
recalled that Lord Atkin had, with reference to the British North
America Act of 1867 described provisions similar to these as "the
2
three principal pillars in the temple of justice". Sansoni J 
added:
The framers of our Constitution erected a fourth 
pillar in that temple when the power of appoint­
ment, transfer, dismissal and disciplinary control 
of judicial officers was vested in the Judicial 
Service Commission. 3
He was referring to section 55 which created a Judicial Service 
Commission consisting of the Chief Justice and two Judges of the 
Supreme Court. From these provisions, the Supreme Court inferred 
that "a division of the three main functions of government is recog­
nised in our Constitution", or at least that "judicial power in the
sense of the judicial power of the State is vested in the Judica­
ture, i.e. the established civil courts of this country".^- The 
Privy Council agreed that there existed a separate power in the 
judiciature which under the Constitution could not be usurped or 
infringed by the executive or the legislature:
These provisions manifest an intention to secure in 
the judiciary a freedom from political, legislative 
and executive control. They are wholly appropriate 
in a Constitution which intends that judicial power
shall be vested only in the judicature. They would
be inappropriate in a Constitution by which it was 
intended that judicial power should be shared by the 
executive or the legislature.5
Whatever other constitutional or political purposes a separation of
powers or functions may serve, it also serves as a safeguard of
individual liberty. Therefore, when, beginning in 1961, the Supreme
Court and the Privy Council in a series of judgments in the course
of that decade sought to prevent any encroachment on, or erosion of,
the powers vested in the judicature, these two Courts were also
seeking to ensure, within the limits laid down by the law, the
continued availability of an independent and impartial tribunal
whenever judicial power was required to be exercised.
1. (1961) 63 NIR 313.
2. Toronto Corporation v. York Corporation [1938] AC 415.
3. Op.cit., at 318.
4. The Queen v. Liyanage (1962) 64 NLR 313, at 350.
5. Liyanage v. The Queen (1965) 68 NLR 265, at 282.
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1. Meaning of "Judicial Power". In The Queen v. Liyanage,^
T.S.Fernando J adopted a broad classification of judicial power:
a) in the sense of the essence of judicial power, the strict judi­
cial power;
b) in the sense of the power of judicial review;
c) in a loose sense, as meaning the powers of a judge, e.g. disci­
plinary powers and powers ancillary to the judicial power.
He accepted a submission that where a power which would ordinarily 
fall into the third loose category is consistent with executive or 
administrative power and is consistent also with judicial power, 
the matter should be considered further in order to see whether 
that particular power falls actually within judicial power or out­
side it. For that purpose, it would be legitimate to adopt one or 
other of the following tests: (a) the historical criterion expounded 
by Dean Roscoe Pound, i.e. to ask whether, at the time when the 
Constitution was adopted, the power in question was exercised by 
the Crown, by Parliament or by the Judges, or (b) the Holmes test,
i.e. to inquire what is the end or purpose in view. As for judicial 
power in the first sense, it was thought to be best described in the 
oft-quoted definition of Griffiths CJ in Huddart Parker Pty.Ltd v. 
Moorehead:
The words 'judicial power' . . . means the power which 
every sovereign authority must of necessity have to 
decide controversies between its subjects, or between 
itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to 
life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power 
does not begin until some tribunal which has power to 
give a binding and authoritative decision (whether 
subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action.2
This approach to the "judicial power" concept was approved by the
Privy Council and was generally followed by the Supreme Court in its
subsequent decisions.
2. Application of the "Judicial Power" Test. Four tribunals
were held to have been constituted in contravention of section 55(1)
of the Constitution, and thereby to be lacking in the essential
3
attributes of independence and impartiality. They were:
(a) Bribery Tribunals established under the Bribery Act, No.11 of 
1954 as amended by Act,No.40 of 1958. A Bribery Tribunal was
1. (1962) 64 NLR 313.
2. (1909) 8 CLR, at 357.
3. No reference will be made in this study to those tribunals 
which according to the Supreme Court, did not purport to exercise
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composed of three members selected from a panel; the panel was 
composed of not more than fifteen persons appointed by the 
Governor-General on the advice of the Minister of Justice. A 
Bribery Tribunal had power to hear, try and determine any pro­
secution for bribery made against any person and to impose 
imprisonment or fine. As Sansoni J observed in Senadhira v. 
Bribery Comnissioner:
The 1958 amendments to the Bribery Act were designed 
to deprive the established Courts of their jurisdict­
ion to try charges of bribery, and to invest perman­
ently established Bribery Tribunals with that juris­
diction. Let me repeat that observation in different 
words. The Bribery Tribunals were Courts set up in 
substitution for the established Courts, and they were 
entrusted with the function of administering justice 
in a particular sphere.-*-
But whether the Bribery Tribunals were substitutes for the estab­
lished Courts as Sansoni J thought, or the Tribunals had concur­
rent jurisdiction with the Courts as was argued before the Privy
judicial power:
Court Martial: Gunaseela v. Udugama (1966) 69 NLR 193; 
Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation: Panagoda v. Budenis 
(1966) 68 NLR 490;
Commissioner of Inland Revenue: Xavier v. Wijekoon (1966)
69 NLR 197;
Income Tax Board of Review: Ranaweera v. Ramachandran (1969)
72 NLR 562,
nor to those tribunals which, though held by the Supreme Court 
to be exercising judicial power, were nevertheless held by the 
Privy Council not to be judicial offices:
President of a Labour Tribunal: United Engineering Workers 
Union v. Devanayagam (1967) 69 NLR 289;
Arbitrator under the Industrial Disputes Act: ibid;
Industrial Court: ibid.
For the overruled Supreme Court view, see Walker Sons & Co.Ltd
v. Fry (1965) 68 NLR 73; Moosajees v. Fernando (1966) 68 NLR 
414; Rockland Distilleries Ltd v. Wijetilleke (1966) 68 NLR 414.
For a full discussion of the "tribunal cases", see M.J.A.Cooray, 
Judicial Role under the Constitutions of Ceylon/Sri Lanka 
(Colombo: Lake House Investments Ltd, 1982), pp. 74-137.
1. (1961) 63 NLR 313.
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Council in Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe,^ they were
institutions seeking to exercise judicial power but not through
2
duly appointed judicial officers.
(b) The office of Quazi established under the Muslim Marriage and
Divorce Act, No. 13 of 1954. The Quazi was appointed by the
Minister and had jurisdiction to entertain an application by a
Muslim wife for a divorce and to adjudicate upon claims for the
payment of Mahr as well as for the maintenance of wives and
children. In Jailabdeen v. Danina Umma, H.N.G.Fernando J
observed that the purpose and effect of the law "was to take
away from the ordinary courts a jurisdiction previously enjoyed
by those courts and to confer that jurisdiction on Quazis".
But, as he emphasized:
There is nothing illegal, in the sense of conflict 
with the Constitution, in a statute which establishes 
a new judicial tribunal with jurisdiction (whether 
exclusive or not) over particular charges or causes.
Indeed, the legislature might well consider it 
necessary in the public interest to constitute such 
tribunals, and one can think of many reasons for 
the adoption of such a course, such as the need to 
secure quick disposal of matters considered to be 
deserving of special priority, or to appoint to such 
tribunals persons having special knowledge or exp­
erience concerning the matters to be adjudged.
The essential requirement was conformity with section 55 of the
Constitution.
(c) The licensing authority constituted under the Licensing of Traders
4
Act, No.62 of 1961. The licensing authority, who was appointed 
by the Minister, was empowered to make a "punitive order" 
suspending or cancelling the licence issued to a trader and 
requiring such trader to pay to the general revenue a sum not 
exceeding Rs.5,000. Two of the four grounds on which such an 
order could be made were:
i. that he was satisfied that such trader had contravened any 
provision of the Act or of any regulations made thereunder; or
ii. that he was satisfied that such trader had acted or was 
acting in contravention of any provision of the Control of 
Prices Act or the Food Control Act.
1. (1964) 66 NLR 73.
2. For other cases, see p.270, n.2.
3. (1962) 64 NLR 419, at 420.
4. Ibrahim v. Government Agent, Vavuniya (1966) 69 NIR 217.
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That is, the act of a trader which provokes the making of a 
"punitive order" is that he has sold an article at a price 
in excess of the maximum price prescribed under the Control 
of Prices Act; in other words, that he has committed an 
offence under that Act which is triable and punishable in 
the ordinary course by a Magistrate. The licensing authority 
is exercising judicial power without having been duly appoin­
ted in the manner set out in section 55(1) of the Constitu­
tion.
(d) An arbitrator appointed under the Co-operative Societies 
Ordinance, No. 16 of 1936.^ The relevant law made provision 
for the decision of certain disputes by the Registrar of Co­
operative Societies or by arbitrators nominated by him.
Included within the category of such disputes were those 
arising:
i. among members or past members of a society;
ii. between a member on the one side and a society or its
comnittee on the other;
iii. between a society or its committee and any officer or
employee of the society.
In this instance, the dispute related to a claim made by the
committee against an employee on the basis that he was liable
to account for goods shown by the books of the society toihave
been under his control as manager. As H.N.G.Fernando noted:
The liability of the manager arises at the least 
upon an implied contract, in the nature of agency.
The dispute concerning the existence of this lia­
bility and the duty to perform it is an ordinary 
civil dispute within the traditional jurisdiction 
of the Courts.1
On 23 June 1962, the Minister of Justice, purporting to act 
under section 440A of the Criminal Procedure Code as amended by 
section 4 of the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act, No.l of 
1962, directed that the trial of twenty-four persons in respect of 
three specified offences under Chapter VI of the Penal Code be held 
before the Supreme Court at Bar by three Judges without a jury. 
Later that same day, the Attorney-General exhibited to the Court 
an Information that these twenty-four persons had conspired to 
wage war against the Queen, and conspired and/or prepared to over-
1. Karunatilleke v. Abeywira (1966) 68 NLR 503.
2. Ibid., at 505.
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throw otherwise than by lawful means the Government of Ceylon by
law established, and thereby committed offences punishable under
section 115 of the Penal Code as amended by section 6(2) of the
Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act. Thereafter, the Minister
of Justice, again on the same day, purporting to act under section
9 of the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act, nominated three
Judges of the Supreme Court to preside over the trial of the persons
referred to above. Section 9 read as follows:
Where the Minister of Justice issues a direction 
under section 440A of the Criminal Procedure Code 
that the trial of any offence shall be held before 
the Supreme Court at Bar by three Judges without 
a Jury, the three Judges shall be nominated by the 
Minister of Justice, and the Chief Justice if so 
nominated or, if he is not so nominated, the most
senior of the three Judges so nominated, shall be
the president of the Court.
The Court consisting of the three Judges so 
nominated shall, for all purposes, be duly consti­
tuted and accordingly the constitution of that 
Court, and its jurisdiction to try that offence, 
shall not be called in question in any Court, 
whether by way of writ or otherwise.
At the commencement of the trial, when the defendants were called
upon to plead, certain preliminary objections were raised on their
behalf. After several days of argument, the Court, upholding one
of the objections, held that because:
a) the power of nomination conferred on the Minister was an inter­
ference with the exercise by the Judges of the Supreme Court of 
the strict judicial power of the State vested in them by virtue 
of their appointment in terms of section 52 of the Constitution, 
or was in derogation thereof, and
b) the power of nomination was one which had hitherto been invar­
iably exercised by the Judicature as being part of the exercise 
of the judicial power of the State, and could not be reposed in 
anyone outside the Judicature,
section 9 of the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act was ultra
vires the Constitution.^ T.S.Fernando J explained:
The right of a judge to exercise judicial power is 
so inextricably bound up with the actual exercise 
of the power and is such an essential step in the 
exercise of the strictly judicial power that it must,
1. The Queen v. Liyanage (1962) 64 NLR 313.
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in our opinion, be considered part of the power 
itself. Unless the Legislature has vested the exer­
cise of any strictly judicial power in the entire 
Supreme Court, it is necessary that a bench of 
Judges should be nominated to exercise that judicial 
power vested in the Supreme Court. If the power of 
nomination is completely abolished, no judicial power 
vested in the court can be exercised. If that power 
is vested in an outside authority, it will legally 
be open to such authority to exercise that power to 
prevent a particular judge or judges from exercising 
any part of the strictly judicial power vested in 
them by the Constitution as judges of the Supreme 
Court. The absurdity of such a possible result will 
be more marked if, instead of the position of a 
Puisne Justice of the Court, the position of the 
Chief Justice himself be considered. Under a prov­
ision of law of this nature it seems to us legally 
possible to exclude the Chief Justice himself from 
presiding in the Court of which he is the constitu­
tionally appointed Head. The exercise of the power 
to nominate can then in practice result in a total 
negation of the judicial power of a judge or judges 
vested in them by the Constitution.
Dealing with another objection "of a fundamental character", 
the Court observed that even had it come to a different conclusion 
regarding the validity of section 9, it would have been compelled 
to give way to a principle which "has now become ingrained in the 
administration of the common justice in this country", namely, that 
"it is not merely of some importance, but is of fundamental import­
ance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly 
and undoubtedly be seen to be done". The Court pointed out that 
the new legislation, passed with retrospective effect, after the 
commission of the offences alleged, had purported to vest in the 
Minister (a member of the Government which the defendants were 
alleged to have conspired to overthrow by unlawful means and who, 
it was not disputed, had participated in the investigation and 
interrogation of some of the defendants), the additional power to 
nominate the three Judges. This power had hitherto been vested in 
the Supreme Court as a body or in the Chief Justice, and in no 
person or body outside the Judicature. T.S.Fernando J conceded 
that a Court could not inquire into the motives of legislators.
But. he observed:
The circumstances set out above are, however, such 
as to put this court on enquiry as to whether the
1. Ibid., at 357.
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ordinary or reasonable man would feel that this court 
itself may be biased. What is the impression that is 
likely to be created in the mind of the ordinary or 
reasonable man by this sudden and, it must be presumed, 
purposeful change of the law, after the event, affec­
ting the seelction of Judges ? Will he not be justi­
fied in asking himself, 'Why should the Minister, 
who must be deemed to be interested in the result of 
the case, be given the power to select the Judges 
whereas the other party to the cause has no say what­
ever in a selection ? Have not the ordinary canons of 
justice and fairplay been violated ? Will he harbour 
the impression, honestly though mistakenly formed, 
that there has been an improper interference with the 
course of justice ? In that situation will he not 
suspect even the impartiality of the Bench thus nomi­
nated ? 1
An Assessment
The existence of a court with jurisdiction to inquire into 
and pronounce upon the validity of legislation is a feature comnon 
to most democratic countries today. It does not mean, as. most Sri 
Lankan politicians tend to believe, that the country would then be 
governed by such a court or be ruled by its judges. It does mean 
that the legislature, together with the executive and the judiciary, 
will be subject to the supreme law of the land as declared and 
contained in the Constitution. The function of the court is to 
ensure that Parliament acts within the limits placed upon it by the 
Constitution. It is, of course, the privilege of Parliament, as 
the embodiment of the will of the people, to extend those limits, 
if the people have so willed by giving it the strength necessary 
for that purpose.
Any assessment of the Ceylonese experience of the ex post 
facto review of legislation must take note of the shortcomings 
which were inherent in the system devised in the 1946 Constitution. 
These were:
1. The absence of a court vested with exclusive jurisdiction.
Neither the Constitution, nor any other law, vested jurisdiction 
in respect of such matters in any particular court. Consequently, 
the validity of statutes was challenged at different levels of the 
judicial heirarchy. Kodakkan Pillai who questioned the validity 
of the Citizenship Act before a revising officer in 1951 was 
fortunate that the Attorney-General sought by way of certiorari in
1. Ibid., at 360. See also Liyanage v. The Queen (1965) 68 
NLR 265, where the Privy Council held that the Criminal Law (Spec­
ial Provisions) Law was a "legislative plan" to secure the conviction 
and severe punishment of an identified group of person^ .
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in the Supreme Court to have the revising officer's order quashed; 
by 1953 the Privy Council had authoritatively pronounced upon the 
matter. Kodeeswaran was less fortunate. In 1962 he chose the 
declaratory action in the District Court to impugn the Official 
Language Act; in 1970, two appeals and eight years later, the matter 
was still pending a final determination. Neither a revising officer 
appointed under the Franchise Act, nor a District Judge exercising 
original jurisdiction in a wide variety of matters, appears to be 
the appropriate authority to inquire into and pronounce upon the 
validity of a law. While Parliament was critical of the delay 
involved in obtaining an authoritative pronouncement in these 
matters, it took no remedial action. When, in March 1971, the Min­
istry of Justice proposed that the new Court of Appeal, which was 
about to be established as the country's final appellate tribunal, 
should have exclusive jurisdiction to pronounce upon the validity 
of legislation and in regard to the interpretation of the Constitu­
tion, and that all such matters should forthwith be referred to that 
Court should they arise in the course of proceedings in subordinate 
courts, the Cabinet rejected that proposal.^ However, this is the 
practice in several Commonwealth countries. For instance, the 
Constitution of Mauritius of 1968 provides thus:
i. Where any question as to the interpretation of 
this Constitution arises in any court of law 
established for Mauritius (other than the Court 
of Appeal, the Supreme Court or a court-martial) 
and the court is of opinion that the question 
involves a substantial question of law, the court 
shall refer the question to the Supreme Court.
ii. Where any question is referred to the Supreme 
Court in pursuance of this section, the Supreme 
Court shall give its decision upon the question 
and the court in which the question arose shall 
dispose of the case in accordance with that 
decision or, if the decision is subject to an 
appeal to the Court of Appeal or Her Majesty in 
Council, in accordance with the decision of the 
Court of Appeal or, as the case may be, of Her 
Majesty in Council.^
1. Ceylon Daily News, 30 March 1971.
2. Art.84. For similar provisions, see Constitutions of Antigua 
and Barbuda 1981, Art.120; Saint Lucia 1978, Art.106; Saint 
Vincent 1979, Art.97; and Grenada 1973, Art.102.
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2. The absence of a uniform method of challenge.
A person wishing to question the validity of a statute was left to 
his own ingenuity in devising a method by which he could reach the 
forum of his choice. Often, the chosen method was a devious one 
of reaching the destination. The legality of the Official Language 
Act remained clouded in doubt while lawyers argued before three 
courts, over a period of five years, whether or not Kodeeswaran,
being a public servant, was entitled to sue for his wages. Kariapper
had to divide his attention between the twin questions of the vali­
dity of the Imposition of Civic Disabilities Act and whether mandamus 
lay against the Clerk to the House of Representatives; he must surely 
have been consoled by the assurance of the Privy Council that had 
that Court not held against him on the former, it would have been 
compelled to reject his application on the latter. Don Anthony was 
singularly unlucky: the two Supreme Court Judges who heard his 
appeal against a bribery conviction thought that it was not compet­
ent for him to attack as invalid the very Act of Parliament which
conferred on him the right of appeal, while fellow appellants, 
Piyadasa and Ranasinghe encountered no such teething problem.
3. The requirement of locus standi.
The question of the validity of a statute could not be raised except
by one who was adversely affected by its implementation. Even if a
law bore upon its face the clear imprint of invalidity, it continued
to remain in the statute book until an "aggrieved person" appeared
who was ready, able and willing to canvass its enforceability.
Although several other Commonwealth Constitutions also require a
person to have "a relevant interest",^- or to show that "his interests
2
are being or are likely to be affected", before he is permitted to 
allege that a constitutional provision has been contravened, this 
is not an invariable rule. In Malta, a right of action for a decl­
aration that a law is invalid, on any ground other than inconsistency 
with a fundamental right (for which special provision is made)
"shall appertain to all persons without distinction and a person
1. For instance, Constitutions of Grenada 1973, Art.101;
Saint Vincent 1979, Art.96; Saint Lucia 1978, Art.105; and 
Antigua and Barbuda 1981, Art.119.
2. See Constitutions of Mauritius 1968, Art.83(1); Fiji 1970, 
Art.97(1); and Kiribati 1979, Art.88(l).
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bringing such an action shall not be required to show any personal 
interest in support of his action".^
These procedural shortcomings must be viewed in perspective. 
The 1946 Constitution did not require the judiciary to declare 
invalid any legislation which was inconsistent with the Constitu­
tion. Nor did it contain a comprehensive bill of rights which a 
court was required to enforce. In both respects, the Supreme Court 
chose to perform an innovative role. On the one hand, it assumed 
the power to review legislation. On the other, by its interven­
tionist approach, it sought to create an informal regime of rights. 
If, in so doing, it showed reluctance in entering into a confront­
ation with Parliament over legislation relating to fundamental 
issues such as citizenship and language, it was displaying a degree
of prudence which was perhaps understandable, having regard to the
2
criticism to which it was, in any event, subjected to. H.N.G.
Fernando CJ gave expression to this cautious policy when he quoted
with approval the opinion of an American text-book writer that:
It must be evident to anyone that the power to declare 
a Legislative Enactment void is one which the Judge,
conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment,
will shrink from exercising in any case where he can 
conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official 
oath decline the responsibility.-^
But while it assiduously circumvented the substantive issues
raised by politically sensitive legislation, the Supreme Court did
not hesitate to intervene, and to do so forcefully and fearlessly
on occasion, in the cause of individual liberty. On the one hand,
it applied the doctrine of the separation of functions unyieldingly,
and repeatedly struck down legislation which either encroached on,
or eroded, judicial power. Thereby, it prevented Parliament from
proceeding to:
establish new Courts with powers as great as, or even 
greater than, those possessed by the established Courts, 
and devise a new method of appointing the judges who 
are to preside over them. Such substitute or parallel 
courts could be given unlimited power over 'the life, 
liberty and property of the subject' to be exercised 
by persons to be appointed in any manner Parliament 
may choose.
1. Constitution of the Republic of Malta 1964, Art.119.
2. See criticism in the Constituent Assembly, supra, pp.114-123.
3. Attorney-General v. Kodeeswaran (1967) 70 NLR 121, at 138.
4. Senadhira v. Bribery Commissioner (1961) 63 NLR 313, at 
320, per Sansoni J.
308
The Court believed that "such an attempt made once could well be
repeated",”^ unless it was stifled immediately. It also thought
that "any departure from these salutary provisions of the Order in
Council, ensuring to the citizen the independence of the Judiciary,
2
will no doubt lead to malpractices", and should not, therefore, be 
permitted. On the other hand, the Court applied ordinary statute 
law in such a way as to create an informal regime of rights. Prin­
ciples of criminal justice such as the right to resist unlawful
3 4arrest, the right to judicial surveillance of detention, the right
5 6to trial within a reasonable time, the right to be defended, the
7 8presumption of innocence, the privilege against self-incrimination,
9
and the doctrine of double jeopardy, were extracted from the law
relating to criminal procedure and equated to fundamental principles
which were "ingrained in the Rule of L a w " T h e  Court was not willing
to countenance their non-observance or contravention, however grave
the provocation might have been. And, as Basnayake CJ declared:
Under our law, everyone has the right of access to 
the established courts of law for relief against the 
infringements of his rights, and to no one will the 
courts deny that right if their powers are invoked in 
appropriate proceedings.-*-
In the final analysis, whatever criticism it might have earned 
in other respects, justifiably or otherwise, none could have said of 
the Supreme Court, particularly of the Court of the 'Sixties, that 
it did not possess the capacity, in appropriate circumstances, and 
through an effectual mechanism, to make a properly formulated, comp­
rehensive bill of rights work. ^
1. Ibid.
2. Piyadasa v. Bribery Commissioner (1962) 64 NLR 385, at 391.
3. Muttusamy v. Kannangara (1951) 52 NLR 324; The Queen v. Corea
(1954) 55 NIR 457.
4. Kolugala v. Superintendent of Prisons (1961) 66 NLR 412.
5. Premasiri v. Attorney-General (1967) 70 NLR 193.
6. Jayasinghe v. Munasinghe (1959) 62 NLR 527; The Queen v.
Peter (1961) 64 NLR 120; The~Queen v. Prins (1962) 61 CLW 26; 
Premaratne v. Guneratne (1964) 71 NLR 113; Subramaniam v. Inspector 
of Police, Kankesanturai (1968) 71 NLR 204.
7. The Queen v. Sumanasena (1963) 66 NLR 350.
8. De Mel v7 Haniffa (1952) 53 NIR 433; The Queen v- Buddharakkita 
(1961) 63 NLR 43; The Queen v. Gnanaseeha (1968) 73 NLR 154.
9. The Queen v. Tennekoon (1965) 69 CLW 28.
10. This aspect is more fully examined by G.L.Peiris, "Human Rights 
and the System of Criminal Justice in Sri Lanka", Ceylon Journal of 
Historical and Social Studies, vol.VIII, no.l, pp.1-31.
11. Modera Patuwata Co-operative Fishing Society Ltd v. Gune- 
wardene (1959) 62 NLR 192.
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Review of Bills
Under the 1972 Constitution, no institution administering
justice and no other institution, person or authority had the
power or jurisdiction to inquire into, pronounce upon or in any
manner call in question the validity of any law of the National
State Assembly.^ A similar prohibition was imposed by the 1978
2
Constitution in respect of Acts enacted by Parliament. In regard 
to existing law, both Constitutions provided that such law shall 
continue to be valid and operative notwithstanding any inconsis-
3
tency with the fundamental rights guaranteed therein. Therefore, 
as far as legislation was concerned, it was no longer possible to 
impugn a statute on the ground that it was incompatible with a 
fundamental right. There was prescribed, however, a procedure 
whereby the question whether a bill or any provision thereof was 
inconsistent with a fundamental right or any other provision of 
the Constitution could be determined before such bill was taken up 
for discussion by the legislature. This jurisdiction was vested 
solely and exclusively in the Constitutional Court under the 1972
4
Constitution and in the Supreme Court under the 1978 Constitution.
General Observations
Locus Standi
No special interest on the part of a petitioner was required 
in order to invoke the jurisdiction either of the Constitutional 
Court or of the Supreme Court. Any citizen could do so by a 
writing addressed to the Court. But non-citizens and corporate 
bodies,^ despite the fact that they too were guaranteed certain 
rights under both Constitutions, were left without the right of 
recourse.
Of those who raised questions of inconsistency before the 
Constitutional Court, five were interest groups, namely:
a) the directors and shareholders of the Associated Newspapers of 
Ceylon Limited, with reference to the Associated Newspapers of 
Ceylon Ltd (Special Provisions) Bill;
b) worshippers of the different Christian denominations, with 
reference to the Church of Sri Lanka (Consequential Provisions) 
Bill;
1. S.48(2). 2. Art.80(3).
3. S.18(3); Art.16(1). 4. Supra, pp.124-130, 152.
3. The 1978 Constitution defined "citizen" for this purpose to
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c) members of the Buddhist clergy and leading lay Buddhists, with 
reference to the Pirivena Education Bill;
d) trade union leaders, with reference to the Greater Colombo Econ­
omic Commission Bill; and
e) those who would be directly affected by it, with reference to 
the Local Authorities (Imposition of Civic Disabilities)(No.1) 
and (No.2) Bills.
Apart from those described above, only fourteen citizens emerged 
between 1972 and 1978 to raise questions of inconsistency in regard 
to bills. Two of them were Members of Parliament, while one was the 
secretary of the civil rights movement. A fourth, L.O.K.Wanigasekera, 
canvassed the validity of three bills. The Attorney-General exer­
cised his right of reference on three occasions,^ while the leaders
2
of the UNP and the SLFP made two references each. Between 1978 and 
1981, only one citizen, the general secretary of the SLFP, invoked 
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
This apparent indifference on the part of the ordinary citizen 
is probably due to an intrinsic weakness in the concept of anticipa­
tory review. The publication of a bill in the Gazette does not 
provide the publicity that is necessary to enable interested parties 
to advise themselves on whether or not to raise any question of 
inconsistency. The Gazette is not freely available on the day of 
publication; nor is it widely read. Even a subscriber receives his 
copy nearly two or three weeks late. Therefore, a citizen will not 
have the ooprtunity of questioning the constitutionality of a bill 
unless, being particularly interested in the subject-matter of a 
bill, he follows its progress through the newspapers and then obtains 
a copy of the bill in time. Having done so, this public-spirited 
citizen will have to seek and obtain legal advice, have the petition 
prepared in proper form and with sufficient copies and then file 
the same in Court, all within a period of barely one week. He or 
his legal adviser will also have to test the constitutionality of 
its provisions, not with reference to its actual implementation, but 
on a purely hypothetical basis.
include an incorporated body if not less than three-fourths of its 
members were citizens: Art.121(1).
1. Associated Newspapers of Ceylon (Special Provisions) Bill, 
Administration of Justice Bill, and the Greater Colombo Economic 
Commission Bill.
2. J.R.Jayewardene referred the Sri Lanka Press Council Bill and 
the Administration of Justice Bill, while Mrs.Bandaranaike referred 
the two Local Authorities (Imposition of Civic Disabilities) Bills.
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The 1972 Constitution required the Attorney-General to examine 
every bill and to inform the Speaker if, in his opinion, a question 
of inconsistency should be referred to the Constitutional Court.
That is, if the Attorney-General had a doubt in regard to the const­
itutionality of a bill, or even an uneasy feeling, it was his duty 
to comnunicate that opinion to the Speaker; and the Speaker was then 
required to refer that bill to the Constitutional Court for a 
decision. The unreality of this situation, particularly in respect 
of a controversial bill, has already been noted.'*' On 15 November 
1972, Attorney-General Tennekoon addressed the Minister of Justice 
in the following terms:
I refer to your note on the Press Bill which you 
handed to me yesterday.
I would like to say, with all respect to the Cabinet, 
that I still continue to hold the view that certain prov­
isions in the Bill are inconsistent with the guarantee 
of equal protection of the law contained in the Court [sic]. 
Indeed, I would have written to Mr.Speaker to that effect 
and have refrained from doing so only because the objection 
has already been taken by others.
When the matter comes up for hearing I believe it will 
be my duty to inform the Court of my views and the reasons 
therefor.
You posed to me the question how the Cabinet1 s view may 
be placed before the Court.
It would not be possible for a lawyer member of the 
Cabinet to appear because the Constitution prohibits 
members of the National State Assembly appearing before 
the Constitutional Court.
A private lawyer may I think, with leave of the Court, 
appear and present the Government's point of view. Apart 
from other reasons this would be convenient for me in 
view of other important and time-consuming commitments.
A possible course may be for me as Attorney-General to 
appear before the Constitutional.. Court and say that the 
Cabinet had been advised of the existence of unconstitutional 
provisions in the bill and that upon the Constitutional 
Court so holding the Government would present the bill in 
the House as one requiring a 2/3 majority for passing.
The only other course which I can think of - though it 
is not one which I can commend or even contemplate with 
equanimity - is to find a new Attorney-General. He would 
have to be one who shares the Cabinet's view on the bill.
It is clear from this letter that the Attorney-General was of the 
opinion that certain provisions in the Press Council Bill were incon­
sistent with the Constitution. It was his constitutional duty to have 
communicated that opinion to the Speaker. He did not do so. The fact 
that some other person had raised the same question of inconsistency
1. Supra, p.128.
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was no reason for the non-performance by the Attorney-General of 
his duty. His belief that it would be sufficient if he expressed 
his views on the bill after the Constitutional Court had assembled 
to consider objections raised by others, was a misconception of 
his own responsibilities. As a matter of fact, even when he did 
appear before the Constitutional Court, he did not publicly disclose 
his views on the bill He was an essential link in the constitu­
tional process of testing the validity of bills; but if an Attorney- 
General were to deliberately neglect to perform his constitutional 
duty and yet continue to remain in office, that process could not 
work. The requirement in the 1978 Constitution that the Attorney- 
General should convey his views on a Bill to the President appears, 
therefore, to be a more realistic one.
If an amendment is moved to a bill in the course of its prog­
ress through the legislature, there is no opportunity available to 
a citizen to raise a question of inconsistency in regard to that 
amendment. Under both Constitutions, the Attorney-General was 
required to examine all amendments proposed to a bill and to comm­
unicate his opinion to the Speaker at the stage when the bill was 
ready to be put to the House for its acceptance. But the 1978 
Constitution does not enable the Speaker to make a reference to the 
Supreme Court at any stage. Under the 1972 Constitution it was 
theoretically possible for the Speaker to refer to the Constitu­
tional Court at any stage an opinion communicated to him by the 
Attorney-General. Such a reference, however, was never made. This 
is a serious omission as was made evident when on 17 October 1980, 
the following clause was moved at the committee stage discussion 
on the Presidential Elections Bill and the Parliamentary Elections 
Bills
1. No person shall canvass for, or act as agent of or 
speak on behalf of, a candidate, or in any way 
participate in an election, if such person is a 
person on whom civic disability has been imposed 
by a resolution passed by Parliament in terms of 
Article 81 of the Constitution, and the period of 
such civic disability specified in such resolution 
has not expired.
2. Every person who contravenes the provisions of 
subsection (1) shall be guilty of an offence and 
shall, on conviction after a summary trial before 
a Magistrate, be liable to a fine not exceeding
1. Supra, pp.241-255.
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one thousand rupees, or to imprisonment of 
either description for a term not exceeding 
six months, or to both such fine and impris­
onment . 1
On the previous day, Parliament had imposed civic disability on 
the leader of the SLFP, Mrs.Bandaranaike. This new prohibition 
was , prima facie, an infringement of Article 14(1) (e) which guar­
anteed freedom of speech and expression to all citizens, including 
those on whom civic disability had been imposed. But in the 
absence of a challenge and, consequently, of a determination by 
the Supreme Court, this provision found its way into the statute 
book.
Jurisdiction
The Constitutional Court was required to advise the Speaker
whether an impugned bill or any of its provisions was inconsistent
with the Constitution. In arriving at its decision, the Court was
entitled to hear the Attorney-General, who had the right to be heard
on all matters before that Court, and any other person: as a matter
of practice, the Court heard every petitioner or counsel appearing
on behalf of such petitioner. On one occasion when the Attorney-
General advised the Speaker to refer to the Court the question of
the inconsistency of a bill and then declined, for personal reasons,
to exercise his right of audience, the Court heard private counsel
who had been retained by the State to place before it the case for
2
constitutionality of the impugned bill. The Constitutional Court 
was also entitled to hear witnesses and examine documents. Although 
no oral evidence was ever recorded, the Court had recourse to a
3
variety of documents including a party manifesto, a Speech from
4 5the Throne, constituent assembly proceedings, a report of a press
interview given by a Minister; a commentary on the constituent
1. Parliamentary Debates, 17 October 1980, col.1665.
2. Attorney-General Tennekoon declined to appear in respect of 
the Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd (Special Provisions) Bill 
on the ground that his wife was a shareholder of the newspaper 
company concerned. The Government thereupon retained C.Thiagalin­
gam, Q.C., a leading member of the Unofficial Bar, who appeared with 
the Secretaries for Justice and Constitutional Affairs as his 
juniors.
3. Sri Lanka Press Council Bill.(1973) DCC, Vol.l, p.l.
4. Ibid; Companies (Special Provisions) Bill (1974) DCC, Vol.2,
p.l.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
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1 2 assembly; a government communique; reports of commissions of
3 4 5inquiry; a budget speech; court proceedings; and the "trend
g
of legislation", as well as to other constitutions and the deci­
sions of foreign courts, notably those of the Supreme Courts of 
India and the United States. The decision of the Constitutional 
Court together with the reasons therefor was required to be given 
within two weeks of the reference; a dissentient member could if he 
so wished state at the same time the reasons for his dissent.
The Supreme Court's jurisdiction in respect of proposed 
legislation is wider in scope. Any provision of the 1978 Constitu­
tion may be amended with a special majority (i.e. by not less than 
two-third of the total number of members of Parliament voting in 
favour thereof);^ the amendment of certain further entrenched 
provisions requires, in addition, approval by the people at a
g
referendum. The Constitution as a whole may not be repealed unless
the bill for such repeal also seeks to enact a new Constitution to
........9 .........................................................
replace it. The operation of the Constitution, or any part thereof,
may not be suspended."^ Accordingly, the Supreme Court may, in
respect of a bill, be required to determine one or more of the
following questions:
a) whether the bill or any provision thereof requires to be passed 
with the special majority;
b) whether the bill or any provision thereof requires to be passed 
with the special majority and to be approved thereafter at a 
referendum;
c) whether the bill seeks to repeal the Constitution without seeking 
to enact a new Constitution to replace it;
d) whether the bill seeks to suspend the operation of the Consti­
tution or any part thereof;
e) whether the long title of the bill requires to be amended so as 
to state specifically that it is either for the amendment or for 
the repeal and replacement of the Constitution.
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid.
3. Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd (Special Provisions) Bill
(1973) DCC, Vol.l, p.35.
4. Companies (Special Provisions) Bill, supra; Banking Corpor­
ation of Sri Lanka Bill (1977) DCC, Vol.5, p.l.
5. Church of Sri Lanka (Consequential Provisions) Bill (1975)
DCC, Vol.3, p.5.
6. Greater Colombo Economic Commission Bill (1978) DCC, Vol.6,p.5.
7. Art.82(5). 8. Art.83.
9. Art.75. 10. Ibid.
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The Attorney-General as well as the petitioner (either in person 
or by attorney-at-law) have the right to be heard.^ There is no 
specific provision for the admission of evidence, whether oral or 
documentary, and the Court has so far confined itself to the 
content of the relevant bills without proceeding to examine extra­
neous matter in order to gather or understand the pith and substance 
or true character of a proposed legislative measure. The determin­
ation, accompanied by the reasons therefor, is required to be 
communicated to the President and the Speaker within three weeks
of the making of the reference or the filing of the petition, as the
, 2 case may be.
Urgent Bills
By the simple device of an endorsement under the hand of the 
Secretary to the Cabinet that a bill is "urgent in the national 
interest", it has been possible to avoid any argument in Court
3
between contending parties on the constitutionality of such bill.
A bill which bears such an endorsement is not required to be
4
gazetted. Consequently, its existence is generally not known 
outside the Cabinet. In respect of such a bill, the Constitutional 
Court was required to examine it along with the Attorney-General 
and to communicate its opinion to the Speaker "as expeditiously 
as possible and in any case within 24 hours of the assembling of 
the Court". Its opinion could have been that the bill or any 
provision therein was either consistent or inconsistent with the 
Constitution, or that it entertained a doubt on that question; in 
the latter event, it was deemed that an inconsistency existed.^
The 1978 Constitution retained this extraordinary technique and 
procedure, but gave the Supreme Court "twenty-four hours (or such 
longer period not exceeding three days as the President may 
specify) of the assembling of the Court" within which to communi- 
cate its determination to the President and the Speaker. Neither 
the Constitutional Court nor the Supreme Court was required to 
give reasons for its opinion or determination.
1. Art.134.
2. Art.121(3).
3. S.55(1); Art.122(1).
4. Ibid.
5. S.55.
6. Art.122.
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This procedure was justified in the Constituent Assembly on 
the basis that "there comes once in a way, as in the case of the 
demonetization law, the need for a government in the national 
interest to pass a law in the shortest possible time before people 
can make preparations against that law".^ This is undoubtedly 
true; pre-emptive action can be taken to nullify the effect of a 
bill which seeks to impose a new tax or levy new duties if prior 
notice is given of such bill and its passage through Parliament is 
attended with delay. But none of the five bills for which this 
procedure was invoked by the SLFP Government between 1972 and 1977 
fell into this category:
1. The Bribery (Special Jurisdiction) Bill sought to give the
Minister of Justice power to nominate a district court situated
anywhere in Sri Lanka for the purpose of the trial and disposal
of offences under the Bribery Act irrespective of the place
2
where such offences had been committed.
2. The Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd (Special Provisions)
(Amendment) Bill sought to enlarge the definition of the term
"members of the public" in the principal Act, being persons to
whom shares in the company could be offered for sale, by including
3
within it "public corporations".
3. The Interpretation (Amendment) Bill sought to declare clearly
and unequivocally the intention of the legislature in previously
enacting that no court shall grant an injunction against the
4
State or person acting on behalf of the State.
4. The Banking Corporation of Sri Lanka Bill sought to establish 
a Banking Corporation and to vest in that Bank upon payment of 
compensation the existing undertakings in Sri Lanka of all 
foreign commercial banks which were not nationalised banks in 
their own countries.^
5. The Temple Lands (Abolition of Service Tenures) Bill sought to 
abolish the feudal system of service tenure of temple lands.
There was no urgency which was apparent in regard to Bills (1) and
(2); in fact, Bill (1) was referred to the Constitutional Court 
under section 53 only because the Minister of Justice thought it
1. Colvin R.de Silva, Constituent Assembly Debates, 4 July 1971, 
col.2856.
2. 14 February 1973; (1973) DCC, Vol.l, p.23.
3. 28 June 1974; (1974) DCC, Vol.2, p.7.
4. 3 September 1974; (1974) DCC, Vol.2, p.8.
5. 7 April 1977; (1977) DCC, Vol.5, p.l.
6. 15 April 1977 (1977) DCC, Vol.5, p.6.
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was about time that the special procedure contemplated in that 
section was "tried out".'*’ Bill (3) was probably considered urgent 
because it sought also to nullify certain court decisions granting 
injunctions against the State. Bills (4) and (5) were referred to 
the Court at a time when the National State Assembly stood prorogued. 
There was no secrecy involved in either proposal since they had both 
been announced five months previously in the budget speech of the 
Minister of Finance. The reference of these two bills was probably 
a political ploy, at a time of mounting speculation as to whether 
or not the National State Assembly would be dissolved; in fact, the 
Assembly was dissolved on 20 May without either of these bills being 
presented to it.
Between September 1977 and August 1978, the new UNP Government 
referred the following bills to the Constitutional Court as being 
urgent in the national interest:
2
1. Second Amendment to the Constitution
....................... 3 ...................................
ii. Rent (Amendment) Bill
4
iii. Ceiling on Housing Property (Amendment) Bill
iv. Criminal Justice Commissions (Repeal) Bill^g
v. Exchange Control (Amendment)(Repeal) Bill
vi. Export Duty (Special Provisions) Bill^
g
vii. Foreign Exchange Entitlement Certificate (Repeal) Bill
9
viii. Monetary Law (Amendment) Bill
ix. Budgetary Relief Allowance of Workers Bill^ 
x. Public Security (Amendment) Bill^
12xi. Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Bill
13xii. Parliament (Powers and Privileges) (Amendment) Bill
14xiii. Bretton Woods Agreements (Special Provisions) Bill
15xiv. Criminal Procedure (Special Provisions) Bill
xv. Proscribing of Liberation Tigejs of Tamil Eelam and Other 
Similar Organisations Bill.l°
1. Private information.
3. Ibid, p.10.
5. Ibid., p.22.
7. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p.26.
11. (1978) DCC, Vol.6, p.12.
13. Ibid., p.15.
15. Ibid., p.22.
2. (1977) DCC, Vol.5, p.8.
4. Ibid., p.12.
6. Ibid., p.23.
8. Ibid., p.25.
10. Ibid., p.33.
12. Ibid., p.13.
14. Ibid., p.21.
16. Ibid., p.24.
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Of them, bills (vi), (vii), (viii) and (ix) sought to implement 
certain budgetary proposals and could be said to have been legiti­
mately referred under the special emergency procedure. Bill (xiii) 
was non-controversial, but not urgent. Bill (x) sought to provide 
greater parliamentary control over a state of public emergency, but 
was not urgent. Four other bills sought to give relief: (ii) to 
enable one-house owners to recover possession of such houses; (iii) 
to enable tenants of low-rent houses to become owners of such houses; 
(iv) and (v) to terminate certain controversial criminal proceedings 
in respect of exchange control offences. There was no element of 
urgency, however, in regard to any of these four bills, in the sense 
of the delay that might have been involved had these bills been 
gazetted and public notice given. The five remaining bills are 
worthy of a closer examination:
Bill (i): The Second Amendment to the Constitution sought to 
transform Sri Lanka's parliamentary executive into a presidential 
executive. By invoking section 55, the Government succeeded not 
only in avoiding any prior discussion of the bill within its own 
parliamentary group, but also in preventing the Opposition from 
raising before the Constitutional Court the fundamental question 
whether the National State Assembly was competent to make such a 
dramatic re-structuring of the Constitution. The lack of urgency 
in regard to this bill is evident from the fact that, upon being 
passed by the Assembly on 20 October 1977, the new law was not 
brought into operation until several months later, on 4 February 1978.
Bill (xi): The Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Bill 
sought to provide a method by which the conduct of public officers 
could be examined and civic disability could be imposed on those 
found guilty of political victimisation, misuse or abuse of power, 
corruption or fraud. In a cursory examination, the Constitutional 
Court only considered the likely impact of this bill on those prov­
isions in the Constitution which prescribed the qualifications of 
voters. It did not, for instance, consider the question whether 
the imposition of civic disability by the legislature, which involved 
the deprivation of the right to vote and to stand for election as 
well as the right to hold public office, would amount to the 
infliction of a punishment by the legislature without a judicial 
trial. Had an opportunity been afforded for this question to be
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argued, there is no reason to think that the Court might not haye
held, as it did six months later after a full argument in respect
of another bill, that the deprivation of the right to vote:
is more than a mere disqualification; it is a clear 
punishment depriving him of the right to participate 
in the democratic process of choosing those who will 
guide the destinies of his city or his town or his 
village;
and that the deprivation of the right to hold public office:
is the severest punishment that could be inflicted 
on . . .  a public officer.-*■
By invoking section 55, the Government effectively stifled any such
argument.
Bill (xii): The Parliament (Powers and Privileges)(Amendment)
Bill sought to grant the National State Assembly concurrent juris­
diction with the Supreme Court to punish summarily any breach of 
privilege. Thereby, the legislature in Sri Lanka was seeking to 
acquire, for the first time, the power of arrest and the power to 
impose sentences of fine or imprisonment. The question whether this 
acquisition of judicial power traditionally exercised by the courts 
was lawful was prevented from being argued. The Constitutional Court
merely referred to section 5(c) of the Constitution and held that
2
the bill was in accord with it.
Bill (xiv): The Criminal Procedure (Special Provisions) Bill 
sought to prohibit the grant of bail to persons alleged to have been 
concerned in the commission of certain scheduled offences. The Bill 
also sought to take away the power of the Court to impose a suspen­
ded sentence of imprisonment on, or to order the conditional release 
of, such persons, and required instead the imposition on conviction 
of a mandatory term of imprisonment of not less than one-third of 
the prescribed maximum in addition to any other punishment imposed 
by Court. The power of the Supreme Court on appeal to revise such 
sentences was also sought to be removed. The Constitutional Court 
looked for a "permissible classification" and found it in the fact 
that the scheduled offences related to "(1) the State; (2) persons;
(3) property; and (4) offences under the Offensive Weapons Act".
The first three of these categories encompass the whole field of 
serious crime and can hardly form the basis for a reasonable classi­
fication. Be that as it may, the question whether the legislature
1. Local Authorities (Imposition of Civic Disabilities)(No.2) 
Bill (1978) DCC, Vol.6, p.30, at 43-44.
2. S.5(c) declared that the National State Assembly exercises
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was seeking to trespass on judicial territory was not examined; 
nor did anyone have an opportunity to invite the Court to examine 
that question.
Bill (xv): The Proscribing of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
and Other Similar Organisations Bill intruded deep into the area 
of individual liberty. It sought, inter alia, to empower the 
President to proscribe any movement, society, party, association, 
or body or group of persons; to authorise the censorship of news; 
to enable the Minister to make an order of forfeiture of property; 
to prohibit the grant of bail; and to empower the Minister to order 
the detention of persons. The Constitutional Court considered that 
the power to make an order of forfeiture of property, being an 
exercise of judicial power, could only be conferred on a court, but 
held that none of the other provisions were inconsistent with the 
Constitution. No special consideration was given, for instance, 
to section 18(1) (a) of the Constitution which guaranteed the equal 
protection of the law. No qpportunity was afforded to those who were 
likely to be affected by the operation of this bill to argue that 
there was no good reason why the ordinary criminal law should not 
have been permitted to take its course in relation to them.
Between September 1978 and December 1981, it became the 
invariable practice for President Jayewardene to refer to the Sup­
reme Court for a determination within 24 hours any bill which appe­
ared likely to raise a legal or political controversy. During this 
period, the Supreme Court exercised its constitutional jurisdiction 
in respect of the following bills. It is significant that all except 
one, namely, the Essential Public Services Bill, were referred under 
Article 122(1) (b) on the basis that they were urgent in the national 
interest:
Universities Bill 
Tax Amnesty Bill
Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry (Special Prov­
isions) Bill 
First Amendment to the Constitution 
National Housing (Amendment) Bill 
Compulsory Public Service (Amendment) Bill 
Local Authorities (Special Provisions) Bill 
Second Amendment to the Constitution 
Monetary Law (Amendment) Bill
"the judicial power of the People through courts and other institu­
tions created by law except in the case of matters relating to its 
powers and privileges, wherein the judicial power of the People may 
be exercised directly by the National State Assembly according to law".
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Proscribing of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and 
Other Similar Organisations (Amendment) Bill 
Motor Traffic (Amendment) Bill
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Bill
Essential Public Services Bill
Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill
Payment of Supplementary Allowance Bill
Passport (Regulation) and Exit Permit (Amendment) Bill
Parliament (Powers and Privileges)(Amendment) Bill
Inland Revenue (Amendment) Bill
Development Councils Bill
Third Amendment to the Constitution.
Of course, any constitutional exercise during this period was 
largely academic for the reason that the Government had a comfortable 
majority in Parliament with which it was able to secure the passage 
of amendments to the Constitution as well as bills which were incon­
sistent with any provision of the Constitution. The Government 
could only have been deterred if the Supreme Court held that approval 
at a referendum was also necessary for the passage of a bill. The 
Court so held on three occasions;^ the Government deleted the 
offending provisions in two bills and abandoned the third altogether. 
But the invocation of the special procedure in Article 122 has 
produced two more far-reaching effects. Firstly, it has prevented 
the citizen from enforcing his fundamental rights in respect of 
legislative action. Secondly, it has resulted in the enactment of 
laws which have been subjected only to a hurried and perfunctory 
test by the Supreme Court against the fundamental rights so solemnly 
and ostentatiously incorporated in the Constitution.
Principles of Interpretation
The function of a court called upon to determine whether a 
bill is inconsistent with the Constitution is different from that 
of a court which has to decide whether a law enacted by Parliament 
is invalid. In the latter case, the court may presume that all laws 
are constitutional. Where two interpretations are equally possible, 
namely, one consistent and the other inconsistent with the Consti­
tution, the court may lean towards the former. In the judicial 
review of bills, however, none of these presumptions need apply. 
Before making its first determination in 1973, the Constitutional 
Court declared that in the performance of its functions:
the correct approach is to examine the provisions of 
the bill vis-a-vis the Constitution and thereafter
1. Essential Public Services Bill, Development Councils Bill, 
and the Third Amendment to the Constitution.
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decide the question without resort to presumptions 
or counter-presumptions. Secondly, we should inter­
pret the Constitution as far as possible in a manner 
that will make the Constitution work and not in a 
manner that will place impediments and obstacles to 
the working of the Constitution. ^
In applying the first of these principles, the Court had
necessarily to consider the scope of the limitation clause, section
18(2) of the 1972 Constitution. In its view, the Court was entitled
to determine whether the provisions of a bill which, prima facie,
infringed a fundamental right, were in the interests of the several
matters set out in that section. But the Court considered that the
words "in the interests of" were words of great amplitude which had
2
to be given not a restricted meaning but a wide connotation. A 
wide connotation, of course, lessened the applicability and reduced 
the scope of the fundamental right concerned.
The differentia which is the basis of classification and the 
objects of a bill are distinct from each other. In order to ascer­
tain the latter, the Court at first looked only at its title, preamble 
and provisions. In order to find out the differentia, the Court did 
not restrict itself to the bill, but went outside it to find some 
economic, political or other social interest to be secured and some 
relation of the classification to the objects sought to be accompli­
shed. In doing this, the Court considered matters of cornnon knowledge,
3
common report, the history of the times and reports of commissions. 
Later, however, the Court was of the view that in ascertaining the 
objects of a bill, its function was not merely to look at the title, 
preamble and provisions and assume that the matters of fact stated 
therein were factually true and were correctly set out; the Court 
was entitled to look at extraneous matter in order to determine
4
whether the matters of fact thus stated were, in fact, true.
Although the Constitutional Court declared at the outset that 
it will not resort to presumptions or counter-presumptions in deciding 
a question of alleged inconsistency, it became evident that at least 
one presumption consistently influenced its decisions in the early 
years. Dealing with an objection to the Press Council on the ground
1. Sri Lanka Press Council Bill (1973) DCC, Vol.l, p.l, at 6.
2. Ibid., at 15.
3. Ibid., at 42.
4. Church of Sri Lanka (Consequential Provisions) Bill (1975) 
DCC, Vol.3, p.5, at 15.
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that its members were to be appointed by the President on the
advice of the Minister who, it was argued, could pack the Council
with nominees of his choice or of his own political persuasion,
the Court observed that:
The petitioners appear to see a bear behind every bush.
If the Constitution enables the President to appoint on 
the advice of the Minister [sic] judges to the highest 
judicial tribunals, what is the suspicion about the 
Minister advising the President on the appointment of 
members of the Press Council ? Must we in considering 
this Bill presume that the Minister will act mala fide 
and not in the interests of the country ? To give such 
an interpretation and to hold that therefore this is a 
violation of the Constitution would be doing injustice 
to the Constitution.1
In the same case, the Court rejected a submission that the Minister 
might, in tendering advice to the President on another matter, some­
times act capriciously:
Can one imagine a responsible Minister observing coll­
ective responsibility advising the constitutional 
President the removal of a member unless it be for good 
cause ?2
The power conferred on the Minister by the Administration of Justice
Bill to prescribe by regulation the offences which may be compounded
and to specify the persons by whom they may be so compounded was
objected to on the ground that the Minister could make a regulation
to compound a case at the instance of a person to be named in the
regulation and in respect of offences normally not compoundable
and thereby abuse the powers given to him. The Court observed:
We repeat that we must not examine the Bill with the 
premise that a responsible Minister will act perversely 
and irresponsibly under the powers given to him under 
the Bill.^
In rejecting a submission that the power to exempt a company or class 
or category of companies from the application of the Companies (Spec­
ial Provisions) Bill would amount to a delegation of the legislative 
power of the National State Assembly, the Court considered it rele­
vant to note that:
under the present Bill, the power of granting and 
revoking exemptions is vested not in any administrative 
officer, but in two responsible Ministers.^
1. Sri Lanka Press Council Bill, supra, at 17, per Pathirana J.
2. Ibid., at 17.
3. Administration of Justice Bill (1973) DCC, Vol.l, p.57. at 
72, per Pathirana J.
4. Companies (Special Provisions) Bill, supra, at 72, per K.D. 
De Silva.
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Examining the argument that the Licensing of Traders and Regulat­
ion of Internal Trade Bill sought to single out traders and manu­
facturers for discriminatory legislation, the Court insisted that 
there was an intelligible differentia which was apparent. After all:
The Minister of Trade has presented this Bill to the 
National State Assembly. As an elected representative 
of the people in the National State Assembly and as a 
member of the Cabinet he would have been conscious and 
aware of the abuses on the part of manufacturers and 
traders in this connection and the Bill is directed to 
prevent these abuses and malpractices and thereby 
ensuring to the consumers articles of good quality at 
controlled prices.-*-
With the change of government in July 1977, the Constitutional Court's 
attitude towards the vesting of discretionary power in Ministers 
also underwent a transformation, and its approach became more realistic, 
In October 1977, the question arose whether the Excise (Amendment)
Bill offended section 18(1) (a) of the Constitution for the reason 
that it sought to vest an unfettered discretionary power in the 
Minister if he considered it necessary to do so, without assigning 
any reason, to direct the authority granting a licence, to grant, 
renew or cancel a licence. The Court had no doubt that the Minister 
could "arbitrarily discriminate between persons in like circumst­
ances". It was argued by the Attorney-General that the discretion­
ary power being vested in a person of high standing like a Minister 
was an assumption that the power will not be abused and that that 
was a sufficient safeguard against the exercise of arbitrary power 
in a manner so as to discriminate between persons similarly placed 
and in like circumstances. The Court did not agree:
That is quite a different thing from saying that the 
granting of such arbitrary powers by statute does 
not contravene the provision in the Constitution 
regarding the equal protection of the law when there 
is no principle or policy that should guide the 
exercise of such wide discretion.^
In January 1978, the Constitutional Court expressed the view that 
a provision in the Greater Colombo Economic Comnission Bill which 
empowered the Minister, by regulation, to modify or alter the prov­
isions of any written law in their application to the area of 
authority of the Commission, was likely to be abused by the
1. Licensing of Traders and Regulation of Trade Bill (1976) 
DCC, Vol.4, p.l/, at 22, per Pathirana J.
2. Excise (Amendment) Bill (1977) DCC, Vol.5, p.14, at 21, per 
Pathirana J.
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Minister:
It would be open to the Minister to amend for 
instance the Trade Unions Ordinance by making 
regulations prohibiting the formation of trade 
unions and there would then be a violation of 
section 18(l)(f) of the Constitution whereby 
all citizens have the right to freedom of ass­
ociation.
The second principle formulated by the Constitutional Court
implied that the Court intended to be an active participant in the
process of effecting social change. According to the Court, the
1946 Constitution had been "an obstacle to solving the problems of 
2
the people". One of its principal defects was that:
We were also not sure whether our Legislature 
was supreme, because time and again the Leg­
islature was told that it had not the right to 
enact certain laws.
The doctrine of separation of powers which the Supreme Court had
4
read into that Constitution "has no place in our Constitution now".
Although a Constitution must be interpreted "in a broad way and not
in a narrow and pedantic sense",  ^ the concept of judicial power
had been given too extensive a meaning under that Constitution:
We are not prepared to go outside the definition 
of Griffiths CJ in order to find out the meaning 
of the term 1 judicial power'.6
The Constitutional Court believed that to adopt the "Holmes test"
or to apply the "historical criterion" expounded by Dean Roscoe
Pound, as the Supreme Court had previously done, "will be in our
view to put the clock back many years".^ It had no intention of
doing that since:
We are now emerging from a colonial economy and 
marching towards a socialist democracy,°
Analogies, precedents, principles and practices of the past, however
useful, should now yield, in the interpretation of a Constitution
1. Greater Colombo Economic Commission Bill, supra, at 8, per 
Wijesundera J.
2. Sri Lanka Press Council Bill, supra, at 4, per Pathirana J.
3. Ibid.
4. Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd (Special Provisions)
Bill, supra, at 53, per Pathirana J.
5. Sri Lanka Press Council Bill, supra, at 4, per Pathirana J.
6. Administration of Justice Bill, supra, at 69, per Pathirana J.
7. Ibid., at 63, per Pathirana J.
8. Companies (Special Provisions) Bill, supra, at 4, per K.D. 
de Silva.
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which derives its power and authority solely from the People, to
the principles set out in the Constitution itself,
namely, the Principles of State Policy and the Funda­
mental Rights and Freedoms and to what extent those 
fundamental rights and freedoms are subject to rest­
rictions which the Constitution itself had prescribed 
in the interests of national unity and integrity, 
national security, national economy, public safety, 
public order, the protection of public health or 
morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others or giving effect to the Principles of State 
Policy.-*•
It is significant that in reminding itself of the principles by 
which it should be guided, the Constitutional Court considered that 
foremost among them, taking priority even over fundamental rights, 
were "the Principles of State Policy set out in section 16(2) which 
states that the Republic is pledged to carry forward the progressive 
advancement towards the establishment in Sri Lanka of a socialist 
democracy, the objectives of which are more fully set out in that 
section".^
The Supreme Court under the 1946 Constitution was not concerned
with the merits or demerits of a legislative measure; nor with the
policy underlying it. But not so the Constitutional Court. In
its view, the Sri Lanka Press Council Bill:
is essential for the proper and efficient functioning 
of the democratic process under the Constitution of 
Sri Lanka and to safeguard the rights of the common 
man and the Press.
The purpose of the Bribery (Special Jurisdiction) Bill, which was
the expeditious trial and disposal of bribery cases that were pending
4
all over the island, "is indeed a laudable object". The Places
and Objects of Worship Bill,
by restricting the indiscriminate construction of 
buildings and objects of public worship in a manner 
that will not promote discord and dissatisfaction 
among the adherents of different religions, will help 
promote the rights and freedoms of all religionists 
and will thereby give effect to one of the Principles 
of State Policy, namely, promoting co-operation and 
mutual confidence between all religious groups in 
this country. ^
1. Sri Lanka Press Council Bill, supra, at 6, per Pathirana J.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., at 21.
4. (1973) DCC, Vol.l, p.23, at 25, per K.D.de Silva.
5. (1973) DCC, Vol.l, 27, at 34, per Pathirana J.
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The Court was sympathetic to the policy of the Government to broad- 
base the Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Limited, particularly 
since several of its directors had been found by a Royal Commiss­
ion to have contravened the Exchange Control and Inland Revenue Acts
Every person or company which indulges in activities 
which deprive a nation of vitally needed foreign 
exchange is in fact waging an economic war against 
the State. The State is therefore both morally and 
in the interests of the nation justified in enacting 
laws which will serve to curb the powers and tenden­
cies of those who are in commanding heights from 
which they could deprive the country of such foreign 
exchange.!
The Administration of Justice Bill was "another milestone in the
legal history as it makes far-reaching changes in the administration 
2
of justice". The Companies (Special Provisions) Bill will "remove
the stranglehold which foreign business interests have over the
economy of the country" as we emerge from a colonial economy and
3
march towards a socialist democracy. The Constitutional Court
understood why the Banking Corporation of Sri Lanka Bill exempted
from its application those banks which operated in Sri Lanka which
were nationalised in their own countries:
Bilateral relations between the countries which have 
established these banks in Sri Lanka, in view of the 
expanding trade between Sri Lanka and these countries, 
may be affected if these banks are vested in the pro­
posed Banking Corporation of Sri Lanka. In addition, 
the Comity of Nations necessitates this differentia 
because a foreign bank operating in Sri Lanka which 
has been nationalised in its own country will be more 
co-operative in carrying out the decisions and poli­
cies of that government and country vis-a-vis Sri 
Lanka rather than a private foreign-owned bank.^
Impugned Bills
During the ten year period under review, from May 1972 to 
December 1981, 499 statutes were enacted by the legislature. Between 
1972 and 1977, under the SLFP administration, of the 209 bills 
which were placed on the agenda of the National State Assembly, the 
Constitutional Court examined 14 government bills (i.e. 9 per cent), 
namely:
Sri Lanka Press Council Bill 
Bribery (Special Jurisdiction) Bill
1. Supra, at 48, per Pathirana J.
2. Supra, at 58, per Pathirana J.
3. Supra, at 5, per K.D.de Silva.
4. (1977) DCC, Vol.5, p.l, at 2, per Pathirana J.
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Places and Objects of Worship Bill
Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd (Special Provisions) Bill 
Administration of Justice Bill 
Companies (Special Provisions) Bill
Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd (Special Provisions) 
(Amendment) Bill 
Interpretation (Amendment) Bill 
National Prices Commission Bill 
Pirivena Education Bill
Licensing of Traders and Regulation of Internal Trade Bill
Parliamentary Pensions Bill
Banking Corporation of Sri Lanka Bill
Temple Land (Abolition of Service Tenures) Bill,
and one private member's bill, namely, the Church of Sri Lanka (Con­
sequential Provisions) Bill. Only the latter was held, with one 
member of the Court dissenting, to be inconsistent with the Consti­
tution. The Court agreed with the Attorney-General that three clauses 
of the Administration of Justice Bill were inconsistent with the 
Constitution, and the Minister of Justice informed the National 
State Assemnbly that the Government intended to amend the bill accor- 
ingly.
Between the election of the UNP Government in July 1977 and 
the repeal of the 1972 Constitution fourteen months later, of the 
60 bills which were placed on the agenda of the National State 
Assembly, the Constitutional Court examined 22 bills, of which 15 
had been referred under section 55 as being urgent in the national 
interest. The seven inter-parte applications related to:
Excise (Amendment) Bill
Local Authorities Elections (Special Provisions) Bill 
Finance (Amendment) Bill 
Greater Colombo Economic Commission Bill 
Protection of Tenants (Special Provisions)(Amendment) Bill 
Local Authorities (Imposition of Civic Disabilities)(No.1) 
and (No.2) Bills.
Of them, the Court held the Excise (Amendment) Bill to be inconsis­
tent with the Constitution, but on a ground not urged by the petit­
ioner. Four other bills, including one referred under section 55, 
were found to contain certain provisions which were also inconsis­
tent with the Constitution.
Between 1978 and 1981, 230 bills were placed on the Order 
Paper of Parliament. Of them, the Supreme Court examined 20 bills 
(i.e. 8 per cent), 19 of which had been referred to the Court by 
the President in terms of Article 122(1) (b) on the ground that 
they were urgent in the national interest. The single bill, the
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constitutionality of which was the subject of a full argument, 
namely, the Essential Public Services Bill, was found to contain 
one provision which could not be passed by Parliament alone, but 
which also required approval at a referendum. The Court was of 
the view that five of the bills referred to it for a special det­
ermination within 24 hours, namely,
Universities Bill
National Housing (Amendment) Bill
Proscribing of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Other 
Similar Organisations (Amendment) Bill 
Development Councils Bill 
Third Amendment to the Constitution
contained provisions which either required to be passed by a special
majority or by a special majority followed by approval at a referendum.
Enforcement of Fundamental Rights
At the end of ten years, only four fundamental rights had 
been successfully invoked in respect of proposed legislation. Only 
six bills were judicially found to contain provisions which infringed 
the protected rights and freedoms.
Freedom of Religion
The Church of Sri Lanka (Consequential Provisions) Bill was 
presented to the National State Assembly by a private member. Foll­
owing a decision by the Church of Ceylon, the Methodist Church of 
Ceylon, the Churches affiliated to the Sri Lanka Baptist Sangamaya, 
the Presbytery of Lanka and the Jaffna Diocese of the Church of South 
India to surrender their separate existence (a fact asserted in the 
preamble to the bill) and to join together to form a united church 
called the Church of Sri Lanka, this bill sought to establish a 
Trust Association of the Church of Sri Lanka in which would vest 
the properties of the five uniting churches. The bill was challen­
ged by a number of clergymen as well as laymen who disputed the 
claim in the preamble that the five churches had indeed decided to 
surrender their separate existence. On the evidence placed before 
it, the Constitutional Court found that at least three of the 
churches had not duly decided to join the Church of Sri Lanka, and 
that even if they had, the decisions were invalid. If, therefore, 
the property of those three churches, including the places of wor­
ship, vested in the proposed new trust association, those who 
resorted to those churches for the performance of their religious
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observances would no longer have a church building of their own for 
the practice of their religion. Accordingly, the Court held that 
section 18(1)(d) was infringed. Once the churches to which they 
resorted for their worship were taken away, their right to freedom 
of peaceful assembly and association under section 18(1)(f) was 
also infringed.^- The bill was withdrawn.
Freedom of Assembly and Association
The Greater Colombo Economic Commission Bill sought to estab­
lish a corporate body for the purpose of attracting foreign capital 
for investment in Sri Lanka. The commission would be authorised to 
grant certain facilities and concessions to business enterprises 
within its two hundred square-mile area of authority. The commiss­
ion would have the power to enter into any agreement with any enter­
prise, and in so doing, it could grant exemptions from certain 
scheduled laws or modify or vary the application of such laws to 
such agreement in accordance with regulations made by the Minister. 
The bill provided, inter alia, that the Minister may by regulation:
(a) determine the scope and extent of any exemption or modification 
of the scheduled laws which may be embodied in an agreement, and
(b) modify or alter the provisions of any scheduled laws in their
application to the area of authority of the commission. The Court
accepted the submission that the power sought to be conferred on the
Minister could be exercised for the purpose of amending the Trade
Union Ordinance, which was one of the scheduled laws, by making
regulations prohibiting the formation of trade unions. This would
2
constitute an infringement of section 18(1 )(f). In the National 
State Assembly, the Prime Minister announced that the offending
3
provision would be deleted.
Right to Equal Protection of the Law •
The Greater Colombo Economic Commission Bill noted above also 
sought to empower the commission, inter alia, to stipulate minimum 
wages for employees in any enterprise and to prescribe their cond­
itions of service. Thereby, the commission would be empowered to 
vary the conditions of service, including minimum wages which had 
already been determined by law. The Constitutional Court held that
1. (1975) DCC, Vol.3, p.5.
2. (1978) DCC, Vol.6, p.5.
3. National State Assembly Debates, 19 January 1978, col.247.
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this would enable the comnission to discriminate between enter­
prises similarly placed and in like circumstances. Accordingly, 
this provision was inconsistent with section 18(1)(a) The Govern­
ment accepted this decision and moved to delete the offending
. . 2provision.
The Excise (Amendment) Bill sought to confer a new power on
the Minister in the following terms:
Notwithstanding anything in this Ordinance, if upon 
representations made or otherwise, the Minister 
considers it necessary to do so, he may without 
assigning any reason therefor, direct the authority 
granting a licence, to grant a licence, or to renew 
or cancel a licence, and such authority shall give 
effect to such direction.
The Constitutional Court observed that the bill made no classifica­
tion of the persons or class of persons for the purpose of applying 
this new provision, but left it to the absolute and uncontrolled 
discretion of the Minister. The bill also did not lay down any 
principle or policy for guiding the exercise of discretion by the 
Minister in the matter of selection or classification. It, however, 
gave wide and uncontrolled power to the Minister to discriminate 
between persons similarly situated and therefore the discrimination 
was inherent in the bill itself. In the result, the bill, while 
giving the power to the Minister to discriminate between persons in 
like situations, provided no differentia which had a reasonable basis 
in terms of some rational view of the public interest. Accordingly,
3
the Court held that the bill was inconsistent with section 18(1)(a). 
The bill, however, was moved in its original form and passed with 
the special majority required to enact laws inconsistent with the
4
Constitution.
The Local Authorities (Imposition of Civic Disabilities) (No.2) 
Bill sought to impose civic disabilities on certain persons named 
in the schedule against whom findings had been made by a commission 
of inquiry "as it has become necessary to do so in the public 
interest". It was submitted that not only did the schedule include 
the names of persons against whom no specific findings had been made 
in the report of the comnission, but that certain persons against
1. (1978) DCC, Vol.6, p.5.
2. National State Assembly Debates, 19 January 1978, col.247.
3. (1977) DCC, Vol.5, p.14.
4. Excise (Amendment) Law, No.14 of 1977.
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whom findings had in fact been made were not so included. In order
to verify this contention, the Court looked at the report of the
conmission and found that nine of the persons named in the schedule
had no findings recorded against them, while six persons against
whom findings had been made were omitted from the schedule. The
Constitutional Court held that the relevant provisions of the bill
were inconsistent with section 18(1)(a) for two reasons: firstly,
the National State Assembly was seeking through this bill to select
persons on some basis other than on the findings by the comnission
in its report; secondly, the classification of these persons was
arbitrary and had no relation to the objects sought to be achieved
by the bill.'*’ The Government did not move to amend the bill, but
2
used its two-thirds majority to pass it in its original form.
Freedom from Torture
The Essential Public Services Bill sought to provide for the 
declaration of specified services provided by certain government 
departments, public corporations, local authorities and co-operative 
societies as "essential public services", and to make provision, 
including sanctions and punishments, to ensure that those services 
were carried out unimpeded and uninterrupted. Clause 4 of the bill 
sought to provide for punishment. An offender would be liable, on 
conviction, to imprisonment ranging from a minimum of two years to 
a maximum of five years, or to a fine ranging from Rs.2,000 to a 
maximum of Rs.5,000, or to both imprisonment and fine. Additionally, 
he would also be liable to a mandatory forfeiture of all movable and 
immovable property and, in the event the offender was registered 
under any law to practise any profession or vocation, the mandatory 
removal of his name from such register. It was argued that these 
punishment provisions contravened Article 11. The Attorney-General 
countered that all these forms of punishment were already recognised 
by existing law. The Court observed that "the piling of punishment 
on punishment indiscriminately, whether they be old forms of punish­
ment or new, must pass the test of Article 11, if they are to be 
valid"; it was not a case of mere excessiveness of the punishment, 
but one of inhuman treatment and punishment. Accordingly, it held
1. (1978) DCC, Vol.6, p.30. See also p.26 for Bill No.2.
2. Local Authorities (Imposition of Civic Disabilities)(No.1) 
(No.2) Laws, Nos.38 and 39 of 1978. See also National State Ass- 
bly Debates, 11 August 1978, cols.1725-1952.
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that:
the compulsory forfeiture of property and the 
erasure of the offender's name from his profess­
ional register, in addition to compulsory impri­
sonment or fine, constitute excessive punishment 
and savours of cruelty. In our view, clause 4(2) 
of the Bill contravenes Article 11 of the Consti­
tution. It is not our view that the mandatory 
confiscation of property or the removal from the 
register of a profession is inherently bad, or 
that all these punishments cannot be applied 
together in a serious and fit case. Our object­
ion is to their mandatory nature and to their 
indiscriminate application ad terrorem, irrespect­
ive of the nature of the offence or the culpa­
bility of the offender.1
In Parliament, the government moved to amend the offending provision
by making the forfeiture of property and the removal of a name from
the register discretionary: the Court may impose these additional
punishments if it was of the opinion that there were sufficient
2grounds for doing so. Thereby, the Government avoided the necessity 
for approval of the bill by the people at a referendum.
An Assessment
The 1972 and 1978 Constitutions both offered a special forum 
and a special procedure whereby any citizen, irrespective of whether 
or not he had an "interest" in the matter, could canvass the consti­
tutionality of proposed legislation. No longer did such a person 
have to concern himself with extraneous issues of a preliminary 
nature in order not only to acquire a locus standi, but also to vest 
the forum of his choice with jurisdiction. Laws achieved certainty 
upon enactment, in the sense that their validity was thereafter not 
open to question.
There were, however, inherent defects in the system devised 
by the Constituent Assembly and subsequently adopted, with slight 
modifications, in the 1978 Constitution:
1. Publication of a bill in the gazette did not provide it with 
sufficient publicity to enable it to be read and examined by 
at least a cross section of the adult population during the 
period within which proceedings could be initiated to test its 
constitutionality. This defect is one that can be remedied by 
requiring a bill to be published in one or more of the national
1. Parliamentary Debates, 2 October 1979, cols.421-422.
2. Ibid., cols.448-838. See also Essential Public Services 
Act No.61 of 1979.
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newspapers as well.
2. The time limit of fourteen days originally precribed for the 
Constitutional Court to comnunicate its decision to the legis­
lature was quite inadequate; the present limit of twenty-one 
days is more reasonable, although a period of one month would 
perhaps be more realistic.
3. The requirement that a bill which the Cabinet has certified as 
"urgent in the national interest" should be examined and repor­
ted upon by the Court within 24 hours is the very antithesis of 
judicial review. Apart from the entire proceedings being 
shrouded in secrecy, with no publicity being given either to 
the bill or to the fact that a Court is about to examine it, it 
is inconceivable that any body of men, however astute or learned, 
could, unaided except by the Government's lawyer, subject a bill 
to the scrutiny and examination that any measure which seeks to 
encroach upon a fundamental right deserves. Section 55 of the 
1972 Constitution was originally intended to be the answer to a 
finance minister's pre-budget nightmare. If so, the application 
of the present Article 122 ought to be restricted to financial 
measures which are urgent in the national interest. Alternati­
vely, any bill which is enacted without having been previously 
published in the gazette (and therefore not examined for incon­
sistency at the instance of a citizen) should be liable to be 
impugned within a prescribed period of such enactment.
4. The procedure relating to amendments is unsatisfactory. If the 
concept of the judicial review of proposed legislation is now 
accepted, it must surely cover not only the original bill but 
also any amendments that are intended to be moved in the legis­
lature before that bill becomes a law. This is particularly 
important in view of an allegation which was made in 1979 by the 
Opposition that an entirely new clause which had not even been 
moved on the floor of the house had found its way into an Act of 
Parliament.^
1. The printed version of the Special Presidential Commissions 
of Inquiry (Special Provisions) Act, No.4 of 1978, contained the 
following section:
"8. The following new section is hereby inserted immediately 
after section 21 of the principal enactment and shall have
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The Sri Lankan experience of the judicial review of bills 
demonstrates very vividly that constitutional provisions alone 
can achieve very little if the will and the desire to implement 
them in the spirit in which they were enacted, is absent. The 
Constitutional Court appears to have been preoccupied with the
effect as section 21A of that enactment:-
Effect of 
this law 
notwith­
standing 
inconsis­
tencies .
(b)
(c)
21 A. The provisions of this Law and any warrant 
issued under the provisions of this Law shall be 
so interpreted and given full force and effect in 
order that any commission shall have full authority, 
power and jurisdiction to inquire into the conduct 
of any Prime Minister, Minister or other public 
officer including -
(a) the misuse or abuse of power, interference, 
fraud, corruption or nepotism, 
any political victimisation of any person, 
any irregularity -
i. in the making of any appointment or 
transfer of any person, 
ii. in the granting of any promotion to any 
person,
iii. in the termination of the services of any 
person,
(d) the contravention of any written law, 
by or on the part of any Prime Minister, Minister 
or other public officer and the extent to which he 
is so responsible, notwithstanding that the confer­
ment of the authority, power or jurisdiction on a 
commission to hold an inquiry into such conduct may 
be or may have been or may be construed to be or to 
have been inconsistent with the provisions of sect­
ion 46(1) or any other section of the Ceylon 
(Constitution) Order in Council 1946, or section 
92 or section 106(5) or any other section of the 
Constitution of Sri Lanka adopted and enacted on 
22nd May 1972".
This section did not appear in the printed bill. The verbatim 
record of Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, of 20 November 1978, did 
not contain any reference to this section. The minutes of Parlia­
ment made no mention of this section. The tape recording of the 
proceedings of 20 November 1978 had, according to the Speaker, 
been erased on the following day. When, on 4 December 1978, the 
Leader of the Opposition raised the matter of "this rather myster­
ious section" in the House after having previously mentioned it to 
the Speaker, the latter replied that "from the information I have 
I gather that there have been certain precedents set in this House 
since 1972 where the Legal Draftsman and the Attorney-General have, 
subsequent to the passing of bills, included certain provisions" 
(col.646). Later that day, the Speaker made a further announcement: 
"I have looked into this matter and find that this amendment 
was also handed in to me by the Minister of Trade and Shipp­
ing at the time he moved amendments to this Bill during the 
committee stage, stating that there were further amendments,
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urgent need "to carry forward the progressive advancement towards 
the establishment in Sri Lanka of a socialist democracy". This 
was undoubtedly one of the foremost principles of state policy 
enunciated in the 1972 Constitution, and was intended to serve as 
a guide to "the making of laws and the governance of Sri Lanka".
But the Constitutional Court's function was neither the making of 
laws nor the governance of Sri Lanka. That task had been entrusted 
by the people to their elected representatives sitting in the 
National State Assembly and functioning in the Cabinet of Ministers. 
The duty of the Constitutional Court was to examine the laws which 
these representatives intended to make in order to ensure, inter 
alia, that they did not encroach upon that area of individual liberty 
the boundaries of which had been demarcated in the Constitution.
Of course, the fundamental rights were not absolute, but were 
subject to restrictions which the legislature was entitled to pres­
cribe in certain defined circumstances.. But those circumstances, 
whether it be "national security", "the protection of public health 
or morals", or "giving effect to the Principles of State Policy", 
were all exceptions to the rule. In the hands of the Constitutional 
Court, particularly during the SLFP administration, the scales often 
appeared to be tilted, but hardly ever due to the tonnage of human 
liberty.
additional copies of which, however, were not available to 
be distributed, (cols.754-755).
On 6 December 1978, the Prime Minister made a statement on this matter. 
(He had been present in the House when the Speaker made his first 
response two days previously). He explained that on 20 November, 
shortly after he had presented the bill and had retired to his room, 
he had received information from "a certain person known to me" that 
Mrs.Bandaranaike had filed a fresh application in the Supreme Court 
against the Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry. He was shown 
a copy of her application:
"I asked the Attorney-General, who was in the Official's 
Box, to go through the writ application and gave him 
specific instructions that we must close all loopholes 
so that nobody could go through them."
He said that this section was then prepared by the Attorney-General.
He read out a statement from Attorney-General Pasupati confirming 
what he had said. In his statement, the Attorney-General said that 
he actually recalled the Minister of Trade and Shipping reading out 
this new section on the floor of the House, (cols.1070-1080).
An Opposition motion for the appointment of a select committee to 
investigate and report on whether "a clause which had neither been ironed 
in, nor passed by, Parliament had been interpolated" after the bill 
had been read a third time and passed, was not proceeded with.
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If the Constitutional Court was misguided by its own enthu­
siastic comnitment to a socialist democracy, the attitude of the 
Government, particularly after the general election of 1977, was 
indefensible. Rejecting the spirit not only of the Constitution 
which it inherited, but also of that which it fathered, the Cabinet 
misused section 55 of one and Article 122 of the other, to deprive 
the citizen of his right to test the constitutionality of the 
intended exercise of legislative power. Thereby, the Government 
ensured that in the complex matter of legislation, the fundamental 
rights of the individual, together with all the elaborate arrange­
ments made for their protection and enforcement, would remain quite 
ineffective and impotent.
No assessment of the judicial review of bills would be complete 
without a reference to the strange phenomena of extraordinarily 
large majorities which the electorate offered the governments 
elected to office in 1970 and 1977. With a two-thirds majority 
readily available, the constitutional sanctions imposed on the 
exercise of legislative power had little or no significance. Court 
decisions, whether they be of the Constitutional Court or of the 
Supreme Court, whether they approved or condemned, were only of 
academic interest and value. Their relevance, insofar as influen­
cing the course of legislative history, was minimal.
CHAPTER VI
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ACTION
In this chapter it is proposed to examine the effectiveness 
of the remedies made available in Sri Lanka to persons who claimed 
that their fundamental rights protected by the Constitution had 
been, or were about to be, infringed by executive action. This 
will involve an examination both of the traditional remedies which 
were available under the 1972 Constitution and of the special 
remedy created by the 1978 Constitution. It must be noted that, 
however desirable it might have been, it was not possible for a 
court or tribunal under either Constitution to have inquired into 
or pronounced upon, or in any manner called in question, the 
validity of a statute if such statute was relied upon as authority 
for the impugned executive act.
Traditional Remedies
Section 18(1) of the 1972 Constitution declared the funda­
mental rights which citizens and other persons in Sri Lanka were 
entitled to. Neither that section nor any other provision of the 
Constitution assured that those rights would be justiciable, or 
indicated how an infringement of any of them could be prevented or 
redressed.^ Therefore, in order to enforce a right, an aggrieved 
party had necessarily to rely upon the traditional remedies. These 
were the prerogative writs, the declaratory judgment, the injun­
ction, damages and bail. It is proposed to examine whether these 
remedies were capable of being adapted for this purpose, particu­
larly in the absence of any constitutional direction to that effect. 
This examination will be made on the basis of the law applicable 
when that Constitution was brought into operation.
1. The justiciability of the fundamental rights could perhaps 
have been inferred from s. 17 which, unlike s. 18, expressly declared 
that the provisions of s.16 which contained the Principles of State 
Policy Mdo not confer legal rights and are not enforceable in any 
court". See also the assurance given by the Minister of Constitu­
tional Affairs in the Constituent Assembly, supra, p.130.
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The Nature and Scope of the Traditional Remedies
The Prerogative Writs
The prerogative writs were discretionary remedies which
originated in England many centuries before the advent of the
concept of justiciable human rights.'*' Some of them were first
introduced into Sri Lanka by the Charter of Justice of 1801,
shortly after the British occupation of the maritime provinces.
At the commencement of the 1972 Constitution, section 42 of the
Courts Ordinance empowered the Supreme Court or any judge thereof
"to grant and issue, according to law, mandates in the nature of
writs of mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, procedendo and
prohibition against any District Judge, Commissioner, Magistrate,
or other person or tribunal". The expression "according to law"
2
had been interpreted very early to mean the English law. As the
Supreme Court later explained:
That means that the writs would issue in the circum­
stances and under the conditions known to the English 
law. These would include the persons against whom 
the writs would issue.^
It also meant that along with these remedies, Ceylon had also
inherited even the "pricklier parts of the historical undergrowth
4
of the law of the remedies". Principles and procedural technicali­
ties established in the dim distant past when these remedies served 
purposes different from those of the present, thus continued to 
regulate their application. The writ of habeas corpus, which 
unlike the other writs was a writ of right, was introduced by the 
Charter of Justice of 1833. The Supreme Court or any judge thereof 
was authorised to issue this writ to have brought before such court 
or judge (a) the body of any person to be dealt with according to 
law, or (b) the body of any person illegally or improperly detained 
in public or private custody.^
1. For the historical origins of the prerogative writs, see
S.A.de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th ed. 
(London: Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1980),pp.584-603.
2. Grenier's Reports, p. 125, per Creasy CJ* in 1873.
3. Wijesekera v. Assistant Government Agent, Matara (1943)
44 NLR 533, per De Kretser J. Approved by a Divisional Bench in 
Abdul Thassim v. Edmund Rodrigo (1947) 48 NLR 121.
4. De Smith, Judicial Review, op.cit., at p.380.
5. Courts Ord., s.45.
340
1. Habeas Corpus, The mandate in the nature of a writ of
habeas corpus, which the Supreme Court was authorised to grant,
was the equivalent of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum
known to the English law.'*' This, according to Halsbury,
is a prerogative process for securing the liberty 
of the subject by affording an effective means of 
immediate release from unlawful or unjustifiable  ^
detention, whether in prison or in private custody.
In Ceylon, however, this writ had been sought more often for the
determination of the custody of minor children than in aid of the
liberty of the subject. The few successful, applications of the
latter category included the release from custody of a British
subject held on a deportation order made in excess of his powers 
3
by the Governor; the release of a non-citizen held on an invalid
4
removal order made under the Imnigrants and Emigrants Act; the 
release of a prisoner at large arrested by a police officer without 
a warrant and confined in prison without an order of remand from a
5
magistrate; and the release of a person remanded by a magistrate 
following his arrest by a police officer acting under an emergency 
regulation but without the requisite personal knowledge of the 
commission of an offence required by that regulation.
An applicant for a writ of habeas corpus had to satisfy the 
Court by affidavit that his detention was unlawful.^ He could make
successive applications to different judges, provided they were not
8 9made vexatiously or frivolously. In John Nadar v. Grey, T.S.Fer­
nando J considered the production by the respondent of an order, 
warrant of commitment or other document valid in law justifying the 
detention to be a sufficient answer. But in Avaummah v. Solomons,^ 
six years later, Herat J disagreed: it is not a sufficient answer 
to justify the alleged illegal detention to merely say that the 
respondent is holding the corpus under an order made by some other
1. In re Liyane Aratchie (1958) 60 NLR 529.
2. Vol.11, 3rd ed., p.24.
3. In re M. A. L. Bracegirdle (1937) 39 NLR 193.
4. Sellamuttu v. Solomons (1964) 66 NLR 307.
5. Kolugala v. Superintendent of Prisons (1961) 66 NLR 412.
6. Gunaseke'ra v. De Fonseka (1972) 75 NLR 246.
7. In re Liyane Aratchie, supra.
8. In re P.C.Siriwardene (1929) 31 NLR 111; Weerasinghe v. Sam- 
arasinghe (1966) 69 NLR 262.
9. (1956) 58 NLR 85.
10. (1962) 64 NIR 167.
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executive officer of the Crown; it is necessary for the respondent
to satisfy the Court as to the legality of the order under which he
purports to detain the corpus. By 1972, the Supreme Court, still
very much under the influence of Liversidge v. Anderson,'*' was more
2
inclined to the former view.
Following a declaration of martial law, the Supreme Court had 
declined to issue a mandate for the production of a person who was 
being detained in military custody by order of the General Officer
3
Commanding the Troops. Wood Renton J explained:
When martial law in the sense with which we have to do 
in the present case is involved, the function of muni­
cipal courts is limited. They have the right to inquire, 
and the duty of inquiring, into the question of fact, 
whether an'actual state of war’ exists or not. But when 
once that question has been answered in the affirmative, 
the acts of the military authorities in the exercise of 
their martial law powers are no longer justiciable by 
the municipal courts.^
That was in 1915, when Europe was at war and the resources of the
British Empire were being drawn upon in all directions for military
purposes. In Ceylon, relations between the Sinhalese and Muslim
canmunities had also erupted into violence: "domestic disturbances
which present all the features of actual warfare and which justify
such measures for the public security".^ But many years later,
following the assassination of a prime minister, the Governor-
General purported, by a regulation made under the Public Security
Ordinance, to suspend the application of section 45 of the Courts
Ordinance to persons detained or held in cusotdy under any emergency
regulation. The legality of the suspension was not questioned on
that occasion, but when its repetition some years later was, the
Supreme Court did "not think there is anything alarming or startling
about the suspension of the writ".^ Alles J explained:
If written constitutions like those of the United States 
and India, which recognise the liberty of the subject as 
a fundamental right, can make provision for the suspen­
sion of Habeas Corpus in their constitutions in certain 
circumstances, I see no reason why our Sovereign Parlia­
ment [sic] cannot make such a provision by legislation y 
and call for such a suspension in times of grave emergency.
1. [1942] AC 206.
2. Hirdaramani v. Ratnavale (1971) 75 NLR 67.
3. In re W.A.de Silva (1915) 18 NLR 277.
4. Ibid., at 279.
5. Ibid.
6. Gunasekera v. Ratnavale (1972) 76 NLR 316.
7. ibid., at 334.
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Judicial authority, therefore, existed for the proposition that at 
moments when this remedy was most needed to protect the citizen 
from the almost absolute power arrogated to itself by the executive, 
it can simply be suspended or made inoperative by executive fiat.
2. Mandamus. The writ of mandamus lay to secure the perfor­
mance of an existing public duty. It was essentially a discretion­
ary remedy, and "not a writ that is to issue of course, or to be 
granted for asking".'*' The applicant had to satisfy the Court that 
he had a sufficient legal interest in the performance of the public
duty, and that performance had been refused by the authority obliged 
2
to discharge it. The duty to be performed had to be of a public
nature. Mandamus had been successfully invoked in Sri Lanka to
3
have a name inserted on an electoral register; to have such regi-
4
ster exhibited as required by law; to compel a returning officer 
to hold an election in accordance with law;^ and to compel a mayor
g
to allow a matter to be discussed at a council meeting. Where a 
person had been wrongfully deprived of an office, this writ lay to 
restore him, provided the office was of a public character.^
In compelling the performance of a public duty, the Court had 
also to consider whether the duty was of a judicial or of a merely 
ministerial character. In the latter case, the Court could compel
the specific act to be done in the manner which to it seemed lawful.
If the duty was of a judicial character, a mandamus was granted only
g
where there had been a refusal to perform it in any way; not where
1. Shortt on Mandamus, p.224, quoted by Howard CJ in Perera v. 
Sockalingam Chettiar (1946) 47 NLR 265.
2. Refusal could be inferred from continued silence or might 
be expressed by words: Wiiesekera Sc Co.Ltd v. Principal Collector 
of Customs (1951) 53 NLR 329. In respect of duties which affected 
the public at large, as distinct from duties of a private nature,
a literal demand and refusal might, however, not be necessary: 
Amugodage James v. Balasingham (1950) 52 NLR 321.
3. Peries v. Gunaratne (1946) 47 NLR 491.
4. Wijesekera v. Assistant Government Agent, Matara, supra.
5. In re Chairman, Municipal Council, Galle (19Q6T~5 NLR 156;
In re Government Agent, Northern Province (1927) 28 NLR 323; Joseph
v. Kannangara (1943) 45 NLR 63.
6. De Silva v. Schockman (1939) 41 NLR 97.
7. A municipal charity commissioner held a public office: Wije- 
singhe v. Mayor of Colombo (1948) 50 NLR 87, while a municipal medi- 
cal officer did not: Perera v. Municipal Council of Colombo (1947)
48 NLR 66. See also Rodrigo v. Municipal Council, Galle (1947) 
(1947) 49 NLR 89.
8. Peries v. Gunaratne, supra.
343
it had been done in one way rather than another, even though the
method adopted might have been erroneous.^ The Supreme Court also
intervened where an authority in whom was vested a discretion of a
judicial nature had, in the exercise of his discretion, applied
2
arbitrary or unjust rules or a wrong principle of law, or had been
influenced by extraneous considerations which he ought not to have
3
taken into account.
Mandamus issued only against a natural person who held a
4
public office. It did not lie against a servant of the Crown where 
the duty sought to be enforced was not imposed on the servant him­
self but was imposed on him only in the capacity of agent for the 
Crown.Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that mandamus did 
not lie to require an assistant government agent to pay compensation 
in respect of land acquired by the State. But where the duty had 
been directly imposed by statute upon a Crown servant or persona 
designata, and the duty was to be wholly discharged by him in his 
own official capacity, as distinct from his capacity as a mere agent 
for the Crown, a writ of mandamus would issue at the instance of a 
person who had a direct and substantial interest in securing the 
performance of that duty.^
The remedy of mandamus was not granted by way of a prohibitory 
injunction requiring a person to refrain from doing something
g
unlawful. Nor was it granted to compel the performance of a duty 
which might arise in the future; there had to be an existing duty 
and an existing right in someone to have it performed. The Supreme
1. Norman v. Perera (1900) 4 NLR 85; Fernando v. Rubber Contro­
ller (1924) 26 NLR 211; In_ re Government Agent, Western Province 
(1928) 30 NLR 81; Samynathan v. Whitehom (1934) 35 NLR 225; In re 
Assistant Govemnent Agent, Uva (1937) 39 NLR 450; De Zoysa v. Dyson 
(1945) 46 NLR 351; Qrr v. District Judge, Kalutara (1948) 49 NLR 204.
2. Noordeen v. Chairman, Village Committee, Godapitiya (1943)
44 NLR 2941
3. Wijesuriya v. Moonesinghe (1959) 61 NLR 180.
4. Haniffa v. Chairman, Village Committee, Nawalapiyata (1963)
66 NLR 48"!
5. Munasinghe v. Devaraian (1955) 57 NLR 286.
6. iFifr '' -----
7. City Motor Transit Co.Ltd v. Wijesinghe (1961) 63 NLR 156.
8. Colombo Buddhist Theosophical Society Ltd v. De Silva (1961)
63 NLR 237.
9. Mohamadu v. De Silva (1949) 52 NLR 562.
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Court has also refused to grant a mandamus to undo an act already 
done, or to allow the validity of an act purported to have been 
done under a statute to be tried: for example, the cancellation 
of a licence which has been irregularly issued.'*'
Since the remedy was essentially discretionary in nature, 
the following factors have generally militated against its issue:
a) the conduct of the applicant: Where there had been delay on the
part of an applicant, or where the Court had not been convinced
3
of the propriety of his motives, it has declined to issue 
mandamus even though the substantive complaint might have been 
established. A candidate at an election who had acquiesced in 
the method of voting adopted at a meeting was held to be estopped 
from applying for a writ of mandamus on the ground that the 
procedure was irregular.^ "
b) the availability of an alternative remedy: The existence of 
another and equally convenient and effectual remedy provided by 
law, e.g. a right of appeal or a civil action, has often led the 
Court to decline to exercise its writ jurisdiction.^
c) futility of the order: The Court will not order that to be done 
which either cannot be done or is already done, or would be 
futile to do; for example, to place a motion on the agenda of 
a meeting which has already been held, ^ or to direct the issueg
of a residence visa to a person who has already been deported.
1. Ibid.
2. Abdul Rahuman v. Mayor of Colombo (1965) 69 NLR 211.
3. Madanayake v. Schrader (1928) 29 NLR 389.
4. Inasitamby v. Government Agent, Northern Province (1932)
34 NLR 33.
5. Bank of Chettinad v. Tea Export Controller (1935) 37 NLR 
190; Dankoluwa Tea Estates Ltd v. Tea Controller (1940) 42 NLR 
36; Samynathan v. Whitehorn, supra; Rodrigo v. Municipal Council, 
Galle (1947) 49 NLR 89. The alternative remedy need not be an 
action at law; it may be by way of an appeal to a forum domesticum: 
Cooray v. Grero (1954) 56 NLR 87.
6. Wimalasuriya v. Chairman, Urban Council, Matale (1927) 28 
NLR 4171 Simon Silva v. Assistant Government Agent, Kalutara 
(1931) 33 NLR 257.
7. Goonesinghe v. Mayor of Colombo (1944) 46 NLR 85. Cf. Local 
Government Service Commission v. Urban Council, Panadura (19521
55 NLR 429; Seenivasagam v. Kiripamoorthy (1954) 56 NLR 450; 
Samaraweera v. Balasuriya (1955) 58 NLR 118; Pathirana v. Goone- 
sekera (1962) 66 NLR 464.
ITT Sethu Ramasamy v. Moragoda (1961) 63 NLR 115.
345
3. Certiorari and Prohibition. The principles governing 
the issue of these two writs were very similar. Prohibition, how­
ever, was invoked at an earlier stage than certiorari. Prohibition 
did not lie unless something remained to be done that a court could 
prohibit. Certiorari did not lie unless something had been done 
that a court could quash.'*' The general principle which formed the 
basis of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to grant the remedy 
of certiorari is best stated in the oft-quoted words of Atkin LJ in 
Rex v. Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London Electricity Joint 
Committee:
Whenever any body of persons having legal authority 
to determine questions affecting the rights of sub­
jects, and having the duty to act judicially act in 
excess of their legal authority they are subject to 
the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench 
Division exercised in these writs.2
In other words, before a body of persons could be made amenable to
this remedy, it had to be shown not only that such body had legal
authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects,
but also that such body was required to act judicially.
The circumstances in which a person or body of persons is
required to act judicially have been examined by Parker J in R.v.
Manchester Legal Aid Committee:
Where the decision is that of a court then, unless, 
as in a case, for instance, of justices granting 
excise licences, it is acting is a purely minister­
ial capacity, it is clearly under a duty to act 
judicially. When on the other hand, the decision is 
that of an administrative body and is actuated in 
whole or in part by questions of policy, the duty to 
act judicially may arise in the course of arriving 
at the decision. Thus, if, in order to arrive at the 
decision, the body concerned has to consider propos­
als and objections and consider evidence, then there 
is a duty to act judicially in the course of that
inquiry.3
The following are some of the instances where the Supreme Court 
has held that the duty to act judicially existed:
4
i. an arbitration under the Co-operative Societies Ordinance;
ii. the determination of the employment of an officer by the
Local Government Service Commission;^
1. For a full discussion, see De Smith, Judicial Review, ch.8.
2. [1924] 1 KB at 205.
3. [1952] 1 All ER 480, at 489.
4. Illangakoon v. Bogollagama (1948) 49 NLR 403; Sirisena v. 
Kotawera-Udagama Co-operative Society (1949) 51 NLR 262.
5. Abeygunasekera v. LGSC (1949) 51 NLR 8; cf. Suriyaperuma v. 
LGSC (1947) 48 NLR 433.
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iii. the cancellation of a licence by the Controller of Textiles;'*'
iv. the granting of a road service licence by the Commissioner
2
of Motor Traffic;
3
v. the proceedings before a prison tribunal;
vi. the making of a "punitive order" by the licensing authority
4
under the Licensing of Traders Act; 
vii. the proceedings of a labour tribunal, an arbitrator and an 
industrial court under the Industrial Disputes Act;"* 
viii. the determination of a revising officer appointed under the
g
Franchise Act;
ix. the determination of a prescribed officer appointed under the 
Citizenship Act;^ 
x. the exercise by the Director of Education of his power under
g
the Education Code to remove the manager of a school; 
xi. the determination by the Principal Collector of Customs that 
a person "had been concerned" in the importation of prohibited
9
or restricted goods; 
xii. the determination by a Minister of an appeal against a surch­
arge imposed by the Auditor-General under the Town Councils 
Ordinance;^
xiii. the dismissal of a teacher by a university on the ground of 
incapacity or misconduct.'*''*'
1. Abdul Thassim v. Edmund Rodrigo, supra; overruled by the 
Privy Council in Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne (1950) 51 NLR 457.
2. South Western Bus Co.Ltd v. Arumugam (1947) 48 NLR 385;
Kandy Qnnibus Co.Ltd v. Roberts (1954) 5o NLR 293.
3. Kolugala v. Superintendent of Prisons, supra.
4. Ibrahim v. Government Agent, Vavuniya (1966) 69 NLR 217.
5. Walker Sons St Co.Ltd v. Fry (1965) 68 NLR 73; overruled by 
the Privy Council in United Engineering Workers Union v. Devenaya- 
gam (1967) 69 NIR 289.
6. Mudannayake v. Sivagnanasunderam (1951) 53 NLR 25.
7. Manickam v. Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence and
External Affairs (1960) 62 NLR 204.
8. Don Samuel v. De Silva (1959) 60 NLR 547.
9. Tennekoon v. Principal Collector of Customs (1959) 61 NLR
232.
10. Munasinghe v. Auditor-General (1961) 64 NLR 474.
11. Linus Silva v. University Council of the Vidyodaya University
(1961) 64 NLR 104; overruled by the Privy Council: 66 NLR 505.
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If, on the other hand, an administrative body in arriving at 
its decision at no stage has before it any form of lis and through­
out has to consider the question from the point of view of policy 
and expediency, it cannot be said that it is under a duty to act 
judicially.^ Generally, the effect of such expressions as "if he 
sees no objection" and "after such inquiry as he thinks fit" is
that the act contemplated is merely executive or ministerial and 
2
not judicial. As a general rule, words such as "where it appears
to", "if it appears to the satisfaction of", "if the . . .considers
it expedient that", or "if the . . .  is satisfied that", standing
by themselves without other words or circumstances of qualification,
3
exclude a duty to act judicially. These are the well-recognised 
forms of expression by which Parliament, to an increasing extent, 
entrusts the performance of various administrative functions to a 
Minister or other high official, relying on the sanction that the 
Minister will be answerable to Parliament in regard to the manner 
in which those duties are performed. Accordingly, it has been held 
that:
a) where the Controller of Textiles may cancel a licence if he 
lfhas reasonable grounds to believe" that any dealer is unfit
4
to continue as such;
b) where the Minister may remove the chairman of a village commi­
ttee from office on being satisfied "that there is sufficient 
proof of" misconduct in the performance of his duties;"*
c) where the Minister may dissolve a municipal council "if it 
appears" to him that such municipal council is not competent to
g
perform any duty or duties imposed upon it;
d) where a Government Agent "after such inquiry as he thinks fit" 
may "if he sees no objection" grant a licence under the Public 
Performances Ordinance;^
e) where the Minister may refuse an application for citizenship 
"if he is satisfied" that it is not in the public interest to
g
grant the application, 
each of the functionaries concerned was not under a duty to act
1. R^ _ v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee, supra.
2. Munasinghe v. Jayasinghe (1958) 6l NLR 425.
3. Sugathadasa v. Jayasinghe (1958) 59 NLR 457.
4. Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne, supra.
5. Gunapala v. Kannangara (1955) 57 NLR 69.
6. Sugathadasa v. Jayasinghe, supra.
7. Munasinghe v. Jayasinghe, supra.
8. Leelawathie v. Minister of Defence and External Affairs (1965)
68 NLR W 7
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judicially. Additionally, a person or body of persons entrusted by 
law with the task of ascertaining facts is not required to act 
judicially in the performance of that task. Accordingly, it has 
been held by the Supreme Court that the function of a commission of 
inquiry or that of an inquirer conducting an inquest cannot be des­
cribed as judicial or even quasi-judicial over which the Court 
could exercise any controlling jurisdiction. ^
The grounds on which certiorari had been successfully invoked
were:
(a) that the person or tribunal had acted without jurisdiction or 
in excess of jurisdiction;^
(b) that an error of law had been apparent on the face of the record;
(c) that there had been a denial of natural justice: e.g. bias in
4
the judge, or a failure to observe the audi alteram partem 
rule.'*
As in the case of mandamus, the Supreme Court has declined to inter- 
vene if an alternative and equally convenient remedy was available; 
if there had been delay attributable to the petitioner;^ if no
g
benefit would have arisen by the grant of the writ; if the conduct 
of the party making the application had been such as to disentitle 
him to relief, e.g. where he had acquiesced in the irregularity
1. Dias v. Abeywardene (1966) 68 NLR 409; Seneviratne v. Attomey- 
General~TT968) 71 NLR 439.
2. Kandy Chmibus Co.Ltd v. Roberts, supra; Illangakoon v. 
Bogollagama, supra; Mohamed Miya v. Controller of Textiles (1947)
48 NLR 493; Simon Silva v. Debt Conciliation Board (1963) 65 NLR 
139.
3. Mudannayake v. Sivagnanasunderam, supra; Manickam v. Perm­
anent Secretary, Ministry of Defence and External Affairs, supra; 
Hayleys Ltd v. Crosette Thambiah (1961) 63 NLR 248; Hayleys Ltd v.
De Silva (1962) 64 NLR 130; Virakesari Ltd v. Fernando (1963)
66 NLR 145.
4. Abdul Thassim v. Edmund Rodrigo, supra.
5. Munasinghe v. Auditor-General, supra; Don Samuel v.De Silva, 
supra; Linus Silva v. University Council of the Vidyodaya Univer­
sity, supra (but cf. Privy Council judgment, supra); Mohmned & Co.
v. Controller of Textiles (1947) 48 NLR 461; Subramaniam v. Minis­
ter of Local Government and Cultural Affairs (1957) 59 NLR 254^ 
Vadamaradchy Hindu Educational Society v. Minister of Education 
(1961) 63 NLR 322.
6. Sirisena v. Kotawera-Udagama Co-operative Society, supra.
7. Virakesari Ltd v. Fernando, supra!
8. Kiri Banda v. Government Agent, Uva (1944) 46 NLR 15.
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complained of or had failed to take objection at the earliest oppor-
1 2 tunity; or if the application had been made prematurely. When
it was argued that the House of Representatives had not been pro­
perly constituted when it purported to enact the Motor Transport Act 
and that consequently that legislative act was invalid, the Supreme 
Court observed that it was relevant to consider, in deciding whe­
ther certiorari should issue, the probable consequences of granting 
the writ:
In the present case, the consequences of granting the 
writ can only be described as disastrous. It would 
result in all the legislation passed by Parliament 
since it came into existence and all its actions liable 
to be regarded as illegal and of no effect. It would 
affect the rights and liabilities of several thousands 
of people who conducted their business activities and 
their lives on the basis that legislation enacted by 
Parliament is valid; it would disturb the peace and 
quiet of the country; and, above all, it will bring the 
government of the country to a standstill. I take the 
view that in these circumstances, even if the grounds 
on which the application is made are valid, no court 
would exercise its discretion in favour of the petit­
ioner . ^
In the final analysis, therefore, the writs of certiorari and
prohibition were not merely of limited application; they were also
essentially discretionary remedies. To invoke the jurisdiction of
the court it had to be established that the impugned tribunal was
under a duty to act judicially:
The true test to my mind of whether the writ lies is
what kind of function the law has imposed upon the 
authority when acting within its statutory powers and 
not what it has actually done acting outside of its 
powers. If the answer to that question is that the 
function imposed by law is judicial in character the 
writ will lie to quash determinations or orders made 
outside or in excess of its statutory authority, or 
in breach of the rules of natural justice or where 
there is error of law on the face of the record. Where 
the function is not judicial in character, whatever 
other remedies may be available, the prerogative writs 
of certiorari and prohibition will not be available to 
question acts of such authority which are ultra vires 
of its legal powers.^ "
But even where that stringent test had been satisfied, the Court may
yet decide not to grant the relief sought owing to extraneous factors
not directly related to the actual matter in dispute.
1. Ibid.
2. Ceylon Mineral Waters Ltd v. EJ, Anuradhapura (1966) 70 NLR 312.
3. P.S.Bus Co.Ltd v. Members' and~Secretary,CTB (1958) 61 NLR 491.
4. Seneviratne v. Attorney-General, supra.
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4. Quo Warranto. The writ of quo warranto was first issued
by the Supreme Court for the purpose of declaring an election to a
local authority null and void on the ground that the elected member
was not qualified to be so elected.^ There was at that time no
2
statutory authority for the issue of this writ, but the Court 
acted in the exercise of its inherent power; it believed that "there 
must be some means of trying title to office in such cases as the 
present". Thereafter, this writ has been invoked several times in 
order to determine whether the holder of a public office (generally 
a member elected to a local authority) is legally entitled to it.
Two essential requirements for the issue of this writ were that the
3
office usurped was of a public nature, and the person alleged to 
have usurped it had assumed that office and was in actual possession
4
of it. The writ, being discretionary, was not granted where the
5 6petitioner had acquiesced; where its issue would have been futile;
or where there had been unreasonable delay in making the application
to court.^
5. Procedendo. The writ of procedendo was addressed by a 
superior to an inferior court directing the latter to proceed forth­
with to deliver judgment, or remitting to an inferior court an action 
which had been removed on insufficient grounds to the superior court
g
by habeas corpus, certiorari or any like writ. This remedy had 
fallen into disuse and was of no relevance in 1972.
1. In re Election of a Councillor for the Galupiadda Ward of 
the Galle Municipality (1905) 8 NLR 300. See also Re Election of 
Danister Perera as Member of the Municipal Council of Galle (1906) 
9 NLR 142.
2. This was provided by Ordinance No.4 of 1920.
3. Chandrasena v. De Silva (1961) 63 NLR 308.
4. Dharmaratne v. Commissioner of Elections (1950) 52 NLR 429; 
Punchi Singho v. Perera (1950) 53 NLR 143.
5. GivenHrasinghe v. De Mel (1948) 49 NLR 422; Navaratnam v. 
Sabapathy (1968) 71 NLR 566.
6. Peiris v. Gunasekera (1963) 66 NLR 498.
7. Wiiegoonewardene v. Kularatne (1950) 51 NLR 453.
8. Walter Pereira, Laws of Ceylon, 2nd ed. (Colombo, 1913), 
pp.109-110.
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The Declaratory Judgment
Section 217(G) of the Civil Procedure Code provided that a 
decree or order of a civil court may, without affording any subst­
antive relief or remedy, declare a right or status. Upon this 
provision was founded the declaratory judgment. Such a judgment 
could not be enforced, but, as Gratiaen J has observed:
Courts of justice have always assumed, so far without 
disillusionment, that their declaratory decrees against 
the Crown will be respected.-*-
Denning U  knew of "no limit to the power of the court to grant a
declaration except such power as it may in its discretion impose 
2
upon itself". The declaratory jurisdiction in Ceylon was not
3
quite so wide as it was in England. It was confined to the decl­
aration of a "right or status". It has been held, moreover, that 
in the exercise of this jurisdiction:
a court should not permit itself to be converted into 
a forum for the discussion of purely academic problems 
and ought therefore to be satisfied that the declaratory 
decree asked for in any particular action relates to a 
concrete and genuine dispute and would, if passed, 
serve some real purpose in the event of future liti­
gation between the same parties.^-
Yet, the declaratory judgment was much wider in scope than any of
the other traditional remedies, and had a distinct advantage over
the prerogative writs in that it was free of the technicalities of
procedure that circumscribed the operation of the latter, and since
no question of enforceability arose, the court was not restricted
or inhibited by the probable consequences attendant upon its order.
The Injunction
Section 20 of the Courts Ordinance authorised the Supreme 
Court or any judge thereof to grant and issue injunctions to prevent 
any irremediable mischief which might ensue before the party making 
application for such injunction could prevent the same by bringing 
an action in any original court. Therefore, the Supreme Court's 
power to grant an injunction was a strictly limited one, to be 
exercised only on special grounds and in special circumstances:
1. Attorney-General v. Sabaratnam (1955) 57 NLR 481, at 485.
2. Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board [1953] 2 WLR 995, at 1009.
3. For the scope of this remedy in England, see I.Zamir,
The Declaratory Judgment (1962: London).
4. Naganathan v. Velautham (1953) 55 NLR 319, at 321, per 
Gratiaen J.
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(a) where irremediable mischief would ensue from the act sought to 
be restrained;
(b) an action would lie for an injunction in some court of original 
jurisdiction; and
(c) the plaintiff is prevented by some substantial cause from 
applying to that court.
Such an injunction was usually sought after a prospective plaintiff
had given the required statutory thirty-days' notice to the Crown
of his intention to institute an action in an original court. In
a fit case, the Supreme Court would grant the injunction after only
ex parte hearing and without notice to the opposite party.^ In order
that an injunction may issue, the Supreme Court did not consider it
necessary that it should be satisfied that a case existed which
would entitle the plaintiff to relief at all costs; it was quite
sufficient if the court found a case which showed that there was a
substantial question to be investigated and that matters ought to
be preserved in statu quo until that question could be finally 
2
disposed of.
Section 86 of the Courts Ordinance empowered a District Court 
or a Court of Requests to grant an interim injunction, as an inci­
dental step in a proceeding instituted in such court:
(a) where it appeared from the plaint that the plaintiff is 
entitled to a judgment against the defendant restraining the 
caimission or continuance of an act which would produce injury 
to the plaintiff;
(b) where it appeared that the defendant during the pendency of 
the action is doing or is about to do an act which would render 
the judgment ineffectual: or
(c) where it appeared that the defendant during the pendency of 
the action is about to dispose of his property with intent to 
defraud the plaintiff.
Such an injunction was granted on the basis of evidence tendered in 
affidavit form, and was usually issued to accompany the summons. 
Where, however, the court was of the view that the object of 
granting the injunction would not be defeated by delay, and in
1. Mahamado v. Ibrahim (1895) 2 NLR 36; Buddhadasa v. Nadaraja 
(1955) 56 NLR 537; Amolis Silva v. Tambiah (1961) 63 NLR 228.
2. Ratwatte v. Minister of Lands (1969) 72.NLR 60. See also 
Yakkaduwa Sri Pragnarama Thero v. Minister of Education (1969) 71 
NLR 506, where H.N.G.Fernando CJ applied the "balance of convenience" 
rule.
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every case where the application was made after the defendant had 
answered, notice of application was first issued on the party 
sought to be restrained.'*' The proper question for decision upon 
such an application was "whether3 there is a serious matter to be 
tried at the hearing". If it appeared frcm the pleadings already 
filed that such a matter did exist, the further question was 
whether the circumstances were such that a decree which might ulti­
mately be entered in favour of the party seeking the injunction
2
would be nugatory or ineffective if the injunction was not issued.
The fact that the judge thought on the evidence then available that
the plaintiff could not succeed in his substantive action was not,
3
by itself, a ground for refusing an interim injunction. The
Supreme Court has, however, emphasized that the fact that that Court
had already issued an injunction under section 20 did not absolve
the original court from the duty of considering the matter and of
forming its own view, particularly where it came to consider the
matter after the defendant had placed before it such material as he
was permitted to place before it by law in support of his objection
4
to the grant of the injunction.
An application under section 86 usually accompanied a plaint 
in which was sought either a declaration of a right or status, or 
a decree or order of court enjoining a person "not to do a specified 
act, or to abstain from specified conduct or behaviour".'*
Damages
A decree or order of court could command the person against 
whom it operated to pay money. Accordingly, an action for damages 
in tort or for breach of contract were also remedies which were 
available for the vindication of rights. However, this remedy, 
which was available even against the Crown,^ could be invoked only 
after the alleged injustice had been suffered.
Bail
The courts in Ceylon had no common law power to admit persons 
to bail. Its power and jurisdiction to do so was regulated by
1. Civil Procedure Code, s.664.
2. Dissanayake v. Agricultural and Industrial Credit Corporation 
(1962) 64 NLR 283.
3. Ibid.
4. Ratwatte v. Minister of Lands, supra.
5. Civil Procedure Code, s.217(E).
6. Ibid., s.217(A).
7. Crown (Liability in Delict) Act, No.22 of 1969.
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statute, namely, the Criminal Procedure Code and the Courts Ordin­
ance.'*’ The former required a person accused of a bailable offence 
to be released on bail if at any stage of a criminal proceeding he 
was prepared to give bail; the court having a discretion whether or
2
not to discharge him on his simply executing a bond without sureties.
A magistrate or a district judge could, in his discretion, release 
any person accused of a non-bail able offence, except where reason­
able grounds existed for believing that such person had been guilty
of treason, fabricating false evidence to procure conviction of a
3
capital offence, or of murder. The Supreme Court had an unfettered 
discretion to direct that any person, whether accused of a bailable 
or non-bail able offence, be admitted to bail, as well as to reduce
4
or increase the quantum of bail required by a magistrate. In exer­
cising this discretion, the main question which the Court usually 
considered was whether it was possible that the accused would appear 
to stand his trial and not abscond. In answering that question, 
three considerations have been taken into account:
1. What is the nature of the crime ? Is it grave or trifling ?
2. The severity of the punishment upon conviction.
3. The probability of a conviction or the nature of the evidence 
to be offered by the prosecution.^
The Supreme Court has, however, stressed that while "the favour 
shown to freedom" will always influence Judges who approach questions 
affecting the liberty of the subject, it must not be thought that the 
grant of bail should be the rule and the refusal of bail should be 
the exception where serious non-bailable offences were concerned.
This has not been the approach of the Supreme Court in inter­
preting and applying section 31 of the Courts Ordinance which 
contained a statutory right to bail, however serious the offence 
might have been. That section provided that if any prisoner comm­
itted for trial before the Supreme Court for any offence was not 
brought to trial at the first criminal sessions after the date of 
his commitment at which he might properly have been tried (provided 
twenty-one days had elapsed between the date of commitment and the
1. In re Ganapathipillai (1920) 21 NLR 490; Kannusamy v. Min- 
ister of Defence and External Affairs (1961) 63 NLR 214.
2. S.394.
3. S.395.
4. S.396.
5. The Queen v. Liyanage (1963) 65 NLR 289.
6. Ibid.
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first day of such criminal sessions), the Supreme Court or any
judge thereof shall admit him to bail, unless good cause be shown
to the contrary, or unless the trial shall have been postponed on
the application of such prisoner. The Supreme Court understood
this provision to contain "an important principle safeguarding the
liberty of the subject who has a right to be brought to trial with
reasonable despatch".'*’ It emphasized that:
The liberty of the subject is an important personal 
right enjoyed in democratic countries observing the 
Rule of Law, and custody pending trial being an inf­
ringement of that liberty, the courts must be vigi­
lant in ensuring that the infringement is restricted 
to the limits spelled out by the legislature.2
Accordingly, the Court rejected the submission that since the indict­
ment was the foundation of a trial and no person could be tried 
unless an indictment had in fact been presented, the criminal sess­
ions at which an accused "might properly be tried" would be a sess-
................................  3 ..............
ions held after indictment had been served. If this submission had
been accepted, the Attorney-General could, by delaying to present an
indictment, have ensured that an accused person continued to remain
incarcerated. The preparation and service of the indictment was a
step involved in bringing a prisoner to trial, and by omitting to
take that step the State could have denied a prsioner his right to
liberty. T.S.Fernando ACJ expressed the attitude of the Court in
such matters thus:
The liberty of the subject is not a slogan as was 
suggested, cynically so it appeared to us, during 
the argument, but is a valuable right of a citizen 
and the courts must be vigilant in ensuring that 
it is not unprofitably thwarted.4'
Such then were the imperfections, shortcomings and inherent 
limitations of the traditional remedies. The citizen was now 
expected, by displaying sufficient ingenuity, to convince the court 
of the urgent need to adapt them in order that they may serve to 
realise the laudable aspirations of the new Constitution, despite 
the fact that the Constitution itself did not require the courts to 
so adapt them.
1. De Mel v. Attorney-General (1940) 47 NLR 136, at 137, per 
Nihil1 J.
2. Premasiri v. Attorney-General (1967) 70 NLR 193, at 195, 
per T.S.Fernando ACJ.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., at 199.
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The Erosion of Traditional Remedies
The 1972 Constitution
Section 121(3) provided that the powers of the highest court 
with original jurisdiction established by law for the administra­
tion of justice (which was then the Supreme Court) shall include 
the power to issue mandates in the nature of writs. Ostensibly, 
the writ jurisdiction had, for the first time, been entrenched in 
a Constitution. But having so provided, the same section proceeded 
to state an exception, namely, "except in matters expressly excl­
uded by existing law or laws enacted by the National State Assembly". 
The Assembly was further empowered to enact such laws by a simple 
majority of the members present and voting. Therefore, in effect, 
what section 121(3) guaranteed was that whatever was left of the 
writ jurisdiction, after giving effect to existing law which sought 
to exclude it and any laws enacted in the future which may seek to 
exclude it, will continue to be vested in the highest original 
court. Had this section not been included in the Constitution, the 
writ jurisdiction would not have been less secured. Indeed, by 
specifically stating the exception, constitutional authority was 
being given, for the first time, to the legislature to deny the 
writ jurisdiction in respect of such "matters" as the legislature 
may consider fit. Examining the Administration of Justice Bill, 
the Constitutional Court held that the word "matters" in this 
context "is a word of great amplitude", and would include not only 
subject matter but also persons and bodies.^
The Constitution itself prohibited certain matters of an 
executive or administrative nature from being inquired into, or 
being prcnxrced upon, by a court, namely:
i. anything done or omitted to be done by the President in his
2
official or private capacity;
ii. the question whether the President had, as required, acted 
on the advice of the appropriate Minister or had omitted to
3
do so or had disregarded such advice;
iii. anything done, purported to be done or omitted to be done 
by or in the National State Assembly, whether in the course
4
of its proceedings or otherwise;
1. (1973) DCC, Vol.l, p.57, at 65.
2. S.23(1).
3. S.27(2).
4. S.39(1), except as otherwise expressly provided in the Consti­
tution.
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iv. any recommendation, order or decision of the Cabinet of Min­
isters, a Minister, the State Services Advisory and Discipl­
inary Boards, or a state officer, regarding any matter concer­
ning appointments, transfers, dismissals or disciplinary 
control of state officers;'*'
v. any decision by the Cabinet on the question whether or not
the principal duty or duties of a state officer was the perfor-
2
mance of functions of a judicial nature.
Existing Law
1. "Final and conclusive" clauses. A few pre-Independence 
enactments contained provisions which sought to oust the juris­
diction of the courts in respect of executive action. For instance, 
section 9 of the Service Tenures Ordinance, No.4 of 1870, provided 
that the determination made by commissioners appointed to inquire 
into claims made under that Ordinance:
shall be final and conclusive in that or any future 
proceeding, whether before the said commissioners or 
any other judicial tribunal, as to the tenure of the 
pangus in such village, whether it be praveni or 
maruwena, the nature of the service due for and in 
respect of each praveni pangu, and the annual amount 
of money payment for which the services due for each 
praveni pangu may be fairly commuted at the time those 
registries are made.
In an 1884 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the submission that
the finality and conclusiveness conferred on the determination of
commissioners by section 9 did not extend to a determination made
3
outside the scope of their authority. In that case, it appeared 
that the service tenure commissioners had travelled outside their 
powers and entered in the register they were authorised to make 
under the Ordinance particulars which they were not required to 
determine or enter.
This restrictive approach to finality clauses was confirmed 
by a Divisional Bench in Ladamuttu v. Attorney-General.^  In that 
case, the Supreme Court examined the scope of section 3(4) of the 
Land Redemption Ordinance, No.61 of 1942, which provided that the 
question whether any land which the Land Commissioner was authorised
1. S.106(5).
2. S.110(2).
3. Bogolle Punchirala v. Kadapatwehera Ding (1884) 6 SCC 157.
4. (1957) 59 NLR 313.
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to acquire under that Ordinance should or should not be acquired:
shall, subject to any regulations made in that 
behalf, be determined by the Land Commissioner 
in the exercise of his individual judgment and 
every such determination of the Land Commiss­
ioner shall be final.
Did section 3(4) preclude a person from questioning the Land Comm­
issioner's determination by way of a regular action ? Basnayake CJ 
explained:
In the first place . . .  it is necessary to consider 
what it is that the subsection declares shall be final.
It is the determination that any land which the Land 
Commissioner is authorised to acquire under subsection
(1) should or should not be acquired. Therefore, if 
the Land commissioner determines that he should acquire 
any land which he is not authorised to acquire under 
subsection (1) the requirements of subsection (4) are 
not satisfied and the determination will not be final.
The Crown argued that finality attached to the Land Commissioner's
decision whether he was or was not authorised by subsection (1) to
acquire the lands. Basnayake CJ thought this was "an astounding
proposition" to which he could not assent:
Now, when an Ordinance or an Act provides that a deci­
sion made by a statutory functionary to whom the task 
of making a decision under the enactment is entrusted 
shall be final, the Legislature assumes that the 
functionary will arrive at his decision in accordance 
with law and the rules of natural justice and after all 
the prescribed conditions precedent to the making of 
his decision have been fulfilled, and that where his 
jurisdiction depends on a true construction of an 
enactment he will construe it correctly. The Legislat­
ure also assumes that the functionary will keep to the 
limits of the authority committed to him and will not 
act in bad faith or from corrupt motives or exercise 
his powers for purposes other than those specified in 
the statute or be influenced by grounds alien or 
irrelevant to the powers taken by the statute or act 
unreasonably. To say that the word 'final' has the 
effect of giving statutory sanction to a decision 
however wrong, however contrary to the statute, how­
ever unreasonable or influenced by bad faith or corrupt 
motives, is to give the word a meaning which it is 
incapable of bearing and which the Legislature could 
never have contemplated.^
He added:
To read the word 'final' in the sense which the learned 
counsel for the Crown seeks to place upon it would amount 
to giving the public functionary authority to act as he
1. Ibid., at 328.
2. Ibid., at 329.
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pleases. It is unthinkable that the Legislature would 
give such a blank authority to a functionary however 
highly placed. Such powers are rarely given even when 
the country is at war or is facing a crisis. It must 
be presumed that the Legislature does not sanction 
illegal acts on the part of functionaries. If it 
intends to sanction unauthorised and illegal acts it 
should say so in plain and unmistakable terms and not 
use a word of such doubtful import as 1 final1. That
the subject should not be harassed by unauthorised
action on the part of statutory functionaries is as 
much the concern of the Legislature as of the Courts 
and once a piece of legislation has been put on the 
statute book the Legislature as well as the public 
looks to the Courts to exercise their controlling 
authority against illegal and unjust use of the powers 
conferred thereby, and the Courts will be failing in 
their legitimate duty if they denied relief against  ^
illegal action on the part of statutory functionaries.
2. "Shall not be called in question in any court" clauses.
By the late 'Forties, the legislature was experimenting with a more
explicit formula to oust the jurisdiction of courts. Section 8 of
the Public Security Ordinance, No.25 of 1947, provided that:
No emergency regulation, and no order, rule or direct­
ion made or given thereunder shall be called in quest- .. 
ion in any court.
Section 12(3) of the Citizenship Act, No.18 of 1948, stated that the 
refusal by the Minister to allow the application of any person for 
registration as a citizen of Ceylon "shall be final and shall not 
be contested in any court".
The former provision was relied upon by the Attorney-General
2
in Hirdaramani v. Ratnavale. in support of his argument that the 
Court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity or good 
faith of a detention order made by the Permanent Secretary which 
was valid on its face and applicable to a particular detainee. In 
view of the apparent conflict between two decisions of the House of 
Lords, H.N.G.Fernando CJ found himself "unable to reach with 
certainty a firm opinion as to the scope of section 8". G.P.A.Silva J,
1. Ibid., at 329. This point was not argued before the Privy 
Council when the matter went up in appeal, but the Judicial Comm­
ittee expressed its agreement with the Supreme Court's view: Land 
Commissioner v. Ladamuttu (1960) 62 NLR 169, at 180. See also 
Wijerama v. Paul (1973) 76 NLR 241, where T.S.Fernando P, inter­
preting s.18(1) of the Medical Ordinance, No.26 of 1927, came to 
the same conclusion.
2. (1971) 75 NLR 67.
3. Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council [1956] AC 736;
and Anisminic Ltd v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147.
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however, chose to express his view on the matter, having regard to
the well-established rule of construction that statutes which have
the effect of infringing on the liberty of the subject must be
strictly construed:
It is beyond argument that the Courts can inquire into
a complaint by an aggrieved party, in the first instance,
that any particular rule, regulation or by-law is ultra 
vires or that an enactment or rule has been misapplied 
in his case. It is also the undoubted duty of the Court, 
after such inquiry, either to pronounce on the validity 
of the rule or regulation, or, where the validity is not 
in doubt, to decide, inter alia, whether any power conf­
erred on the executive by such rule or regulation has 
been exercised in terms of such provision strictly const­
rued. 1
He conceded that an incorrect decision by the Permanent Secretary
would not be justiciable by reason of the provision of section 8:
If of course he acts in bad faith in making an order . . 
the provisions taking away the right of the Court to call 
the order in question would not apply. On a very simple 
analysis of the language involved in the regulation, it 
seems to me that in such an event the Court's jurisdict­
ion to interfere remains untouched because, when the 
Permanent Secretary acts in bad faith, he has obviously 
not made the order of detention because he is of opinion 
that the person in respect of whom the order is made is 
likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the public 
safety and that he should be prevented from so acting, 
but because the Permanent Secretary has some other 
obvious reason. Many such reasons can be imagined, the 
simplest of which is that the officer is actuated by a 
personal motive.2
According to G.P.A.Silva J, therefore, mala fide was an implied
exception to any exclusionary provision which on the face of it
precluded a court from questioning the validity of an order made
thereunder. Samarawickrema J agreed with him:
It is however open to a party challenging a detention 
order to show, if he can do so, that the Permanent 
Secretary never had the opinion that it was necessary 
to make an order for the detention of the person named 
and that the detention order was not made because he 
had formed an opinion as required by the regulation but 
for an ulterior object. For example, the order would 
not be in terms of the regulation and would be a sham 
if the Permanent Secretary were to make it for a purely 
private purpose such as the detention of the rival to 
the woman he loved. Again, if there is overwhelming
1. Hirdaramani v. Ratnavale, supra, at 104.
2. Ibid., at 107.
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ground for believing that no reasonable Permanent 
Secretary could form the opinion that it was nece­
ssary to make a detention order in respect of the 
person affected, it might show that the Permanent 
Secretary was acting in bad faith and that the det­
ention order was not made on the basis of an opinion 
required by the regulation but for an improper 
purpose.1
A different view of the effect of section 8 was taken by
2
the majority in Gunasekera v. Ratnavale. Wijetilleke J consid­
ered that section 8 "can only apply to emergency regulations duly 
made" and to order, rules or directions "validly made" under such 
regulation:
If such orders are not validly given they would not 
be 1 orders1 within the meaning of section 5; so that 
in effect this Court has the power and jurisdiction 
to question the legality and/or propriety of an 
order purported to have been made male fide.3
The other two Judges did not agree. Alles J, following the East
Elloe case, thought that:
If plain words have to be given their plain meaning, 
the effect of section 8 must necessarily be intended 
to oust the jurisdiction of the Court in regard to 
the right to question the validity of a detention 
order . . .In such event, the issue of good faith 
also will not be justiciable.^
He conceded that the language used in section 8, while making the 
intention of Parliament manifestly clear "must necessarily shock 
the conscience of the Court and disturb any legal mind who has 
respect for the Rule of Law". Thamotheram J distinguished the 
Anisminic case on the ground that it did not deal with executive 
discretion but with a tribunal, and held that in the face of sect­
ion 8, it was not open to the Court to inquire into an allegation 
of mala fide where the determination or order was prima facie 
valid. The reasoning of the majority in East Elloe commended 
itself to him; particularly the observations of Viscount Simon:
But no one can suppose that an order bears upon its 
face the evidence of bad faith. It cannot be predic­
ated of any order that it has been made in bad faith 
until it has been tested in legal proceedings, and it 
is just that test which paragraph 16 (equivalent to 
section 8) bars. How, then, can it be said that any 
qualification can be introduced to limit the meaning 
of the words ?
1. Ibid., at 112. 2. (1972) 76 NIPL 316.
3. Ibid., at 347. 4. Ibid., at 334.
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He did not share Alles J's distaste for the language of section 8. 
The Court must accept the supremacy of Parliament and "should not 
be carried away by any feeling of outrage it may justifiably or 
otherwise have of the restrictions of personal freedom by Parlia­
ment".^
This, then, was the uncertain state of the law in 1972. The 
two cases cited above both arose out of the turbulent events foll­
owing Ceylon's first armed insurrection. Having regard to the 
Supreme Court's attitude to earlier attempts at ousting the juris­
diction of courts, it seemed probable that, "when the battle flags 
were furled and the war drums throbbed no longer", when peace 
returned to the countryside and the normal tempo of life was rest­
ored, the Courts too would revert to their traditional concern for 
individual liberty. But that was not to be. In May 1972, barely 
ten days before the new Constitution came into operation, Parlia­
ment amended the Interpretation Ordinance with devastating effect 
on many of the traditional remedies.
Interpretation (Amendment) Act, No.18 of 1972.
The Governments headed by Mrs. Bandaranaike appeared to have
2
a deep and abiding suspicion of the judiciary. It was not merely 
that a traditionally conservative judiciary was looked upon warily 
by a socialist government. Following the abortive coup d'etat of 
January 1962, her first Government believed that at least two 
Judges of the Supreme Court had actively participated in formula­
ting a scheme for the transfer of power; hence the need for a new 
law which would vest the Minister of Justice with the power to 
nominate the Judges who would preside at the trial of the alleged
3
conspirators. Her second Government elected to office in 1970
1. Ibid., at 360.
2. See, for instance, the memorandum entitled "Independence of 
the Judiciary or Supremacy of the Judiciary", submitted to the 
Constituent Assembly by the SLFP Lawyers' Association, in which
it was argued that "the talk of the need for an independent judic­
iary which will guarantee that the Rule of Law will be observed and 
the fundamental rights preserved is to ensure the setting up of a 
fortress or bastion to make it easy for the anti-socialist elem­
ents to launch their counter-attack when the time is opportune":
The Nation, 19 November 1970.
3. Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act, No.l of 1962.
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was conmitted to an extensive programne of social and economic ref­
orm, but feared that the Judges would use their powers to stultify 
this programne. Pre-emptive action in the legislative sphere took 
the form of a prohibition of the judicial review of legislation.^
In respect of executive action, particularly in regard to the acqui­
sition of land for public purposes, the Government decided that the 
power of Judges, by the issue of injunctions, to delay, if not to 
prevent altogether, acquisitions determined by the Minister to be 
necessary, should be curbed. The draft bill prepared by the Minister 
of Justice for this purpose, however, went much further than this; 
it also sought to replace the prerogative writs, including habeas 
corpus, with orders of court. The Minister sent a copy of this 
draft bill to the President of the Court of Appeal for his observa­
tions; the latter thought that the Minister was attempting to use 
"nuclear weapons" in a situation which called only for the use of 
"small arms". The Judge had in mind an appropriate amendment to 
the Land Acquisition Act which would be sufficient to prevent any
abuse of the courts' injunction jurisdiction. The Cabinet, however,
3
endorsed the Minister's draft with certain modifications. The 
Interpretation (Amendment) Bill was passed unamended despite protests 
from civic and public interest groups in the country. The bill was 
attacked both in the legislature and outside principally as grant­
ing a licence to the executive to abuse its powers at will. None 
expressed any apprehension of the impact which it was likely to have 
on the procedures which the new Constitution contemplated for the 
enforcement of the much-awaited fundamental rights.
1. 1972 Constitution, s.48(2).
2. This was an unusual practice which Minister Felix Dias Band- 
aranaike initiated upon assuming office in January 1972. Copies of 
bills prepared by him were sent to a number of judges and lawyers 
for their observations. Those judges who responded were generally 
careful to explain that their comments were expressed in a purely 
private capacity and without prejudice to any views which they might 
express in court after hearing arguments should their jurisdiction 
be properly invoked in respect of such matters.
3. The proposal to replace the prerogative writs with orders of 
court was not approved.
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Act No.18 of 1972, which received the Governor-General's 
assent on 11 May 1972, added three new sections to the Interpretat­
ion Ordinance, No.21 of 1901. The new section 22 provided that:
Where there appears in any enactment, whether passed 
or made before or after the commencement of this Ord­
inance, the expression 'shall not be called in quest­
ion in any court', or any other expression of similar 
import whether or not accompanied by the words 'whe­
ther by way of writ or otherwise" in relation to any 
order, decision, determination, direction or finding 
which any person, authority or tribunal is empowered 
to make or issue under such enactment, no court shall,
in any proceedings and upon any ground whatsoever,
have jurisdiction' to pronounce upon the validity or 
legality of such order, decision, determination, dir­
ection or finding, made or issued in the exercise or 
the apparent exercise of the power conferred on such 
person, authority or tribunal.
If, therefore, in addition to those instances where the legislature 
had already used the expression "shall not be called in question in
any court" or words of similar import, the new National State Asse­
mbly were to exercise the power expressly conferred on it by section 
121(3) of the Constitution to exclude the application of writs to 
any executive act, the effect would be that the proposed new funda­
mental rights may not be invoked in respect of such act:
i. in any proceeding, i.e. whether by way of writ, declaratory 
judgment, action for damages or injunction;
ii. upon any ground whatsoever, i.e. whether made allegedly in bad 
faith, unreasonably, or upon irrelevant grounds, in breach of 
the rules of natural justice, fraudulently, or in excess or in 
-the absence of jurisdiction; and
iii. whether performed in the exercise or the appearent exercise of 
power, i.e. regardless of whether the act had been performed 
for the purpose intended by the legislature or not.
A proviso to section 22, however, sought to provide two excep­
tions to this sweeping exclusion of judicial supervision. Firstly, 
section 22 would have no application to the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its power to issue mandates in the nature of writs of
1 2habeas corpus. Both the National State Assembly and the executive 
nevertheless retained the power to exclude the application of that 
remedy, and it would only be in those situations where its application
1. 1972 Constitution, s.121(3).
2. Gunasekera v. Ratnavale, supra, at 334.
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was not so excluded that this proviso would keep it alive. Secondly, 
the power of the Supreme Court to issue other writs would also be 
preserved, even in the face of an exclusion clause, in respect of 
the following matters:
a) where such order, etc., is ex facie not within the power confer­
red on the person, authority or tribunal making it;
b) where the person, authority or tribunal upon whom the power to 
make or issue such order, etc., is conferred is bound to conform 
to the rules of natural justice and the Supreme Court is satis­
fied that he has not done so; or
c) where the compliance with any mandatory provision of any law is
a condition precedent to the making or issuing of such order, etc., 
and the Supreme Court is satisfied that there has been no such 
compliance.
An aggrieved person, therefore, had to satisfy the Court of 
the existence of at least one of these conditions in order to main­
tain his application for a writ. In regard to requirement (c), he 
had to satisfy the Court not only that there had been a failure to 
comply with a provision of law, but also that such provision of law 
was mandatory and not directory. The question whether a provision 
of law is mandatory or directory is in itself not one capable of 
easy resolution. As Sharvananda J observed recently:
When Parliament prescribes the manner or form in which 
a duty is to be performed, or a power exercised, it 
seldom lays down what will be the legal consequences of 
failure to observe its prescriptions. The Courts must 
therefore formulate their own criteria for determining 
whether the procedural rules are to be regarded as 
mandatory, in which case disobedience will render void 
or voidable what has been done, or as directory, in 
which case disobedience will be treated as an irregul­
arity not affecting the validity of what has been done.
Judges have often stressed the impracticability of 
specifying exact rules for the assignment of a proce­
dural provision to the appropriate category. The whole 
scope and purpose of the enactment must be considered, 
and one must assess the importance of the provision 
that has been disregarded and the relation of that 
provision to the general object intended to be secured 
by the Act.
But Judges sometimes disagree in regard to the application of the 
rules which they themselves have formulated. For instance, in 
regard to whether paragraph (b) of section 2(7) of the Heavy Oil
1. Nagalingam v. De Mel (1975) 78 NLR 231.
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Motor Vehicles Taxation Ordinance which required the Minister to 
lay before the House of Representatives within a specified period 
any Order made by him under that subsection, was mandatory or dir­
ectory, the Supreme Court expressed diametrically opposite views 
within an year of each other. In Illeperuma Sons Ltd v. Govern­
ment Agent, Galle,^ H.N.G.Fernando CJ held that the provision was 
mandatory and must be complied with to give validity to the Taxa­
tion Order. But in the previous year, Alles J in Podi Appuhamy v.
2
Government Agent, Kegalle, was equally certain in his own mind 
that a Taxation Order which had been laid before the House on a 
date subsequent to the expiry of the specified period, was valid 
and enforceable since section 2(7)(b) was not mandatory but merely 
directory in nature.
In regard to requirement (b), the Court had to be satisfied 
not only that there had been no conformity with the rules of nat­
ural justice, but that the authority concerned was under a duty to 
conform to such rules. But "the rules of natural justice are not
rigid norms of unchanging content, and their ambit may vary accor-
3
ding to the context". The need to observe them is not governed 
by any general principle and their applicability depends on various 
factors. "The nature of the power exercisable by the administrative 
authority, the nature of the interest or rights interfered with or 
affected, the intent of the legislature, the urgency of the situat­
ion, public policy and public interest are some of the factors 
which have deprived this concept of uniformity of application and 
content. The vacillating attitude of the courts and the varying 
meaning given by the judges to the rules of natural justice have 
contributed to uncertainty and unpredictability as to their appli-
4
cation". In Linus Silva v. University Council of Vidyodaya Univ­
ersity,^  the Supreme Court was of the view that when the University 
Council sought to exercise its power to suspend or dismiss a teacher 
on the grounds of incapacity or misconduct, it was "under a duty to 
act judicially at the stage of ascertaining objectively the facts 
as to incapacity or misconduct", and accordingly to observe the 
rules of natural justice. On appeal, the Privy Council disagreed:
1. (1968) 70 NLR 549. 2. (1967) 70 NLR 544.
3. De Smith, Judicial Review, op.cit., at p.163.
4. G.L.Peiris, Essays on Administrative Law (Colombo: Lake House 
Investments Ltd, 1980), p.298. For a full discussion of the effect 
of the Interpretation (Amendment) Act, see pp.271-310.
5. (1961) 64 NLR 104.
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the University was not bound to act judicially and therefore was 
not obliged to give the teacher an opportunity to be heard after 
being made aware of the grounds upon which the termination of his 
appointment was to be considered.
Requirement (a) was very limited in scope. An applicant for 
a writ had to satisfy the Court that the act complained of was "ex 
facie not within the power" conferred on the person who had perfor­
med that act. That is, an aggrieved person had to establish firstly, 
that the act was in excess of the powers of the officer concerned, 
and secondly, that such invalidity was apparent on the face of the 
act. In other words, if the stamp of invalidity was not apparent 
on the face of the order, such order could not be challenged. There—  
fore, this paragraph of the proviso effectively excluded any chall­
enge being made on the basis that an executive act had been perfor­
med by an officer in abuse of his powers. By 1972 it was well 
established that abuse of powers formed part of the doctrine of 
ultra vires. The principles governing the exercise of discretionary 
power, as explained by De Smith, had generally been adopted and 
applied by Courts in Ceylon:
In general, a discretion must be exercised only by the 
authority to which it is committed. That authority must 
genuinely address itself to the matter before it: it 
must not act under the dictation of another body or dis­
able itself from exercising a discretion in each indi­
vidual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion 
it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor 
must it do what it has not been authorised to do. It 
must act in good faith, must have regard to all rele­
vant considerations and must not be swayed by irrelevant 
considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien 
to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that 
gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously. Nor where a judgment must be made that 
certain facts exist can a discretion be validly exer­
cised on the basis of an erroneous assumption about 
those facts.^
The effect of requirement (a) of the proviso was to withdraw from 
the reach of judicial review the entire field of administrative 
discretion, and to offer the executive immunity in respect of the 
exercise, abuse or misuse of discretionary power.
1. (1964) 66 NLR 505.
2. De Smith, Judicial Review, op.cit., at p.285.
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The new section 23 stated that:
Subject to the provisions of section 24, where a court 
of original civil jurisdiction is empowered by any 
enactment . . .  to declare a right or status, such 
enactment shall not be construed to empower such court 
to entertain or enter decree or make any order in any 
action for a declaration of a right or status upon any 
ground whatsoever, arising out of or in respect of or 
in derogation of any order, decision, determination, 
direction or finding which any person, authority or 
tribunal is empowered to make or issue under any writ­
ten law:
Provided, however, that the provisions of this section 
shall not be deemed to affect the power of such court 
to make an order or decree relating to the payment of 
damages.
This section removed the jurisdiction of the original courts to 
grant a declaration against the executive in respect of the exer­
cise or the intended exercise of statutory power. It kept alive 
the action for damages; a remedy which could be invoked only after 
an executive act had been performed, and which was capable of offer­
ing redress only in monetary terms. In the United Kingdom, Denning 
LJ had only recently emphasized the relevance of the declaratory 
judgment:
Just as the pick and shovel is no longer suitable for 
the mining of coal, so also the procedure of mandamus 
and certiorari and action on the case are not suitable 
for the winning of freedom in the new age. They must 
be replaced by new and up to date machinery, by decl­
arations, injunctions and claims for negligence.1
The declaration was no less relevant in Sri Lanka. The employee
who is dismissed for resorting to strike action needed a declaration
that he was still in employment; not a few months wages as damages.
The citizen who was mistaken for an illegal imnigrant and ordered
to leave the country needed a declaration and an injunction; he
would not be around to make a claim for damages.
The new section 24 stated that:
(1) Nothing in any enactment . . . shall be construed 
to confer on any court, in any action or other 
civil proceedings, the power to grant an injunct­
ion or make an order for specific performance 
against the Crown, a Minister, a Parliamentary 
Secretary, the Judicial Service Commission, the 
Public Service Commission, or any member or officer 
of such Commission, in respect of any act done or
1. Sir Alfred Denning, Freedom under the Law (London: Stevens 
Sc Sons Ltd, 1949), p.126.
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intended or about to be done by any such person 
or authority in the exercise of any power or 
authority vested by law in any such person or 
authority:
Provided, however, that the preceding provis­
ions of this subsection shall not be deemed to 
affect the power of such court to make, in lieu 
thereof, an order declaratory of the rights of 
parties.
(2) No court shall in any civil proceedings grant
any injunction or make an order against an
officer of the Crown if the granting of the
injunction or the making of the order would be 
to give relief against the Crown which could 
not have been obtained in proceedings against 
the Crown.
This section was intended to bring to an end the proliferating app­
lications for injunctions to restrain the Minister of Lands from 
proceeding with proposed acquisitions. It did not have that desired 
effect. On 3 September 1974, a bench of nine Judges of the Supreme 
Court, by a majority of five to four, referred to the key words in 
the limitation clause: Min the exercise of any power or authority”, 
and held that for the preclusive clause to take effect, "the exer­
cise of a power by the Minister must be real or genuine as opposed
to a purported exercise of power”.'*' In a series of cases instituted 
in original courts it had been alleged that acquisition orders had 
been made by the Minister to victimise political opponents of the
Government. The Supreme Court upheld the injunctions issued in these 
2
cases. The reaction of the Government was both predictable and 
instantaneous. Within minutes of the delivery of the judgment, a 
bill "to declare clearly and unequivocally the intention of the Leg­
islature in enacting section 24” was submitted to the Constitutional 
Court as being urgent in the national interest. It was approved by 
that Court on the same day as being not inconsistent with the Const­
itution, and was tabled in the National State Assembly that after­
noon and passed before the day was over. The new section 24 
introduced by the Interpretation (Amendment) Law, No.29 of 1974, 
declared, inter alia, that:
(1) Nothing in any enactment . . . shall be deemed to 
confer upon any court jurisdiction to grant inj­
unctions or to make orders for specific performance
1. This judgment is still unreported. Extracts from it were 
published in Ceylon Daily News, 4 September 1974.
2. For a discussion of this judgment, see L.J.M.Cooray, "The 
Twilight of Judicial Control of Executive Action in Sri Lanka”, 
(1976) 18 Mal.L.R. 230.
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against the State, a Minister or a Deputy 
Minister, upon any ground whatsoever.
(2) No court shall upon any ground whatsoever 
grant any injunction or make any order 
against a state officer if the effect of 
the granting of such injunction or the mak­
ing of such order would be, whether directly 
or indirectly, to restrain the State, a 
Minister or a Deputy Minister from proceed­
ing with, or to compel the performance by 
the State, a Minister or a Deputy Minister 
of,any matter or thing.
This language was explicit enough to withdraw yet another remedy, 
not merely in respect of land acquisition orders, but over the whole 
range of executive action, whether such action be taken for the pur­
pose authorised by law or mala fide. The new section also contained 
the following subsection:
(5) The preceding provisions of this section 
shall not be deemed to affect the power of 
any court to make an order declaratory of 
the rights of parties.
This subsection was in conflict with the previously enacted section
23 referred to above. But since the new section 24 was to have
effect "notwithstanding . . . any other provisions of this Ordinance",
it probably meant that the declaratory judgment was restored even in
respect of the exercise of statutory power. Assuming that such was
the intention of this hastily conceived legislation, it does not
appear to have caught the eye of any aggrieved person.
Laws Enacted by the National State Assembly
The largest number of exclusion clauses enacted in any single 
period of Sri Lanka's legislative history was sandwiched into the
six and a quarter years during which the 1972 Constitution operated.
2
Although expressions such as "shall be final", and "final and con- 
3
elusive", were occasionally used, the emphasis was clearly on the
1. This section also provided that any injunction which had 
already been granted by any court, "which injunction such court 
would not have had the jurisdiction to grant if this section had 
then been in operation", shall for all purposes be deemed to have 
been and to be null and void and of no force or effect in law: s.24(3).
2. Janawasa Law, No.25 of 1976, s.57.
3. University of Ceylon Act, No.l of 1972, s.40; Rent Act,
No.7 of 1972, s.40; Co-operative Societies Law, No.5 of 1972, s.36; 
National Archives Law, No.48 of 1973, s.14; Shop and Office Employ­
ees (Regulation of Employment and Remuneration) (Amendment) Law,
No.7 of 1975, s.2; Janawasa Law, supra, s. 10.
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more explicitly worded exclusion clause. There was a lack of 
uniformity in the phraseology used, but no doubt at all as to its 
intention:
TABLE 25
EXCLUSION CLAUSES USED BY THE 
NATIONAL STATE ASSEMBLY 
1972-1978
Clause
No court shall entertain 
any such application
Shall not be questioned in 
any court or tribunal
Shall not be called in 
question in any court of 
law, whether by way of 
writ, mandate or otherwise
Shall be final and shall 
not be called in question 
in any court
Final and conclusive and 
shall not be called in 
question in any court
Statute
State Mortgage and Investment Bank 
Law, No.13 of 1975, s.50.
Common Amenities Board Law, No. 10 
of 1973, s.4.
Requisitioning and Acquisitioning 
of Lorries Law, No.45 of 1973,s.2.
Resumption of State Land (Anuradh- 
apura Preservation Board) Law,
No.3 of 1975, s.3.
^University of Ceylon Act, No.l of 
1972, s.73.
Proscribing of Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam and Other Similar 
Organisations Law, No.16 of 1978, 
s.13.
Payment of Gratuities and Other 
Monetary Benefits to Indian Re­
patriates (Special Provisions)
Law, No.34 of 1978, s.7.
Agricultural Productivity Law,
No.2 of 1972, s.35.
Co-operative Societies Law, No.5 of 
1972, s.58.
National Water Supply and Drainage 
Board Law, No.2 of 1974, s.20.
Tea Control (Amendment) Law, No.39 
of 1974, s.HE.
Sri Lanka Tea Board Law, No. 14 of 
1975, s.19.
Ceiling on Housing Property Law,
No.l of 1973, s.39.
^University of Ceylon Act, No.l of 
1972, s.65.
Agricultural Insurance Law, No.27 
of 1973, s.15.
Requisitioning and Acquis itioning of 
Lorries Law, No.45 of 1973, s.11.
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Final and conclusive and 
shall not be called in 
question in any court, 
whether by way of writ 
or otherwise
Shall be final and concl­
usive for all purposes 
whatsoever and shall not 
be called in question in 
any court or tribunal, 
whether by way of appeal 
or writ, or in any other 
manner whatsoever
Shall be final and concl­
usive and shall not be 
called in question in any 
court or tribunal, whether 
by way of action, applic­
ation in revision, appeal, 
writ or otherwise
National Water Supply and Drainage 
Board Law, No.2 of 1974, ss.65, 
86, 87.
Local Government Service Law,
No.16 of 1974, s.4.
Companies (Special Provisions) Law, 
No.19 of 1974, ss.3,4,6.
Silkworm Seed Law, No.36 of 1974, 
s.10.
Licensing of Clubs Law, No. 17 of 
1975, s.13.
Land Betterment Charges Law, No.28 
of 1976, s.10.
Health Services (Amendment) Law,
No.3 of 1977, s.2.
Extradition Law, No.8 of 1977, 
ss.2,3.
Local Authorities (Special Provis­
ions) Law, No.24 of 1977, s.32.
Co-operative Societies (Special 
Provisions) Law, No.12 of 1978, 
s.2.
Local Authority Quarters (Recovery 
of Possession) Law, No.42 of 
1978, s.4.
Land Reform Law, No.l of 1972, 
ss.13,14, 24,38.
Agricultural Productivity Law,
No.2 of 1972, s.19.
Mines and Minerals Law, No.4 of 
1973, s.7.
Termination of Employment of Work­
men (Special Provisions) Law,
No.4 of 1976, s.2.
Special Presidential Commissions 
of Inquiry Law, No.7 of 1978, 
s.2,9.
^Licensing of Shipping Agents Act, 
No.10 of 1972, s.6.
^Criminal Justice Commissions Act, 
No.14 of 1972, ss.2,25.
Criminal Justice Commission (Amend­
ment) Law, No.10 of 1972, s.5. 
Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd 
(Special Provisions) Law, No.28 
28 of 1973, ss.3,5,10,13.
* Enacted shortly before the National State Assembly was constituted.
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Thirty-two statutes contained exclusion clauses protecting 
from judicial review a wide variety of executive acts, including:
i. requisitioning of movable property;
ii. vesting of land;
iii. detention of persons;
iv. dispossession orders in respect of imnovable property;
v. restrictive or prohibitory orders in respect of trades or 
businesses;
vi. rejection of indemnity claims made by insured persons; 
vii. award of compensation; 
viii. determination of rates and charges; 
ix. removal of members of statutory boards; 
x. refusal, cancellation and suspension of licences; 
xi. refusal to register societies; 
xii. refusal to recognise political parties; 
xiii. dissolution of co-operative societies; 
xiv. quit notices in respect of residential premises;
xv. invalidation of the alienation of agricultural land; 
xvi. reports, findings, orders, determinations, rulings and recom­
mendations of commissions of inquiry.
Administration of Justice Law, No.44 of 1973.
This law, inter alia, abolished non-sumnary proceedings. 
Consequently, it made radical changes in the field of criminal proc- 
dure. In one such change, section 31 of the Courts Ordinance, which 
for nearly a century contained "an important principle safeguarding 
the liberty of the subject who has a right to be brought to trial 
with reasonable despatch",'*' was repealed. In fact, the question 
whether or not bail ought to be granted to a person accused of a 
serious offence was withdrawn altogether from the trial court, and 
left in the discretion of the Director of Public Prosecutions, a 
public officer who functioned in the Ministry of Justice. The 
remedy of bail was further restricted by two other statutes. The 
Criminal Procedure (Special Provisions) Law, No. 15 of 1978, and the 
Proscribing of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Other Similar 
Organisations Law, No. 16 of 1978, required any person "who is pro­
duced on arrest on an allegation that he has committed or has been 
concerned in committing or is suspected to have conmitted or to have 
been so concerned in committing" a scheduled offence, to be kept on
1. Supra, p.354.
2. S.103(4).
374
remand until the conclusion of his trial and, in the event of his 
being eventually tried and convicted, until the determination of 
his appeal.
An Assessment
In April 1969, Mrs.Mallika Ratwatte, the SLFP Member of 
Parliament for Balangoda, applied to the Supreme Court for an inju­
nction to restrain the UNP Minister of Lands from proceeding to 
acquire certain lands belonging to her family. Her husband, who 
had been the Member of Parliament before her, was the yc^ iger brother 
of Mrs. Bandar ana ike, then Leader of the Opposition. Both at the 
election at which she was elected and at the election at which her 
husband was returned, the opposing candidate was one Aboosally, who 
now held the office of Chairman of the Urban Council of Balangoda. 
According to Mrs.Ratwatte, Aboosally had informed her that instead 
of widening the existing main road which passed through the bazaar 
in Balangoda, an old circuitous road, which had hitherto been hardly 
used by motorists, would be widened by 34 feet. The main road which 
was at most places about 40 feet wide was at the centre of the baz­
aar only about 20 feet wide and the land and buildings adjacent to 
that spot were owned and occupied by Aboosally and several of his 
relatives. The land and premises on either side of the old circui­
tous road belonged to Mrs.Ratwatte's family. When the Permanent 
Secretary inspected the old circuitous road, Mrs.Ratwatte's husband 
had appealed to him not to pursue the proposed road-widening project 
as it was nothing but an attempt to take political revenge. Accor­
ding to Mrs.Ratwatte, the Permanent Secretary rejected this appeal, 
apparently for the reason that it did not lie in the mouth of the 
Ratwattes to raise such an objection because the previous Government 
of Mrs.Bandaranaike had arbitrarily acquired lands, including a land 
belonging to a relative of his, upon false pretexts. Mrs.Ratwatte 
also alleged that Aboosally, who was present at the inspection, 
stated that the previous Government had acquired a land belonging 
to him about ten years previously, allegedly for a housing scheme, 
but had failed to pay him compensation. The Supreme Court issued 
an injunction as prayed for. Samarawickrema J observed that:
It is remarkable how often over the years it has turned 
out by some extraordinary coincidence that the public 
interest appeared to require the acquisition of lands 
belonging to persons politically opposed to the party
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in power at the time. It is, therefore, necessary 
that Courts, while discouraging frivolous and grou­
ndless objections to acquisitions, should be vigi­
lant, if it is open to them to do so, to scrutinise 
acquisition proceedings where it is alleged that  ^
they are done mala fide and from an ulterior motive.
Had these events taken place three years later, Mrs.Ratwatte 
would probably have been entitled to argue that, due to her politi­
cal views, she was being denied the equal protection of the law, 
guaranteed to all citizens by section 18(1) (a) of the Constitution. 
But to whom, and how, could she have taken her grievance ? The 
Courts were prohibited from granting injunctions against Ministers.
An action to obtain an order declaratory of Mrs.Ratwatte's rights 
would not have stopped either the acquisition proceedings or the 
construction of the proposed new roadway, and would have brought 
her neither relief nor redress. Mandamus was not available by way 
of a prohibitory injunction. Certiorari to quash the proceedings 
already taken, or Prohibition to prevent the Minister from making 
further orders necessary to complete the acquisition could have been 
invoked only if the Minister was under a duty to act judicially in 
exercising his powers under the Land Acquisition Act. But even 
assuming that such a duty existed, the Minister's opinion that a 
particular land was required for a public purpose was "conclusive" 
for all purposes and could not be questioned in a court of law, 
unless it was possible to bring it within one of the grounds referred 
to in the proviso to section 22 of the Interpretation Ordinance. 
Mrs.Ratwatte's complaint was not that the Minister had failed to 
comply with the provisions of the statute, but that he was exercis­
ing his powers for an ulterior purpose; in other words, that the 
Minister was acting mala fide. But the Minister's mala fide, if 
any, was not apparent on the face of his orders, and the proviso to 
section 22 was, therefore, of no avail. Therefore, Mrs.Ratwatte 
would have had no remedy.
It does^appear to be necessary to examine other hypothetical 
situations. The most eloquent testimony to the ineffectiveness of 
the traditional remedies for the enforcement of the fundamental 
rights protected and guaranteed by the 1972 Constitution must surely 
be the fact that no record exists of any of these remedies ever 
having been invoked for that purpose.
1. (1969) 72 NLR 60, at 63.
The Special Remedy
Article 17 of the 1978 Constitution states that:
Every person shall be entitled to apply to the 
Supreme Court, as provided by Article 126, in 
respect of the infringement or inminent infrin­
gement, by executive or administrative action, 
of a fundamental right to which such person is 
entitled under the provisions of this Chapter.
Article 126 is to the following effect:
(1) The Supreme Court shall have sole and exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear and determine any question 
relating to the infringement or imminent infri­
ngement by executive or administrative action of 
any fundamental right or language right declared 
and recognised by Chapter III or Chapter IV.
(2) Where any person alleges that any such fundamen­
tal right or language right relating to such 
person has been infringed or is about to be inf­
ringed by executive or administrative action,
he may himself or by an attorney-at-law on his 
behalf, within one month thereof, in accord­
ance with such rules of court as may be in force, 
apply to the Supreme Court by way of petition in 
writing addressed to such Court praying for relief 
and redress in respect of such infringement.
Such application may be proceeded with only with 
leave to proceed first had and obtained from the 
Supreme Court, which leave may be granted or 
refused, as the case may be, by not less than 
two Judges.
(3) Where in the course of hearing in the Court of 
Appeal into an application for orders in the 
nature of a writ of habeas corpus, certiorari, 
prohibition, procedendo, mandamus or quo warr­
anto, it appears to such Court that there is 
prima facie evidence of an infringement or immi­
nent infringement of the provisions of Chapter 
III or Chapter IV by a party to such application, 
such Court shall forthwith refer such matter for 
determination by the Supreme Court.
(4) The Supreme Court shall have power to grant such 
relief or make such directions as it may deem 
just and equitable in the circumstances in resp­
ect of any petition or reference referred to in 
paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Article or refer 
the matter back to the Court of Appeal if in its 
opinion there is no infringement of a fundamental 
right or language right.
(5) The Supreme Court shall hear and finally dispose 
of any petition or reference under this Article 
within two months of the filing of such petition 
or the making of such reference.
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A special remedy has, therefore, been created for the enforcement 
of the fundamental rights declared and recognised in Chapter III of 
the Constitution. Since the Supreme Court has "sole and exclusive 
jurisdiction” in respect of such matters, it would appear that the 
question of the infringement of a fundamental right may not now be 
raised by way of any of the traditional remedies discussed earlier 
in this chapter and which could now be invoked only in one or other 
of the subordinate courts.
The Nature and Scope of the Special Remedy
The power of the Supreme Court to "grant such relief or make 
such directions as it may deem just and equitable" is no less exten­
sive than that enjoyed by the superior courts of other Commonwealth 
countries vested with jurisdiction to enforce fundamental rights. 
Indeed, the power thus conferred is as extensive a power as a consti­
tution could possibly have conferred on a court. It has so far been 
understood by those called upon to exercise it as including the power
to restrain, to quash, and to direct the performance of executive
1 2 action; to order the payment of compensation; and to require the
3
institution of disciplinary proceedings against an errant officer.
This special remedy is available notwithstanding any limitat­
ions contained in existing law on the judicial review of executive 
action. It is significant that while Article 16 of the Constitution 
subjects the exercise and operation of the fundamental rights decl­
ared in Articles 10 to 15 to "all existing written law and unwritten 
law", which continues to be "valid and operative notwithstanding any 
inconsistency with the preceding provisions of this Chapter", this 
remedy is provided by the immediately succeeding Article 17. The 
right to;a remedy conferred by Article 17 is, therefore, not subject
to existing law. One such existing law, which is now superseded by
/(,
this Article, is section 22 of the Interpretation Ordinance.
In terms of Article 168(1), "existing law" is mutatis mutandis 
and except as otherwise expressly provided in the Constitution, 
continued in force. Therefore, the question arises whether section 
22 of the Interpretation Ordinance can co-exist with Article 17.
Such co-existence will be possible only if the constitutional prov-
1. Perera v. University Grants Commission, S.C.M. of 4 August 
1980.
2. Velmurugu v. Attorney-General, S.C.M. of 9 November 1981, 
per dissenting opinion of Sharvananda J.
3. Ibid. 4. Supra, p.364.
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ision is not in conflict with existing law. Section 22 states 
that when a law contains the expression "shall not be called in 
question in any court" in relation to any executive act which any 
person is empowered to perform under such law: (a) no court shall,
(b) in any proceedings, (c) upon any ground whatsoever, (d) in 
respect of that act, whether made in the exercise or the apparent 
exercise of power, (e) have jurisdiction to pronounce upon its 
validity or legality. Article 17, read with Article 126, states 
that: (a) the Supreme Court, (b) in proceedings under Article 126,
(c) on the ground that a fundamental right has been or is about to 
be infringed, (d) by executive or administrative action, (e) have 
sole and exclusive jurisdiction to grant such relief or make such 
directions as it may deem just and equitable. It appears, therefore, 
that in every respect Article 17 is in conflict with section 22. 
Article 17 contains a special remedy; it is "otherwise expressly 
provided" in the Constitution, in the face of which section 22 does 
not continue in force, in respect of the matters referred to in that 
Article. So it must be with all exclusion clauses too, contained
in existing law, since Article 17 expressly provides that executive 
and administrative action may be questioned in a particular court, 
on a particular ground, in a particular manner.
The remedy thus provided is not in any way limited in its 
scope by the constraints of existing law. It is also non-derogable. 
However, that is not to say that the special remedy is an absolute 
one. Inherent in the constitutional provisions which have created 
it are the following clearly expressed limitations.
1. The remedy may be invoked only by an aggrieved person.
An aggrieved person is one in relation to whom a fundamental 
right has been, or is about to be, infringed. He may invoke the 
remedy himself or by an attomey-at-law on his behalf; such attor- 
ney-at-law would require to be authorised by proxy to act. In many 
Commonwealth jurisdictions, there is provision for a remedy such 
as this to be invoked in the case of a detained person by any other 
person.'*' This is a very necessary provision, particularly if the 
detained person is being held incommunicado. In Sri Lanka, there­
fore, if a person is held in custody for one month and denied access
1. Supra, p.131.
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to any visitors during that period, this special remedy will not be 
available to him.
The requirement of an infringement or imminent infringement 
of a fundamental right also raises the question of locus standii.
The Court may be satisfied that an executive or administrative act 
is in conflict with a fundamental right, but unless the petitioner 
is able to satisfy the Court that such right has been infringed in 
relation to him, the Court would refrain from making any directions 
in respect of such act. For example, in Palihawadana v. Attorney- 
General,^ it was alleged that the Government's scheme for the place­
ment of the unemployed in the State and public sector institutions, 
popularly known as the Job Bank Scheme, violated the equality post­
ulated by Article 12, in that the petitioner had been excluded from 
access to State employment by the refusal of his Member of Parlia­
ment to give him a Job Bank application form. It was his submiss­
ion that he had been discriminated against for the reason that he 
belonged to a political party opposed to that to which the Member 
of Parliament belonged. The Job Bank Scheme envisaged the nomin­
ation of one thousand unemployed persons by each Member of Parlia­
ment from his electorate. The criteria for nomination was that each 
person so nominated was between the ages of 18 and 40 years; was 
resident in the electorate; was unemployed; and in his family there 
was no income-earner or the income was so low that it was inadequate 
to sustain him and the other members. The Cabinet had decided that 
all non-staff grade vacancies in the ministries, government depart­
ments, corporations, statutory boards and local government institu­
tions should be filled only through the Job Bank. As the Supreme 
Court noted:
Unless one applies in the employment-registration 
form issued to the MP, one has no chance of being 
considered for employment in government institut­
ions. The MP thus stands at the gateway, and unless 
he opens the gate, one is completely shut out from 
the prospect of government employment. The MP's 
discretion in the selection of potential employees 
is absolute.^
But the class of persons who satisfied the aforesaid criteria far 
exceeded in number the one thousand who were required to be nominated,
1. S.C.M. of 27 April 1979.
2. Ibid.
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and the scheme did not lay down any guidelines for selection, but
left it to the Member’s uncontrolled and arbitrary discretion to
make the selection of the thousand. Accordingly, in the view of
the Supreme Court, discrimination was inherent in that part of the
scheme which conferred power on the Member of Parliament to select
one thousand persons who should be issued Job Bank forms:
Vesting of such naked and arbitrary power in an MP, 
the exercise of which will deprive large numbers of 
citizens of their opportunity to enter State Serv­
ice militates against the concept of equality. The 
Scheme lays down no rules by which its impartial 
execution is assured, or partiality or bias prevented.
The excluded persons may legitimately attribute the 
non-issue of the application forms to them by the MP 
to improper influences and motives such as favourit­
ism, partisanship, animosity or bias which are easy 
of concealment and difficult to be detected and ex­
posed.-*-
In fact, the Supreme Court found that the Member of Parliament con­
cerned had even selected persons from families owning substantial 
properties and in receipt of incomes and pensions. In regard to 
the petitioner, it appeared that the Member had not addressed his 
mind to the question of his eligibility; he had exhausted the appl­
ication forms by the time the petitioner requested one for himself. 
In the course of the proceedings, however, Counsel for the State 
tendered an affidavit according to which the petitioner was a mem­
ber of a family which owned both house property and agricultural 
land. Although the State had not originally pleaded a lack of locus 
standi, it now argued that the petitioner did not satisfy the elig­
ibility criteria stipulated in the Job Bank Scheme and was therefore 
not entitled to maintain the application before Court. One of the 
Judges saw "no significant difference" between the position of the 
petitioner's family and the position of most of the families from 
which persons had been nominated to the Job Bank. Nevertheless, 
the Supreme court held that since the petitioner "can, in no objec­
tive view, claim to come in the class of persons who satisfy the 
eligibility criteria, whatever the MP's bias against him be", he 
had no locus standi and the application must be dismissed.
1. Ibid.
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2. The remedy must be invoked within one month of the executive or 
administrative action complained of.
A thirty-day time limit for the invocation of a remedy pre­
supposes not only the existence of a vigilant community conscious 
of its rights, but also easy access to professional expertise.
Neither of these factors can be said to generally characterise 
contemporary Sri Lanka, and for that reason, a more realistic per­
iod of six months would have been preferable. On the other hand, 
the prompt assertion of individual rights may serve not only to 
provide early relief to an aggrieved person, but also to alert the 
executive to the probable consequences of a continuing course of 
action. Be that as it may, this requirement does operate to limit 
the applicability of the remedy. During the period under review,
25 per cent of the applications which were argued were rejected on 
the ground that they were out of time.^
3. The remedy is available only in respect of executive or administ­
rative action.
Article 4(d) requires "all the organs of government" to resp­
ect, secure and advance the fundamental rights declared and recogn­
ised by the Constitution. But any infringement of the rights by 
legislative or judicial action may not be the subject of a complaint 
to Court under Article 126. In fact, Article 80(3) quite explicitly 
declares that no court or tribunal shall inquire into, pronounce 
upon or in any manner call in question the validity of an Act of 
Parliament on any ground whatsoever. The protection which Article 
80(3) provides is not confined to the statute simpliciter; it also 
extends to an executive or administrative act which derives its 
authority from such statute. For instance, if a public officer, 
exercising an unfettered discretion vested in him by law, orders 
the closure of a printing press without adducing any reasons therefor, 
the Court is precluded from inquiring into the validity of his action 
by reference to any of the fundamental rights which may appear 
thereby to have been infringed. So it is with judicial acts. A 
person who believes that he has been discriminated against in the 
matter of a bail application or in the imposition of sentence, does 
not have the benefit of this special remedy.
1. Infra, p.389.
2. A resolution of Parliament imposing civic disability on a 
person is also given the same effect by Article 81(3).
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The scope of governmental activity has expanded considerably 
during the past few decades. Apart from maintaining law and order 
and administering justice, the government is also directly involved 
in the provision of community services. For instance, it provides 
a transport service throughout the island through the Railways Dep­
artment. It helps in the distribution of certain agricultural pro­
ducts through the Marketing Department. For reasons of political 
and economic expediency, including that of better management, the 
government may sometimes decide that a particular service should 
be provided not by a government department but through some other 
agency such as a public corporation. The State Industrial Corpor­
ations Act, No.49 of 1957, enables the establishment of corporations 
with capital provided by the government for setting up and carrying 
on industrial undertakings on a commercial footing. In terms of 
that Act, as well as under special statutes, several corporate 
bodies have been created for the performance of a multitude of 
functions. These include the Ceylon Transport Board, the Ceylon 
Petroleum Corporation, the Insurance Corporation, the State Trading 
Corporation, the Ceylon Shipping Corporation, the Milk Board, the 
Paddy Marketing Board and the Co-operative Wholesale Establishment. 
The directors and chief executives of these bodies are usually app­
ointed by the Minister; the latter also has the power to give gen­
eral or special directions on matters of policy. The question will, 
therefore, arise whether the acts of such corporate bodies constitute 
"executive or administrative action".
In Dahanayake v. De Silva,^  which was an election petition, 
Samarakone CJ examined the question whether the Ceylon Petroleum 
Corporation established by Act No.28 of 1961, and with which the
respondent was alleged to have held a contract, was an agent of the
State:
It is a legal hybrid bred by the Government to enable 
it to engage in a commercial business - tailor made 
to suit its style of business. It is a government crea­
tion clothed with juristic personality so as to give
it an aura of independence but in reality it is just a
business house doing only the State's business for and 
on behalf of the State. Such a legal entity carrying 
on monopolistic commercial transactions for the State 
must necessarily be the agent of the State.
1. [1978/79] 1 SIR 41.
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He was probably influenced by the fact that:
The Minister has the power to fix prices at which 
petroleum products shall be sold and also prescribe 
other conditions of sale. In short, the Corporation 
does not act like other corporations who engage in 
business. Its business is merely, if not wholly, 
controlled by the Minister and therefore the State.
It does not have tie independence in matters of 
business which is enjoyed by theBCompanies formed 
under the Companies Ordinance. It is a well known 
fact that this is a monopoly business acquired by 
the State which is also compelled to subsidise 
some part of its business for the welfare of the 
comnunity.
These observations of the Chief Justice do not necessarily apply to
every state corporation. Where ministerial control is less apparent
and managerial independence more conspicuous, a Court may well hold
that the actions of that corporate body do not attract the provisions
2
of Article 126. In Perera v. University Grants Commission, the 
Supreme Court thought that "it is idle to contend that the respon­
dent is not an organ or delegate of the government and that its action 
in the matter of admission of students to the universities under it 
does not have the character of executive or administrative action". 
That was the first occasion on which this question was raised in 
relation to an alleged infringement of a fundamental right, but it 
is not likely to be the last.
4. The requirement of an "administrative practice".
A fourth limitation has been sought to be placed on this remedy 
by the Supreme Court by requiring, in respect of certain allegations 
of torture, evidence of an administrative practice. In Thadchana-
3
moorthi v. Attorney-General, the petitioner complained of police 
brutality following his arrest on charges of robbery and murder.
The Court rejected the application on the ground that the material 
placed before it "is neither clear nor cogent and falls far short 
of even the minimum proof necessary for that purpose". Having done 
so, Wanasundera J proceeded to examine whether when an allegation of 
torture was made against a law enforcement officer, since such 
conduct was both unlawful and ultra vires the powers of such officer, 
it would be necessary for the petitioner to prove the existence of 
"an administrative practice" before he could obtain relief or 
redress against the State. Citing the jurisprudence of Strasbourg
1. Ibid.
2. S.C.M. of 4 August 1980.
3. S.C.M. of 14 August 1980.
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that an administrative practice could be established by the presence 
of two elements, namely, repetition of acts and official tolerance, 
he expressed the view that "those principles, with suitable modi­
fications, can profitably be adopted by us in the exercise of our 
powers under Article 126", since he saw "more than a superficial 
similarity" between Sri Lanka's Supreme Court and the European Court 
of Human Rights. In that case, he found that an on-going police 
inquiry into the complaint of the petitioner and the provisions of 
the Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and the Police Ordinance 
which prohibited and outlawed violence and unlawful practices by 
the law enforcement authorities, negatived the existence of an adm­
inistrative practice of torture or ill-treatment.
In Velmurugu v. Attorney-General the petitioner alleged that
he had been subjected to acts of torture, cruelty and degrading
treatment by army personnel to whom he had been handed over by a
senior police officer who had said: "Take him and do as you like".
A majority of a five-Judge bench held that this allegation had not
been proved to their satisfaction.” Wanasundera J, who was one of
the majority, proceeded to explain in greater detail the relevance
of "an administrative practice" to Article 126. In his view, that
Article had drawn a distinction between high state officers and
subordinate personnel. The former constituted the executive, while
the latter acted for and on behalf of the State:
The State should be held strictly liable for any acts 
of its high state officials . . . The liability in 
respect of subordinate officers should apply to all 
acts done under colour of office, i.e. within the 
scope of their authority, express or implied, and 
should also extend to such other acts that may be ultra 
vires and even in disregard of a prohibition or special 
directions provided that they are done in the further­
ance or supposed furtherance of their authority or 
done at least with the intention of benefiting the 
State.
In the instant case, Wanasundera J was of the view that:
All in all the acts complained of, if they had taken 
place as alleged, seem to be in the nature of indivi­
dual and personal acts due to some aberration or idio- 
syncracy. They are also suggestive of the venting of 
some grievance of a personal and private nature or in 
consequence of some strong passion, prejudice or malice.
1. S.C.M. of 9 November 1981.
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He considered it relevant that the instruction to, and the respon­
sibility of, the army to whom the petitioner had been temporarily 
handed over, was only to transport him, and that in the absence of 
the declaration of a state of public emergency, the army personnel 
had no more powers over the petitioner than any civilian. Accord­
ingly, he explained that the application of the concept of "admin­
istrative practice" could help to extend State liability to cases 
such as this if it can be shown that "the occurence of the acts 
complained of can be attributed to the existence of a general sit­
uation created or brought about by the negligence and indifference 
of those in authority". Of course, he was quite satisfied that in 
that case, no such situation existed:
The alleged acts have not been authorised, encouraged 
or countenanced or performed for the benefit of the 
State. The material before us shows that they would 
also not have been tolerated by the authorities.
Wanasundera J's attempts to draw a distinction between the 
acts of "high state officers" and "subordinate personnel", and a 
further classification of the acts of the latter category, does 
not appear to be warranted by the provisions of Article 126. Where 
an allegation of torture is made against a law enforcement officer, 
the question must surely be whether that act had been committed in 
the exercise of the coercive power vested by the State in that 
officer. The motive for his act should be irrelevant. Does it 
matter whether it was for the purpose of extracting vital informat­
ion or for the purpose of satisfying a very personal desire ? If
the officer had utilised the authority with which he was clothed in
order to place himself in a position to comnit that act, the State, 
which provided him with that authority, must accept liability. In 
his dissenting opinion in Velmurugu, Sharvananda J expressed similar 
sentiments, but then went on to say:
This sweep of State action, however, will not cover 
acts of officers in the ambit of their personal pur­
suits, such as rape by a police officer of a woman
in custody; such act has no relation to the exercise
of the State power vested in him. The officer had 
taken advantage of the occasion, but not his office, 
for the satisfaction of a personal vagary.
If a person, who happens to be a police officer, commits rape in
some private place, it would not have been the fact of his public
office that facilitated the commission of that act. But if a police
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officer rapes a woman who is held in custody within the confines of 
a police station, he would surely have taken advantage, not only of 
the occasion, but also of his office. The potential victim has not 
the same freedom to resist and rush out screaming for help when she 
is held in a police cell that she would have if the officer in 
mufti had intruded into the privacy of her living room. It is sub­
mitted, therefore, that the unwarranted introduction of the concept 
of "an administrative practice" has further limited the scope of 
the remedy provided by Article 126.
In this connection, it is perhaps relevant to note that Wana­
sundera J appears to have misunderstood, perhaps due to the non­
availability of the relevant reports, the context in which the Stras­
bourg institutions formulated and applied the concept of "an admin­
istrative practice". It was not intended to limit the scope or the 
applicability of the Article which prohibited torture. It was 
intended for an altogether different purpose. ECHR, Article 26, 
requires an applicant to exhaust the domestic remedies available to 
him under national law before proceeding to the European Comnission. 
But where an applicant raises the issue of an administrative pract­
ice of non-observance of certain Convention provisions, the Commi­
ssion has agreed not to insist on strict compliance with Article 26 
on the basis that in such circumstances, the domestic remedies are 
likely to be side-stepped or rendered inadequate by the difficulty 
of securing probative evidence and administrative inquiries would 
either not be instituted, or, if they were, would be likely to be 
half-hearted and incomplete.^
Exclusion of the Special Remedy
No proceedings under Article 126 may be instituted in respect
of anything done or omitted to be done by the President in his off- 
2
icial capacity. This inmunity, however, does not extend to the 
exercise by the President of any power pertaining to any subject or 
function of government which he has retained in his charge without
3
assigning to a Minister; in other words, to any act in his capacity 
of a Minister of the Government.
1. Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Netherlands v.’ Greece (3321-23/67 
and 3344/67), YB 12, 502 et seq; Ireland v. United Kingdom (5310/71) 
YB 15, 76, at 242; Donnelly v. United Kingdom (5577-83/72), CD 43, 
122, at 147.
2. Art.35(1). 2. Art.35(3).
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The provision of a special remedy in the Constitution for 
examining the validity of executive and administrative action has 
not deterred Parliament from seeking, on occasion, to exclude the 
application of that remedy. Several subsequent statutes contain 
the familiar phraseology which was very effectively resorted to 
under the 1972 Constitution to oust the jurisdiction of courts.
The injunction of Parliament that a particular executive act "shall 
not be called in question in any court" means that the validity of 
such act may not be examined by the Supreme Court even in the exer­
cise of its Article 126 jurisdiction.'*' Executive acts thus protected 
include:
i. a detention or restriction of movement order made by a 
Minister;^
ii. a vesting order made by the Minister in respect of agricul-
3
tural or estate land;
iii. the decision of an official whether or not a tenant cultivator 
has been evicted contrary to law;
iv. the decision of the Monetary Board refusing to register a 
finance company;**
v. the decision of the Minister on appeal against the suspension 
or cancellation of a licence;^ 
vi. the confirmation by the Minister of a disciplinary order 
made by a local authority;^ 
vii. the refusal of the Ombudsman to investigate a complaint made 
to him;**
viii. the determination of the Commissioner of Elections as to which 
one of rival sections of a recognised political party is that 
party.9
1. This is made clear by two other statutory provisions. S.6 of 
the Urban Development Projects (Special Provisions) Act, No.2 of 1979, 
states that an exclusion clause contained therein shall not affect 
the powers of the Supreme Court under Art. 126. S. 10 of the Parliam­
entary Commissioner for Administration Act, No. 17 of 1981, states 
that the Ombudsman may investigate any matter notwithstanding the 
presence of any exclusion clause.
2. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, No.48 
of 1979, ss.10,11(5).
3. Land Grants (Special Provisions) Act, No.43 of 1979, s.2(3).
4. Agrarian Services Act, No.58 of 1979, s.5(6).
5. Control of Finance Companies Act, No.27 of 1979, ss.5,9,16.
6. Licensing of Produce Brokers Act, No.9 of 1979, s.5(6).
7. Local Authorities (Special Provisions) Act,No.3 of 1979,ss.3,4.
8. Parliamentary Conmissioner for Administration Act, supra,s. 14.
9. Presidential Elections Act, No.15 of 1981, s.10; Parlia­
mentary Elections Act, No.l of 1981, s.13.
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Application of the Special Remedy
Between the coimencement of the Constitution in September 
1978 and the end of December 1981, thirteen applications under 
Article 126 had been determined by the Supreme Court. Of these, 
in only one did the Court hold that the petitioner was entitled 
to relief or redress, namely, Perera v. University Grants Comm­
ission.^ The State agency concerned was a statutory body and the 
impugned decision related to the selection of students for admi­
ssion to the universities. The petitioner was a prospective 
medical student from Colombo, the daughter of a medical practit­
ioner.
The minimum requirement for university admission in 1980 was 
that a candidate should have, on one and the same occasion, at the 
GCE (Advanced Level) Examination, passed in at least three approved 
subjects and obtained a mark of not less than 25 per cent in the 
fourth approved subject, and should also have obtained an aggregate 
of not less than 160 marks for the four subjects. Two Advanced 
Level examinations had been held in 1979: in April, 18,753 students 
had sat offering subjects in the Bio-Science group, of whom 4863 
attained the minimum standard for university admission; in August, 
12,857 sat, of whom 1887 reached the required standard. The univ­
ersities had only 995 places in the Bio-Science group of courses 
(of which 400 were set apart for medicine) but 6750 had attained the 
minimum standard. The University Grants Comnission decided that 
admission should be in the ratio of the number of students who 
attained the minimum requirement in each examination. This meant, 
in respect of medicine, 7.2:2.5 or 288:112. Of this number, 55 per 
cent of the places were reserved for admission on a district basis 
and 15 per cent for the "educationally under-privileged areas".
The Supreme Court very properly held that this formula violated 
Article 12 of the Constitution. All those who qualified for admiss­
ion at each examination had been integrated into one class of quali­
fied candidates. Once the qualified candidates were absorbed into 
one class, they could not, by reference to their original source,
1. S.C.M. of 4 August 1980.
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be discriminated:
Allocation of places in the Universities on the basis 
of the ratio . . . will result in candidates of an 
inferior calibre from the April batch being selected, 
while candidates of a superior calibre from the Aug­
ust batch not being selected.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed the University Grants Comm­
ission to make the selection of candidates on the basis of the high­
est aggregate of marks in an integrated or consolidated list of
successful candidates. In so doing, the Court rejected an objection
raised in limine that the Commission was not a body exercising exec­
utive or administrative action. It pointed out that education was 
one of the most important functions of the State:
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of education. Such an opp­
ortunity where the State undertakes to provide it,
is a right which must be made available to all on 
equal terms.
With this pronouncement on a subject of general concern to all parents, 
particularly those with intelligent children of school-leaving age, 
may be contrasted the dozen unsuccessful applications.
Seven applications were made on the basis that the right to 
equality had been violated. Four of them related to employment, 
while the rest concerned the possession of land. All of them had
political overtones and each was referable to the intervention of
the Cabinet, a Minister or a Member of Parliament of the ruling party. 
In three applications, allegations of torture were made against law 
enforcement officers. The other two concerned an alleged violation 
of the freedom to form and join a trade union and of a language 
right. In these twelve applications, the Supreme Court avoided a 
consideration of the constitutional issues raised by either declining 
to exercise jurisdiction, or after having done so, dismissing them, 
on one or other of the following grounds.
1. Procedural Deficiency
In Palihawadana v. Attorney-General, ^ the Supreme Court upheld 
two objections raised by the State, at the close of the argument, 
that the petitioner lacked locus standi, and was also out of time. 
Neither of these pleas had been taken in the statement of objections 
which the respondents were required, by rules of court, to file within
1. S.C.M. of 27 April 1979.
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one week of the service on them of notice of application. Sharva- 
nanda J (with Ismail J agreeing) based his order on the lack of 
locus standi, but made no reference to the time factor. The petit­
ioner's complaint was that his Member of Parliament had refused to 
give him a Job Bank application form. The Member concerned confes­
sed that that he had not directed his mind to the question whether 
or not the petitioner satisfied the stipulated eligibility criteria, 
since by the time the petitioner applied, he had exhausted all the 
application forms. Wanasundera J found as a fact that the Member of 
Parliament had selected several persons who lacked the eligibility 
criteria, in that they were from families owning substantial prop­
erties and in receipt of incomes and pensions. He saw "no signifi­
cant differences" between the petitioner's family and most of those 
families. Therefore, for whatever reason, the eligibility criteria 
was regarded as irrelevant by this particular Member of Parliament. 
That was not the basis on which he chose the thousand persons; indeed, 
he declined to disclose to Court the guidelines he adopted for the 
selection. Sharvananda J, delivering the judgment of the Court, 
chose to ignore that aspect of the matter and proceeding on the 
theoretical basis that an eligibility criteria existed, rigidly 
enforced it and ruled the petitioner out of court. Wanasundera J, 
who agreed that the application should be rejected, preferred to do 
so on the ground that the impugned act had been done prior to the 
enactment of the Constitution and was, therefore, beyond the reach 
of the constitutional guarantees.
Also rejected by Wanasundera J (with Thamotheram J and Ismail J 
agreeing), as being out of time were acts of torture, cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment alleged in Mahenthiran v.
Attorney-General;^ the application to Court was late by one week.
2
In Ranatunge v. Jayawardene, where an acting sub-postmaster of ten 
years' standing alleged that the UNP Member of Parliament for the 
area had instigated his removal in consequence of which, after rep­
eated advertisements the permanent appointment had been given to an 
unqualified person, Samarakone CJ (with Ismail J and Wanasundera J
1. S.C.M. of 14 August 1980.
2. S.C.M. of 3 August 1979.
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agreeing) upheld the objection taken on behalf of the State that 
the petition which should have been made within one month of 7 Sept­
ember 1978 (when the Constitution came into force) had in fact been 
filed on 4 June 1979. On the facts, however, the Chief Justice was:
unable to state that the allegation made by the 
. petitioner of wrong doing on the part of one or 
more of the respondents for political reasons is 
unjustified.
Ranasinghe v. Ceylon Plywoods Corporation^ was rejected on a
procedural deficiency of an altogether different character. After
the petitioner had made his application to Court complaining that
three of his fellow workmen had been promoted on purely political
considerations, the impugned promotions had, on the directions of
the Minister, been cancelled. In fact, the Minister informed the
Court that he had so directed because the promotions had been made
"otherwise than in accordance with the scheme of promotions". The
Court believed that it thereupon became functus:
The cancellation of the promotions complained of has
given the relief or redress sought under Article 126
of the Constitution. The petitioner can have now no 
grievance or cause for complaint and therefore cannot 
invoke our jurisdiction under Article 126 of the Con­
stitution.
When counsel insisted that the Court do consider whether or not there
had been a breach of a fundamental right, Thamotheram J (with Ismail J
and Weeraratne J agreeing) had only this to say:
We are of opinion that Article 126 of the Constitu­
tion does not give us the power to investigate a 
grievance which does not exist and give a relief 
which the circumstances do not require.
If this is a correct statement of the law, it is within the reach 
of the executive to perform an act which violates a person's funda­
mental right; restore the status quo in the event of such person 
making an application to Court within the prescribed time limit; and 
thus prevent any relief being granted in respect of its wrongful act. 
It is submitted that once the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is 
invoked in terms of Article 126 in respect of an executive or admi­
nistrative act, it is incumbent on the Court to determine whether 
that act infringed a fundamental right or not. If it did, the fact 
that the executive has since taken steps to conform to the Constitu­
tion may make it unnecessary for the Court to make any directions
1. S.C.M. of 17 September 1979.
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in respect of that act, but will not deprive it of jurisdiction to 
grant "such relief . . .  as it may deem just and equitable" in 
respect of that infringement. It is only by granting such relief 
and by demonstrating its readiness to do so, that the Supreme Court 
can perform its constitutional duty of exercising its jurisdiction 
for the "protection of fundamental rights".
2. Evidential Deficiency
In Thadchanamoorthi v. Attorney-General'*' and Mahenthiran v.
2
Attorney-General, which related to the same transaction, it was 
alleged by the two petitioners, who were Tamils and were murder and 
robbery suspects, that after they had been taken into police custody, 
they had been severely assaulted with hands, shod feet, batons, an 
axe handle, fence sticks and the muzzle of a gun. The petitioners 
identified the officer-in-charge of the Eravur police station and 
two constables as the alleged assailants. Having disposed of Mahe­
nthiran on the ground that that application had been made one week 
too late, Wanasundera J (with Thamotheram J and Ismail J agreeing) 
was of the view that:
The corroborative evidence of the other petitioner's 
affidavit in the connected case would now be no longer 
available to him in view of our ruling. There now rem­
ains only the petitioner's affidavit and the medical 
evidence.
The fact that the connected petition had been filed out of time 
could not have deprived the accompanying affidavit of any evidential 
worth. It had been affirmed to by a person who claimed he was pres­
ent when Thadchanamoorthi was assaulted by the police. It was, there­
fore, relevant. But the Court not only disregarded Mahenthiran's 
affidavit; it declined to call for a report from the magistrate as 
to the circumstances in which two medical reports were filed in his 
record:
Mr.Pullenayagum suggested that the Court should call 
for this information from the magistrate. It seems to 
me that this is a matter on which the petitioner him­
self would have been in a position to enlighten us and 
ought to have done so.
Consequently, in the view of the Court:
There seems to be considerable doubt as to how or when 
these injuries came to be suffered by the petitioner.
3
The case of Velmurugu v. Attorney-General was also one in which 
Article 11 was invoked: alleged assault by army personnel. The pet­
itioner, a prominent TULF politician in Amparai, complained that he
1. Supra. 2. Supra. 3. Supra.
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had been arrested by a Sinhalese assistant superintendent of police 
at a time of communal violence, and handed over to army personnel 
to "take him and do as you like", and that the latter had thereupon, 
while transporting him, subjected him to acts of torture, cruelty, 
and degrading treatment. According to medical evidence, the petit­
ioner had ten injuries, nine of them contusions and abrasions and 
one a fracture of the neck at the left side of the mandible which 
was described as grievous. These injuries were alleged to have been 
inflicted late in the evening of 9 August 1981, shortly after the 
petitioner had been taken into custody. At 11 p.m., when the pet­
itioner was taken before the magistrate, who released him on bail, 
he did not complain of the alleged torture, but told the magistrate 
that he found it difficult to walk. On 10 August, with the permi­
ssion of court, he was examined at home by a doctor. This medical 
report contained a complaint of assault by army personnel. On 12 
August, the petitioner appeared in court and sought permission to 
enter hospital. The hospital report of 13 August also contained a 
complaint of assault by army personnel. In his statement to the 
police on 14 August, he explained that he did not tell the magis­
trate of the assault because he feared that he would be attacked 
again when he was handed back to the assistant superintendent's 
custody; in fact, "when I was put into the jeep again, he showed me 
his revolver and said that he would one day or other shoot me".
Unlike in Thadchanamoorthi, the Court decided in this case,
on its own initiative, to call for a report from the magistrate.
The magistrate denied that the petitioner had told him that he found
it difficult to walk. Attaching great significance to this report,
and much less to the actual sequence of events which made it appear
most improbable that the injuries were self-inflicted, the Supreme
Court dismissed the application.^ As Wanasundera J (with whom
Ismail J and Weeraratne J agreed) explained:
In all the circumstances of this case, I am unable to 
say that the petitioner had proved these matters to my 
satisfaction.
1. Sharvananda J (with whom Ratwatte J agreed) thought that the 
facts disclosed "a shocking and revolting episode in law enforcement". 
He awarded Rs.10,000 as compensation and directed that appropriate 
disciplinary action be taken against the senior police officers for 
misconduct.
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In Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Netherlands v. Greece,^  the European
Commission commented on the ’’inherent difficulties" in the proof of
allegations of torture and ill-treatment:
First, a victim or a witness able to corroborate his 
story might hesitate to describe or reveal all that 
has happened to him for fear of reprisals upon himself 
or his family. Secondly, acts of torture or ill- 
treatment by agents of the police or armed services 
would be carried out as far as possible without wit­
nesses and perhaps without the knowledge of higher 
authority. Thirdly, where allegations of torture or 
ill-treatment are made, the authorities, whether the 
police or armed services or the ministries concerned, 
must inevitably feel that they have a collective rep­
utation to defend, a feeling which would be all the 
stronger in those authorities that had no knowledge 
of the activities of the agents against whom the 
allegations are made. In consequence, there may be 
reluctance of higher authority to admit or allow 
inquiries to be made into facts which might show that 
the allegations are true. Lastly, traces of torture 
or ill-treatment may with lapse of time become unrec­
ognisable, even by medical experts, particularly where 
the forms of torture itself leaves . . . few external 
marks.
The Supreme Court, which relied on the authority of Strasbourg to 
require evidence of "an administrative practice" in both Thadchana­
moorthi and Velmurugu, paid no heed at all to the caution thus 
expressed.
3. Restrictive Interpretation
In Wijesinghe v. Attorney-General the petitioner who was 
admittedly not a supporter of the ruling party was stripped, by 
order of the Cabinet, of her office of sub-post mistress which she 
had held for four years, and replaced by a government supporter.
The apparent reason for her removal and replacement was the recomm­
endation of a political victimisation committee appointed by the new 
Government following its election to office. There was no hearing 
before this committee; the petitioner was not specifically told why 
her services were being terminated, nor was she given an opportunity 
of defending herself. The committee was of the view that the pre­
vious government had shown a preference for the petitioner because 
of her political views. Be that as it may, the simple question for
1. YB 12.
2. S.C.M. of 30 April 1979.
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the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner had, by being removed 
from her job, been discriminated against on political grounds in 
violation of Article 12. The power of appointment and dismissal of 
public officers, including sub-post mistresses, was vested in the 
Cabinet and, subject to one exception, no court or tribunal had the 
power to inquire into, pronounce upon, or in any manner call in 
question any decision of the Cabinet in regard to the appointment 
or dismissal of a public officer. That single exception was the 
jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court by Article 126.^ In the 
exercise of that jurisdiction, the Court was entitled, and indeed 
required, to inquire whether the petitioner's fundamental right to 
equality had been infringed by her summary removal without any char­
ges or a hearing. However, in the view of Wanasundera J (with whom 
Ismail J and Sharvananda J agreed):
considering the extent and the width of the powers of 
the Cabinet, no limitations . . .  on its powers can be 
lightly assumed.
The Court recognised that:
The Cabinet cannot be expected, in the course of its 
multifarious duties, to give its mind to intricate and 
technical questions of law in the same manner as a 
court of law.
Even assuming that there was a duty on the Cabinet to hear every
intricate legal issue with the same meticulous care and knowledge
as a court of law:
would not such an omission still constitute just a 
mere error on the part of the Cabinet ?
As the Court was quick to point out:
Every wrong decision or breach of the law does not 
attract the constitutional remedies relating to funda­
mental rights. Where a transgression of the law takes 
place, due solely to some corruption, negligence or 
error of judgment, I do not think a person can be 
allowed to come under Article 126 and allege that there 
has been a violation of the constitutional guarantee.
It is submitted that Article 55(5) intended to place the Cabinet, in
respect of matters relating to the appointment, transfer, dismissal
or disciplinary control of public officers, in the same position as
any other repository of executive power. But by introducing a
different standard by which to judge the actions of the Cabinet, the
Supreme Court has considerably restricted the scope and effect of
that Article.
1. Art.55(5).
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In Gnanatilleke v. Attorney-General^ and Sirimanne v.
2
Attorney-General , the impugned acts were those of a Government
Agent. It was alleged that, by a wrong determination of facts,
namely, that they owned land when they in fact did not own, possess
or occupy any land, the petitioners had been "treated unequally" in
the matter of the allocation of state land. In the view of Samara-
kone CJ (with whom Ismail J and Sharvananda J agreed):
This is not a decision of law but a decision on dis­
puted facts. The bona fides of the 2nd Respondent 
[the Government Agent] in making the finding of fact 
is not in question. In the circumstances, though the 
petitioners may have a grievance, I fail to see how 
a wrong decision bona fide made on a question of fact 
could constitute a breach of the fundamental right of 
equality in the eye of the law.
The Court was not inclined to investigate whether or not the petit­
ioners had been wrongly excluded from the class of persons who would 
have been entitled to receive land grants, and to give an appropriate 
direction even for the future. In its view, the fact that a public 
officer had acted in good faith was a sufficient answer to an alle­
gation of an infringement of a fundamental right. In Dawesius
3
Perera v. Attorney-General, in which it was alleged that a land 
acquisition order had been made "as a measure of revenge and harass­
ment on account of the petitioner having opposed the present Member 
of Parliament and having openly expressed his political convictions 
as pro Sri Lanka Freedom Party", the Court stressed that discrimin­
ation on the ground of political opinion must be proved to be deli­
berate . Additional ly:
in order to prove that he was discriminated against 
on the ground of political opinion he had to show 
that the decision to take his land was "for the sole 
purpose of taking political revenge". This he has 
miserably failed to do.4*
In Adiapathan v. Attorney-Generalthe language right alleged 
to have been infringed was that which entitled a person "to receive 
communications from, and to communicate and transact business with, 
any official in his official capacity, in either of the national 
languages". The petitioner refused to accept a payment due to him 
from the Employees Provident Fund by way of a cheque written in the
1. S.C.M. of 17 October 1979.
2. Ibid.
3. S.C.M. of 25 July 1979.
4. Per Thamotheram J (with Samarawickrema J and Ismail J agree­
ing). The emphasis appears in the original judgment.
5. S.C.M. of 19 June 1979.
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Sinhala language; he insisted that the cheque be written in his 
mother tongue, which was Tamil. Samarakone CJ (with Thamotheram J 
and Ismail J agreeing) held that a cheque was not a "communication". 
He distinguished an addendum or appendix which may be added to a 
letter and which is read as part and parcel of it; a cheque was 
nothing more than an enclosure. By thus taking away an "enclosure" 
or an "annexure" from the ambit of a communication, the content of 
the latter expression was appreciably shrunk. The Chief Justice 
also pointed out that the receipt of a cheque is on a par with the 
receipt of currency. It is interesting to note that coins and notes 
which are legal tender in Sri Lanka bear the value thereof in both 
national languages. Be that as it may, payment is ordinarily made 
by legal tender in the absence of any legal provision or any express 
or implied agreement for payment to be made by cheque. Therefore, 
the petitioner was within his rights in insisting that if payment 
was being made by cheque, such cheque should be written in the Tamil 
language. But the Supreme Court distinguished that right, to which 
a person was entitled "by reason of the civil law of the country" 
from a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution which alone 
was enforceable by the remedy provided by Article 126.
In Yasapala v. Wickremasinghe,^  the Court was called upon, 
for the first time, to determine the content of a specific right, 
namely, the right of a citizen to form and join a trade union. In 
that case, the petitioner, a teacher who absented himself from work 
on account of strike action launched by the trade union to which he 
belonged, was treated as having vacated his post. Sharvananda J 
(with Ismail J and Wanasundera J agreeing) held that the right to 
form and join a trade union did not include the right to strike.
When Article 14 guaranteed not merely the freedom of association, 
but more specifically, the freedom to form and join a trade union, 
it must have had in mind the need for employees to combine for the 
purpose of protecting their interests. Why would a citizen form or 
join a trade union except to protect his interests ? It is the 
mutual need for the protection of their individual and common 
interests that bring together a group of citizens engaged in a 
particular enterprise or occupation. The Strasbourg institutions
1. S.C.M. of 8 December 1980.
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have held that the words "for the protection of his interests" in 
ECHR, Article 11, clearly denoting purpose, safeguards the freedom 
to protect the occupational interests of trade union members by 
trade union action, the conduct and development of which the State 
must both permit and make possible. It follows that members of a 
trade union have a right, in order to protect their interests, that 
the trade union should be heard. Consultations, collective bargai­
ning and the conclusion of collective agreements are some of the 
means by which this is accomplished; strike action is another almost 
universally accepted method.^ Without it, a trade union cannot 
effectively function as an instrument for agitating, negotiating 
and bargaining in respect of wages or conditions of work. Without 
it, the right to form and join a trade union is lacking in any 
content.
An Assessment
The UDHR states that:
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the 
competent national tribunals for acts violating the 
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution 
or by law. ^
According to the ICCPR:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms 
as herein recognised are violated shall have an 
effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violat­
ion has been comnitted by persons acting in an 
official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy 
shall have his right thereto determined by comp­
etent judicial, administrative or legislative 
authorities, or by any other competent authority 
provided for by the legal system of the State, 
and to develop the possibilities of judicial 
remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall 
enforce such remedies when granted.3
The ECHR guarantees that:
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in 
this Convention are violated shall have an effective 
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding 
that the violation has been committed by persons 
acting in an official capacity.^
1. National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium (4464/70), 
Report: 27 May 19/4; Judgment: 1 EHRR 578; Schmidt v. Dahlstrom 
(5589/72), Judgment: 1 EHRR 637; Swenska Lokmannaforbundet v. 
Sweden (5614/72), Report: 27 May 1974, Judgment: 1 EHRR 617; 
Trade Union X v. Belgium (7361/76), DR 14, 40.
2. Art.8. 3. Art.2. 3. Art.13.
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What is deducible from these instruments is that the State is now 
under an obligation to provide an "effective remedy". It has been 
suggested'*' that the factors which go to establish whether a remedy 
is "effective" are as follows:
i. the remedy must be accessible, i.e. the individual must be in 
a position to start a procedure which will result in a decision 
from the relevant authority;
ii. the remedy must be sufficient, i.e. the relevant authority 
must have the power to redress the alleged violation if it is, 
in fact, established;
iii. the remedy must have some likelihood of being accepted, e.g. 
there must not be established precedents against its avail­
ability;
iv. the remedy must not be the mere repetition of a remedy which 
has already been used.
To these perhaps ought to be added:
v. the remedy must be expeditious, i.e. the individual must be 
able to obtain a decision without any unreasonable delay;
vi. the remedy must be inexpensive, i.e. it must be within the means 
of the alleged victim of executive action.
Despite its inherent limitations, the special remedy offered 
by Article 126 appears to conform to the standards laid down by inter­
national law. In the hands of an activist or assertive court, it is 
capable of providing relief or redress, expeditiously and in adequate 
measure, to a person whose fundamental rights have been or are about 
to be infringed. It is perhaps too early to evaluate fairly its 
actual performance. It has not been sufficiently invoked. On the 
few occasions that it has, relief or redress has not been easily 
forthcoming. On the one hand, some of the applications may not have 
been properly constituted with all the necessary and relevant mater­
ial or made in time. Counsel too must have had their own teething 
problems in what to them is a comparatively new field of law. On the 
other hand, the Court has so far tended to approach the exercise of 
its new and potentially powerful jurisdiction with considerable 
caution. The circumstances in which the present Court was constituted
1. J.Raymond, "A Contribution to the Interpretation of Article 
13 of the European Convention on Human Rights", 5 Human Rights 
Review, 161.
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and the nature of its composition may perhaps have contributed to 
this obvious self-restraint. But if the Judges are able to approach 
their constitutional duty of protecting fundamental rights without 
being excessively deferential to the executive or being too astute 
to seek a rationale for its every act; if they are willing to show 
the same degree of understanding of the individual's bewilderment 
in a maze of rules, regulations, laws and other manifestations of 
state power, as it has already done of the functions of the police, 
the armed forces and the public service, the machinery now exists 
for them to make a significant contribution to the assertion of 
individual liberty.
CHAPTER VII
HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER A STATE OF EMERGENCY
A state of public emergency is usually accompanied by the 
violation of human rights. Yet, it is the existence of machinery 
for the declaration of a state of emergency that enables extraord­
inary measures to be taken in a democratic society within the 
framework of the law to deal effectively with a critical situation 
which affects the continued existence of that society itself. 
Therefore, the problem, in so far as its impact on human rights 
is concerned, is one of ensuring that a state of emergency is not 
abused.
The provisions of the law relating to public security have 
been invoked in Sri Lanka with increasing frequency. Between 
August 1953, when the Government first assumed the power to rule 
by emergency regulations, and the end of 1981, a state of emergency 
has been in force during the following periods. The immediate 
cause for setting it in motion, in respect of each continuous period, 
is also set out below.
TABLE 26 
STATES OF EMERGENCY, 1947-1981
From To Length 
y. m. d.
Immediate Cause
12. 8.53 11. 9.53 1 The Hartal
27. 5.58 26. 3.59 10 Communal riots
25. 9.59 3.12.59 2 9 Assassination of the Prime 
Prime Minister
17. 4.61 4. 4.63 1 11 19 Civil disobedience campaign in 
the northern provinces
5. 3.64 4. 4.64 1 Electricity Department strike
8. 1.66 7.12.66 11 Agitation in Colombo against the 
proposed Tamil Language Regulat­
ions
19.12.66 18. 1.69 2 1 Reduction of the rice ration
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From To Length 
y. m. d. Immediate Cause
26.10.70 25.11.70 1 Demonetization of high denom­
ination currency notes
16. 3.71 15. 2.77 5 11 Insurgent activity in the 
country
29.11.78 28. 5.79 6 Cyclone relief operations
3. 7.79 27.12.79 5 24 Terrorist activity in the nor­
thern provinces
16. 7.80 15. 8.80 1 General strike
3. 6.81 - )
) 6 28 
)
Police rampage in Jaffna
17. 8.81 — Communal riots
The shortest single continuous state of public emergency has 
been the then statutory month, while the longest has extended to 
five years and eleven months. From August 1953, during a period of 
twenty-eight years, Sri Lanka has been governed under the provisions 
of the Public Security Ordinance for a period of thirteen years, 
nine months and twenty days. During the latter half of the toventy-eigjnt 
year period, a state of emergency was in existence for over nine 
years. Between 1970 and 1977, the executive enjoyed for a period of 
six years the uninhibited power to make instant laws, without notice, 
scrutiny or discussion, and regardless of whether such laws contra­
vened fundamental rights.
History of Public Security Legislation 
The Public Security Ordinance, No.25 of 1947, was enacted at 
a time when both the private and public sectors of the country were 
virtually crippled by strike action. Demanding better living and 
working conditions, higher wages, and trade union and political 
rights for government employees, nearly 50,000 workers had come out 
in what was then the biggest ever strike organised in the country.
On 5 June 1947, the police opened fire on a demonstration in Colo­
mbo, killing a government clerk, V.Kandasamy. Five days later, the 
Minister of Home Affairs, Arunachalam Mahadeva, presented the Public 
Security Bill in the State Council. He did not even attempt to 
disguise the fact that the bill he was presenting was motivated by
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the general strike:
Government have one function which they cannot 
abdicate, and that is, if there is a threat to 
orderly government which would place the lives 
and fortunes of the people at the mercy of trou­
ble makers and law breakers, which would place 
. in jeopardy distribution of food, which would 
place in jeopardy all road and rail transport, 
and if they are of the view that attempts are 
being made to create a general strike which 
would paralyse the life of the commmity, any 
Government worth the name will have to take up 
the challenge and arm themselves with the nece­
ssary powers to meet that situation.1
Part II of the Ordinance empowered the Governor to make emergency 
regulations "as appear to him to be necessary in the interests of 
public security and the preservation of public order and the supp­
ression of mutiny, riot or civil commotion, or for the maintenance
2
of supplies and services essential to the life of the community".
More specifically, the Governor could by regulation provide for
3
the detention of persons. An emergency regulation prevailed over 
all other law, whether or not it expressly purported to amend, 
modify or suspend the operation of such law.^ This overriding 
effect was extended even to orders or rules made under an emergency 
regulation.^ An emergency regulation came into force forthwith 
upon its being made by the Governor, without the need for its publ-g
ication. The power to make emergency regulations, however, was 
activated only when the Governor proclaimed under Part I of the 
Ordinance that he was "of opinion that, by reason of the existence 
in Ceylon of a state of public emergency, it is expedient so to do 
in the interests of public security and the preservation of public 
order or for the maintenance of supplies and services essential to 
the life of the community".^ When a proclamation was made, itg
remained in force until it was revoked by the Governor. Neither 
the fact of the existence of a state of public emergency, nor an 
emergency regulation or any order, rule or direction made or given
9
thereunder, could be called in question in any court.
1. State Council Debates, 10 June 1947, col.1936. See also 
speeches of J.R.Jayewardene, ibid., col.1969; and National State 
Assembly Debates, 31 January 1978, col.673.
2. S.5(1). 3. S.5(2)(a). 4. S.7.
5. S.6. 6. S.11. 7. S.2(1).
8. S.2(2). 9. Ss.3,8.
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In 1949, one year after Independence, and following consid­
erable agitation by opposition political groups, the Government 
sought to liberalise this law. The Public Security (Amendment)
Act, No.22 of 1949, made four significant changes: (1) a proclama­
tion under Part I was limited in duration to one month at a time;^
(2) the making of such proclamation was required to be communi-
2
cated forthwith to Parliament; (3) the specific reference to 
"detention of persons" in the provision enabling emergency regu-
3
1 at ions to be made was deleted; and (4) the House of Represen­
tatives was empowered to add to, alter or revoke any emergency
4
regulation. This amending Act introduced an element of parlia­
mentary control over executive action. The extent of executive 
power, however, remained undiminished and, so long as a government 
commanded a majority in the House, parliamentary control over the 
exercise of that power would be purely formal.
In 1953, the Government removed the subsidy on rice, increased 
postal rates and railway fares, and abandoned the free midday meal 
which was being provided to school children. To protest against 
these measures, the trade unions and left-wing political parties 
organised a "hartal" (a general stoppage of work) on 12 August 1953. 
On the same day, a state of emergency was declared. Six days later, 
a bill to amend the law relating to public security was rushed 
through all its stages at one sitting. The Public Security (Amend­
ment) Act, No.34 of 1953, which had retrospective effect from 11 
August 1953, enabled the Governor-General to bring Part II into 
operation whenever he considered it expedient to do so in view of 
the imminence of a state of public emergency."* Also restored to the 
principal enactment was the specific power, by emergency regulation, 
to "authorise and provide for the detention of persons".
1. S.2(1).
2. S.2(2). If Parliament at the relevant time stood adjourned 
or prorogued, it was required to be summoned within ten days for 
this purpose.
3. S.4(l)(i). This deletion would, however, not have affected 
the generality of the power conferred on the Governor-General, and 
his power to make a regulation on this subject probably remained 
unfettered.
4. S.4(2).
5. S.3.
6. S.5(l)(b).
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The law relating to public security had been severely criti­
cised in Parliament by the leaders of the left movement. In 1947, 
W.Dahanayake (LSSP) expressed himself in hyperbolical language:
This Bill will go down to history as the meanest and 
dirtiest law . . . I describe it as the most dastardly, 
the most cruel, the most brutal law that has been 
inflicted upon the working classes of any country, not 
excepting Nazi Germany or Italy under Mussolini. Here, 
under the provisions of this Bill, there is complete 
and hundred percent annihilation of civil liberties.
. . .  I say that this Bill is something which no civil­
ized society should consent to.-*-
In 1949, P.H.W.Silva (LSSP) did not find it possible even to subsc­
ribe to a bill the avowed object of which was to extract from the 
principal enactment some of its fangs:
The basic,fundamental, repulsive and reactionary 
nature of the Public Security Ordinance remains.
. . . And as the amending Bill does not repeal the 
Public Security Ordinance but instead tries to show 
up the present Bill as amended [sic] as a piece of 
harmless democratic legislation, on behalf of our 
Party I wish to state that we cannot support the 
amendment suggested by this amending Bill.2
In 1953, S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike (SLFP) vehemently objected to the re-
introduction of the concept of preventive detention:
The only purpose of this so-called preventive detention 
is to cause an injustice owing to the fear and panic, 
on the one hand, of the authorities, and on the other, 
owing to their incompetence. In other words, when such 
an occasion arises, if they feel that A, B, C, D, and 
so on, five hundred or a thousand people all over the 
place, may conceivably give trouble, the easiest thing 
to do is to collar them all and lock them up, no matter 
how many, fifty, five hundred or five thousand. That 
easy way of dealing with matters is neither in keeping 
with those principles of personal liberty inculcated 
by democracy nor indeed necessary.
It was not surprising, therefore, that when in 1956 the Mahajana
Eksath Peramuna was formed under the leadership of Bandaranaike, its
manifesto, to which both W.Dahanayake and P.H.W.Silva subscribed,
should promise that:
We shall repeal the Public Security Ordinance . . . 
and similar restrictions and invasions of public and 
personal rights, particularly those affecting freedom 
of association, assembly and s p e e c h . ^
1. State Council Debates, 11 June 1947, col.2024.
2. Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 29 March 
1949, col.2018.
3. Ibid., 18 August 1953, col.882.
4. MEP Programme, s.18.
406
But the Bandar ana ike Government, in which both W.Dahanayake 
and P.H.W.Silva were Cabinet Ministers, did not repeal the law 
relating to public security. Instead, it took steps to refine that 
law and to add a new dimension to it. In March 1959, ten months 
after a state of emergency had been declared in the wake of comm­
unal disturbances on an unprecedented scale, the Public Security 
(Amendment) Act, No.8 of 1959, was enacted by a Parliament from 
which every single Opposition member had either walked out or been 
carried out on the orders of the Speaker.'*' Prime Minister Bandara- 
naike explained his volte face:
It is true that our Government Party before the 
elections felt that the Public Security Ordinance 
may be safely repealed. But what has happened in 
recent times has convinced us . . . that any Govern­
ment needs legislation of this type as a safeguard 
for the people.^
The amending Act provided for a declaration of a state of emergency
3
in a limited area. It also enabled the armed forces to be called 
out by the Prime Minister whenever "circumstances endangering the 
public security in any area have arisen or are imminent and the 
Prime Minister is of the opinion that the police are inadequate to
4
deal with such situation in that area"; the imposition of a 
curfew in any area whenever "the Prime Minister considers it necess­
ary to do so for the maintenance of public order" in such area;”* 
and the declaration of a service to be an "essential service" 
whenever "the Prime Minister considers it necessary in the public 
interest to do so for the maintenance of any service which, in his 
opinion, is essential to the life of the community". Any cessation 
of work, or any act comnitted with a view to securing a cessation of 
work, in an essential service, other than "in consequence of a strike 
commenced by a registered trade union solely in pursuance of an 
industrial dispute" was declared to be an offence.^ These provisions 
were contained in a new Part III which could be invoked without the 
declaration of a state of public emergency. When invoked, however, 
the orders made thereunder were required to be communicated to
Q
Parliament, and they would remain in force only for a month at a time.
1. For events leading to the exclusion of the Opposition, see 
Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 12 February 1959, 
col.819 et seq.
2. Broadcast speech of 14 February 1959, reported in the Obser­
ver, 15 February 1959.
3. S.3. 4. S.12. 5. S.16.
6. S.17. 7. Ibid. 8. S.21.
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As with Parts I and II, orders made under Part III, and the circum­
stances necessitating the making of such orders were declared to be 
non-justiciable. ^
The drafting of the 1972 Constitution was undertaken on the 
premise that legislative power would be vested exclusively in the 
National State Assembly, which would be the "supreme instrument of 
state power" under that Constitution, and that the Assembly would 
not be free to delegate or in any manner alienate its legislative 
power to any other person or institution. The provisions of the 
Public Security Ordinance clearly ran counter to this scheme. 
Accordingly, the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Dr.Colvin R.de 
Silva, who throughout his political career had consistently opposed 
the grant of emergency powers to the executive, made the following 
alternate proposals:^
a) A new Public Security Act to be passed by Parliament before the 
new Constitution came into operation.
b) A full and classified set of emergency regulations to be passed 
by Parliament as a schedule to the new Act.
c) The new Act to provide that, upon proclamation of an emergency 
by the Governor-General, the entire schedule of emergency regu­
lations, or such parts of them as the Governor-General decides, 
shall come into operation either throughout the country or in 
any part of the country which the Governor-General will indicate 
in the proclamation.
d) The proclamation will operate as a summoning of Parliament to 
meet within a specified period.
e) When Parliament meets it will consider a resolution approving 
the proclamation of the emergency.
f) Parliament will be given special power to pass regulations having 
the effect of law in a summary way, i.e. without the need of 
giving notice or of following the bill procedure. Any special 
regulation designed to meet a special need could be made ready 
during the period between the making of the proclamation and the 
meeting of Parliament.
These proposals were rejected by the Ministry of Defence which
1. Public Security: A paper for consideration by the Security 
Council, prepared by the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs, 14 
February 1971.
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expressed the view that "any variation of the present position is 
not in the interests of public security and order".^ Having regard 
to the fact that one month after the Minister had made his proposals, 
the Government found it necessary to invoke the provisions of the 
Public Security Ordinance, it was inevitable that the existing 
position would remain unaltered. Accordingly, the 1972 Constitution 
only succeeded in protecting itself from the overriding effects of 
emergency regulations.^
The state of emergency declared in March 1971 to deal with a 
rapidly developing insurrectionary situation was thereafter renewed 
every month for the next six years. In 1978, following a general 
election and a change of government, priority was given to the amend­
ment of the Public Security Ordinance for the purpose of ensuring 
greater parliamentary control over executive action. As the new 
Prime Minister, J.R.Jayewardene, explained:
On several occasions, we in the Opposition tried to 
commence a debate on the Emergency, but we were not 
successful. We gave notice of several motions dealing 
with specific regulations, but they were treated as 
private members' motions and they never came up for 
discussion. ^
The Public Security (Amendment) Law, No.6 of 1978, provided that:
(1) the longest period that a state of emergency will remain in force
............................4 ...........
without parliamentary approval is fourteen days; (2) if a state 
of emergency is revoked within a period of fourteen days, or if it 
expires on the fourteenth day, a fresh state of emergency declared 
within fourteen days of such revocation or expiry will not take 
effect without parliamentary approval;"* and (3) if a state of 
emergency has been in operation for a period of ninety consecutive 
days, or a period of ninety days in the aggregate during six consec­
utive calendar months, no further extension nor a fresh declaration 
made at any time during the succeeding six calendar months, will be 
effective for more than ten days without parliamentary approval by 
a two-thirds majority. The Jayewardene Government was, of course, 
not seeking to inhibit itself since it then commanded a comfortable 
five-sixth majority in the National State Assembly. Additionally, 
it caused the legislature to give it an extensive armoury of powers
1. Views of the Security Council on the Paper submitted by the 
Ministry of Constitutional Affairs, (undated).
2. See ss. 45(4), 134.
3. National State Assembly Debates, 31 January 1978, col.612.
4. S.2(2). 5. S.2(5). 6. S.2(6).
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which no government had previously enjoyed in normal times, and 
which could be utilised without the need to declare a state of 
emergency:
1. The Proscribing of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Other 
Similar Organisations Law, No. 16 of 1978, provided for:
a) the proscription of any movement, society, party, association 
or body or group of persons "if the President is of opinion" 
that such organisation "advocates the use of violence and is 
either directly or indirectly concerned in or engaged in any 
unlawful activity;
b) the detention of any person for an aggregate period of one 
year "where the Minister has reason to believe or suspect 
that" such person "has committed or been concerned in the 
commission of any offence under any law and that such offence 
was committed in pursuance of or in furtherance of or in 
relation to the aims or objects or the apparent or ostensible 
aims or objects" of a proscribed organisation;
c) the prohibition of the publication of any matter relating to 
any activity of a proscribed organisation, including news 
concerning any act alleged to have been committed by such 
organisation and of any investigation undertaken in respect 
of such act.
The penalties prescribed by this law included mandatory remand, 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years, the closure 
of printing establishments, and the forfeiture of property; the 
last-mentioned penalty being at the discretion, not of a court, 
but of a Minister. Neither a proscription order made by the 
President, nor a detention order made by the Minister, was 
justiciable in a court. This law was in force for a period of 
fourteen months, from 23 May 1978 to 20 July 1979.
2. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, No.48 of 
1979, defines twelve different "acts of terrorism" and provides, 
inter alia, for:
a) any police officer not below the rank of sub-inspector to 
arrest any person, enter and search any premises, stop and 
search any individual or vehicle, and seize any document or 
thing, without a warrant, if he "reasonably suspected" such 
person, premises, vehicle or thing to be connected with or
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concerned in any act of terrorism;
b) the retention by the police in custody, without producing 
before a magistrate, of a person arrested without a warrant, 
for a period of three days, and his mandatory remand there­
after until the conclusion of his trial;
c) the admissibility in evidence of confessions made to the police 
while in police custody, not only against the maker thereof, 
but also against any other person who is jointly charged;
d) the prohibition, upon pain of punishment, of any retraction 
or contradiction at the trial, of any statement made by a 
witness to a magistrate;
e) the detention of any person for an aggregate period of eight­
een months if "the Minister has reason to believe or suspect 
that" such person "is connected with or concerned in" any act 
of terrorism;
f) the prohibition of the publication of any matter relating to 
the commission of any act of terrorism or the investigation 
into any such act.
Minimum periods of imprisonment which are mandatory, the forfeiture 
of all movable and immovable property, and the closure of printing 
establishments, are among the penalties prescribed by this Act.
A detention order made by the Minister is final and cannot be 
called in question in any court or tribunal by way of writ or 
otherwise. This Act came into force on 20 July 1979 and, though 
originally intended only for a period of three years, is still 
operative.
3. The Essential Public Services Act, No.61 of 1979, empowers the 
President to declare any service provided by certain government 
departments, public corporations, local authorities and co-oper­
ative societies, to be an essential public service. Thereupon, 
the failure by any employee to report for work at such estab­
lishment, and any attempt to induce an employee to refrain from 
so reporting, whether or not in pursuance of a strike conmenced 
by a trade union, are offences which are punishable with imprison­
ment, fine, forfeiture of property and, in the case of a person 
who is registered to practise any profession or vocation, by the 
removal of the name of such person from such register. Each order 
made by the President under this Act remains in force for one 
month, subject to approval by resolution of Parliament before the 
expiry of the first fourteen days.
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Concept of a State of Public Emergency 
Justiciability
Section 2(1) of the Public Security Ordinance provides that:
Where, in view of the existence or imminence of a state 
of public emergency, the President is of the opinion that 
it is expedient so to do in the interests of public sec­
urity and the preservation of public order or for the 
maintenance of supplies and services essential to the 
life of the comnunity, the President may, by Proclama­
tion published in the Gazette, declare that the provis­
ions of Part II of this Ordinance shall come into oper­
ation forthwith or on such date as may be specified in
the proclamation.
Section 3 provides that:
Where the provisions of Part II of this Ordinance are 
or have been in operation during any period by virtue 
of a Proclamation under section 2, the fact of the 
existence or imminence, during that period, of a state 
of public emergency shall not be called in question 
in any court.
Therefore, in unequivocal language, the legislature has excluded the
jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and pronounce upon the
question whether or not a state of public emergency exists or is
inminent. That question is left to the sole determination of the
President. Under the 1946 and 1972 Constitutions, the determination
was made by the Prime Minister on whose advice the President (and
previously, the Governor-General) acted. In fact, the latter
Constitution specifically provided that:
Upon the Prime Minister advising the President of the 
existence of a state of public emergency, the Presi­
dent shall declare a state of emergency.^
A parliamentarian has expressed his understanding of the extent of
this power in the following terms:
This so-called state of emergency is not defined in the
Ordinance. It can be something imaginary. It may be
that the Governor-General can get up one morning - he 
might have had a bad dream - and declare a state of
emergency. If in the opinion of the Governor-General ^
there is a state of emergency, he makes a declaration.
Under section 2(1), the President may bring into operation the 
extraordinary law-making power contained in Part II only after he 
has formed the view that a state of public emergency is in exist­
ence or is imminent. That view must necessarily be formed on the
1. S.134(2).
2. Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 8 January 
1959, col.2848, per E.P.Samarakkody (LSSP).
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basis of information within his knowledge as Head of the Government,
and in the exercise of his own judgment as the person ultimately
charged with the direction and control of that Government. It is
as much a matter of comnonsense as it is of intuition and conscience.
He may act on reports submitted by his security staff; he may have
regard to advice given by Cabinet and Parliamentary colleagues; or
he may simply apply his own political experience and his knowledge
of men and matters to what he perceives to be portentous trends.
Section 72 of the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act
1935 provided that:
The Governor-General may, in cases of emergency, make 
and promulgate ordinances for the peace and good gove­
rnment of British India or any part thereof.
In King Emperor v. Benoari Lai Sarma,^  the Privy Council observed
that the question whether an emergency existed at the time when an
ordinance was made and promulgated was a matter of which the Governor-
2
General was the sole judge.
If then the President is the sole judge of the question whether 
a state of public emergency exists or is imminent, is he entitled to 
determine that question mala fide ? If, for instance, he anticipates 
a parliamentary defeat due to the temporary absence of certain members 
of his party, can he invoke, until their return, the regulation- 
making power provided for in the Public Security Ordinance by falsely 
determining that a state of public emergency exists or is imminent ?
In Benoari Lai Sarma, the Privy Council made the following obser­
vation:
Assuming that he acts bona fide and in accordance with 
his statutory powers, it cannot rest with the courts to 
challenge his view that the emergency exists.3
This dictum seems to suggest that the absence of good faith would
vitiate a determination made by the President. But the absence of
good faith, or mala fides, will not be apparent on the face of a
proclamation made under section 2(1). Such proclamation:
. . . bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead.
Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to 
establish the cause of invalidity and to get in quashed- 
or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its 
ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.
1. [1945] 1 All ER 210.
2. See also Bhagat Singh v. King Emperor [1931] LR Ind.App.169; 
Uganda v. Comm, of Prisons, ex p.Matovu [1966] EA 514.
37 At p.212.
4. Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council [1956] 1 All ER 
855, at 871.
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Unlike the Government of India Act 1935, which was being interpreted 
in Benoari Lai Sarma, the Public Security Ordinance states that "the 
fact of the existence or imminence of a state of public emergency 
shall not be questioned in any court". If the premise upon which 
the proclamation is made cannot be questioned in any court, it does 
not appear to be possible to establish that that premise is tainted 
by mala fides.
In Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, Lord Reid,
expressing the minority view, observed that "cases involving mala
fides are in a special position in that mere general words will not
deprive the court of iurisdiction to deal with them11. ^ In Anisminic
2
v. The Foreign Compensation Comnission, the House of Lords held that
the words "shall not be called in question in any court of law"
appearing in section-4(4) of the Foreign Compensation Act 1950 did
not operate to debar any enquiry that may be necessary to decide
whether a tribunal had acted within its authority or jurisdiction.
Lord Reid, expressing the majority view in that case, observed2
If the draftsman or Parliament had intended to intro­
duce a new kind of ouster clause so as to prevent any 
enquiry even whether the document relied on was a 
forgery, I would have expected to find something much 
more specific than the bald statement that a deter­
mination shall not be called in question in any court 
of law. Undoubtedly such a provision protects every 
determination which is not a nullity. But I do not 
think that it is necessary or even reasonable to 
construe the word 'determination' as including every­
thing which purports to be a determination but which 
is in fact no determination at all.3
He explained : what he meant by "nullity":
It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may 
have made a decision which it had no power to make.
It may have failed in the course of the enquiry to 
comply with the requirements of natural justice. It 
may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the prov­
isions giving it power to act so that it failed to 
deal with the question remitted to it and decided 
some question which was not remitted to it. It may 
have refused to take into account something which it 
was required to take into account. Or it may have 
based its decision on some matter which, under the 
provisions setting it up, it had no right to take 
into account.^
1. Op.cit., at 867.
2. [1969] 1 All ER 208.
3. Ibid., at 213.
4. Ibid.
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The "determination" in Anisminic, however, is distinguishable 
from the "view" required in section 3. In Anisminic, a commission 
established by statute had enquired into and decided a matter which 
they had no right to consider. The commission was clearly acting 
outside its statutory jurisdiction. Its "determination" was there­
fore not "real", but "purported". On the other hand, the "view" 
formed by the President that a state of public emergency exists or 
is imminent is quite different in character and content. It is 
formed on the basis of information which he will normally not be 
able to disclose to a court. It is not an assessment that a court, 
with no responsibility for the governance of the country, will 
ordinarily be able to make, and is fraught with consequences which 
a court is not, and will not be, called upon to face. It is a 
decision which, in the words of Lord Macmillan, "can manifestly be 
taken only by one who has both knowledge and responsibility which 
no court can share". ^ As Lord Parker has observed:
Those who are responsible for the national security 
must be the sole judges of what the national security 
requires. It would be obviously undesirable that such 
matters should be made the subject of evidence in a 
court of law or otherwise discussed in public.
Accordingly, when Parliament invests the President with extraordinary 
power which could be utilised whenever "a state of public emergency 
exists or is imminent", he is under a duty to exercise that power 
cautiously, wisely and well whenever in his judgment he considers it 
necessary and appropriate to do so. The power is held in trust, and 
in determining if and when he should use it, the President is guided 
by purely subjective factors, and is then accountable only to 
Parliament and to the people of the country to whose political 
judgment of his actions he must ultimately bow. His judgment of the 
state of the nation is essentially political in nature and is, there­
fore, incapable of review by a court.
Section 3 contains an irrebittable presumption of fact. During 
any period when the provisions of Part II are, or have been, in 
operation by virtue of a proclamation under section 2, it is presumed 
that a state of public emergency exists or has existed, or is immin­
ent or had been imminent. By denying a court jurisdiction to 
question the fact of the existence or imminence, during that period,
1. Liversidge v. Anderson [1941] 3 All ER 338, at 367.
2. The Zamora [1916] 2 AC 77, at 107.
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of a state of public emergency, the presumption is made irrebuttable.
Section 3 is, therefore, neither a "finality clause" nor an "ouster
clause", in the sense in which those terms are commonly understood.
Perhaps it is more akin to a "conclusive evidence clause". As De
Smith has observed:
The courts will also accept the conclusiveness of a 
certificate entered by a responsible Minister on certain 
matters of State into which they are not prepared to 
conduct any independent inquiry - e.g. whether another 
State is independent, whether the Crown is at war with 
it, whether its government is recognised de jure or de 
facto or not at all, whether a defendant in legal proc­
eedings is entitled to sovereign immunity or to diplom­
atic status. These questions are not, however, strictly  ^
matters of discretion but rather matters of law or fact.
The marginal note to section 3 describes it as "Presumption as to
existence or imminence of public emergency". Although a marginal
note has little relevance in the interpretation of a provision in
a statute, it suffices to state that, in this instance, the marginal
note accurately describes the content of that section.
No attempt has yet been made in Sri Lanka with any degree of
success to invoke the jurisdiction of a court to examine the question
whether or not a state of public emergency existed or was imminent
2
at any particular point of time. In December 1980, Sharvananda J
offered the only rational explanation for this:
The existence of a state of emergency is not a 
justiciable matter which the Court could be called 
upon to determine by applying an objective test.3
He stressed that:
The President is not bound as a matter of law to 
disclose the reasons for the Proclamation. A 
proclamation of emergency is thus conclusive and 
is not assailable on any ground.
If this is a correct statement of the law (which it is), it is
difficult to understand the action of the same Judge who, as a
member of a special presidential commission of inquiry in February
of the same year, noticed Mrs.Bandaranaike, Prime Minister from
1. De Smith, Judicial Review, op.cit., at p.290.
2. In Republic of Sri Lanka v. Amirthalingam (Trial at Bar No.l 
of 1976), the High Court held that a proclamation purported to have 
been made by the President to bring Part II into operation did not 
satisfy the requirements of s. 134(2) of the Constitution; consequently, 
there had been no valid declaration of emergency. Acting in revision, 
the Supreme Court set aside this decision: S.C.Application No.658/76.
3. Yasapala v. Wickremasinghe, S.C.M. of 8 December 1980.
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1970 to 1977, to explain, inter alia, why:
Even after the conditions precedent for the contin­
uance of a state of emergency had ceased to exist, 
you did continue to recommend to the President that 
such conditions did in fact exist and that you did 
thereby cause the state of emergency to continue 
until it lapsed on 16 February 1977.1
The reference was to the state of emergency which was declared on 
16 March 1971 to deal with insurgent activity, and which was rene­
wed every month until 15 February 1977.
Before the commission served its notice on Mrs.Bandaranaike, 
it had recorded, at an ex parte inquiry, the evidence of three 
police officers who testified that, in their view, there was no 
justification for the continuance of the state of emergency after 
about August/November 1971. Each of them had served as a member of 
the Security Council of the Ministry of Defence which met regularly 
under the chairmanship of the Secretary to that Ministry; but, 
according to them, they had not been individually consulted by the 
Prime Minister at any stage as to the need for the continuance of 
the state of emergency. The commission had also recorded the evid­
ence of two insurgent leaders. One of them had been in prison 
custody from March 1971 till December 1976. Nevertheless, he had 
testified on oath to events which according to him had taken place 
in the country during that period, and he concluded that owing to 
the relative strength of the insurgents and the police, the former 
having been "decimated and destroyed" and the latter having been 
"fully equipped with generators, aircraft and lorries", there was 
no threat to public security after August 1971. The other insurgent, 
who had been arrested in March 1973, had testified that by the end
of August 1971, the insurgent movement "was decimated and only a
2
few hundred remained outside".
Mrs.Bandaranaike appeared before the commission, but declined
"to explain, be answerable or be accountable in respect of the acts
of my Government to any non-sovereign body or tribunal which has no
constitutional authority to override or supersede the sovereign
legislature, which alone had power and authority to question my
actions or that of my Government and to which alone I was respon- 
3
sible". With regard to the specific charge relating to the state
1. Third Interim Report, SPCI, op cit.
2. Ibid., at 125-136.
3. Ibid., at 160.
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of emergency, she said:
The Public Security Act has provided Parliament 
as the only body which has cognizance over the 
question of an emergency and expressly declares 
that the fact of the existence or imminence of 
a state of public emergency shall not be called 
in question in any court. How can this commiss­
ion presume to inquire into the question of the 
declaration of the emergency when the law says 
it is not justiciable and that law remains un­
amended ?
After further ex parte proceedings, the commission reported
to the President that:
On the material placed before us and for the 
reasons given in considerable detail, we are 
amply satisfied that a continuance of a state 
of emergency recommended by the respondent as 
Prime Minister to the President, promulgated 
after the end of December 1972 from month to 
month until the Emergency lapsed on the 16th 
February 1977, constitutes abuse or misuse of 
power.1
Thereupon, the President caused a resolution to be passed by Parlia­
ment imposing civic disability on Mrs.Bandaranaike for a period of 
seven years, thereby disqualifying her, during that period, from
seeking election either to the office of President or to Parliament
2
or from voting or holding public office.
The commission's finding was based on the conclusion reached 
by the three commissioners that, in their view, a state of public 
emergency was neither in existence nor was imminent during the 
period 1 January 1973 to 16 February 1977. In other words, contrary 
to the provisions of section 3, they had questioned the fact of the 
existence or imminence of a state of public emergency during the 
periods when the provisions of Part II had been in operation by 
virtue of a proclamation made under section 2. The commission was 
not unaware of section 3. In fact, it asked itself the question 
whether the language of section 3 precluded them from inquiring 
into the propriety of the Prime Minister's conduct, and answered 
that question in the negative. The commission's reasoning appeared 
to be on the following lines:
1. The law under which the caimission had been constituted autho­
rised it to proceed with any inquiry into the conduct of any 
public officer.
1. Ibid., at 136. 2. Supra, p.
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2. There was ample authority for the proposition that the finality 
clauses in sections 3 and 8 did not preclude a person from 
invoking the assistance of the courts where the exercise of 
discretionary power was mala fide or done for improper or coll­
ateral reasons.
3. The denial of an opportunity to exercise the power vested in 
Parliament to discuss the Emergency by way of debate invali­
dated the purposes of sections 3 and 8 in barring judicial 
review.
It is now proposed to examine the validity of each of these reasons.
The commission believed that it had received clearance by law 
to question the "fact of the existence or imminence of a state of 
public emergency" by reason of the following provision in the 
Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry (Special Provisions)
Act:
. . . and notwithstanding that under the Consti­
tution in force during the relevant period, no 
court, tribunal or other institution has, or had 
the power or jurisdiction to inquire into, pro­
nounce upon or in any manner call in question any 
such conduct . . .
This enabling provision was inserted into section 22 of the principal
enactment which sought to define the expression "conduct of any
public officer”. Therefore, what this provision sought to do was
to enable the commission to inquire into the conduct of a public
officer despite the fact that the Constitution might have expressly
prohibited such conduct from being called in question by a court.
The 1972 Constitution contained several such "ouster clauses";^ but
there was none which prevented a court from inquiring into the
conduct of a prime minister in relation to a state of emergency.
On the other hand, section 3 of the Public Security Ordinance
contained an irrebutable presumption that, during any period when
the provisions of Part II of that Ordinance were in operation by
virtue of a proclamation made under section 2, a state of public
emergency was in existence or was imminent. That section was
neither repealed nor made inoperative by the Special Presidential
Commissions of Inquiry Law. Therefore, the law on which the
commissioners relied could not have given them the authority to
1. Supra, p.356.
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embark on an investigation to ascertain whether the state of the 
nation was, at the relevant time, different to that which the law 
irrebuttably presumed it to have been.
The second reason given by the commission was that "there is 
ample authority for the proposition that the finality clauses in 
sections 3 and 8, 'shall not be called in question in any court1, 
does not preclude a person from invoking the assistance of courts 
where the exercise of discretionary power is mala fide or done for 
improper or collateral reasons". Unfortunately, not even one 
authority was actually cited in the report. A "finality clause" 
is different from an "ouster clause". Section 8, which provides 
that:
No emergency regulation, and no order, rule or 
direction made or given thereunder shall be 
called in question in any court,
contains an "ouster clause". Section 3 contains neither a "finality
clause" nor an "ouster clause". That section contains an irrebuttable
presumption of fact, and while that section remained operative, it
was not open to any court or tribunal to canvass the fact stated
therein.
Finally, the commission appears to have accepted a submission 
made by State Counsel that "the provisions of sections 3 and 8 were 
based on the premise that the excesses or abuses of power vested 
in the executive by the Public Security Ordinance are within parlia­
mentary control by the process of debate and discussion in Parlia­
ment, on the proclamation sought to be made". The commission noted 
that:
Arising from what has been just said is the question 
whether the denial of an opportunity to exercise the 
power vested in Parliament, referred to above, by 
way of debate invalidates the purposes of section 3 
and 8 in barring judicial review.
By reference to Hansard, the commission observed that several
requests for debate on the renewal of the Emergency made by members
of the Opposition in the National State Assembly had been met with
the same reply, namely, that this would be possible only by way of
a substantive motion.^ State Counsel submitted that the "technical
1. The commission omitted to refer to a number of occasions 
when the Emergency had in fact been debated in the National State 
Assembly; e.g. (i) motion of no-confidence in the Government for 
misuse of emergency powers: Parliamentary Debates (House of Rep­
resentatives), 2 May 1972, c.868; 3 May 1972, col.102; (ii) motion
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objection" that a substantive motion must be moved in regard to so 
important a matter as the continuation of a state of emergency 
from month to month "is an indication of a lack of good faith", 
particularly since the Government "knew fully well that such a 
motion would require a longer period than one month during which 
the proclamation is in force". Although there is no acceptance of 
it in express terms, the commission appears to have adopted this 
submission. Therefore, it needs to be noted that:
a) Standing Orders of the National State Assembly permitted a 
debate to be held only on a substantive motion.
b) On previous occasions, the Emergency had been debated by way
of substantive motions. For instance, in 1958, the Leader of
the Opposition, Dr.N.M.Perera, moved:
That this House expresses its lack of confidence 
in the Government in view of its failure to end 
the Emergency and restore normal democratic rights 
and civil liberties.1
On 1 November 1961, the Senate began a debate on an Opposition 
motion calling for the withdrawal of a proclamation under section 
2 made on 11 October 1961. When the debate was resumed on 14 Nov­
ember 1961, the motion was amended to read:
and as further amended by Proclamation in Govern­
ment Gazette Extraordinary No.12747 of 11 November 
1961,
2
and the debate continued. On 17 May 1961, the House of Repres­
entatives debated the following motion, although on that very day 
a fresh proclamation and fresh regulations had been made by the
of no-confidence in the Government for misuse of emergency powers: 
National State Assembly Debates, 8 March 1973, col.1117; (iii) dis­
cussion on adjournment motion of the emergency regulation relating 
to the ban on meetings of the United National Party: National State 
Assembly Debates, 8 May 1974, col.1623; (iv) debate on motion 
calling for the repeal of the emergency regulation relating to the 
closure of the Sun and Davasa newspapers: National State Assembly 
Debates, 4 September 1974, col.1730; (v) appointment of a parlia­
mentary committee to examine emergency regulations, and debate on 
adjournment motion on the release of persons on detention under 
emergency regulations: National State Assembly Debates, 23 December 
1976, col.2281.
1. Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 21 November 
1958, col.1898. See also ibid., 29 September 1961, col.863;
23 November 1961, col.1792; and 26 January 1966, col.1048.
2. Parliamentary Debates (Senate), 14 November 1961, col.1070.
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Governor-General:
That this House is of opinion that any direct­
ions given under paragraph 1 of Regulation 22 
of the Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and 
Powers) Regulation 1961, should be restricted 
to the Administrative Districts of Jaffna,
Vavuniya, Mannar, Trincomalee and Batticaloa, 
and that directions given by the Competent 
Authority published in Government Gazette No.
12,366 of 17 April 1961 should be amended acc­
ordingly, thereby affording complete freedom 
of publication in the other administrative 
areas.1
Thus, the fact that a proclamation made under section 2 remained 
in force for only a month has not prevented Parliament from 
debating the subject of the Emergency by way of a substantive 
motion.
c) The Public Security Ordinance, in the original form in which it 
was enacted in 1947, did not provide for any form of parliament­
ary control. There was no requirement that Parliament should 
even be notified of a proclamation made under that Ordinance.
The concept of parliamentary control was first introduced by the 
amending Act, No.22 of 1949. Nevertheless, both sections 3 and 
8 were in the original Ordinance. Therefore, there is no basis 
for the argument that the provisions of sections 3 and 8 "were 
based on the premise that the excesses or abuses of power vested 
in the executive . . . are within parliamentary control by the 
process of debate and discussion". Consequently, there is no 
basis for State Counsel’s submission, which the commission 
appears to have accepted, that "the denial of an opportunity to 
exercise the power vested in Parliament . . . invalidates the 
purposes of sections 3 and 8 in barring judicial review".
Therefore, in determining that, notwithstanding the provisions
of section 3 of the Public Security Ordinance, it was entitled to
examine whether a state of public emergency existed or was imminent
during the period March 1971 to February 1977, the commission had
clearly misdirected itself on the law. The correct position has
always been, as stated by Sharvananda J in Yasapala v. Wickrema- 
2
singhe, that the existence or inminence of a state of public 
emergency is not a justiciable issue.
1. Parliamentary Debates (Senate), 17 May 1961, c.6069.
2. Supra, p.415.
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Definition
A state of public emergency is not defined in the statute. 
Since the existence or imninence of a state of public emergency is 
not justiciable, the expression has not been judicially defined 
either. In the circumstances, the meaning to be given to this 
expression has to be sought by reference to State practice.
The immediate cause for making a proclamation under section 2, 
in respect of each of the fourteen continuous periods has already 
been noted. A proclamation remains in force only for a month, and 
when that month comes to an end, so do all the regulations and 
orders made by virtue of that proclamation. A fresh proclamation, 
even though made on the day following that on which the previous 
proclamation expired, is a separate and distinct act which may well 
have been motivated by altogether different considerations. Some­
times the Government has indicated that the "nature" or "character" 
of the emergency has undergone a change. At other times, the 
Government has not thought it necessary to take the public into 
its confidence, and has preferred to let both Parliament and the 
people speculate as to why a state of public emergency is considered 
to exist.
An examination of the reasons officially stated for invoking 
the Public Security Ordinance from time to time indicates that 
Governments have considered it proper and legitimate to use the 
extraordinary law-making powers contained in that Ordinance for the 
following purposes or for dealing with the following situations.
Threat to Security
1. Abortive coup d'etat. On 28 January 1962, the Ministry of
Defence and External Affairs issued the following communique:
On the night of Saturday the 27th January the 
Government received reliable information that 
certain senior Officers of the Police and Armed 
Forces had conspired to arrest some Ministers 
and other political leaders and to overthrow the 
Government. The arrests were scheduled to be made 
shortly after midnight on Saturday.
On receipt of the information the Government 
took immediate action and the plots of the cons­
pirators were completely foiled. Several officers 
were questioned in this connection and the inves­
tigations made have revealed a carefully planned 
coup d'etat.l
1. Ceylon Daily News, 29 January 1962.
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Having then mentioned the names of certain persons who had been 
taken into custody and were being detained under emergency regu­
lations, the communique added that:
The Government wishes to assure the public that 
the situation is well under control.
On the date of this comnunique, a state of emergency was
already in existence, precipitated some nine months previously
by a civil disobedience campaign in the North. However, this
abortive coup d'etat was clearly the dominant reason for its
renewal on 8 February 1962. Authority for the detention of the
suspects and for their questioning, as well as for the general
conduct of the investigation, was provided by a series of new
regulations.
On 13 February, in a statement made on behalf of the Cabinet,
Parliament was informed of the details of the alleged attempted
coup d'etat.^ Two days later, the Government tabled the Criminal Law
(Special Provisions) Bill which contained special provisions for the
trial of the persons accused of complicity in the attempted coup
d'etat. This bill was passed in the House of Representatives on
2 March, and by the Senate on 16 March. Meanwhile, an announcement
was made on 26 February that the Governor-General, Sir Oliver
2
Goonetilleke, was being replaced, and on 2 March, his successor, 
William Gopallawa, a kinsman of the Prime Minister, assumed office.
On 23 June, the Minister of Justice directed that the trial of the 
twenty-four persons accused of having attempted to overthrow the 
Government be held before the Supreme Court at Bar by three Judges 
without a jury, and nominated a bench comprising T.S.Fernando J,
3
L.B.de Silva J and Sri Skanda Rajah J. On 3 October, after
twenty-one days of argument, the Court upheld a defence contention
that section 9 of the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act which 
empowered the Minister to nominate the Court was ultra vires the 
Constitution, and that, accordingly, that Court, having been nominated
4
by the Minister, had no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial.
1. Supra, p.62.
2. In the Cabinet statement of 14 February, it was disclosed 
that certain suspects had alleged that the Governor-General had 
prior knowledge of the planned overthrow of the Government. Sir 
Oliver Goonetilleke was in fact questioned by the CID before he 
vacated office.
3. The document nominating the Judges is published as an appendix 
to the judgpnent in The Queen v. Liyanage (1962) 64 NLR 313.
4. Ibid.
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Meanwhile, on 30 August, in the House of Representatives, the 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister, Felix Dias Bandara- 
naike, declared that the Emergency will continue in force "as long 
as the coup case lasted". He explained that the fact that there 
was an Emergency on in January helped the Government to take 
immediate action to crush the attempted coup; "that action could 
not have been taken without the Emergency".^
No appeal was taken to the Privy Council against the judgment 
of the Supreme Court; instead, the power to constitute the Court 
was restored to the Chief Justice by the Criminal Law Act, No.31 
of 1962, which was passed in the House of Representatives on 9 Nov­
ember and by the Senate on 14 November. On the president of the
2
former Court, T.S.Fernando J, declining to serve, the Chief 
Justice nominated a bench of three Judges comprising L.B.de Silva J,
3
Herat J and Abeysundera J. This Court dissolved itself within 
half an hour of assembling when the Attorney-General brought it to 
their notice that one of the Judges, Abeysundera J, had as acting 
Attorney-General in March 1962 approved certain documents and 
tendered legal advice in connection with the investigation.^ A 
third bench was constituted by the Chief Justice comprising 
Sansoni J, H.N.G.Fernando J and L.B.de Silva J, and after a month 
of preliminary arguments, the trial proper commenced in April 1963.^ 
On 30 April 1963, the state of emergency was allowed to lapse.
1. Times of Ceylon, 31 August 1962.
2. It is understood that his decision was due to certain 
references made in the House of Representatives by an Opposition 
member, after judgment had been delivered, that the three Judges 
and the Minister all belonged to the same caste, and that the whole 
episode was a "fishy business", being also a reference to this caste. 
There was no response to these allegations from the Government front 
bench.
3. The third member of the original bench, Sri Skanda Rajah J, 
is believed to have been excluded by the Chief Justice since his- 
appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court was made consequent to 
an amendment to the Courts Ordinance increasing the strength of the 
Court from nine to eleven, made by the impugned Criminal Law (Spec­
ial Provisions) Act.
4. With the dissolution of each bench, the accused ceased to
be in fiscal's custody, and were therefore held on detention orders 
made under emergency regulations by the Permanent Secretary to 
the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs.
5. For preliminary orders, see 65 NLR 289, 73, and 337.
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2. "A conspiracy to overthrow the government". On 17 Feb­
ruary 1966, the chairman of a state corporation, former civil 
servant M.Chandrasoma, had disclosed to the Inspector General of 
Police that he had information of an attempt by "Rev. Gnanaseeha's 
boys and Mr.N.Q.Dias' boys"'*' to overthrow the Government by 
violence between then and the 22nd. Chandrasoma did not disclose 
the source of this information, but had later told the acting Head 
of the Government, J.R.Jayewardene, that he had received the infor­
mation from LSSP Senator Doric de Souza. Chandrasoma's statement
2
was recorded on 24 February, and De Souza's on 26 February. In
the Senate, a few days later, De Souza denied that he had conveyed
any information in regard to a planned coup d'etat:
According to the CID officers who questioned me, the 
basis of their interrogation was a conversation at a 
club. This conversation took place between four per­
sons - myself, the public servant referred to, and 
another gentleman and his wife. It took place while 
two persons were playing a game of chess and the other 
two - if I remember right - were trying to solve a 
crossword puzzle. The talk ranged, as it is apt to do 
under such circumstances, over a wide range of subjects 
and was desultory. I am not absolutely certain now 
about the sequence in which different topics were 
discussed.
However, at one stage the matter of a coup d'etat 
taking place at the rate of about two a week in Africa 
and other places came up for conment. Again, I chose 
to show off some recently acquired and ill-digested 
knowledge about astrology. I said that the sun had 
entered a new constellation on the 14th of February 
and that a number of planets were about to have a dog­
fight as a result and that, accordingly as the phrase 
goes, it was a 'bad time'. I added - this is not to 
be taken as a serious view - that no doubt the sudden 
departure of the Prime Minister to America was conn­
ected with the bad time, and that he would probably 
not return to Ceylon until the bad time was over.
I said that it was a funny thing that in Ceylon pred­
ictions about 'bad times' came true because bad people 
chose bad times to do bad things. I remember citing 
the case of Somarama who chose a 'bad time' for his 
criminal act.
1. These two persons, the former a politically active monk, and 
the latter a former Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Defence 
and External Affairs, were known at that time to be taking much 
interest in Buddhist activities among public servants and service 
personnel.
2. Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed to inquire into 
and report on the circumstances and causes which led to the deaths
of L.V.P.Podiappuhamy alias Dodampe Mudalali and Corporal S.K.P.
Tillekewardene, S.P.IV - 1977, at p.3.
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At some stage of the conversation I said that 
Emergencies were very dangerous things for the 
country, and that I had no doubt that certain 
persons, and notably the Honourable Minister of 
State, had various sinister plans to carry through 
during the Emergency if it went on much longer.
I said that it was quite possible that if the 
Emergency went on, not only would democracy be 
destroyed completely, but that we of the Opposi­
tion might be bumped off.
De Souza allged that he saw "one clear motive in this wanton action",
namely, "to drive a wedge between the Opposition parties". The
suggestion was that pro-SLFP elements had planned a coup and that
LSSP members had secretly denounced the plans in advance to the
Government.
A state of emergency had been declared on 8 January 1966 to
deal with public agitation against the presentation in Parliament
of regulations made under the Tamil Language (Special Provisions)
Act. It had been renewed on 8 February. Despite strict censorship
of the press, the pro-Government "Ceylon Daily News" gave wide
publicity in its issue of 24 February to what was described as a
"Dramatic Army Coup Plot". On the same day, Jayewardene confirmed
that "the Government had reliable information that violence was to
be committed against members of the Government and some members of 
2
the Opposition". On 4 March, the Special Branch of the CID was 
placed in charge of the investigation. On the same night, eight 
Army non-commissioned officers were brought to the Special Branch 
and, after being questioned, were served with detention orders made
3
under emergency regulations. In the next few weeks, several other 
NCOs and civilians were placed on detention. They were all prevented 
from having access to friends and relations or lawyers and were held
4
in solitary confinement under emergency regulations. It was clear, 
therefore, that the disturbances of 8 January having receded, the 
provisions of Part II were now being invoked for the purpose of 
facilitating the investigation into the alleged conspiracy to over­
throw the Government. The proclamations under section 2 continued
1. Ceylon Observer, March 1966 (date not available).
2. Ceylon Daily News, 25 February 1966.
3. The Queen v. Gnanaseeha Thero (1969) 73 NLR 154, at 163.
4. Ibid. See also letter from the Ceylon Branch of the 
International Commission of Jurists to the Prime Minister, The Sun, 
June 1966 (date not available).
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to be made until November 1966; the final one was allowed to 
lapse on 7 December 1966, five months after the magisterial inquiry 
into charges laid against twenty-eight persons in connection with 
this alleged conspiracy had begun.^
3. Insurgent Activity. On 17 March 1971, in a broadcast to 
the nation, the Prime Minister, Mrs.Bandaranaike, explained why she 
had advised the Governor-General to bring into operation the prov­
isions of Part II on the previous day. She said:
We have received and are receiving information from 
various sources, many of which have been on checking 
found to be correct, that a small minority of our 
population have banded themselves together in secret 
cells, and are making preparations to cause bloodshed 
and chaos in this country.
We are also aware that in several village areas 
where these secret cells have been formed, the local 
population have been terrorised and terrified into 
passive acquiescence of the preparations for violence.
The Government is also aware that those belonging to 
this Movement have been manufacturing as well as 
collecting arms, ammunition, and other deadly weapons 
such as hand bombs, in order to create chaos and 
confusion in the country, and to try and capture 
power, if possible, in the ensuing situation.
We have reason to believe that attempts are being 
made to cause destruction to communications and 
supplies and to spread terror by persons and groups
of persons whose object is to thwart the will of the
people as expressed in the outcome of the General 
Election of May 27, 1970. 2
The Prime Minister referred,in particular, to recent events such as 
the accidental explosion of a large cache of hand bombs in a hut in
Nelundeniya in the Dedigama electorate which killed five youths;
the discovery in a shrub jungle at Pindeniya of nine crates contain­
ing hand bombs; and the carefully planned attack on the United States
1. Of the twenty-eight persons, six were discharged in the course 
of the proceedings. Twenty-two were committed for trial, and these 
persons who included a Buddhist monk, a former army commander, one 
captain and nineteen non-commissioned officers, were tried before 
three Judges of the Supreme Court by a Sinhala-speaking jury (An 
attempt by the Crown to replace the Sinhal a-speaking jury for which 
the accused had opted with a Special Jury which was necessarily 
English-speaking, was rejected by the Supreme Court). When the Crown 
closed its case, several accused including the monk, the army comm­
ander and the single officer among them, were acquitted. At the end 
of the 374-day trial, the rest of the accused were all acquitted on
a unanimous verdict of the jury.
2. Sunday Observer, 18 March 1971.
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Embassy in Colombo which resulted in considerable damage to prop­
erty and the death of a police inspector. Six days later, she told 
the House of Representatives that:
Consequent to the declaration of the Emergency and 
the searching of various premises by the Police and 
the Armed Services, large quantities of explosives, 
firearms, uniforms and subversive literature, were 
traced. In some cases, even after the Emergency was 
declared, persons were caught in the act of manufact­
uring hand bombs. Explosives from governmental stores 
have been stolen. Sabotage to the high tension lines 
caused a power failure in Badulla. An explosion in 
the Peradeniya campus, damaging the roof of the Marrs 
Hall, brought the police into the premises and led to 
the discovery of hand bombs and large quantities of 
explosive material used in the manufacture of hand 
bombs. These and other revelations have amply justi­
fied the steps taken by my Government to prevent a 
violent attack on the organs of public life and the 
disruption of the life of the community. 1
Despite the pre-emptive action which the Government had attem­
pted to take, like a whiplash in all its fury, the storm broke upon 
the country on 5 April 1971. In the early hours of that day, the 
police station at Wellawaya, a remote fastness in the Uva mountain 
ranges, was subjected to an insurgent attack in which two police 
officers lost*their lives. That night, armed with shot guns, hand
bombs and locally made hand grenades, a massive attack was launched
2by insurgent groups on police stations throughout the country.
Between 5 April and 11 April, a total of ninety-three police stations
were attacked and overrun; thirty-five police station areas went
under insurgent control and in these provincial towns and villages
revolutionary government replaced the civil administration completely.
As the Prime Minister confessed:
On the 5th of April, the Government was militarily 
unprepared for the kind of concentrated armed 
attack that the terrorists launched . . . The 
Police and our Armed Services have been constituted 
and equipped to deal with basic internal security 
and to act to restore order in instances such as 
cases of riot and sporadic outbursts of civil 
commotion. They were not geared with the men and 
equipment to handle situations of such organised 
thoroughness and surprise in execution as the 
attacks launched by these insurgents. In fact, what
1. Statement made by the Prime Minister in the House of Repres­
entatives , 23 March 1971, reported in Ceylon Today, Vol.xx, Nos.3 
8c 4, at p.9.
2. Inquiry No.1/1977, Judgment of the Criminal Justice Commission 
(Insurgency), at p.407.
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was deliberately done over the years was to minimise 
expenditures on defence and divert resources from 
that sector to other sectors such as industry and 
agriculture. . . Therefore, on the 5th of April, we 
found that we had inadequate weapons, ammunition 
and aircraft to meet a sustained threat over a long 
period of time by these terrorist insurgents.1
However, urgent purchases of military equipment and the assistance
of several foreign governments helped the security forces to re-arm
themselves within a few weeks. Soon, they were able to move from
purely defensive action into the offensive. As the Prime Minister
explained:
Today, the whole country knows not only that the so- 
called one-day revolution has failed, but that it 
cannot hope to succeed. The terrorists have, by and 
large, run out of sources of supplies, ammunition, 
weapons and fuel. Even the vehicles that they managed 
to steal or capture in the first few days are now 
being left abandoned on the roads. In the Southern 
Province and in some villages in the North Western 
Province, terrorist insurgents who had made attempts 
to raid the food stocks of farmers have been dealt 
with by the farmers themselves. In a military sense 
now, the Government is in a position to launch an 
offensive, area by area, to clear up the pockets of 
insurgents who have taken to the hills and jungles 
and are now living by banditry.2
Before it launched a concerted offensive which "would mean that many
young people, on the threshold of their lives, will be killed or
3
maimed fighting for a cause that is already lost", the Prime Mini­
ster called upon them to lay down their arms and surrender. Arrange­
ments were made at kachcheris, divisional revenue offices, police 
stations and army stations throughout the country for insurgents to 
hand themselves in, alone or in groups of less than five, without 
carrying any weapons, between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m., from 1 May to 4 May, 
and from 7 June to 9 June, two periods that coincided with the 
Buddhist religious festivals of Wesak and Poson. This appeal was 
broadcast and also made known in thousands of pamphlets, signed by 
the Prime Minister, which were airdropped in the affected areas.
"No violence will be suffered by those who surrender", promised the 
Prime Minister; "once the insurrection is ended, as your Prime Mini-
4
ster, I can assure you I know how to be reasonable".
After the process of surrender had been completed, the security 
forces conducted a mopping-up operation. On 20 July 1971, it was.
1. Broadcast speech by the Prime Minister, reported in Ceylon 
Today, Vol.xx, Nos.3 and 4, at p.5.
2. Ibid., at 7. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid.
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possible for the Prime Minister to inform Parliament that:
I am now satisfied that the insurgency is broken 
and that, given the alertness on the part of the 
Security Services, it will not be possible for 
these insurgents to launch any concerted attack 
on Government authority. However, there could be 
for sometime a possibility of isolated attacks on 
institutions and individuals by certain desperate 
terrorist elements who have not yet been appre­
hended, so that we will have to continue to be 
vigilant. 1
When it was all over, it was not merely that a text-book plan for
the overthrow of a government had failed. Over 1200 people had been
2 3killed; twenty million rupees worth of property had been destroyed;
and a developing economy had been set back several years.
With the end of the combat phase, the Government continued to 
utilise the provisions of Part II to deal with another problem 
arising from the insurrection. On 5 April 1971, the total prison 
population in Ceylon, including remand prisoners, was 8228. This 
was more than double the number that could have been conveniently 
accommodated in the old, existing prisons. A new Government, barely 
ten months in office, was still devising ways in which to expedite 
the disposal of criminal trials and seeking alternatives to custodial 
treatment for first offenders and persons who had defaulted in the 
payment of fines; this latter category accounted for nearly one 
half of the total number of convicted prisoners. With the outbreak 
of the insurgency, the prison population nearly trebled. On 17 July 
1971, there were 14,446 suspected insurgents and 7,456 ordinary 
prisoners. Of the former, approximately 4200 had surrendered in 
response to the Prime Minister's appeal in May and June, and 77 were 
being held on detention orders. The total prison population was, 
therefore, 21,902. In anticipation of this problem, and to 
face it and deal with it in all its varied aspects, emergency regu­
lations had been made in April and May 1971 empowering the Permanent 
Secretary to the Ministry of Justice:
a) to designate any place to be a prison;^
1. State made by the Prime Minister in the House of Represent­
atives on 20 July 1971, reported in Ceylon Today,Vol.xx, Nos.7 & 8, 
at pp.6-7.
2. Ibid., at 5. The Prime Minister admitted that this figure is 
not "absolutely accurate", but was "based on the best available 
information as it is today".
3. Inquiry No.1/1977, op.cit., at 436.
4. On 15 May 1977, Fort Hammen Heil in Jaffna and the Vidyodaya
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b) to make rules on all or any of the matters on which under the 
Prisons Ordinance the Minister was authorised to make rules, 
and on any other matter relating to prisons or prisoners in 
respect of which the Permanent Secretary considered that rules 
were necessary or expedient;"^
c) to direct that all or any of the provisions of the Prisons 
Ordinance, or all or any of the rules made thereunder, shall 
not apply, or shall apply subject to modifications, to all or 
any categories of prisoners;^
d) to give special or general directions to a superintendent of a
prison to release from prison any person who is accused of a
bailable offence and is either remanded by court or ordered
bail but owing to his inability or otherwise to furnish bail,
3
is remanded by court;
e) to suspend, or remit the remaining portion of, the sentence of 
a convicted prisoner who has served a part of a sentence of 
imprisonment imposed by a court.^
and Vidyalankara Universities were designated as prisons. On 26 
August 1971, certain land and premises adjoining the Malwatu Oya 
in Anuradhapura, the Rajakiya Maha Vidyalaya in Polonnaruwa, the 
State Home for the Aged at Koggala, the Army Camp at Ridiyagama, 
and the Certified School at Senapura were designated as prisons.
On 6 November 1971, the former Tuberculosis Sanatorium at Wirawila, 
the former Malwatte Farm in Amparai and the Certified School at 
Keppitipola were designated as prisons. On 23 April 1972, the 
Government School in Karachchi in the Jaffna District was desig­
nated a prison.
1. The temporary conversion of schools, universities and other 
public buildings into prisons required new arrangements for admi­
nistration, accommodation, feeding, exercise, etc., and accordingly, 
new rules in respect of these matters.
2. This power was exercised, for instance, to regulate visits 
to prisoners. A remand prisoner was ordinarily entitled to receive 
one visit each day. But having regard to the numbers of suspected 
insurgents in custody, it was impossible to arrange for even one 
visit each week or, in the early stages, for one visit each month. 
Accordingly, the normal rule was applied only to ordinary prisoners 
awaiting trial. For security reasons, it also became necessary at
a certain stage to suspend the activities of Boards of Prison 
Visitors as well as visits to prisons by Members of Parliament.
3. As a rule, every person remanded in respect of a bailable 
offence was released from prison upon admission, on his entering 
into a bond with the superintendent of the prison to appear in 
court when required to do so. Failure to comply with this term of 
the bond was a non-bail able offence.
4. In order to make room in regular prisons, sentences on all 
categories of prisoners serving terms of imprisonment were, from 
time to;time, remitted. For instance, a long term prisoner would 
be released upon his entering the final year of his normal term of 
imprisonment.
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The presence of 14,000 young men and women in custody, many 
of whom were university students or graduates, was an investigator’s 
nightmare. They fell broadly into two categories: those who had 
been arrested in combat and those who had surrendered to the auth­
orities. The names and addresses of many of the arrested persons 
were not known even to the prison authorities, while less was known 
of those who had chosen to surrender. Many of the persons who had 
been arrested in combat had been taken in by the armed forces who 
had handed them over to the police who in turn had had them remanded 
by local magistrates. Many of these persons had given false names 
and addresses. Many of the army personnel who arrested them were 
later killed in action or wounded or transferred for action else­
where and were therefore not available for the purpose of making 
any statements. In regard to those who had surrendered, it was not 
even known why they had done so. On 1 May 1971, the Government 
established a special investigation unit under a retired Inspector 
General of Police who was recalled to service in the Ministry of 
Defence. The unit was manned by Crown Counsel and senior public 
servants who were assisted by officers of the regular police.'*'
Under an emergency regulation which enabled the powers of a police 
officer to be exercised by any person authorised by the Prime Mini­
ster in that behalf, police powers were conferred on these public 
officers to enable them to record statements and conduct other 
investigations. About two hundred other public officers of staff 
rank were briefed on 11 May and sent out to all the prisons in order 
to obtain information and statements (on a printed questionnaire) 
from persons in custody. After this exercise was over and the 
prisoners had been identified, the special investigation unit began 
its laborious task of isolating the prisoners into different cate­
gories on the basis of their degree of involvement as disclosed by 
them. Meanwhile, it became quite impracticable, by reason of the 
magnitude of the numbers, the lack of adequate transport facilities,
1. The public officers who were originally co-opted to this 
unit were the Additional Secretary to the Ministry of Constitutional 
Affairs, the Public Trustee, four Crown Counsel, the Director of 
Establishments, the Director of Combined Services, the Commissioner 
of Local Government, and the senior assistant secretary of the 
Ministry of Public Administration.
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the likelihood of the resulting confusion, and the then prevailing 
security situation, to produce the persons held in custody before 
the appropriate magistrates at intervals of fourteen days, as 
required by the Criminal Procedure Code. Accordingly, another 
emergency regulation was made:
a) providing that every such person shall continue to remain in 
prison custody until he is released upon an order made by the 
Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Justice;
b) requiring each magistrate to visit prisons, if any, situated 
within his jurisdictional area, at intervals of not more than 
fourteen days, to record any representations that may be made 
to him by any person held in custody in such prison, and to 
forward such record together with any observations that he may 
make thereon, to the Permanent Secretary.
On the material gathered, the prisoners were identified into 
the following five categories: (1) those who had been arrested on 
suspicion and against whom there was no evidence; (2) those who had 
attended lectures for the purpose of joining the insurgent movement, 
but who claimed not to have participated in any other insurgent 
activity; (3) those who admitted to participating in insurgent 
activity but claimed they had done so involuntarily or on compulsion;
(4) those against whom there was evidence of serious involvement in 
the insurgency; and (5) those who constituted the leadership of the 
insurgent movement, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (the Peoples' 
Liberation Front). It was decided by the Government that persons 
belonging to the first three categories should be released progress­
ively, subject to surveillance, and in such numbers at a time as 
not to create any security problems in the areas to which they 
returned. To enable their executive release, an emergency regulation 
was made empowering the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of 
Justice to release from custody, subject to such terms or conditions 
as the Permanent Secretary may specify, any person held in custody 
in any prison (whether upon an order of remand made by a magistrate 
or by reason of his having surrendered voluntarily) and suspected 
or accused of an offence under the Explosives Act, the Offensive 
Weapons Act, the Firearms Ordinance, or under chapters VI, VII or 
VIII of the Penal Code (offences against the State), or under any
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emergency regulation.^ By July 1971, 6,251 of the prisoners had
2
been processed and 2,020 had been recommended for release. By 
August 1971, 8,763 had been processed and 3,127 recommended for
3
release. By October 1971, 2,271 of those recommended for release
4 5had in fact been released. By May 1972, 2,726 had been released.
By March 1973, 14,470 had been released; of them 12,103 were
reporting regularly either to the local police or the divisional
revenue officer. By August 1973, the total number of insurgent
suspects held in custody had come down to 1201. On 15 September
1973, only 119 remained to be processed.^
1. The conditions usually attached to release orders were:
i. that he shall report immediately after his release to 
the Divisional Revenue Officer (who was also the chairman of the 
local rehabilitation vigilance committee), and continue to so report 
once every week on a date and at a time specified by the DRO;
ii. that he shall, if so required by the DRO, give a full 
and true account of his activities for the period required by the 
DRO;
iii. that he shall keep the DRO informed of his residence, 
whether permanent or temporary, and every change thereof;
iv. that he shall abstain from any violation of the law; 
v. that he shall not associate with persons belonging to 
any proscribed organisation or with persons involved in any form of 
subversive activity against the duly constituted Government of 
Ceylon or with persons of notoriously bad character;
vi. that he shall appear in court whenever he may be 
required to do so by or upon the order of a judicial officer.
In the case of certain categories of prisoners released, the 
officer-in-charge of the nearest police station was substituted for 
the DRO. A further condition was that "he shall not leave or 
attempt to leave the police area in which he resides without the 
permission of the OIC".
The release was made subject to the person concerned 
entering into a bond without sureties for the performance of the 
terms and conditions set out above. Under emeregency regulations, 
the failure to conform to or comply with the above terms and 
conditions was an offence punishable with rigorous imprisonment 
for a term not less than three months and not exceeding five years 
and with a fine not less than Rs.500 and not exceeding Rs.5,000.
2. Minutes of the discussion held at Temple Trees on 12 July 
1971 relating to the investigation of insurgent activities and allied 
security matters.
3. Letter dated 1 August 1971 from the Minister of Public Admin­
istration to the Prime Minister.
4. Letter dated 9 October 1971 from the Permanent Secretary to 
the Ministry of Justice to the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry 
of Defence and External Affairs.
5. Letter dated 3 May 1972 from the Comnisacrer of Prisons to the 
Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Justice.
6. Letters dated 20 August and 27 August 1973 from the Asst.
Addl. Secretary, Ministry of Defence to the Permanent Secretary to 
the Ministry of Justice.
7. Ibid., 13 September 1973.
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In regard to the trial of persons classified into (4) and
(5) above, the Attorney-General advised the Government that:^
A large scale conspiracy was afoot between 1968 and 
1971 for the overthrow of the legally constituted 
government by use of criminal force. This conspiracy 
culminated in widespread overt acts of violence 
. which commenced on 5 April 1971. The conspiracy 
itself consisted of plans -
i. to launch simultaneous attacks on police stations 
in all or nearly all parts of the island; 
ii. to take into custody all Ministers, including the 
Prime Minister, the Service Chiefs and the IGP; 
iii. to set up their own administration in various 
parts of the island; 
iv. to disable Navy personnel and to attack Panagoda 
Cantonment, Katunayake Air Force Base, and Naval 
Headquarters in Colombo.
The overt acts consisted largely of -
i. attacks on police stations; 
ii. an attempt to rescue one Rohana Wijeweera, suspec­
ted to be the leader of the movement, from the 
Jaffna Prison; 
iii. damaging or destroying or attempting to damage 
public property such as government or semi­
government buildings, bridges, culverts, telephone 
communications, postal services, etc; 
iv. actual instalment of rebel administration in 
certain areas of the country, namely, Elpitiya,
Deniyaya, Anuradhapura and Kegalle.
Of the 16,000 then in custody, the Attorney-General was of the view
that the material gathered in the course of the investigations
pointed to only about 8,000 of them having been involved in the
commission of offences. In regard to the balance, he was of the
view that there was no material on which any court could have been
invited to hold them guilty of any offence. The offences committed
appeared to be:
i. waging war against the Queen or attempting to 
wage war against the Queen (s. 114 of the Penal 
Code, punishable with death, imprisonment up to 
twenty years and forfeiture of property);
ii. conspiracy to wage war against the Queen (s.115
of the Penal Code, punishable with imprisonment
up to twenty years);
iii. preparing to wage war against the Queen (s. 116
of the Penal Code, punishable with imprisonment
up to twenty years and forfeiture of property);
iv. murder, robbery, mischief, trespass, unlawful 
assembly and offences against persons and prop­
erty or incidental to the main design of waging 
war against the Queen.
1. Report dated 1 February 1972 from the Attorney-General to 
the Minister of Justice.
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In the Attorney-General' s view, having regard to the nature of the
evidence available, "it [was] impossible to proceed under the
ordinary law to secure the conviction of the guilty". Having
considered whether "new tribunals governed by new rules of procedure
and new rules of evidence" should be set up, the Attorney-General
concluded that this too would be impractical since "the factual
position is that we have here one conspiracy, one common design
which was put into execution. Logically, there must be one joint
prosecution. However, that is out of the question in view of the
large numbers involved". The third alternative which the Attorney-
General invited the Government to consider was the constitution of
a judicial commission with punitive powers:
What is contemplated is a commission acting in much 
the same way as a commission of inquiry untrammeled 
by strict codified rules of procedure and evidence.
Such a commission will have the power to look at all 
material of probative value and even to question a 
person whose conduct is under investigation. It will 
have power, after serving a set of charges on a 
particular person and giving him every opportunity 
of defending himself, as required by rules of natural 
justice, to acquit him or to convict him of the 
charges and to pronounce appropriate sentence on him 
if convicted. The standard of proof will of course 
remain, viz., proof beyond reasonable doubt. The 
main endeavour should, of course, be to render 
impossible the conviction of any possibly innocent 
person.
On 2 February 1972, on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice, 
the Cabinet adopted in principle the third alternative suggested by 
the Attorney-General. On 15 March, the Cabinet approved the draft 
Criminal Justice Commissions Bill. It was passed by Parliament on 
5 April.
The Criminal Justice Commissions Act, No. 14 of 1972, provided 
that the Governor-General may, whenever he was of opinion that the 
practice and procedure of the ordinary courts were inadequate for 
the trial of offences committed in connection with a rebellion or 
insurrection or in relation to currency or foreign exchange, appoint 
a commission with "power and jurisdiction for the inquiry into 
crimes and offences committed throughout Ceylon of the description 
or character set out in the warrant establishing the commission, and 
for determining whether any person is or is not guilty of any offence
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and to pass sentence on any person so found guilty".^ Such a 
commission, which was deemed to be a superior court of record 
whose findings were final and conclusive and not subject to review, 
would consist of at least three Judges of the Supreme Court nomin­
ated by the Chief Justice. The proceedings at any inquiry before 
a commission were to be free of the formalities and technicalities 
of the rules of procedure and evidence ordinarily or normally 
applicable to a court of law, and were to be conducted in any 
manner not inconsistent with the principles of natural justice,
which to the commission seemed best adapted to elicit proof
concerning the matters that were being investigated. On the 
subject of custody, the Act provided, inter alia, that:
1. Any person held in custody in any prison upon 
the order of a magistrate at the time of the 
establishment of a Commission and suspected or 
accused of any offence which may be the subject 
of any inquiry before the Commission under this
Act shall continue to remain in such custody,
until he is released upon an order made by the 
Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Justice.
2. Where a person is in custody by reason of his 
having surrendered himself into the custody of 
any authority, at the time of the establishment 
of a Commission or thereafter, such person shall 
continue to remain in custody, until he is rel­
eased upon an order made by the Permanent Secre­
tary to the Ministry of Justice.2
These two provisions, therefore, made the emergency regulations 
unnecessary or irrelevant, in so far as the custody of persons who 
were likely to be brought to trial in connection with the insurrec­
tion were concerned.^
On 16 May 1972, the Governor-General established a Criminal 
Justice Commission to inquire into offences committed in connect­
ion with the insurrection of April 1971. This commission which 
consisted of five Judges of the Supreme Court, commenced its public 
sittings on 12 June 1972, and concluded its first inquiry relating 
to the politbureau of the insurgent movement on 20 December 1974.
On 11 Septemiber 1975, this commission was replaced by two other 
commissions consisting of three Judges each. On 24 March 1976, a
1. S.5. The commission could not, however, impose sentence of 
death.
2. Ss. 14(2)(a), 14(3).
3. For a criticism of the concept of a criminal justice commiss­
ion, see Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Sri Lanka, 
9-15 January 1975, 2nd ed. (London, 1975).
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a third commission consisting of three Judges was established.
By November 1976, the tasks assigned to the Criminal Justice Comm­
issions were practically over. 140 inquiries had been held at 
which 3,014 suspects were tried,^ and dealt with in the following 
manner:
Convicted and sentenced to rigorous
2
imprisonment ... 390
Convicted and sentenced to simple
imprisonment ... 3
Convicted and released on suspended
sentences of imprisonment ... 2492
Acquitted / Discharged ... 104
Charges withdrawn ... 25
Having regard to the fact that "the insurgency was broken" 
by July 1971, and that the appropriate legislation for the detention 
and trial of persons concerned with the insurgency had been enacted 
by April 1972, was it necessary to have kept bringing Part II into 
operation, month after month, until February 1977 ? The executive 
release of arrested and surrendered suspects, which was effected by 
emergency regulations, was also virtually over by September 1973; 
in any event, there was no legal impediment to their release being 
regulated by statute rather than by emergency regulations, particu­
larly since the Government then commanded a sufficient majority in 
the legislature to pass laws which were inconsistent with the 
Constitution. No explanation was offered by the Government for the 
continued state of public emergency. However, emergency regulations 
were utilised in 1974 to deal with political agitation, coupled with 
a threat of a civil disobedience campaign, by the United National
3
Party. They were also extensively applied to the "liberation
1. 3,908 suspects had been sumnoned to appear before the commi­
ssion, but owing to premature executive releases, 894 did not-present 
themselves for trial.
2. The sentences imposed were as follows:
Seven years ... 24 
Eight " ... 9
Ten " ... 3
Twelve " ... 4
Twenty " ... 1
Life ... 5
One year ... 2
Two M ...156
Three " ...80
Four " ...53
Five " ...39
Six " ...14
Infra, p.481.
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struggle" in the North, "a part of the island where there prevailed
a brazen disregard of the law and public property was wilfully
destroyed by the enemies of peace and order".^ The Sansoni Comnis-
sion, which was appointed by the UNP Government in 1977, described
the "steady growth of lawlessness which appeared to be leading to
something approaching anarchy" in the Northern Province in the years
1972-1977 in the following terms:
Hand bombs were being manufactured and used to cause 
destruction; firearms were used for the murder or 
attempted murder of political opponents and inconven­
ient witnesses of crimes; burglaries were committed 
in order to collect the weapons and ammunition; public 
property was attacked and damaged merely because the 
Government was unpopular with a certain section of the 
community, although it was a lawfully and constitu­
tionally appointed government of the entire island; 
youths in their twenties wielded arms to dispose of 
persons whose views did not coincide with their own, 
and robbed banks to obtain funds to buy such arms; 
inflammatory and abusive speeches were made on public 
platforms against the Government and the police; 
hunger strikes scheduled to last a few hours were 
staged even in the premises of the courts of law, 
disrupting the work of the judges; and school children 
were mobilised to join these law breaking crowds who 
staged their frequent hartals, and were thus inducted 
into politics under c o m p u l s i o n .  ^
Assuming then that the state of emergency was continued in order to 
deal with the violent separatist demands which were being made in 
the North, its continued existence was nevertheless availed of by 
the Government for a number of non-emergency purposes. In other 
words, it had become a convenient form of government. The regulat­
ions which are classified below are often self-explanatory.
TABLE 27
USE OF EMERGENCY REGULATIONS 
FOR NON-EMERGENCY PURPOSES
1971-1977
Purpose Regulation
Law enforcement Emergency (Protection of Public Property 
Regulation 
Emergency (Release on Bail) Regulation 
Emergency (Protection of State Officers) 
Regulation
1. Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the 
incidents which took place between 13 August and 15 September 1977,
S.P.VII-1980, at p.39. 2. Ibid., at p.274.
440
Purpose 
Public administration
Conduct of elections
Relief to workers
Economic Development
Regulation
Food Control Regulations 
Firearms Ordinance (Amendment) Regulat­
ion
Emergency (Protection of Company 
Estates) Regulation 
Emergency (Paddy Lands) Regulation 
Emergency (Coconut Products) Regulation 
Holidays Act (Amendment) Regulation 
Emergency (Requisitioning of Bakeries) 
Regulation 
Emergency (Weights and Measures) Regu­
lation ,
Maha Jana Pola (Colombo) Regulation 
Emergency (Fuel Conservation-Five Day 
Week) Regulation 
Emergency (Ceylon Broadcasting Corpor­
ation) Regulation 
Suspension of Employees of Public Corp­
orations Regulation 
Emergency (Stoppage of Emoluments to 
Service Personnel) Regulation
Local Authorities (Postponement of 
Elections) Regulation
Emergency (Plantation Workers' Additional 
Special Allowance) Regulation 
Emergency (Estate Workers Guaranteed 
Minimum Wage) Regulation 
Emergency (Tea Estate Workers' Wage 
Supplement) Regulation 
Emergency (Private Sector) Additional 
Allowance Regulation 
Emergency (Payment of Gratuities and 
Other Monetary Benefits to Indian 
Repatriates) Regulation 
Emergency (Private Sector) Special 
Allowance Regulation 
Emergency (Textile Manufacturing Trade 
Workers' Minimum Monthly Rate of Wage) 
Regulation
Emergency (Cultivation of Food Crops) 
Regulation 
Prohibition of Slaughter of Buffaloes 
Regulation 
Animals Act (Amendment) Regulation 
Emergency (Animal Trespass) Regulation 
Essential Services Order
1. Maha Jana Pola was a weekend bazaar.
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Public Disorder
1. Communal Riots. By proclamation dated 27 May 1958, the
provisions of Part II were brought into operation. A week later,
M.W.H.de Silva,Q.C., Minister of Justice, read out in the Senate
a "statement from the police" on the facts and circumstances leading
to the declaration of a state of emergency. The following portions
of that statement describe the state of public disorder that preceded
the proclamation:
Hon.Senators are all aware of the anti-Sri campaign 
which had been started in the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces. Hon.Senators are also aware of the steps 
taken by some people in the South, by the Sinhalese 
particularly, with regard to the anti-anti-Sri 
campaign where they obliterated Tamil lettering on 
buses with tar. No actual violence to persons took 
place in those campaigns. They were conducted undoubt­
edly with a certain amount of bitterness, but without 
harm to persons.
This campaign led to an attack by certain Tamil 
persons on a Sri bus at Bogawantalawa. The bus was 
brought to the police station on which an attack 
was made, and as a result the police opened fire and 
two Tamils were shot dead. This was followed by two 
Tamils at Kahawatte stabbing and killing two Sinha­
lese, with the result that looting and burning of 
Tamil boutiques took place in Sinhalese areas.
Subsequently, on 3 April, a Sinhalese man was 
killed by stoning in Hatton, and the anti-Sri camp­
aign was launched in the Eastern Province. Unfortun­
ately, at this time, a leaflet was published and 
distributed by the 'Action Conmittee of Campaign of 
National Freedom'. These leaflets were distributed 
by Buddhist monks, and Tamils were given three 
months to leave Sinhalese areas. On 6 April, a public 
meeting was held at which Rev. Mirisse Chandrajothi 
presided. That public meeting demanded the abrogation 
of the Pact between the Prime Minister and Mr .Che 1- 
vanayakam, and urged the Sinhalese to fight the 
Federal Party and the anti-Sri campaign. On 9 April, 
the Prime Minister declared in the House of Repres­
entatives. that the implementation of the Pact was 
not possible due to these various activities.
On 10 April, one Sirisoma Ranasinghe, with the encour­
agement of the United National Party, formed what is 
called the Sinhala Arakshaka Hamudawa [Army for the 
Protection of the Sinhalese]. Leaflets were printed 
and distributed by this organisation to rise and 
fight the Tamils. From that date onwards, police 
started taking action against persons for tarring 
buses in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
On 11 April, a public meeting was held at Nugegoda 
presided over by the Chairman of the Urban Council,
Kotte. The object of that meeting was to boycott 
Tamil boutiques and to get Sinhalese landlords to 
eject Tamil tenants. Also, K.M.P.Rajaratna started 
his Jatika Vimukti Peramuna [National Liberation 
Front], an organisation of extremists to fight Tamils.
In the meantime, the anti-Sri campaign continued, 
while the tarring campaign by the Sinhalese was dying 
down.
On 14 April, a Sinhalese man was murdered by Tamils 
in Trincomalee. The motive was communal. This led to 
tension and to two or three incidents at Trincomalee. 
After this, there was constant agitation for the boycott 
of Tamils by Sinhalese. Several meetings were held in 
all parts of the Island, predominantly Sinhalese, but 
there was no trouble or violence.
On 24 April, K.M.P.Rajaratna started the anti-anti- 
Sri campaign in Welimada. This led to trouble and a 
case of unlawful assembly and rioting in Welimada town. 
Repercussions were evident in the looting of Tamil line 
rooms in two estates in the area. After these events, 
the situation eased considerably and everything was, 
more or less, normal.
On 15 May, a Sinhalese boutique keeper was shot dead 
by Tamils at Chenkaladi in Eravur area: tension rose.
On 18 May, Sirisoma Ranasinghe visited Vavuniya, 
Padaviya and Polonnaruwa with five others to enrol 
volunteers in the Sinhala Arakshaka Hamudawa and to 
organise a counter march to Vavuniya against the 
Federal Party Convention fixed for 23, 24, and 25 May 
at Vavuniya.
On 20 May, there was unrest in Giritale area. Tamils 
complained of threats by Sinhalese.
On the night of 22 May, the night train from Batti- 
caloa was attacked by a large crowd of Sinhalese at 
Kaduruwela. The object was to prevent the Federal Party 
volunteers from travelling to Vavuniya. Only one Muslim 
and one Tamil were in the train; both of them were 
assaulted. The police party was stoned.
On 23 May, the Batticaloa train was derailed two 
miles out of Batticaloa. Police Sergeant Appuhamy and 
Constable Paramasingham died; one Sinhalese civilian 
also died.
On 24 May, the Sinhalese in Polonnaruwa and Giritale 
were active against the Tamils. Vehicles on roads were 
stopped and Tamils were assaulted. ASP Mr.John Pillai, 
travelling to Batticaloa by car, was assaulted and 
stabbed seriously at Giritale. At 10.30 pm., D.A.Sene- 
viratne, ex-Mayor of Nuwara Eliya, was shot dead at 
Eravur. The road was obstructed and the police party 
was shot at when going for inquiry.
On 25 May, a lorry and car were dynamited at Eravur. 
Constable 1899, Perera, of Depot Police, who was on leave, 
and two other Sinhalese were killed. Trouble broke out in 
Colombo at about 10 am, when the news of the deaths of
443
Mr .Seneviratne and Sergeant Appuhamy appeared in the 
papers. Tamils were attacked all over, and rioting, 
looting and murder spread rapidly in Colombo and out- 
stations.
On 26 May, the situation in Polonnaruwa, Hingurak- 
goda and vicinity was getting out of hand. Police 
opened fire and four died in all. Police in Colombo 
were also compelled to open fire on this day but 
there were no casualties. The position in the Ratma- 
lana and the Kalutara areas deteriorated rapidly.
Police opened fire at Panadura. Batticaloa district 
reported many incidents of attacks on Sinhalese. The 
Police and the Army were also fired on in that area.
Looting, arson and murder were rampant and the sit­
uation was getting out of control.
On 27 May, a state of emergency was declared.
Subsequent to the state of emergency being declared, 
there was further rioting and further murders. 1
That the Government should have invoked the provisions of Part 
II to deal with the state of public disorder which then existed,
was not disputed by anyone. Indeed, the complaint made by many at
that time was that Prime Minister Bandaranaike had hesitated for too 
long, and was at least twenty-four hours too late, in declaring a 
state of emergency.
Once declared, the Emergency was availed of for another 
purpose. On 4 June 1958, as they left the Parliament building after 
attending a special session which had been convened following the 
declaration of the state of emergency, detention orders were served 
on Members of Parliament belonging to the Federal Party and the 
Jatika Vimukti Peramuna. On 17 July, the Tamil Language (Special 
Provisions) Bill was presented by the Prime Minister in the House 
of Representatives. On 5 August, after the remaining Opposition 
members had refused to participate in the debate, the Bill was 
read a second and third time and passed. After a two-day debate, 
it was passed by the Senate on 3 September. On 4 September, the 
detention orders were revoked. The conclusion is irresistible that 
the Public Security Ordinance, having been validly invoked, had 
then been utilised for a wholly questionable purpose.
2. Assassination of the Prime Minister. On 25 September 1959, 
at about 10 a.m., at his residence in Colombo, Prime Minister 
Bandar anaike was shot at repeatedly by a Buddhist monk. He was rushed 
to the General Hospital where an emergency operation was performed
1. Parliamentary Debates (Senate), 4 June 1958, col.5.
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on him. The Governor-General, Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, who at that
time was at Queen's House accepting the credentials of a new
ambassador, hurried to the hospital as soon as he heard the news
of the shooting.
Donning a surgeon's mask, he went into the theatre.
Bandaranaike, though in great pain, was cheerful and 
greeted him with the words: 'How interesting you look,
Sir, in that disguise'. He was a brave man indeed, says 
Sir Oliver, so to jest in the face of death. He bent 
over him and in a whisper suggested that he should 
advise the proclamation of a 'state of emergency', 
since the most stringent measures would be necessary 
to prevent violent reaction in a land where Buddhist 
monks were many and one of them had shot and wounded 
a very popular Prime Minister. Bandaranaike readily 
accepted the suggestion and Sir Oliver went off to 
see to the preparation of the necessary legal instru­
ments. He knew that the Prime Minister, even in his 
agony, would be afraid that his vast multitude of 
followers might in their anger embark on reprisals 
against Buddhist monks in general.^
This account written ten years later by Sir Charles Jeffries, the
biographer of Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, is the only record available
of the circumstances in which a state of emergency was declared on
that day. Before his operation, Bandaranaike issued the following
statement from the General Hospital. In it he made no reference to
the state of emergency:
A foolish man, dressed in the robes of a bhikku, fired 
some shots at me at my bungalow this morning. I appeal 
to all concerned to show compassion to this man and not 
to try to wreak vengeance on him. I appeal to the people 
of my country to be restrained and to be patient at this 
time. With the assistance of my doctors I shall make 
every endeavour to be able to continue such services as 
I am able to render my people. I appeal to all to be 
calm, patient and do nothing that will cause trouble to 
the people. To those closely connected with me, to Mrs. 
Bandaranaike and my children, to the members of the 
Government and all my friends and well-wishers I make 
a particular appeal to be calm and to face the present 
situation with courage and fortitude.^
Sir Oliver's biographer has, however, quoted further Sir Oliver's
own words on this matter:
The wide publicity given to that appeal on the govern­
ment radio and in the press and the swift declaration 
of a state of emergency prevented any kind of public
1. Sir Charles Jeffries, PEG - A biography of Sir Oliver Ernest 
Goonetilleke (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969),at p.142.
2. Ibid., at 143. See also Times of Ceylon, 25 September 1959.
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disturbance. But the declaration of an emergency 
had a piquant sequel. One cabinet minister had 
seen in the declaration a deep-laid plot for me 
to take over the government and introduce a 
dictatorial Governor-General's rule. So he had 
hurried to the hospital and approached the oper­
ating table carrying a placard containing the 
query: 'Did you advise an Emergency ?' The Prime 
Minister, still conscious, had nodded an affirm­
ation to this peculiar Doubting Thomas.^
Bandaranaike died early next morning. A few hours after his 
death, W.Dahanayake, Minister of Education and acting Leader of the 
House, was appointed Prime Minister. In one of the first emergency 
regulations made, the death penalty for murder which had been 
suspended for three years by Act of Parliament only in the previous 
year, was restored. A series of bizarre events took place there- 
after. As speculation about the identity of Bandaranaike's 
assassins reached fever pitch, and it was openly insinuated that
3
people in very high places were privy to the conspiracy, a rigorous 
press censorship was introduced by emergency regulation, covering 
a variety of subjects including news of the murder probe. Two weeks 
later, under heavy pressure from the government parliamentary group, 
the censorship regulation was revoked and a woman Cabinet Minister 
who was a close associate of two suspects already in custody, was
4
removed from office. Four weeks later, this ex-Minister and the 
brother of another Minister were arrested in connection with the 
assassination conspiracy.^ Finally, left with no alternative but 
to dissolve Parliament due to a rapid erosion of support in both 
Houses, Prime Minister Dahanayake revoked the state of emergency on 
3 December 1959.
1. Ibid., at 144.
2. For instance, the Prime Minister sacked ten of his Ministers; 
the government parliamentary party expelled the Prime Minister; a 
new Ministry of Internal Security was established with the brother 
of a suspect already in custody as Permanent Secretary; and a 
former Attorney-General was brought down from London to advise on 
the assassination investigation, and on his advice the ex-Minister 
and the brother of a Minister were both discharged.
3. See, for example, speech of Senator A.T.A.De Souza, Parlia­
mentary Debates (Senate), 2 October 1959, cols.328-340.
4. Mrs Vimala Wijewardene, Minister of Health: Ceylon Daily 
News, 21 October 1959.
5. 'Dicky' de Zoysa, brother of Stanley de Zoysa, Minister of 
Finance: Observer, 19 November 1959.
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3. Terrorist Activity. On 3 July 1979, President Jayewardene 
briefed his parliamentary group on the action which the Government 
intended to take with regard to the movement for the division of 
the country and the terrorist activities directed towards the achi­
evement of a separate Tamil State, and announced that special legis­
lation to combat terrorism would be intriduced.'*' On 12 July, the 
Government declared a state of emergency in the Jaffna district and 
the precincts of the Ratmalana and Katunayake airports in Colombo. 
According to Trade Minister Athulathmudali, the reason for this step 
was "terrorist activity":
Frightful murders were committed there, especially 
of police officers. . . One could not get a witness 
to speak because witnesses were frightened of the 
terrorists. Terrorism was more than a crime. It was 
frightening people into silence.^
By emergency regulations, arson was made punishable with death.
Provisions in the law requiring arrested persons to be produced
before a magistrate within twenty-four hours, and an inquest to be
held before the burial or cremation of a person who had died suddenly,
were suspended. Censorship was introduced, public meetings and the
distribution of leaflets banned, and civil disobedience in any form
3
prohibited. On 19 July, the Prevention of Terrorism Bill was
introduced in Parliament and passed as legislation urgent in the
national interest. Meanwhile, the commander of the security forces
in the Jaffna district was authorised by the President:
to eliminate in accordance with the laws of the land 
the menace of terrorism in all its forms . . .  I will 
place at your disposal all resources of the State.
. . . This task has to be performed by you and 
completed before the 31st December 1979.4
The task was presumably completed to the President's satisfaction
because the emergency was withdrawn on 27 December.
4. Police Rampage. Elections to District Development Councils 
were scheduled to be held in seventeen districts, including Jaffna, 
on 3 June 1981. On 2 June, a state of emergency was declared in the 
Jaffna district, with press censorship and a curfew from 5 p.m. to
6 a.m.^ On the previous night, a section of the police had "gone
1. Ceylon Daily News, 4 July 1979.
2. Ibid., 13 July 1979.
3. Ibid.
4. Special Direction to Brigadier T.I.Weeratunge from J.R.Jaye­
wardene, President of the Republic: Weekend, 15 July 1979.
5. Ceylon Daily News, 3 June 1981.
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on the rampage in Jaffna, looting, setting fire and destroying the 
Public Library, the party headquarters of the TULF, the house of 
the MP for Jaffna, a number of shops, buildings and vehicles".^ At 
the close of the poll, the returning officer reported to the Comm­
issioner of Elections that "the election had not been properly 
conducted" : the senior polling officers had been replaced by 
government party supporters; ballot boxes had been tampered with; 
one polling station had no ballot box at all; six ballot boxes were
missing; a ballot box was found in a hotel room occupied by two 
2
Ministers. The counting of the votes was delayed by over a fort­
night, yet when the results were eventually announced, the TULF had 
polled 263,369 as against 23,302 by the UNP.^
5. Communal Disturbances. On 17 August 1981, a state of 
emergency was declared. According to a government communique:
This decision is a sequel to a large number of inci­
dents in several parts of the island, particularly 
in Ratnapura and Negombo. Within the last ten days, 
seven deaths by violence, 196 incidents of arson, 
and 35 incidents of looting have been reported by 
the police. . . .  It has also been reported that 
there has been damage to estates and estate property, 
particularly in the Ratnapura district.^
The Government also released a letter addressed to the President by 
the Leader of the Opposition, TULF leader Amirthalingam, in which 
he requested the former "to take immediate action to put a stop to 
attacks on Tamil people and to safeguard their life, limbs and prop­
erty".^ Previously, on 12 August, the President had invoked Part III 
and called out the armed services for the maintenance of order, and 
imposed curfews in Kelaniya, Ragama and Negombo. It was believed 
that these incidents had been sparked off by a debate in Parliament 
on a strange and unusual motion expressing no-confidence in the 
Leader of the Opposition, and the subsequent widespread distribution 
throughout Sinhalese areas of inflamnatory speeches made on that
1. Motion of no-confidence in the Government, introduced by the 
Leader of the Opposition, dated 12 June 1981: Ceylon Daily News,
2 July 1981.
2. Ibid.
3. Ceylon Daily News, 17 June 1981.
4. Ibid., 18 August 1981.
5. Ibid., 17 August 1981.
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occasion by Cyril Mathew, Minister of Industries, and other govern­
ment members. In fact, the President himself later made a pointed 
reference to this:
I regret that some members of my party have spoken in 
Parliament and outside, words that encourage violence 
- and the murders, rapes and arson that have been comm­
itted. 1
The death penalty was prescribed by emergency regulations, not only
for arson and looting, but also for the unauthorised possession of
arms, ammunition, explosives and offensive weapons in the districts
2
of the Northern Province.
While the declaration of the Emergency appeared to have been 
justified, the same cannot be said of its subsequent use for unrel­
ated purposes. For instance, on 19 August, acting under an emergency 
regulation, the Government requisitioned the six-storeyed headquar­
ters of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. The Secretary to the Cabinet 
explained that:
The Government intervention was intended to prevent 
a breach of the peace, and took into consideration 
two government concerns, the CWE and the People's 
Bank, who were tenants in the building.3
The requisition order also covered the building where the opposition 
party's official organ, "Dinakara", was being printed. The allusion 
to a possible breach of the peace was a reference to a dispute 
within the SLFP between its leader, Mr s. Bandar anaike, and its deputy 
leader, Maithripala Senanayake, who had been suspended from member­
ship of the party. In Parliament, the Prime Minister denied that 
the Government was seeking to create further confusion within the 
SLFP by its action: "The main purpose of the requisitioning order
4
was to let the CWE and the Bank function normally", he asserted.
It had not been suggested publicly by either of these institutions 
that its ordinary commercial activities in the building were in any 
way affected by the dispute in the upper echelons of the SLFP; nor 
were any signs of interference evident. In any event, both insti­
tutions were corporate bodies with the capacity and the resources
1. Address to the UNP All-Island Executive Committee, reported 
in The Sun, 5 September 1981.
2. Ceylon Daily News, 26 August 1981.
3. Sun, 20 August 1981.
4. Ibid., 22 August 1981.
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to look after their own interests. On 9 December, nearly three 
months later, the Government revoked the requisitioning order and 
handed over the party headquarters to Senanayake, who had by then 
been expelled from the party.^ This last act demonstrated the 
Government's lack of good faith in this whole episode.
Meanwhile, on 21 October, the Queen arrived in Sri Lanka on 
a four-day state visit to participate in celebrations organised by 
the Government to mark the 50th anniversary of universal adult 
franchise. It was suggested in Parliament by Opposition members 
that the emergency had been extended to avoid disturbances during 
the Queen's visit, particularly following Mrs.Bandaranaike's dis­
franchisement and expulsion from Parliament. Indeed, by emergency 
regulations made on the eve of the Queen's visit, political and 
trade union meetings, processions, demonstrations and the distri­
bution of leaflets were prohibited. The Prime Minister, while 
denying this allegation, said that he was not in a position to
reveal the information which necessitated the continuance of the 
2
emergency. On 15 December, the emergency was further extended;
the reason given being "the moves by a group of expatriate Tamils
to pass a declaration unilaterally declaring the establishment of 
3
Eelam". This was a threat which neither materialised, nor appeared 
to have been made with any degree of seriousness.
Political Agitation
1. The Hartal. In April 1952, on the eve of a general elec­
tion, Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake announced the reduction of 
the price of a measure of rationed rice to 25 cents. Fifteen 
months later, after a comfortable re-election, his Finance Minister, 
J.R.Jayewardene, announced in the course of his budget speech, 
amidst angry scenes outside and to empty galleries inside, the 
removal of the subsidy on rice. The price of a measure shot up to 
70 cents. As part of island-wide agitation for a reduction in the 
price of rice, a "hartal" or general stoppage of work in all sectors, 
was organised by the left-wing political groups and trade unions on 
12 August 1953. At about 3 p.m. on that day, the Government invoked 
the provisions of the Public Security Ordinance. Speaking in the
1. Ceylon Daily News, 10 December 1981.
2. Ibid., 22 October 1981.
3. Sun, 16 December 1981.
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House of Representatives shortly thereafter, Senanayake explained:
Hon.Members will be aware of the mischief, damage and 
inconvenience caused in Colombo as well as in other 
parts of Ceylon by persons inimical to the State, who 
have been induced by unscrupulous leaders to resort 
to strikes and violence, in defiance of established 
. law and order . . .
The persons responsible for today's strike have not 
contented themselves with that demonstration. They 
have incited and intimidated others to strike and, in 
their desire to achieve their unscrupulous purposes, 
they have obstructed buses and railway trains, held 
them up and, in some cases in the suburbs of Colombo, 
have destroyed or attempted to destroy them. Telephone 
and telegraph communications have been disrupted by 
sabotage, railway lines have been removed with a view 
to causing derailment of trains and fires have been 
caused in various buildings and other places.
Persons engaged in driving public transport have 
been intimidated, molested and assaulted. Crowds have 
been incited to collect in public places, obstruct the 
police in the preservation of public order, pelt stones 
at buses and public buildings and intimidate shop­
keepers to close down their establishments and so 
deprive the public of essential supplies. Incidents 
of mischief, assault and arson have been reported 
throughout the day in Colombo, in south coast towns 
like Moratuwa and Ambalangoda, and further inland in 
places like Hanwella, Maharagama and Boralesgamuwa,  ^
and they have been dealt with promptly and effectively.
Five days later, discussing the state of emergency on the adjournment 
motion in the House of Representatives, different views were expre­
ssed by leaders of the two left-wing parties. According to Pieter 
Keuneman, leader of the Communist Party:
There is no justification whatsoever for this Govern­
ment invoking the Public Security Ordinance, declaring 
a state of emergency and imposing a curfew at a time 
when the 24-hour hartal was almost reaching its end.
. . .  A state of public emergency was declared between 
2 pm and 3 pm on August 12 when the Government was 
thrown into a panic at the overwhelming success of the 
hartal which would have ended a few hours later. I 
accuse the Government of declaring a state of emergency 
not in order to maintain peace, but in order to cover 
up their bankruptcy and panic by giving the armed forces 
legal powers to join the police in shooting down the 
people.2
Keuneman revealed that on the night of the hartal, the offices of 
all the Opposition parties had been raided, their printing presses 
sealed, and issues of their party newspapers of the following day
1. Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 12 August 
1953, col.278.
2. Ibid., 17 August 1953, col.560.
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seized. Dr.N.M.Perera, leader of the Lanka Sama Samaj Party had 
this to say:
I ask whether any democratic Government worthy of 
the name, knowing the .temper of the people, should 
not have, with its ordinary laws and its normal 
police force, been prepared for incidents of this 
nature and been ready to deal with such incidents.
. . .  It should have seen to it that the police did 
not interfere with the hartal, but if there were any 
hooligan elements or rowdies or thugs who utilised 
the opportunity for the purpose of hurling stones or 
stopping transport, or for comnitting various acts 
of violence, it should have concentrated all its 
energy in preventing such incidents. 1
Senator S.Nadesan,Q.C., speaking in "the other place" pointed out
that:
It is the democratic right of a people to express 
their protest. It is the weapon they have of expr­
essing their protest against this huge iniquity of 
the removal of the subsidy . . .  Do you seriously 
believe that any amount of agitation by me or a 
handful of people could have roused the people if 
they did not genuinely feel about it ? 2
2. Civil Disobedience in the North. On 1 January 1961, the
Official Language Act, No.33 of 1956, became fully operative. Prior
to that date, the Act had permitted the languages previously in use
to be continued in use. During 1960, the Federal Party had made
several unsuccessful attempts to reach accord with the two major
political parties on the use of the Tamil language and on allied 
3matters. After the Government of Mrs.Bandaranaike was elected in 
July 1960, the Federal Party leader, S.J.V.Chelvanayakam,Q.C., had 
addressed several communications to, and attended two conferences 
with, the Prime Minister and members of her Cabinet, none of which 
produced any tangible results. On 18 January 1961, a final letter 
had been addressed by him to the Prime Minister protesting against 
certain Treasury Circulars issued in implementation of the Official 
Language Act; no reply was received. Consequently, on 20 February 
1961, the Federal Party commenced a "satyagraha" in five centres - 
Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Batticaloa and Trincomalee. It was 
described as a non-violent demonstration in the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces against the language policy of the Government.
1. Ibid., col.571.
2. Parliamentary Debates (Senate), 18 August 1953, col.299.
3. For an account of these negotiations, see S.J.V.Chelvanayakam, 
Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 23 November 1961, 
cols.1792-1805.
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In the House of Representatives, a few days later, the Minis­
ter of Finance, Felix R.Dias Bandaranaike, described the first day 
of Satyagraha in Jaffna:
At about 8 am, Mr .S. J.V.Chelvanayakam,Q.C. ,M.P. for 
Kankesanturai, came and stood at the centre of the 
main entrance to the Kachcheri facing the road. In 
a couple of minutes some others, including some MPs, 
joined him. They then seated themselves on the 
ground at the gate in five or six rows, blocking the 
entrance. Soon, thereafter, the small entrance on 
to the left of the main entrance was also similarly 
blocked. Thereafter, the main entrance to the Resi­
dency was also blocked.
At about 9 am, the S.P. asked whether any clerk 
would like a passage cleared for them to enter the 
Kachcheri. Some replied in the affrimative, and the 
police cleared a passage by lifting some of the 
squatters to a side.
Bandaranaike added that he did not for a moment think that this
"lifting" was a gentle process; it was quite possible that the
"lifting" might very well be described as "dragging". He continued:
At about 10.15 am, the Government Agent attempted to 
leave his Residency for the Supreme Court to hand 
over the mandate in his capacity as Fiscal, Northern 
Province, in a jeep driven by the S.P. The satya- 
grahis who were lying at the gate refused to make 
way for the jeep, and the police attempted to carry 
than away to clear a passage. As some were carried 
away, others took their places and still others, who 
were seated at the time at the other gates, rushed 
to this particular gate and squatted on the ground 
in the way of the jeep. Police made further attempts 
to clear a passage, and when these attempts failed, 
they were compelled to resort to a baton charge.
The Minister admitted that two persons sustained grievous injuries
in the course of this baton charge. But, he said:
A baton charge is a baton charge. We cannot expect a 
baton charge to be conducted lightly, or with the 
object of not using sufficient force. One either 
conducts a baton charge or one does not.l
On 2 March 1961, the Prime Minister announced in the Senate
that Part III of the Public Security Ordinance had been invoked:
We have sent troops to Jaffna and Batticaloa, as you 
may be aware. There is no government in those areas 
today. The Kachcheris are not functioning, the offices 
are not functioning, as a result of the satyagraha, 
and I cannot allow that to continue any further. The
1. Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 28 Feb­
ruary 1961, cols.2291-2292.
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police we have there are not enough. Therefore, we 
have sent troops to assist them to maintain law and 
order and carry on the essential services in those 
two areas.1
On 14 March, the Leader of the House, C.P.de Silva, described
three weeks of Satyagraha in the two provinces:
In Jaffna district, the campaign has completed its 
third week. Large numbers of persons have been 
picketing the Kachcheri, Education Office, District 
Agricultural Office, Excise Warehouse and a few 
other offices . . . The uniformed staff of the 
Postal Department in Jaffna went on strike for a 
period of a week. There have been token one-day 
strikes in the Government Hospital, the Paranthan 
Chemical Works and the Cement Works at Kankesan- 
turai. In other parts of Jaffna district there 
have been token strikes and closure of offices.
In Batticaloa district, until two days ago, 
large numbers of men, women and children were 
picketing the Kachcheri . . . Since yesterday, 
the Excise Warehouse, the Agricultural Office and 
the Labour Office are also being picketed.
At Trincomalee, the Kachcheri is being picketed 
by a large number of men and women.
At Vavuniya, the Excise Warehouse is being pick­
eted. Federal Party leaders have announced that the 
Kachcheri at Mannar will be picketed from the 20th 
onwards. 2
On 7 April, the Leader of the House made the following statement:
Representations were made to the Hon.Minister of 
Justice by several leading citizens, both Sinhalese 
and Tamil, that an opportunity be given to Mr .Che 1- 
vanayakam to see him.
Last Wednesday night, the Minister, who is in 
charge of implementation of the Language Acts of the 
Government, met Mr.Chelvanayakam and certain members 
of the Federal Party who placed before the Minister 
their demands on the following matters -
1. The Tamil Language as the language of the North­
ern and Eastern Provinces for all administrative 
purposes.
2. The Tamil Language as the language of the courts 
in these parts.
3. The setting up of Regional Councils.
4. The position of Tamil public servants in relation 
to the implementation of the Official Language 
Act.
5. The rights of Tamil-speaking persons outside the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces.
The Hon.Minister of Justice last night placed before 
the Cabinet these demands. The Government is unable to
1. Parliamentary Debates (Senate), 2 March 1961, col.759.
2. Parliamentary Debates (House of Representaives), 14 March 
1961, col.2879.
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consider the demands as they are in conflict with 
the provisions of the Official Language Act and of 
the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act.l
On 18 April, a state of public emergency was declared. Explaining
the reasons for this step, the Leader of the House stated:
It has become patently clear that language has been 
used merely as a convenient weapon for the building 
up of popular support for the real aim of the Fed­
eral Party which is the establishment of a separate 
State . . .
The Federal Party last week began what they called 
a postal service and established their own police ' 
force. They also decided to set up land kachcheris 
of their own and to allot Crown land to their supp­
orters. It was thus quite clear to us that the Fed­
eral Party had challenged the lawfully established 
Government of the country and had sought to establish 
a separate administration . . .
The Government made every attempt, short of the use 
of force, to maintain essential services, to distri­
bute rice rations to the people of the Northern and 
Eastern Provinces, to pay salaries to public servants, 
to pay pensions, to give public assistance allow­
ances and to pay T.B.allowances. The Government has 
not been able to perform these essential services 
owing to the activities of the Federal Party . . .
The Cabinet, therefore, at its meeting yesterday, 
unanimously decided that a state of emergency be 
declared to enable the Government to take effective 
measures to deal with the situation that has arisen 
in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Last night, 
shortly after midnight, the Armed Forces took charge 
of the situation . . .  By early morning, the Mili­
tary were successful in clearing the roads and 
entrances to all public offices which were being 
picketed by satyagrahis. The operation was conducted 
with care and at no stage did it become necessary to 
use firearms.
The Federal Party has been proscribed. Detention 
Orders were issued yesterday in respect of 68 persons.
. . .  A curfew has been imposed . . . Law and order 
now prevails in all parts of the country.2
Senator Nadesan, however, charged the Government with having
failed to discharge its primary duty of maintaining law and order.
He argued that the word "Satyagraha” could not disguise the obvious
fact that those who participated in it were breaking the law:
In this state of affairs what was the duty of the 
Government ? Its obvious duty was to enforce the law 
of the land, to clear the passages to the Kachcheris
1. Ibid., 7 April 1961, col.3946; cf. this intransigent attitude 
with terms of Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957 (supra, p.99) 
and the SLFP's position in 1978 (supra, p.137).
2. Ibid., 18 April 1961, col.4046.
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and other government offices by dispersing the 
satyagrahis by all lawful means, so that govern­
ment administration may be carried on. The 
ordinary laws of the land gave the Government 
ample powers to achieve these results. It is 
absurd to imagine that in any civilized country, 
whether it is Ceylon or elsewhere, the ordinary 
laws can be insufficient to prevent the admin­
istration from collapse merely because a large 
number of unarmed people, singing devotional 
songs, blocked the entrances to Government 
offices.1
He referred in particular to sections 332, 343 and 344 of the Penal
Code; sections 99, 100, 101 and 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code;
and the provisions of the Post Office Ordinance.
But instead of acting as any normal civilized 
administration should, it resorted to what may 
be described as counter satyagraha. It decided 
to permit the satyagrahis to break the law of 
the land with impunity so that the unfortunate 
people who were deprived of their rice rations, 
their salaries, pensions and other services, may 
force the Federal Party in course of time to 
call off the satyagraha.2
Nadesan's contention was that the Government, presumably having
failed in that exercise, had invoked the provisions of the Public
Security Ordinance in order to intimidate the Tamil people of the
Northern and Eastern Provinces into abandoning, at least for the
time being, their agitation for their language rights:
Why are the farmers of Jaffna, who ordinarily 
go to their fields in these hot days at 4 o’clock 
in the morning, prevented from doing so till well 
after 6 am ? Why have the military been beating 
and thrashing innocent passers-by on the streets 
of Jaffna ? Why have some of them been helping 
themselves to goods and articles in shops and 
asking the owners to send the bills to the FP 
leader ? Why have cars been comandeered as if 
a great military campaign was afoot ? Why has 
petrol been issued on permits in Jaffna when there 
is enough petrol for everybody ? Why have car 
owners been made to queue up for petrol at the 
Kachcheri and subjected to humiliating remarks 
by army sentries ? Why have the military prevented 
people from having their lights on at night ?
Because they have been asked not to shoot, why 
have they indulged in the pastime of throwing 
stones at houses ? Why have they set fire to
1. Parliamentary Debates (Senate), 2 May 1961, col.1171.
2. Ibid., col.1174.
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fences and madams and put the blame on the people ?
Are these acts of organised terrorism and lawless­
ness the result of any orders given to the Army to 
strike terror into the inhabitants of Jaffna so 
that they might give up their agitation for their 
language rights ? 1
3. Protests against the Tamil Language Regulations. On 8 Jan­
uary 1966, when Parliament first met after the Christmas recess, 
regulations made by the Minister of Justice under the Tamil Language
2
(Special Provisions) Act, No.28 of 1958, were presented for approval.
In anticipation of demonstrations by Opposition parties against the
motion relating to these regulations, the Prime Minister, Dudley
Senanayake, had directed the Inspector-General of Police that no
processions or demonstrations should be permitted on that day and
that Galle Face Green and the vicinity of the House of Representat-
3
ives should be kept free of crowds. On the night of 7 January, the
armed services had been called out under the provisions of Part III
of the Public Security Ordinance. On the morning of the 8th, a 
large crowd, including several Buddhist monks and Opposition politi­
cians, led by Mr s. Bandar anaike, assembled at Vihara Maha Devi Park 
for a much publicised oath-taking ceremony. Shortly after noon, a 
procession of nearly ten thousand persons, led by Buddhist monks, 
left the Park in the direction of the House of Representatives. At 
1.30 p.m., at Kollupitiya, on Galle Road, barely a mile away from 
Parliament, the police attempted to stop the procession by using
tear gas and by baton-charging. At this stage, the crowd became
very disorderly and considerable damage was caused to nearby commer­
cial buildings. At 1.45 p.m., the police opened fire, killing one 
Buddhist monk and injuring several others. A few hours later, a 
st£e of emergency was declared and a curfew was imposed in Colombo 
and its suburbs.
Two weeks later, the Minister of State, J.R.Jayewardene,
explained why the Government had invoked the provisions of Part II:
Black flags were to be put up on January 8th; fasts 
were the order of the day, and January 8th was to be
1. Ibid., at col.1188.
2. Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 8 January 
1966, col.41.
3. Report of the Special Committee appointed to inquire into and 
report on the police arrangements on the 8th of January 1966 in conn­
ection with the motion in the House of Representatives on the Regula­
tions under the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act, S.P.V-1966.
457
a 'D-day'. Then, evidence came to the Government 
that there was to be a combined movement to prevent 
the Regulations being moved; that the Prime Minister, 
the Speaker of the House, and myself as the person 
moving the Resolution, may even be coerced from 
coming to this House; that the House would be surr­
ounded; and there would be a general strike of 
employees in the private and public sectors to 
request the Government not to proceed with these 
Regulations. Notices were issued, signed not only 
by members of the private and public sectors but 
also by political leaders of the Coalition, asking 
members of the public service to come out on strike 
on a purely political matter which had nothing to 
do with trade union activities. Pamphlets critici­
sing the Government were distributed by public 
servants calling upon their colleagues to stage a 
general strike protesting against the introduct­
ion of these Regulations. From all these it became 
clear that in various ways - by meetings, by proc­
essions, by strikes - there was to be an attempt 
not to persuade but to force the Government not to 
proceed with these Regulations on January 8th. 1
Referring to the events of the 8th, Jayewardene said:
About 10 am in the morning, buses were stopped at 
Ward Place, opposite the Cinnamon Gardens police 
station, on Alexandra Road, Flower Road, by groups 
of people. Drivers were pulled out, passengers 
were manhandled and buses were wrecked. Cars were 
stopped right round the Vihara Maha Devi Park and 
the occupants were pulled out and assaulted . . .
The Hon.Leader of the House was returning from a 
parliamentary group meeting. His car was stopped.
They made violent remarks. They attempted to 
touch him. His security officer got out and bran­
dished his revolver and said he would shoot . . .
The Hon. Minis ter of Public Works who was also 
coming that way early in the morning was heckled 
and hooted opposite the Town Hall at 9.15 . . .
So, Sir, it became quite clear that the pattern on 
the 8th was to incite the people to v i o l e n c e .2
Speaking on the same occasion, the leader of the Communist Party,
Pieter Keuneman, gave his own explanation for the declaration of
a state of public emergency:
The Emergency has been declared not to preserve 
public order, or to maintain supplies and services 
essential to the life of the community, but to gag 
and silence the Opposition parties. That is one of 
the first reasons for this Emergency. Secondly, it
1. Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 26 Jan­
uary 1966, col.1052.
2. Ibid., col.1058.
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has been declared to use emergency laws and armed 
force to suppress and silence public opposition to 
the now not-so-secret UNP-FP Agreement, which we 
say and manypeople believe will lay the foundation 
for the division of the country. 1
Keuneman also had an explanation for the curfew, different from that
%
which the Government had offered:
The curfew was extended from 6 pm to 6 am, and a 
special regulation was introduced allowing the 
police to take charge of dead bodies and making 
it necessary to get the permission of the police 
even to attend funerals . . .
This is the first time, I think, that a Budd­
hist priest has been shot as a result of police 
firing. This is also the first time that a Budd­
hist priest has been cremated with full military 
honours, it was a most farcical thing: one would 
have thought that Kanatte Cemetery was a fort 
under seige with over three hundred armed sold­
iers together with scout cars and armed cars and 
our gallant lads of the Gemunu Watch standing 
there fully armed just in case somebody would 
come and claim the priest's body. From 6 pm to 
6 am, for six days, there was curfew because the 
Government did not know how to dispose of the 
dead priest's body. The cremation was at about 
4 am during the curfew. It was only after the 
cremation that they reverted to the hours 10 pm 
to 4 am. So, one million people or more were 
kept in virtual house arrest for half-a-day for 
six days because the Government did not know how 
to dispose of the priest's body. 2
Keuneman predicted that the Emergency would be kept in force to meet
other contingencies as well:
I want to say, and I will establish, that one of the 
reasons for the continuation of this Emergency is 
that the Government w£s tine to perfect its apparatus 
of intimidation and repression in preparation for 
carrying out other measures demanded from them by 
their imperialist backers as a pre-condition for 
so-called 'aid'. Is this Emergency to be used, to be 
kept on, till such time as you can implement the 
World Bank demand regarding removal of the rice 
subsidy ? We would like to know, and we have reason 
to think so on the evidence before us. 3
4. Reduction of the Rice Ration. The state of emergency which 
had been declared on 8 January 1966 lapsed on 7 December of that 
year. Eleven days later, at midnight on 18 December 1966, the Gov­
ernment again declared a state of emergency. By regulations, all
1. Ibid., at col.1158.
2. Ibid., at col.1182.
3. Ibid., at col.1159.
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public meetings were banned, local authority elections were post­
poned and demonstrations and processions could only be held with 
the approval of the competent authority in each district. Then, 
in a broadcast to the nation, Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake 
announced that owing to a world shortage of rice,
supplies are not available to the extent that we need 
to maintain the ration of two measures, and we can 
only give one measure of rice on the quota.1
That one measure, however, would be issued free of charge.
Matured by experience and conscious of the fact that 'rice'
was then the most sensitive and explosive political issue in the 
2
country, the Government on this occasion struck what was obvi­
ously a pre-emptive blow. Other measures such as devaluation were 
to follow, but the Government embarked on these with confidence and 
a sense of security since it was well insulated from any form of 
protest. A popular Opposition daily newspaper, "Jana Dina", was 
sealed up for over five months under emergency regulations because 
it had published what was alleged to be a false report of a private
3
social function which the Prime Minister had attended. Another, 
which dared to expose corruption in high places, was threatened 
with closure.^
As the weeks dragged on and soon gave way to months, and then
an year, and another, even the Government's own supporters began to
be embarrassed by the monotonous regularity with which proclamations
under section 2 were churned out by the Government Press. The Times
group of newspapers was committed politically to the Government. But,
in an editorial comment, early in 1967, it asked:
Has the Government, we wonder, forgotten that the nation 
is in a State of Emergency ? The country is as quiet and
as peaceful as it can be. So far as we are aware, there
are no riots or revolutions in progress and nobody really 
fears that an insurrection will be set in motion tomorrow.
But the country continues to be in a State of Emergency, 
and democracy is shackled.^
1. Weekend, 19 December 1966.
2. In 1963, the SLFP Minister of Finance resigned when his own 
parliamentary group rejected his budget proposal to remove the rice 
subsidy.
3. Ceylon Daily News, 10 February 1967.
4. The Aththa, the pro-communist Sinhala daily, reported the 
smuggling detection in which a Minister's daughter was alleged to 
have been involved.
5. Sunday Times, March 1967 (date not available).
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In April 1967, the Times of Ceylon noted that as the Government
completed two years in office, 446 of those days had been spent
in a state of emergency:
Why does it do it ? We wish we knew. We wish the 
Government would tell us and the general public, 
because we cannot see any purpose in having the 
country in a State of Emergency when in fact there  ^
is no emergency to be seen anywhere on the horizon.
In June 1967, as 512 days of emergency rule was recorded, the Times
observed:
Why does the Government go through this elaborate 
pretence month after month ? . . . There is no 
civil commotion anywhere. There is no threat of 
revolution. We are not about to be invaded by a 
foreign enemy. The country is so quiet that the 
Prime Minister did not heed to think twice about 
taking plane yesterday on a journey which will 
take him to the other end of the world. Perhaps 
he has forgotten there is a State of Emergency 
on paper. Mr.J.R.Jayewardene, his locum tenens, 
might, we suggest, telephone the Prime Minister 
and remind him that the proclamation is due again 
on Saturday.^
In July 1967, the Times affirmed that:
We are all for strong action in a real emergency, 
but this is an entirely unreal 'emergency', and 
it does no good to the prestige of an avowedly 
democratic regime to continue in this semi­
dictator ical f a s h i o n . ^
In August 1967, the Times referred to the Prime Minister's statement
in Parliament that he will not allow the life of the community to be
endangered by a strike, and that not only will the Emergency be
continued, but that other steps will also be taken in regard to food
and petrol stocks. But, as that newspaper pointed out:
What the Government seems to have forgotten is 
that a State of Emergency can be declared in a 
matter of minutes by the Governor-General's proc­
lamation, and even if it should be necessary to 
declare Emergencies repeatedly, that would be far 
better than having an Emergency in operation for 
months on end when the country is peaceful.4-
Seven months later, in March 1968, the Times recorded 882 days of
emergency rule:
It is no excuse to say that the country suffers in 
no way as a result of the continued state of emer-
1. Times of Ceylon, 27 April 1967.
2. Ibid., 15 June 1967.
3. Ibid., 24 July 1967.
4. Ibid., 22 August 1967.
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gency. As well might we say that a state of emer­
gency is quite all right for a democracy, quite 
all right in perpetuity.!
In August 1968, the Times asked again:
Where is the 'Public Emergency' the unfortunate 
Governor-General is made to declare again and 
again ? . . .  Is there one good reason why the 
State of Emergency is continued ? I can't 
think of any. If the Government can, let it tell 
the public what it is.2
Finally, in October 1968, in an editorial entitled "Emergency
Scandal", the Times recorded one thousand days of emergency rule:
The Government's attempts to justify the contin­
uation of the state of emergency have been both 
feeble and ridiculous. One argument advanced is 
that the payment of devaluation allowance to 
certain categories of workers continues under an 
emergency decree and, if the emergency lapses, 
payment would cease to be obligatory. The other 
has to do with co-operative crooks.
The devaluation took place in November last year.
If a whole year later, the Government has been 
unable to regularise the payment in the ordinary 
way, it must be even more incompetent than its 
strongest critics say it is. The same thing might 
well be said of the other 'reason'. Certainly the 
voters will not be impressed with the competence 
the Government has shown in this respect. It is no 
argument either, to claim, as the Government's 
apologists do, that the state of emergency does 
not interefeie with the democratic rights of the 
people.
There was justification for declaring a state 
of emergency when it was done. It might be necess­
ary to do so again. But the Thousand Days are a 
black mark against the Government and the Govern­
ment will save itself from further ridicule (if 
no worse) by allowing the state of emergency to  ^
lapse when the time comes for its next extension.
Three more months were to elapse before the Emergency was eventually
permitted to lapse.
Strike Situations
1. Strike in the Electricity Department. On 5 March 1964, the
Government declared a state of emergency and announced that:
The reason for the declaration of a state of emer­
gency is the strike in the Electrical Departemnt -
1. Ibid., 24 March 1968.
2. Sunday Times, 27 August 1968.
3. Times of Ceylon, 19 October 1968.
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all the trade unions - which has brought the 
electricity industry to a halt. The power 
stations at Laxapana and Grandpass are not 
working and even the 9000 kilowatts of power 
which normally comes from Gal Oya has failed 
to come. We do not know whether the Gal Oya 
power plant has stopped working.
Many essential services have come to a halt.
The sewerage system of Colombo, oil, telecomm­
unications, the loading and unloading of ships 
in the harbour - all are at a standstill. Many 
factories - the Textile Factory at Veyangoda - 
have come to a halt. In order to meet this 
situation a state of emergency was declared.1
Irrigation and Power Minister, C.P.de Silva, who made this statement
in Parliament also explained:
What we really want to do is to declare this 
an essential service and make it work. We found 
that in order to do so, a state of emergency had 
to be declared.^
On the following day, Food Minister Felix Dias Bandaranaike disclo­
sed in Parliament that:
I am informed that after the declaration of the 
electric services as essential services, personal 
service orders were served upon certain elect­
rical engineers. Personal service orders consti­
tute something new. I think that is a technique 
that has not been adopted before in the course of 
any Emergency. By law, by the declaration of the 
Prime Minister, three persons were placed in 
virtual custody; they were taken to their places 
of work and compelled to work. The consequence of 
these personal service orders has been, that the 
electrical engineers, after consultation, have ~ 
called off their strike and restored the services.
2. General Strike. The Joint Trade Union Action Committee 
(JTUAC) called a general strike, beginning 16 July 1980. Among its 
demands were the reinstatement of twelve railway employees and a 
wage increase. On that day, the Government declared a state of 
emergency. The services provided by any government department, 
public corporation, bank, co-operative society, local authority, or 
by any mercantile or commercial undertaking engaged in the importat­
ion, exportation, sale, supply or distribution of goods - virtually
1. Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 5 March 
1964, col.3478. The Minister was in error, however, when he said 
that all the trade unions were on strike. In fact only the engin­
eers had struck work: Ceylon Daily News, 6 March 1964.
2. Ibid., at col.3515.
3. Ibid., 6 March 1964, col.3683.
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all public and private sectors - were declared essential services
1 2 in which strikes were prohibited. Press censorship was imposed.
A Government comnunique announced "three mass rallies at which the
President and the Prime Minister will explain the folly of causing
a stoppage of work"; public meetings convened by the striking
3unions were banned. The Government announced that any person who 
kept away from work will be deemed to have vacated his post and the 
vacancy will be filled imuediately, while those who reported for 
work will receive a special cash allowance for the duration of the
4
Emergency. The strike was called out as planned, and 40,000 
state employees and several thousands more in the private sector 
were dismissed.^ The bank accounts of the striking unions were 
frozen by emergency regulation, and monies lying to the credit were 
appropriated by the Government "to create a fund to help suffering
g
dependants of strikers who have lost their jobs". On 15 August, 
the Emergency lapsed.
Administrative Convenience
1. Demonetization of Currency. On 25 October 1970, in the
course of his budget speech in the House of Representatives, the
Minister of Finance, Dr .N.M. Per era, announced that:
It is common knowledge that there is a considerable 
amount of hoarding of currency in this country.
Both traders and industrialists and other enterpri­
sing people have amassed a considerable amount of 
wealth which they have not disclosed. Various efforts 
that have been made to disgorge these ill-gotten 
gains have not been successful. I have, therefore, 
decided to take the only measure that will bring 
all this hoarded money to the surface. I have decided
that the Rs.100 and Rs.50 notes shall cease to be
legal tender with effect from 3 November 1970.^
While the Finance Minister was announcing this budget proposal, the
Government declared a state of emergency. A government spokesman
announced that the purpose of the Emergency "is to protect the
people who will call at banks and post offices throughout the island
g
to exchange their Rs.50 and Rs.100 notes for new ones". The real
1. Ceylon Daily News, 17 July 1980.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid; Sun, 18 July 1980.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 15 August 1980; Sun, 15 August 1980. The Opposition
disputed this figure and placed it at above 100,000.
6. Ibid., 22 July 1980.
7. Ibid., 26 October 1970.
8. Times of Ceylon, 26 October 1970.
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reason, probably, was that the Government wished to give immediate 
legal effect to the demonetization proposal: one of the regulations
made was the Prevention of the Avoidance of Tax Regulation, which 
was identical in terms to the Bill of the same name which was int­
roduced in Parliament on the following day.^
2. Cyclone Relief Operation. Following the devastation of 
the Eastern Province by one of the worst cyclones to hit the country, 
a state of emergency was declared on 29 November 1978, operative in 
the districts of Batticaloa, Amparai, Polonnaruwa', and the precincts 
of the Colombo port and airport. President Jayewardene explained 
that extraordinary powers and extraordinary organisation were 
required for rehabilitation to be effectively and adequately under­
taken.
There was no time to call for tenders and adopt 
normal procedures. Large consignments of food, 
clothing and other aid were arriving by ship and 
air. They had to be quickly and properly colle­
cted and distributed. These matters needed att­
ention on a war footing.^
Accordingly, the Emergency (Cyclone Affected Areas - Reconstruction 
and Rehabilitation) Regulation provided that "nothing in any written 
law or in the Establishments Code or any other administrative regu­
lations will apply to the construction, reconstruction or repair of 
any buildings, roads or installations, rehabilitation of persons or 
the restoration of services" in certain specified areas. Also made 
inapplicable were several statutes including the Housing and Town 
Improvement Ordinance, Town and Country Planning Ordinance, Munici­
pal Councils Ordinance, Telecommunications Ordinance and the Ceylon 
Electricity Ordinance. The state of emergency remained in force 
until 28 May 1979.
To Facilitate Passage of Legislation
1. Public Security (Amendment) Bill 1959. A state of public
emergency had been in existence for nearly four months in 1958 when
Prime Minister Bandaranaike told the House of Representatives that:
Our Public Security Ordinance is very antiquated.
If I can suitably amend it, I can lift the state 
of emergency tomorrow; but as it stands now, where
1. The Prevention of the Avoidance of Tax Act, No.26 of 1970, 
received the Governor-General1s assent on 1 November 1970. It was 
deemed to have come into force on 26 October 1970.
2. Sun, 20 November 1978.
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for the least action it may be necessary to 
have a state of emergency right throughout 
the country, it is not possible to lift the 
Emergency at the moment, and permit another 
state of affairs like that which took place 
to arise in a month or two.l
On 21 November 1958, the Prime Minister expressed the same 
2
sentiments. The amending bill was passed by the House of 
Representatives on 12 February, and by the Senate on 12 
March 1959. The state of emergency was allowed to lapse 
on 25 March 1959.
2. Suspension of Capital Punishment (Repeal) Bill 1959.
On dissolving Parliament on 5 December 1959, Prime Minister
Dahanayake, in a speech broadcast to the nation, explained:
You will thus see that the State of Emergency 
had to be lifted only after certain national 
requisites had been met - not a day too soon 
and not a day too late. I took the step of 
withdrawing the State of Emergency three days 
ago, after the passage of the Death Penalty 
Bill in the Senate.3
On the day following the death of Prime Minister Bandaranaike,
the following emergency regulation had been made:
During the continuance in force of this regu­
lation the operation of the Suspension of 
Capital Punishment Act, No.20 of 1958 shall 
be suspended.
On 29 October 1959, the Suspension of Capital Punishment (Repeal) 
Bill was introduced in the House of Representatives. It concluded 
its passage through the legislature on 2 December. On the next 
day, the state of emergency was revoked.
1. Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives), 23 Sept­
ember 1958, col.585.
2. Ibid., 21 November 1958, col.1997.
3. "Why Parliament was Dissolved", Ceylon Today, Vol.VIII,
No.12, p.l.
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Emergency Regulations
Section 5 of the Public Security Ordinance empowers the
President to:
make such regulations as appear to him to be nece­
ssary or expedient in the interests of public 
security and the preservation of public order and 
the suppression of mutiny, riot or civil commotion, 
or for the maintenance of supplies and services 
essential to the life of the community.
An emergency regulation comes into force forthwith upon its being
made by the President, and is deemed to be as valid and effective
as if it were enacted in the principal Ordinance."^  Section 6
states that:
Emergency regulations may provide for empowering 
such authorities or persons as may be specified 
in the regulations to make orders and rules for 
any of the purposes for which regulations are 
authorised by this Ordinance to be made . . . .
Section 7 defines the extensive scope of emergency regulations and
orders made thereunder:
An emergency regulation or any order or rule made 
in pursuance of such regulation shall have effect 
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith 
contained in any law; and any provision of a law
which may be inconsistent with any such regulation
or any such order or rule shall, whether that 
provision shall or shall not have been amended, 
modified or suspended in its operation under sect­
ion 5 of this Ordinance, to the extent of such 
inconsistency have no effect so long as such regu­
lation shall remain in force.
Finally, section 8 provides that:
No emergency regulation, and no order, rule or dir­
ection made or given thereunder shall be called in 
question in any court.
Unlike parliamentary legislation, emergency regulations come into 
force as soon as they are made without any prior or subsequent pub­
lication, and without any scrutiny either by Parliament or by a
Court. No problem of construction or interpretation arises when 
an emergency regulation conflicts with an existing law: the emer­
gency regulation simply supersedes that law.
1. S.11.
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The 1946 Constitution was not saved from the overriding
effects of emergency regulations. But the 1972 Constitution
provided that:
The power to make such emergency regulations shall 
include the power to make regulations having the 
legal effect of overriding, amending or suspending 
the operation of the provisions of any law except 
the provisions of the Constitution.1
A provision in almost identical terms is to be found in the 1978 
2
Constitution. Therefore, if an emergency regulation today has 
the legal effect of overriding, amending or suspending a provision 
of the Constitution, it will be ultra vires and, to that extent at
3
least, void. To have it declared ultra vires, it must first be 
called in question in a court, a proceeding which is expressly 
prohibited by section 8 of the Public Security Ordinance. However, 
the all-pervasive effect of the Interpretation (Amendment) Ordin­
ance notwithstanding, it ought to be possible to question the vali­
dity of an emergency regulation on this ground by means of the 
special remedy provided in Articles 17 and 126 for the enforcement
4
of fundamental rights. Whether such an exercise is worth the 
effort is quite another matter, since Article 15 now permits the 
exercise and operation of several fundamental rights to be restricted, 
not only by legislation, but by means of emergency regulations as 
well. These include at least one right which under international 
law is strictly non-derogable even during a state of emergency.
Interpretation of Regulations
In 1971, in Hirdaramani v. Ratnavale,^  G.P.A.Silva J gave
expression to the approach which the Supreme Court would adopt in
the interpretation of emergency regulations:
Even during a war or a state of emergency, no less 
than in normal times, it is in these courts that the 
subject will seek refuge against any unjustifiable
1. S.45(4).
2. Art. 155(2).
3. This principle will be equally valid and applicable to an 
order, rule or direction made under an emergency regulation which 
seeks to override,amend or suspend the provisions of any law since 
it is clear from Art. 155(2) that only an emergency regulation made 
by the President can now have that effect.
4. For a discussion of this remedy, see pp.376-400.
5. (1971) 75 NLR 67.
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encroachments on his liberty and it is the duty of 
the courts to entertain his complaint and inquire 
into it with meticulous care. In the determination 
of the problem, however, the extraordinary condit­
ions of a varied character that prevail during 
times of emergency compel the court to steer a 
course which preserves the fundamental freedom of 
the subject without overlooking at the same time 
the paramount consideration of the safety of the 
State. The latter consideration imposes on a court 
the unusual burden of maintaining an impeccable 
balance between the liberty of the citizen and 
possible danger to the State often involving the 
court’s entry into areas of uncertainty due to 
lack of information which the court well knows is 
available to the executive but cannot for obvious 
reasons be given publicity in a court of law. These 
considerations have given rise to judicial pronoun­
cements by eminent judges that are even conflicting 
in appearance but are reconcilable on reflection 
and tend to tilt the balance in favour of the 
executive when in doubt. This principle is based 
on the implied condition that the officer to whom 
the power to restrict the liberty of the subject 
is confided in the interests of the security of the 
State acts in good faith. 1
A liberal approach
Even before its general approach was enunciated in the words 
set out above, the Supreme Court had been inclined to give a strict
interpretation to emergency regulations.
2
In The Queen v. Fernando, the Court of Criminal Appeal had
before it an emergency regulation gazetted on 2 October 1959 in the
following terms:
During the continuance in force of this regulation
the operation of the Suspension of Capital Punish­
ment Act, No.29 of 1958, shall be suspended.
The Act referred to therein had come into force on 9 May 1958 and
was intended to remain in force for three years. It provided that
during the operative period, life imprisonment and not death shall
be the punishment for the conmission of murder or for the abetment
of suicide. Following the shooting of the Prime Minister by a
Buddhist monk on 25 September 1959, and the declaration of a state
of emergency, the death penalty was sought to be reintroduced by
this regulation. The Court held that this regulation cannot be
construed as being retroactive and that it applied only to those who
committed murder while the regulation was in force and were also
tried and convicted during that time.
1. Ibid., at 94. 2. (1960) 61 NLR 395.
In De Saram v. Ratnayake,^  the Supreme Court had before it
an order purported to have been made by the Permanent Secretary to
the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs under an emergency
regulation which required detainees to be treated as though they
were civil prisoners within the meaning of the Prisons Ordinance
and the rules made thereunder:
Provided that the Permanent Secretary may direct 
that any such rule shall not apply or shall apply 
subject to such amendments or mcxlifications as 
may be specified in such direction.
Three days after the petitioner and sevarl others had been placed 
under detention following an alleged attempt to overthrow the Gove­
rnment, the Coranission or Prisons received a confidential letter, 
signed by an assistant secretary, to the effect that the relevant 
rules had been made inapplicable to the detainees. It was argued 
by petitioner's counsel that a document must purport to be made or 
issued in pursuance of an emergency regulation before it can be 
given the effect claimed for it under the proviso to the regulation. 
It was also argued that a confidential communication, not published 
at any time, passing from an assistant of the Permanent Secretary 
to the Commissioner of Prisons, was not the proper method of giving 
a direction under the proviso. Accepting both submissions, the 
Court observed that:
When the Permanent Secretary acts under that proviso, 
he is in effect exercising legislative power . . .
One must therefore scrutinise with great care any 
document which, assuming that if issued in due form 
it would have legal validity, is said to have been 
issued under that proviso . . .  In a matter which 
concerns personal rights and privileges, it is the 
duty of the Court to construe the relevant provisions 
strictly, and to see that the prescribed conditions 
are observed.2
3
In Gunasekera v. De Fonseka, the Supreme Court examined an 
emergency regulation which empowered, inter alia, any police officer 
to search, detain for purposes of such search, or arrest without 
warrant, any person -
(a) who is committing an offence under any emergency regulation;
(b) who has committed an offence under any emergency regulation; or
(c) whom he has reasonable ground for suspecting to be concerned in 
or to be committing or to have committed an offence under any
1. (1962) 63 NLR 522.
3. (1972) 75 NLR 246.
2. Ibid., at 525.
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emergency regulation. The petitioner was arrested by an assistant
superintendent of police who had orders to do so from his superior
officer. He admitted that he was not personally aware of the actual
offence of which the petitioner was suspected by the superintendent.
Directing the issue of a writ of habeas corpus, G.P.A.Silva J
observed that:
The wording of regulation 19 to my mind permits of only 
one construction, namely, that the person taking another 
into custody must himself have reasonable grounds for 
suspecting the person arrested to be concerned in or to 
be committing or to have committed an offence under any 
emergency regulation. 1
Noting that the regulation conferred the power of arrest on "literally
thousands of members of the police, prisons and the armed services",
the Court stated that:
It is reasonable to think that when such a large number 
is vested with the power of arresting or detaining a 
person, the law would provide the additional safeguard 
that the person arresting should be personally satisfied 
that he has reasonable grounds of suspicion and that he 
should not merely be guided by the satisfaction of a 
third party with whose judgment in the matter the person 
who actually arrests may not agree if he is apprised of 
the facts.2
A literal approach
On the other hand, there have been occasions when the Supreme 
Court has been inclined to "tilt the balance in favour of the exec­
utive".
3
In Hirdaramani v. Ratnavale, the Court construed a regulation 
which authorised the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Defence 
and External Affairs to make an order for the taking into custody 
and detention of a person if the Permanent Secretary was of opinion 
that such order was necessary with a view to preventing that person 
from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety and to 
the maintenance of public order. In the absence of any dispute as 
to the authenticity of the detention order, or as to its application 
to the detainee, H.N.G.Fernando CJ observed that the only question 
that arose was whether the petitioner had proved facts necessary to 
controvert the matter stated in the detention order itself, namely, 
that the Permanent Secretary was of opinion that it was necessary
1. Ibid., at 254.
2. Ibid., at 255.
3. (1971) 75 NIR 67.
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to make the detention order for the purpose specified in the order 
itself. But, as Viscount Maugham had stated in Liversidge v. And­
erson;
It would be useless to attempt to examine the truth 
of the facts alleged in the order in a case where the 
fact relates to the personal belief of the Secretary 
of State, formed partly at least on grounds which he 
is not bound to disclose.-*-
Or as Lord Atkin had observed in the same case;
The meaning, however, which for the first time was 
adopted by the Court of Appeal in the Greene case and 
appears to have found favour with some of your Lord­
ships is that there is no condition, for the words 
"if the Secretary of State has 'reasonable cause' " 
merely mean if the Secretary of State "thinks that he 
has reasonable cause". The result is that the only 
implied condition is that the Secretary of State acts 
in good faith. If he does that - and who could dispute 
it or disputing it prove the opposite - the Minister 
has been given complete .discretion whether he should 
detain a subject or not.2
The Chief Justice emphasized that the observation of Lord Atkin - 
"who could dispute the good faith of the Secretary of State or 
disputing it prove the opposite ?" - pointed forcefully to the diffi­
culty or even to the futility of a challenge that a person who had 
stated an opinion did not in truth hold it. In the present case, 
said the Chief Justice;
It will not by any means suffice for the petitioner 
to establish that the Permanent Secretary was mist­
aken in thinking that the detention was necessary 
for the stated purposes. Even a mistaken opinion will 
not invalidate a detention order, and want of good 
faith can be established only by proof positive that 
the Permanent Secretary did not indeed form that 
opinion.^
Setting out his own views as to the nature of the facts, proof of
which may perhaps justify the Court in investigating an allegation
that an executive order had not been made in good faith, the Chief
Justice explained;
If it is prima facie shown that an official who makes 
a particular executive order had an antecedent motive 
against the person affected by the order, or had an 
antecedent bias in favour of a person benefitted by
1. [1942] AC 206, at 296.
2. Ibid., at 226.
3. Op.cit., at 77.
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the order, then I think the Court may call upon 
the official to disprove the existence of bias or 
to establish that his action was not influenced 
by bias. But even if such antecedent bias was to 
be shown in the circumstances of the instant case, 
the special feature of the Permanent Secretary's 
inability to disclose facts leading to the forma­
tion of his opinion might well be a reason why 
a proper investigation cannot be held.^
Samarawickrema J, who with G.P.A.Silva J expressed the majority view
in that case, observed that "it is not an objective test but the
subjective opinion of the Permanent Secretary that is the condition
of the exercise of the power". Therefore, "this Court cannot
substitute its own opinion for that of the Permanent Secretary, nor
can it examine the sufficiency or the weight or the logical relevance
3
of the reasons for which the Permanent Secretary formed his opinion".
He explained that:
It is however open to a party challenging a deten­
tion order to show, if he can do so, that the Perm­
anent Secretary never had the opinion that it was 
necessary to make an order for the detention of the 
person named and that the detention order was not 
made because he had formed an opinion as required 
by the regulation but for an ulterior object. For 
example, the order would not be in terms of the 
regulation and would be a sham if the Permanent 
Secretary were to make it for a purely private 
purpose such as the detention of the rival to the 
woman he loved. Again, if there is overwhelming 
ground for believing that no reasonable Permanent 
Secretary could form the opinion that it was nece­
ssary to make a detention order in respect of the 
person affected, it might show that the Permanent 
Secretary was acting in bad faith and that the 
detention order was not made on the basis of an 
opinion required by the regulation but from an 
improper purpose.
In Gunasekera v. Ratnavale,^  the majority of the Court pre­
ferred the restrictive approach of H.N.G.Fernando CJ to an impugned 
detention order . Alles J, who stressed that "even a dishonest or 
wrong opinion is not justiciable" explained:
If the detention is ex facie valid, it is presumed 
to be honestly made. Then arises the almost impossible 
burden for the detainee to establish that the satis­
faction or the opinion could not have been present 
due to other reasons.'
1. Ibid., at 79. 2. Ibid., at 118.
3. Ibid., at 116. 4. Ibid., at 112.
5. (1972) 76 NLR 316. 6. Ibid., at 323.
7. Ibid., at 326.
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Thamotheram J, who agreed that challenging a detention order succ­
essfully "is almost impossible", expressed his view that:
I am of the view that there is a burden on the resp­
ondent to establish prima facie that the detention 
order in question was under an emergency regulation.
Bona fides will be presumed unless the respondent's 
case itself shows mala fides or raises reasonable 
doubts as to the bona fides of executive action.
Sometimes the respondent's case may contain two 
contradictory affidavits or some admission made by 
some official and the like. If the respondent's case 
speaks with one voice that the Permanent Secretary 
had the required opinion, it is thereafter not open 
to the petitioner to challenge the prima facie case 
so established. In many cases it might suffice to 
produce the detention order alone. There may be cases 
where something more will be required. The burden on 
the respondent is only to show that the order was 
made under an emergency regulation. 1
Validity of Regulations 
Section 5 is the source of the President's regulation-making 
power. Is it open to a Court to examine the question whether a regu­
lation made by the President under that section is in fact referable
to one of the purposes enumerated therein ? It would appear not.
2
In Yasapala v. Wickremas inghe, it was argued that the
teaching service cannot reasonably be regarded as a service essen­
tial, during a period of emergency, to the life of the community, 
and that the President cannot, therefore, make an emergency regula­
tion for the maintenance of such service. The Court did not agree.
In its view, section 5 does not contain words of limitation defining 
and descriptive of the powers of the President. Instead,
The enumeration of the purposes outlined in section 5 
is a compendious means of delegating full power of 
making emergency regulations. The power to make emer­
gency regulations for the purposes indicated in sec­
tion 5 is a power to enact any kind of regulation to 
deal with the exigencies of the emergency. Section 5
confers on the President plenary powers of making
emergency regulations . . . co-extensive with that of 
Parliament.
Sharvananda J emphasized that the words used are "as appear to him
to be necessary or expedient" which is subjective, and not "as may
be necessary" which is objective. Accordingly,
The President's belief in the necessity or expediency 
of emergency regulations is conclusive of its validity.
1. Ibid., at 369.
2. S.C.M., 8 December 1980.
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The steps taken by him may be founded on information 
or apprehensions which are not known or communicated 
to the public. He is not compellable to disclose his 
mental process. His belief that the emergency regul­
ations will achieve the object of counteracting the 
emergency is sufficient justification for the regul­
ation.
There appears to be, however, one exception to this rule:
The President having deemed necessary or expedient 
to make the said regulations, it is not for this 
Court, in the absence of evidence of bad faith, to 
review what the President has done.
The clear implication, therefore, is that if mala fide is alleged,
the regulation becomes reviewable.
No petitioner has yet undertaken the burden of proving that 
an emergency regulation has been made mala fide. But if and when 
he does, section 8 will undoubtedly be placed across his path. In 
1971, in Hirdaramani v. Ratnavale,^  H.N.G.Fernando CJ drew a curious 
distinction between a detention order made by the Permanent Secret­
ary and an arrest made by a police or service officer. In regard to 
the former, in his view, there was:
a presumption that the Permanent Secretary will act 
in good faith when he makes a detention order, and 
[that] accordingly there would be no need to permit 
the courts to consider the only possible issue which 
can be raised when a detention order valid on its 
face is produced before the courts, namely, the issue 
of good faith.
In regard to the latter, he believed that:
a court must hesitate to attribute to the Prime Mini­
ster and to the Governor-General the manifestly 
unreasonable intention that any and every arrest by 
any member of the police or armed services must nece­
ssarily be accepted as valid by the courts if such 
member merely claimed that he acted under regulation 
19.
Accordingly, the Court held that an ouster clause was effectual in 
regard to the former, but not the latter. Any action taken under 
an emergency regulation being administrative or executive in 
character, this issue is unlikely to arise now in view of the exten­
sive nature of the special remedy available under the 1978 Consti­
tution in respect of the infringement of fundamental rights. But 
the issue nevertheless remains open in regard to emergency regulat­
ions made by the President which are, of course, legislative in 
character and therefore outside the purview of the special remedy.
1. Op.cit.
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Regulations and Orders Inconsistent 
with Fundamental Rights
Under section 45(4) of the 1972 Constitution, the power to
make emergency regulations did not include the power to override,
amend or suspend the operation of any provision of the Constitution.
But section 18 of the Constitution which contained the statement
of fundamental rights provided that: (1) all "existing law" shall
operate notwithstanding any inconsistency with a fundamental right,
and (2) the exercise and operation of the fundamental rights may in
certain circumstances be restricted by "law". The term "existing
law" was defined by the Constitution to mean: "all laws, written
and unwritten, in force immediately before the commencement of the
Constitution".^ "Existing written law" was defined to mean: "all
2
written laws including subordinate legislation".
The term "law" was nowhere defined. It obviously included a 
bill passed in the National State Assembly by a majority of votes
3
of the members present and voting and certified by the Speaker.
Did it also include subordinate legislation ? Section 45(4) made 
it clear that when the President made emergency regulations, he was 
exercising legislative power delegated to him by the National State 
Assembly. If "existing law" to which all the protected rights were 
sulgect included subordinate legislation, there was nothing intrin­
sically illogical in inferring that "law" in the prospective sense 
also contemplated subordinate legislation, and therefore included 
emergency regulations made by the President. Therefore, despite 
section 45(4), it would appear to have been lawful for the President 
to have made emergency regulations which had the effect of overriding, 
amending or suspending the exercise and operation of the fundamental 
rights protected by section 18(1). The 1978 Constitution, of 
course, puts this matter beyond any doubt. For the purpose of 
restricting the exercise and operation of a large number of fundam­
ental rights, law is defined to include regulations made by the
4
President under the Public Security Ordinance.
It is now proposed to examine the extent to which the executive 
infringed on fundamental rights by means of emergency regulations 
during the six year period from 1971 to 1977. Many of these regu­
lations had been made on previous occasions too; they have also been
1. S.12(1).
3. Ss.47, 48.
2. Ibid.
4. Arts.15(1), 15(7).
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re-imposed in subsequent years. They represent therefore, as 
nearly as one can possibly reach, the norm which had guided succ­
essive government in making emergency regulations, whatever the 
nature or seriousness of the crisis facing the executive might 
have been.
Right to Life
By emergency regulations, the death penalty was extended to 
the following offences:
i. destroying or damaging property with fire, any combustible 
matter, explosive or corrosive substance, missile, weapon or 
instrument;
ii. causing or attempting to cause death or injury with fire, 
any combustible matter, explosive or corrosive substance, 
missile, weapon or instrument;
iii. committing theft from vacant or unprotected premises; 
iv. impairing the efficiency or impeding the working of any
vehicle, machinery, apparatus, or other thing used or intended 
to be used in the performance of essential services;
v. committing criminal trespass or illegally removing or 
attempting to remove any goods or articles from any premises;
vi. being a member of an unlawful assembly with the object of 
doing any of the aforesaid acts.
The circumstances in which death may be caused to a wrongdoer in 
the exercise of the right of private defence of property were also 
extended by emergency regulations to include all the offences 
referred to above. These emergency regulations were first made in 
1958, and have always been repeated whenever a state of emergency 
was thereafter declared. They were in force even when the death 
penalty stood suspended for murder. The written sanction of the 
Attorney-General was required for a prosecution for any of these 
offences; such sanction being granted only if he was satisfied 
that the offence was committed in furtherance of, or in connection 
with or in the course of, a civil disturbance prevailing at or 
about the time of its commission.^
In 1953, a regulation empowered any police officer not below 
the rank of assistant superintendent or the officer-in-charge of a
1. There is no record of sentence of death having been actually 
imposed in respect of any of these offences.
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police station or any other officer or person authorised by him
"to take all such measures as may be necessary for the burial or
cremation of any dead body, and to determine in his discretion
the persons who may be permitted to be present at any assembly
for the purpose of or in connection with any such burial or
cremation". This regulation was later amended by the addition of
the following paragraph:
It shall not be necessary for any officer or person 
taking measures relating to the possession and burial 
or cremation of a dead body under this regulation to 
comply with the provisions of any other written law
relating to the inquest of death or to burial or cre­
mation.
The superseded provisions of written law included those which
required a magistrate to inquire into all cases of sudden, violent
or accidental death,'*' a medical practitioner to certify the cause 
2
of every death, and a burial or cremation to be held only in
accordance with the provisions of the Cemeteries and Burials Ordin­
ance. In other words, a police officer was empowered to have the 
body of any man buried or cremated without reporting either the 
fact, or the cause, of his death to any other person or authority, 
whether before or after such burial or cremation. To put it shortly, 
whatever reasons of administrative convenience may have motivated 
this regulation, it was a licence to kill and dispose.
Right to Liberty
1. Arrest. Under a regulation of general application, the 
power to arrest without a warrant was granted to:
any police officer, any member of the Sri Lanka Army,
Sri Lanka Navy or Sri Lanka Air Force, or the Commiss­
ioner of Prisons or any Superintendent, Assistant 
Superintendent or Probationary Superintendent of a 
Prison, or any Jailor or Deputy Jailor, or any 
Prison Guard or Prison Overseer, or any other person 
authorised by the Prime Minister to do so.
A regulation intended to deter persons of Indian origin from encro­
aching upon state lands in the Eastern Province, empowered Govern­
ment Agents and other state officers authorised in that behalf by
3
the Prime Minister to direct the arrest of alleged encroachers.
Under every state of emergency, the Secretary to the Ministry of 
Defence has enjoyed the power to make order that any person be taken
1. Criminal Procedure Code, s.9, ch.XXXII.
2. Births and Deaths Registration Act, Part IV.
3. The Emergency (Encroachment Upon State Lands) Regulation.
478
into custody and detained in custody for an indefinite period.'*'
He could do so if he was of opinion that it was necessary to do so 
"with a view to preventing such person from acting in any manner 
prejudicial to the public safety, or to the maintenance of public 
order, or to the maintenance of essential services".
2. Police Custody. Neither a person arrested in connection 
with an offence under any emergency regulation, nor a person on 
whom a detention order had been served, was required to be produced 
before a judicial officer. Instead, such person could be detained 
in any place specified by the Inspector-General of Police. Invar­
iably, arrested persons were held in police custody for as long as 
the police considered it necessary to do so. Later, the period of 
detention of an arrested person in a place authorised by the 
Inspector-General was restricted to fifteen days, after which such 
person was required to be produced before a court. Whenever the
Secretary for Defence banned a public demonstration under the
2
Emergency (Preservation of Public Order) Regulation, any police 
officer could "take any action he deems necessary to prohibit such 
public demonstration and may for that purpose arrest any person 
without warrant". A person so arrested could be held in custody in 
a police station for three days. At the end of that period, the 
Secretary for Defence, to whom the fact of the arrest was required 
to be communicated, could authorise that such person be kept in 
detention for a period of one month in any place nominated by him.
In 1975, the Exchange Control Act was amended by emergency regulat­
ion to enable the Secretary for Defence to determine where a person 
remanded by a court under that Act should be detained, and to make 
rules in respect of such detention; with that amendment of the law, 
prison custody was transformed into police custody.
3. Mandatory Remand. Several emergency regulations took away 
the discretion vested in a judge to determine whether or not a 
person produced before him should be remanded. For instance, when­
ever a person arrested in connection with an offence under any 
emergency regulation was produced before a court after a period in 
police custody, it was provided that "such court shall order that 
such person be detained in the custody of the fiscal in a prison
1. The Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulation.
2. Infra, p. 480.
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established under the Prisons Ordinance". The Emergency (Encroach­
ment Upon State Lands) Regulation provided that whenever a police 
officer produced a person arrested on the direction of a Government 
Agent or authorised office: before a judge before whom proceedings 
had been instituted against such person, "it shall thereupon be the 
duty of such judge, notwithstanding anything in any other law, to 
remand the encroacher until the conclusion of the proceedings before 
such judge".'*’ The Emergency (Protection of State Officers) Regulat­
ion provided that where any person suspected or accused of having 
caused hurt to, or used criminal force on, a state officer was 
produced before a magistrate, "the magistrate shall remand such
person unless for reasons to be recorded by him he considers the
2
complaint to be frivolous or vexatious or of a trivial nature".
4. Release. Executive order replaced judicial discretion in 
the matter of the release of persons arrested under emergency regu­
lations. Initially, it was provided that no court shall release on 
bail any person accused of any offence under chapters VI, VII or 
VIII of the Penal Code, or any offence under any emergency regu­
lation, "unless the Attorney-General has consented in writing to 
the release of that person on bail, or a police officer of a rank 
not below that of Assistant Superintendent informs the court orally 
or in writing that he does not object to the release of that person 
on bail". Thereafter, it was provided that any person held in 
custody in any prison upon the order of a magistrate and suspected 
or accused of an offence under the Explosives Act, the Offensive 
Weapons Act, the Firearms Ordinance, or under chapters VI, VII or 
VIII of the Penal Code, or under any emergency regulation, as well 
as any person who had surrendered to the authorities in connection 
with any of these offences and was consequently in prison custody, 
"shall continue to remain in such custody until he is released upon 
an order made by the Secretary to the Ministry of Justice". The 
Emergency (Protection of State Officers) Regulation required any 
person remanded under that regulation to "remain in the custody of 
the Commissioner of Prisons until the conclusion of the proceedings 
against him, unless the Secretary to the Ministry of Justice in his
1. With the implementation of land reform and the alienation 
of former tea estates for purposes of village expansion, etc., a 
widespread movement of Indian labour towards the Eastern Province 
began. Hence this regulation.
2. This regulation was made at the insistence of government
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discretion by order in writing addressed to the Commissioner of 
Prisons directs that such person be released subject to such terms 
or conditions, if any, as the Secretary may specify in such order". 
Emergency regulations first made in 1974 further restricted 
judicial discretion in the matter of release in respect of ordinary 
crime. The Emergency (Encroachment Upon State Lands) Regulation 
provided that a person on remand in connection with an offence 
under the Land Development Ordinance, the Forest Ordinance, the 
Crown Lands Ordinance or the Crown Lands Encroachments Ordinance, 
may be released on bail by a magistrate only "if the Attorney- 
General gives his written consent to such release". Another regu­
lation provided that no court shall, except with the written consent 
of the Attorney-General, order the release on bail of any person 
suspected or accused of the offence of theft, misappropriation, or 
criminal breach of trust, committed in relation to any property 
belonging to a co-operative society, bank, government department or 
st^te corporation.
Right to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly.
The power conferred on the Prime Minister by emergency regu­
lation to declare a curfew in any area in Sri Lanka was capable of 
being used to interfere with a person’s right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly. So too the authority which the Prime Minister acquired 
by regulation: (1) to prohibit generally the holding of public 
processions or public meetings in any area in Sri Lanka, and (2) to 
give directions prohibiting the holding of any particular procession 
or meeting if, in the opinion of the Prime Minister, such procession 
or meeting was likely to cause a disturbance of public order or to 
promote disaffection. Two other regulations also considerably 
encroached on the exercise of this right. The Emergency (Preservat­
ion of Public Order) Regulation, first made in 1973, provided that 
if any person takes part in, organises, incites or encourages 
another person to take part in, any public demonstration in such 
circumstances that the Secretary for Defence apprehends that there 
is a likelihood -
i. of a disturbance of public order, or
ii. that the Government Food Production Campaign may be hampered; or
iii. that the freedom of movement or assembly of any section of the
medical practitioners who complained that persons charged with 
attacks on them were being released on bail by magistrates pending 
investigation and trial.
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public may be interfered with; or
iv. that any disturbance to persons engaged in the observance or 
practice of their religion may occur, 
the Secretary may issue a notice to the Inspector-General of Police 
and to any person known or suspected to be organising or encouraging 
the organisation of, or likely to organise or to encourage the orga­
nisation of, such public demonstration, to the effect that he has 
banned such demonstration. Any defiance of such notice was punish­
able with fine, imprisonment and the forfeiture of all property.
The Emergency (Prevention of Incitement) Regulation, first made in 
1974, declared it to be an offence for any person, at a public meet­
ing or in the course of a public procession, by words, signs, visible 
representations or by conduct, to incite or attempt to incite 
another to use any form of physical force or violence, commit a 
breach of the peace, or disobey or obstruct the execution of the law. 
It was also an offence for any person: (1) to assist, whether by 
financial contributions or otherwise, in the organisation of any 
meeting or procession; or (2) to participate in or attend a process­
ion or meeting at which the aforesaid offence is committed. The 
penalties for violation of this regulation also included the forfeit­
ure of all property. Where an offence was committed at a meeting or 
in the course of a procession organised by a political party, every 
member of the governing body of that political party was deemed to 
be guilty of that offence.
In mid-1973, the United National Party announced that it would
perform "satyagraha" around Parliament House "for rain, food and
justice". As marchers converged from many directions in the city,
barricades erected by the police prevented them from reaching their
destination. The next satyagraha was scheduled to be performed in
the Prime Minister's constituency of Attanagalla between 2 p.m. and
4 p.m. on 9 December 1973. It was a day of religious significance,
being the Unduwap Full Moon Day, and satyagraha was to be performed
at the Attanagalla Raja Maha Vihare, the principal temple in the
district. According to the Ceylon Daily News:
The people of Attanagalla and surrounding areas preven­
ted UNP satyagrahis from entering Attanagalla yesterday.
They formed human barricades on all approach roads, and 
at seme points trees and other obstacles were placed
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across roads. Large banners, black flags and 
posters denouncing the satyagraha were up all 
over Attanagalla and the surrounding areas.1
Two days later, the Prime Minister told the National State Assembly
that the people of Attanagalla had a democratic right to block the
road, as they were opposed to the satyagraha campaign. She added:
"I am proud that the people of Attanagalla could put up such a
2
courageous fight". The next satyagraha was fixed for 8 January
1974 - the Duruthu Full Moon Day - at the historic Maha Mevuna Uyana
in Anuradhapura. On 4 January, the Secretary for Defence, acting
in terms of the Emergency (Preservation of Public Order) Regulation,
3banned the proposed satyagraha. In a communique issued on the same 
day, the Government announced that it had decided to prohibit the 
holding of this satyagraha for the following reasons:
1. The promotion of political agitation in a sacred city is inappro­
priate.
2. The Duruthu Full Moon Day, when a large body of pilgrims will 
congregate from all over the island at Anuradhapura to observe 
ata-sil and to engage themselves in other religious activities, 
is not a suitable date for political activities, agitations and 
demonstrations.
3. The possibility that there would be breaches of the peace, 
particularly in view of the likelihood that persons who are
: opposed to the satyagraha campaign would attempt to organise
counter-demonstrations.
4. The leader of the UNP had written to the President expressing 
his own apprehension of a possible breach of the peace.
5. Recent rains has led to an increased enthusiasm on the part of 
the farmers for food production activities. The holding of the 
satyagraha would seriously disrupt these activities and divert 
the attention of the people to essentially non-productive and 
even counter-productive fields.
6. It is the responsibility of the Government on behalf of the
4
people to take all effective measures to maintain law and order.
1. Ceylon Daily News, 10 December 1973. For the UNP version of 
the events at Attanagalla, see T.D.S.A.Dissanayake, J.R.Jayewardene, 
op.cit., at pp.53-54; Kariyakarawana, The People's President, op.cit., 
at pp.135-137. See also Sun, 10 December 1973.
2. Sun, 12 December 1973.
3. Ibid., 5 January 1974.
4. For the full text of the communique, see Sun, 5 January 1974. 
For an account of the events at Anur adhapura, see ibid., 9 January 
1974.
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On 20 March 1974, the Opposition parties announced a new
programme "to compel the Government to resign and hold a general
election".^ Having regard to the fact that the Government had not
even completed serving the fourth year of the five-year term for
2
which it was initially elected, this campaign appeared to be 
somewhat premature. The proposed strategy, which was set out in 
a statement issued on that day, appeared to be calculated to create 
public disorder. That statement called for:
i. the holding of at least one hundred meetings all over the
3
country, if possible on one day;
ii. the people to meet their respective Members of Parliament 
and represent their grievances;
iii. all members belonging to the political parties of the Opposit­
ion in those local bodies whose terms had been extended by 
emergency regulations to resign their seats;
iv. a boycott of state organisations such as District Political
4
Authorities;
v. officials in the public sector to refrain from carrying out 
illegal orders of the Government, with a promise of adequate 
compensation by the next government for any resulting 
injustice;
vi. an island-wide "protest day" of travel by bus and train 
without payment of fares, as a protest against the rise in 
bus and train fares;"*
vii. an island-wide "protest day" of transporting a token quantity 
of rice, as a protest against the emergency regulation which 
prohibited the transport of rice.
1. Sun, 21 March 1974.
2. The 1972 Constitution provided for a five-year term for 
this Government, commencing in May 1972.
3. It might not have been unusual to have such a number of meet­
ings on a single day in the course of a general election campaign. 
But on this occasion, the Government feared that item (i) would be 
followed up by item (ii), and that those present at each meeting 
would be urged, if not incited, to storm the residence of the local 
Member of Parliament immediately thereafter in order to intimidate 
him to resign.
4. The Government was at this time attempting to decentralise 
the budget and to establish a political authority at the district 
level to assume responsibility for the utilisation of capital expen­
diture. The "political authority" was the precursor of the "dist­
rict minister" introduced by the UNP Government in 1978.
5. The increase in bus and train fares in January 1974 was 
consequent to the sudden and unexpected rise in world oil prices.
6. This emergency regulation was made at the request of the
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The UNP made preparations to hold 140 protest meetings - one 
in each electorate - on 21 April 1974, which was the first death 
anniversary of its former leader and Prime Minister, Dudley Senana- 
yake. Through the newspapers of the Independent Newspapers Limited 
Group - the Sun, Davasa and Dinapathi - considerable publicity was 
given to the arrangements being made for these meetings, while 
counter propaganda was set in motion by the pro-government newspap­
ers and the state-controlled radio. Eventually, on the afternoon 
of Saturday 20 April, the following Order was made by the Prime 
Minister under emergency powers which she enjoyed:
2. The holding in any part of Sri Lanka of any public 
procession or meeting whatsoever organised directly 
or indirectly by the United National Party or by 
any of its members or by any other organsiation or 
person or body or group of persons at the instance 
of or in association with the United National Party 
or any of its members or in which any member of the 
United National Party participates, is hereby prohi­
bited:
Provided, however, that the preceding provisions 
of this paragraph shall not prevent the holding of 
any procession or meeting in the case of which the 
following conditions are satisfied:
(a) that the Inspector-General of Police, being 
satisfied that the holding of such procession 
or meeting is not likely to be prejudicial to 
the public safety or to the maintenance of public 
order or to the maintenance of essential serv­
ices, has in his absolute discretion granted a 
permit authorising the procession or meeting;
(b) that the total number of persons taking part in 
such procession or meeting does not exceed such 
number as may be specified in the permit so 
granted; and
(c) that such procession or meeting canmences or 
disperses within such period as may be specified 
in the permit authorising the procession or 
meeting.
3. Where in the course of any procession or meeting held 
on the authority of a permit granted under the proviso 
to paragraph 2 of this Order, any person incites or 
attempts to incite the inhabitants of Sri Lanka or any 
section, class or group of them to the use of any form 
of physical force or violence, breaches of the peace, 
disobedience of the law or obstruction of the execution 
of the law, such procession or meeting shall be deemed 
to be a procession or meeting, as the case may be, held 
in contravention of paragraph 2 of this Order.
Minister of Agriculture in the hope that it would prevent the hoarding 
of rice at a time when stocks were scarce. A lorry used to transport 
any quantity of rice was automatically forfeited to the State. This 
was an ill-conceived regulation which caused considerable hardship
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4. For the purposes of this Order, a certificate 
from the officer-in-charge of the Police Stat­
ion of the area in which a procession or meet­
ing is held to the effect that any person is a 
member of the United National Party shall be 
conclusive proof thereof.1
The Emergency (Prevention of Incitement) Regulation, referred to
above, was also made on the same day. Perhaps in anticipation of
such measures, the UNP leader, J.R.Jayewardene announced that a
Government ban on the meetings would amount to "stifling the voice
of the Opposition and restricting the monopoly of speech, writing
and assembly to the Government Party only". He asserted that:
The Opposition cannot and will not submit to this 
method. Undemocratic laws we need not obey.2
At a meeting of the Security Council held on 20 April, the
Inspector-General of Police informed the Prime Minister that, in
the event of the Opposition defying the ban on meetings, the police
3
had neither the resources nor the capacity to enforce it. There­
upon, again acting under emergency regulations, the Prime Minister 
imposed a twenty-four hour curfew throughout the country on Sunday 
21 April. Explaining her action in a broadcast to the nation, Mrs. 
Bandaranaike said:
The Government has been watching with concern during 
the past few weeks, the escalation of activities by 
the United National Party and its allies which were 
designed and executed to result in mass breach of 
peace and civil commotion. The country too could not 
have been unaware of the mounting tension which would 
have culminated in an imminent threat to law and order 
and in inevitable chaos . . .
We are literally fighting to survive and needed the 
fullest mobilisation of our natural resources and the 
energies of our people to overcome our difficulties.
It is in such a situation that frustrated politicians 
and notorious agents of the propertied classes and 
vested interests have chosen to abuse the freedoms of 
parliamentary democracy which we have cherished and 
protected at all times, to sabotage the production 
effort, incite the people against the Government and 
if possible bring down the Government by violence and 
civil commotion . . /
She referred to economic and social changes effected by her Govern­
ment:
Their efforts to foment civil disorder have an element 
of desperation: for they are aware that the land reform,
and injustice. It was revoked after some months on the insistence 
of the Cabinet.
1. Times of Ceylon, 22 April 1974; Ceylon Daily News, 20 April 1974.
2. Sun, 20 April 1974. 3. Private information.
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the housing reform, income tax reforms, the legal 
reforms and other reforms this Government has int­
roduced and is implementing are now reaching the 
people and are hitting their own supporters where 
it hurts them most . . .
Referring specifically to the ban on UNP meetings, she said:
As a first step, therefore, I have decided to pro­
hibit all public meetings and demonstrations of 
the UNP, beginning with the so-called 150 meetings 
being planned for 21 April in various parts of the 
country. I am satisfied that the purpose of these 
meetings is aimed at incitement and organisation 
of law-breaking, sabotage and commotion on an un­
precedented scale.
I should like to say right now that if and when 
I am satisfied that the UNP and its leaders have 
abandoned their campaign to foment civil disorder, 
breaches of the law and violence, I shall not 
hesitate to remove the restrictions on their act­
ivity which they themselves by their efforts to 
foment and organise civil disorder have compelled 
me to impose today. They will then be able to 
function with no less freedom than any other poli­
tical party now in Opposition. 1
The Ceylon Federation of Labour, which was organised under
the aegis of the Lanka Sama Samaj Party, then a constituent part
of the Government, convened its annual conference for 15 and 16
November 1974. Its programme was to conclude with a procession
from Campbell Park to Hyde Park, where a public meeting was due to
be held. These events were to commemmorate the 39th anniversary
of the LSSP. In response to an application made to the police for
a route permit from Campbell Park to Hyde Park, the Prime Minister
informed the General Secretary of the LSSP by letter that since
"demonstrations divert personnel and material from the current
production effort", it was not desirable that they should be 
2
encouraged. Refusing to be "forced to production through denial
3
of the right of demonstration", the delegates' conference of the 
CFL decided to defy the order and hold the demonstration as planned. 
At 1 p.m. on Saturday 16 November, while CFL delegates were assemb­
ling at Campbdtl Park for the start of the procession, the acting 
Prime Minister, Maithripala Senanayake, imposed a curfew throughout 
the Colombo district. The curfew was operative until 6 a.m. on the
1. Ceylon Daily News, 22 April 1974. This Order was revoked 
on 31 August 1974 after an exchange of letters between the leader 
of the UNP and the Prime Minister.
2. Statement of the Ceylon Federation of Labour, Ceylon Daily 
News, 18 November 1974.
3. Ibid.
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following morning, and Prime Minister Mrs.Bandaranaike who flew 
into curfew-bound Colombo at the end of a state visit to the Soviet 
Union announced that it was she who had telephoned instructions to 
Senanayake from Georgia to take steps to prevent the trade union 
procession from being held. The Prime Minister explained that, in 
view of the large amount of money which would be incurred on trans­
port and batta for police and service personnel required to maintain 
law and order at such processions, she had decided to disallow pro­
cessions in general, other than: (1) religious and funeral process­
ions which will be allowed by the officer-in-charge of a police 
station, subject to normal security considerations; and (2) May Day 
processions, processions connected with the annual sessions of 
recognised political parties, Bandaranaike Commemnoration Day pro­
cessions, and United Front processions held at the district level 
and organised by the three coalition parties jointly.^-
Right to Freedom of Association
Having a direct bearing on this right was the emergency regu­
lation which empowered the Prime Minister to proscribe any organis­
ation if she "is of opinion that there is a danger of action by, or 
of the utilisation of, the organisation or its members or adherents" 
for a purpose prejudicial to the public safety, the maintenance of 
public order, or the maintenance of essential services. Upon pros­
cription, every act performed in connection with, or in relation to, 
such organisation, became a prohibited act. In other words, a 
proscribed organisation ceased to have any legal existence. During 
the six year period of emergency from 1971 to 1977, the Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna stood proscribed.
The Emergency (Prohibition of Para Military Exercises) Regu­
lation prohibited persons from organising themselves for the purpose 
of drilling or exercise, except upon a permit issued in that behalf 
by the superintendent of police of the area. Exempted from the 
operation of this regulation were members of the police and armed
1. Letter from Mrs.Bandaranaike to Bernard Soysa, General Secre­
tary, LSSP: Daily Mirror, January 1975 (date not available). By 
allowing only processions held to commemnorate the founder of the 
SLFP and those organised by the constituent parties of the Govern­
ment, the Prime Minister was clearly discriminating against the 
Opposition political parties. The question whether, and to what 
extent, civil and political rights may be suppressed in order to 
secure economic development is not examined in this study. For a 
recent examination of this subject, see Alan McChesney, "Promoting
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services, and drilling or exercise organised in schools. "Drilling" 
was defined to include marching in groups or formations, and train­
ing persons in armed or unarmed combat. A number of left-wing trade 
unions were affected by this regulation. The Government explained 
that the regulation was necessitated by "the probable growth of 
private armies".^
Right to Freedom of Movement
Three emergency regulations were capable of being applied to
restrict the exercise and operation of this right. The first of
these empowered "any police officer of a rank not below that of a
sergeant, any member of the Sri Lanka Army of a rank not below that
of a corporal, any member of the Sri Lanka Navy of a rank not below
that of a leading seaman, or any member of the Sri Lanka Air Force
of a rank not below that of a corporal" to:
order any person or persons in or about any public 
road, railway, public park, public recreation ground 
or other public ground, seashore, or in or about, or 
in the vicinity of, the premises of any public build­
ing or goverment department, to remove himself or 
themselves from that place.
The order was enforceable by the use of force, including armed force. 
The second, which related to the curfew, empowered the Prime Minister 
to direct that no person in any area in Sri Lanka shall, between such 
hours or during such period as may be specified, be on any public 
road, railway, public park, public recreation ground or other public 
ground, or the seashore, or any other building or premises or place, 
except under the authority of a written permit granted by the comp­
etent authority. The third, the Emergency (Control of Exit of 
Citizens of Sri Lanka) Regulation provided that no citizen of Sri 
Lanka shall leave the country except with the authority of an exit 
permit issued in that behalf by the Controller of Immigration and 
Emigration. The regulation also empowered the Minister of Defence, 
on the ground of public security or in the national interest, to 
direct the Controller not to issue an exit permit to any citizen.
To enforce this regulation, an extensive bureaucratic network was 
erected, and a prospective traveller experienced considerable delay 
while his application was examined and processed by the immigration 
authorities, the CID, the special investigation unit probing the
the gendral-welfare: in a: democratic society: Balancing human rights 
and development" (Unpublished, 1980).
1. Madras Hindu, 21 December 1974.
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insurgency, and the special branch of the police investigating 
exchange control and currency offences. Any one of these State 
agencies could, and sometimes did, apply an embargo on the proposed 
travel.^
Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression
Several emergency regulations either restricted, or facilit­
ated the restriction of, the exercise and operation of this right.
The offence of sedition, which is ordinarily punishable with 
a maximum sentence of two years simple imprisonment, was made puni­
shable with a minimum term of three months and a maximum term of 
twenty years rigorous imprisonment. Its definition was also extended 
to include, inter alia, any attempt to bring the Government or the 
Constitution into hatred or contempt. The Emergency (Prevention of 
Subversion) Regulation made it an offence for any person:
(a) otherwise than in proceedings in the National State Assembly 
or before a court of law, to deny or in any manner defy, chall­
enge or question the validity of the Constitution or of any 
provision thereof;
(b) to incite, encourage, or induce any person to defy in any 
manner, or to act in derogation of, the Constitution or of the 
authority of any institution or office established, appointed 
or recognised thereunder or in defiance of the laws made, 
enacted or recognised thereunder.
Where an offence under this regulation was committed by a recognised 
political party, such party forfeited its status under the law as a 
recognised political party as well as all its movable and immovable 
property.
The printing and publication of newspapers, journals, maga­
zines and pamphlets was sought to be controlled in the following 
manner:
1. The competent authority was empowered to give directions preven­
ting or restricting the publication in Sri Lanka of matter which 
might be prejudicial to the interests of public security or the 
preservation of public order or the maintenance of supplies and 
services essential to the life of the community, or of matter 
inciting or encouraging persons to mutiny, riot or civil commo­
tion. For the purpose of exercising this power, the competent
1. For details, see the evidence of Nihal Jayawickrama, Proceed­
ings of the Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry, January-July, 
1979.
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authority could require that any material be submitted or exhib­
ited to him before publication. The contravention of a direction 
could be dealt with in one of the following ways:
a) a newspaper publisher who had been convicted of the offence 
of contravening a direction may be directed by the Prime 
Minister not to publish a newspaper in Sri Lanka for a 
specified period;
b) a newspaper publisher may be directed by the competent 
authority not to print, publish or distribute, or in any way 
be concerned in the printing, publication or distribution of 
such newspaper for a specified period;
c) the competent authority may direct that the printing press 
in which such newspaper was published shall, for a specified 
period, not be used for any purpose whatsoever, compliance 
being secured by authorising a specified person to take 
possession of such printing press or the premises in which 
it is situated.
2. The competent authority was empowered, if he was of opinion that 
there is or has been or is likely to be published in any newspaper 
matter which is, in his opinion, calculated to be prejudicial to 
the interests of public security or the preservation of public 
order or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to 
the life of the community, or matter inciting or encouraging 
persons to mutiny, riot or civil commotion, to:
a) direct that no person shall print, publish or distribute or 
in any way be concerned in the printing, publication or 
distribution of such newspaper for a specified period; and
b) direct that the printing press in which such newspaper was 
printed not be used, for a specified period, for any purpose 
whatsoever, and for the purpose of securing compliance with 
that direction, authorise any specified person to take poss­
ession of such printing press or of the premises in which it 
is situated.
3. The competent authority was empowered, if he was of opinion 
that any printing press, or the printing press under the 
control of any person, has been or is likely to be used for 
the production of any document containing matter which is in 
his opinion calculated to prejudice the interests of public
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security or the preservation of public order or the maintenance 
of essential services and supplies, or matter inciting or enco­
uraging persons to mutiny, riot or civil commotion, to direct 
that such printing press, or all or any of the printing presses 
under the control of such person, not be used, for a specified 
period, for any purpose whatsoever, and, for the purpose of 
securing compliance with such directions, authorise any speci­
fied person to take possession of such printing press or of the 
premises in which it is situated.
An emergency regulation which amended the Newspapers Ordinance 
provided that no person shall print or publish any new newspaper 
except on the authority of a permit issued in that behalf by the 
competent authority. It was declared to be an offence to affix in 
any place visible to the public or to distribute among the public, 
any posters, handbills or leaflets, except with the permission of 
the Inspector-General of Police or of any police officer authorised 
in that behalf by him. Whoever without lawful authority or reason­
able cause had in his possession, custody or control, any book, 
document or paper:
containing any writing or representation which is 
likely to be prejudicial to the interests of public 
security or to the preservation of public order or 
which is likely to arouse, encourage or promote 
feelings of hatred or contempt to the Government 
or which is likely to incite any person directly or 
indirectly to take any step towards the overthrowing 
of the Government,
was guilty of an offence.
On the afternoon of Friday 19 April 1974, at a meeting of the 
government parliamentary group which had been convened to discuss 
the threatened civil disobedience campaign of the Opposition and, 
in particular, the 140 meetings scheduled to be held two days later, 
it was decided that action should be taken to stop the publication 
of the newspapers of the Independent Newspapers Limited Group.^ 
Accordingly, later that night, the appropriate orders were made 
under the relevant emergency regulation by the competent authority,
1. The subject had previously been discussed by the Ministers 
and the service chiefs earlier in the week. On Friday morning, the 
Prime Minister decided to seek the views of the government parlia­
mentary group. On the advice of the Attorney-General, an amendment 
to the relevant emergency regulation was made that night by the
President to enable the appropriate order to be made by the ccmp- 
etent authority. The unamended regulation required a warning prior 
to closure.
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Ridgeway Tillekeratne, and served on the publishers. With the
assistance of the Government Printer and the police, the presses
were then sealed.'*' In a speech broadcast to the nation, the Prime
Minister explained that:
Government has already announced measures that are 
being taken to prevent the circulation of false and 
malicious rumours that have been made a fine art by 
these interested circles. In a small country like 
our's, where most people know most other people, the 
invention and circulation of malicious stories is 
a remarkably effective political and social weapon.
This pernicious practice has to be brought to an end.
In this connection, I have also had to pay serious 
attention to the criminal irresponsibility of certain 
newspaper magnates who refuse to learn from the 
experience of others and insist on abusing the trust 
that people repose in the profession of journalism.
Our patience with these people has been monumental, 
but they refuse to show any higher sense of respon­
sibility.
I am satisfied that these journals have played no 
small part in the organisation and promotion of the 
campaign for civil disorder. They have continuously 
published falsehoods, distortions, and above all, 
given prominence to the UNP's campaign for civil 
disorder.
I have no alternative but to seal their press and 
thus prevent them from spreading their invented or 
deliberately distorted untruths and half-truths which 
they mistake for journalistic enterprise and the 
promotion of the so-called public good. This action 
is being taken against the ’Davasa’ and ’Sun' news­
paper business in the hope that the opportunity of 
reflecting on their misdeeds will offer them the means 
of self-correction.
We have no desire to convert the newspapers into 
state enterprises. At the same time, no Government 
can allow the immense power of the press to be 
prostituted for narrow and selfish ends. I am 
always mindful of the sorry treatment extended to the 
Opposition press by the UNP Government of 1965-70.
The 'Jana Dina' and 'Aththa' were not newspapers 
with great resources such as that Government had.
But the UNP Government banned their transport in 
CTB buses, sealing the presses at which they were 
being printed, and harassed them in various other 
ways, including vexatious prosecutions. What was worse, 
these presses were closed down for petty personal 
considerations connected with some potentate. We have 
refused to be motivated in this way.2
1- Tillekeratne then held the substantive offices of Director 
of Information, Director-General of Broadcasting, Chairman of the 
Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation and Secretary to the Ministry of 
Information. He was, however, not present at any of the meetings at 
which the question of the closure of this newspaper group was dis­
cussed. 2. Ceylon Daily News, 22 April 1974.
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A few days later, in the National State Assembly, the Prime Minister
reiterated that:
The Davasa press was sealed for more serious reasons.
It gave support to a civil disobedience campaign, 
flouting of emergency regulations preventing the 
transport of rice, and other reasons. It had also 
tried to incite people. In 1958, the Lake House set 
the country on fire during the communal riots. The 
Davasa group had attempted a similar task. If the 
Davasa group was prepared to act in a peaceful manner,  ^
a request for them to publish papers will be considered.
Two years later, Independent Newspapers Limited instituted an action 
for damages in the District Court of Colombo. When notice of action 
was received by the Attorgffy-General, he called for the observations 
of the competent authority. In a statement setting out the grounds 
upon which he formed his "opinion" when he made the first Order on 
19 April 1974, Tillekeratne set out reasons which were totally diff­
erent from those asserted repeatedly by the Prime Minister. Accord-
to his statement, his "opinion" was as follows:
The world at this time was undergoing a severe food 
shortage and its effect naturally was felt in our
country. Therefore, the Prime Minister, a few months
prior to action being taken against the Independent 
Newspapers Limited, declared a Production War and 
geared the entire machinery of government to the 
production of more food as the survival of people in 
this country, as it was in the rest of the world, 
was critically dependent on it. The people of this 
country immediately took to the production of var­
ious types of food, especially yams. Even among the 
various types of yams, a very large extent was to 
be under manioc, especially in homesteads. One of 
the major policy aims of this group of newspapers 
apeared to be to dissuade people from eating these 
yams. Death due to manioc poisoning is common at any 
time in this country. This group of newspapers, not 
taking into account the fact that such deaths were 
reported over the years and get scant attention, if 
at all, in the press, continued to highlight deaths 
of this type. This would have had an adverse effect 
on the cultivation and therefore brought about a 
shortage in supplies. This also brought about or may 
have brought about, a fear in the minds of people 
to cultivate this yam which would have negated the 
attempt of the people to grow their own food for 
survival.2
The order of closure served on the newspaper company was renewed
1. Ceylon Daily News, 29 April 1974. For a journalist’s account 
of the trauma of the closure, see Iqbal Athas, "Midnight Drama at 
the SUN", Sun, 31 March 1977.
2. Special Presidential Commission, Third Interim Report, op. 
cit., at p.141.
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every month until January 1977. For thirty-three months, the 
competent authority had regularly signed orders of closure in 
respect of a national newspaper group on the basis of an "opinion" 
that it was necessary to do so because that newspaper group was 
discouraging people from cultivating a particular subsidiary crop. 
His opinion did not appear to have been shared by the political 
authority responsible for invoking the state of public emergency.
But whether or not it was, neither that "opinion" nor the reason 
offered by the Prime Minister in April 1974, appears to justify 
in any way the denial, for such an unconscionably long period of 
time, of the freedom of speech and expression, not only of the 
newspapers' proprietors and editors, but also of the large section 
ofthe population who had the right to receive the information and 
ideas which that newspaper group was seeking to disseminate.
Right to Free, Fair and Periodic Elections
On 3 October 1972, the 74-year old leader of the Federal
Party, S. J.V.Chelvanayakam,Q.C., Member of Parliament for Kankes-
anturai, resigned his seat in the National State Assembly. In a
statement to the Assembly on the same day, he said:
It is claimed by the Government that a sizeable section 
of the Tamil people accept the Constitution. We deny 
this and want to give an opportunity to the Government 
to prove that claim. The best way in which that can be 
done is for me, as the leader of the Tamil United Front, 
to resign my seat in this Honourable House and recontest 
it on my policy and ask the Government to oppose me on 
its policy. Of course, the decision will be that of the 
Tamil people. My policy will be that in view of the 
events that have taken place the Tamil people of Ceylon 
should have the right to determine their future, whe­
ther they are to be a subject race in Ceylon or they are 
to be a free people. I shall ask the people to vote 
for me on the second of these alternatives. Let the 
Government contest me on that position. If I lose,
I give up my policy. If the Government loses, let it 
not say that the Tamil people support its policy and 
its Constitution.1
The Constitution required the Clerk to the National State Assembly
to inform the President that the seat of a member had fallen vacant;
the President was thereupon required within one month, by notice in
the Gazette, to order the holding of an election to fill the vacancy.
The Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Order in Council 1946 provided
that in every notice ordering the holding of an election, the
1. Ceylon Daily News, 4 October 1972.
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President shall specify the day of nomination, not being less than 
sixteen days nor more than one month after the publication of the 
notice, and the place of nomination. These steps were duly taken 
in respect of the vacancy created by the resignation of Chelvanaya- 
kam. However, an emergency regulation made in November 1972 provided 
that:
The nomination of candidates for the purpose of the 
election to be held to fill the vacancy for the 
Electoral District of Kankesanturai in the National 
State Assembly shall not take place for so long, and 
so long only, as Part II of the Public Security Ord­
inance is in operation in the area comprising that 
Electoral District or any part thereof, and accord­
ingly that part of the notice published in Gazette 
Extraordinary No.31/8 of November 1, 1972, fixing 
the date and place of nomination of candidates for 
such election shall be deemed for all purposes to be 
of no effect.
This regulation was renewed every month until January 1975, and the 
impending by-election, which was intended by the Constitution to be 
held at least within a reasonable time, was thereby postponed for 
over two years. When it was eventually held on 6 February 1975, 
Chelvanayakam was re-elected by a majority which was treble that 
by which he had initially won that seat in 1970.^
An Assessment
International law recognises the right of a State to derogate
from its obligation to protect human rights during times of public
emergency. To describe the exceptional circumstances in which this
may be done, the ICCPR uses the words "in time of public emergency
which threatens the life of the nation". ECHR has clarified the
meaning to be given to this phrase by referring to "in time of war
3
or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation".
ACHR has sought to qualify it further by referring to "in time of 
war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independ-
4
ence or security of a State Party". Therefore, the internationally 
accepted minimum pre-requisite for any derogation by a State from 
its obligation to respect the fundamental rights of its citizens at
1. Times of Ceylon, 7 February 1975.
2. Art.4(1).
3. Art. 15(1).
4. Art. 27(1).
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all times is the existence or imminence of a state of public emer­
gency which actually threatens the life of the nation. In Lawless
v. Ireland,^- the European Court observed that the natural and 
customary meaning of these words is sufficiently clear: they refer 
to an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects 
the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life
of the community of which the State is composed. In Denmark,
2
Norway, Sweden and Netherlands v. Greece, the European Commission 
distinguished four separate elements in this definition, namely:
1. The public emergency must be actual and imminent.
2. Its effects must involve the whole nation.
3. The continuance of the organised life of the community must be 
threatened.
4. The crisis or danger must be exceptional in that the normal 
measures or restrictions permitted for the maintenance of public 
safety, health and order are plainly inadequate.
In Sri Lanka, however, any situation, whether localised or otherwise, 
which appeared to be incapable of being dealt with by or under the 
existing law, has been viewed as a state of public emergency. The 
threshold has also been lowered to meet a challenge to or criticism 
of the Government, to stifle political agitation, to frustrate strike 
action, and evert to interfere with the election process. The use of 
the public security law to facilitate the Central Bank to substitute 
new currency notes for the old shows the extent to which the Govern­
ment has been prepared to disregard the norms whose observance is 
vital to maintain the proper balance between State security and 
individual rights.
1. 3227/57, Judgment: 1 EHRR 15. In applying these principles, 
the European Court held that the existence on 5 July 1957 of a 
"public emergency threatening the life of the nation" had been 
reasonably deduced by the respondent Government from a combination 
of several factors, namely, the existence in the territory of the 
Republic of Ireland of a secret army engaged in unconstitutional 
activities and using violence to attain its purposes; the fact that 
this army was also operating outside the territory of the State, 
thus jeopardising the relations of the Republic of Ireland with its 
neighbour; and the steady and alarming increase in terrorist 
activities from the autumn of 1956 and throughout the first half
of 1957.
2. 3321-23/67 and 3347/67, Report: YB 12.
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International law requires that any derogation from a State's 
obligation to respect human rights, following the declaration of a
state of emergency, must be limited "to the extent strictly required
1 2 by the exigencies of the situation". In Ireland v. United Kingdom,
the European Commission observed that the justification for a 
measure does not follow automatically from a high level of violence: 
there must be a link between the facts of the emergency on the one 
hand, and the measure chosen to deal with it on the other. In this 
respect too, the Sri Lankan law and experience fall short of inter­
national standards. While the question whether a state of emergency 
exists or is imminent may, by its very nature, be incapable of being 
reviewed by a court, there is no reason why the validity of, or 
necessity for, an emergency regulation or an order made thereunder, 
should be non-justiciable. A court does not lack the competence to 
determine, on an objective examination of the material available to 
the State, in camera if need be, whether the detention of a person 
is warranted in terms of the law; or whether the closure of a group 
of newspapers, or the banning of a series of public meetings, or the 
postponement of a scheduled election, is "strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation". The fact that proceedings are taken 
in a court in respect of such a matter is unlikely to impede govern­
mental action to deal with the actual "emergency", and any inconven­
ience such proceedings may cause to the State authorities is simply 
the price which must be paid for keeping in rhythm the hearbeats of 
democracy.
However critical the "emergency" may be, international law
insists that action be not taken in derogation of certain fundamen- 
3
tal rights. These are the right to life, freedom from torture, 
freedom from slavery and servitude, the right not to be imprisoned 
merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation, 
the right not to be punished on the basis of a retroactive law, the 
right to recognition as a person before the law, and freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. Even in this regard, the Sri 
Lankan experience is in conflict with international standards. 
Emergency regulations have, on many occasions, extended the applic­
ation of the death penalty for offences of comparative triviality
1. ICCPR, Art.4(1); ECHR, Art.15(1); ACHR, Art.27(1).
2. 5310/71, Report: 25 January 1976.
3. ICCPR, Art.4(1); ECHR, Art.15(2); ACHR, Art.27(2).
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such as trespass and theft; while the inapplicability of the 
Prisons Ordinance to detainees and other prisoners has, in effect, 
deprived them of the protection which the law affords against 
inhuman or degrading treatment while in custody. The 1978 Consti­
tution now expressly authorises derogation during a state of public 
emergency from the rule which prohibits the retroactivity of the 
criminal law.
CHAPTER VIII
A BILL OF RIGHTS
When in 1948 Jennings expressed the view that because in 
Britain "we do the job better" without a bill of rights, Ceylon 
too did not need to have one, he was, no doubt, expressing the 
hope that the standard bearer of the New Commonwealth would, in 
most respects, do its own job as well as the mother country.
There was reason for him to be optimistic. It was an optimism 
which could have been rationally explained and which was shared 
by many in Ceylon at that time: few countries had emerged into
Independence with such solid foundations of freedom.
History, unfortunately, has taken a different course. The 
informal constraints that operate in Britain are now virtually 
non-existent in Sri Lanka. The constitutional conventions of 
Westminster are rarely observed. A consensus between different 
competing forces is no longer in evidence. For instance, a
unifying figure in the form of a constitutional Head of State
1 2 does not now exist. The second chamber has been abolished. The
elected legislature has extended its own life without recourse
3
to a general election. When a poll is held, it is usually 
accompanied by violence, intimidation and impersonation on a
4
massive scale. The Government has used its parliamentary 
majority to immobilise the leader of the largest political party 
in opposition to it by disfranchising her and then expelling her 
from the legislature.^ Some years ago, Parliament even attempted
1. Under the 1978 Constitution, the President is both Head of 
State and Head of Government, as well as Chairman of the Cabinet 
and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Services. The incumbent Pres­
ident is also the leader of the ruling political party.
2. The Senate was abolished in 1971. Other safeguards for 
minorities such as section 29 of the 1946 Constitution and an inde­
pendent Public Service Commission ceased to exist in 1972.
3. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, passed by Parlia­
ment and approved at a referendum by 38 per cent of the registered 
voters, provided that the Parliament elected in 1977 shall continue 
for twelve years instead of six as previously provided in the 
Constitution.
4. Civil Rights Movement, Was the Referendum Free and Fair ? 
(Colombo: 1983).
5. Supra, pp.226-229.
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to compel the execution of two prisoners despite their death
sentences having been set aside by the appellate court.^ The
Government holds seventy-five per cent of the shares in one
national newspaper group, controls another under the Business
Acquisition Act, and kept a third sealed up for nearly three
2
years under emergency regulations. Judges have frequently been
removed from office without cause or compensation or resort to
3
the constitutional procedure. Relations between the two major 
communities have seriously deteriorated, and new generations, 
educated separately in Sinhala or Tamil, are unable to communicate 
with each other even if they wish to. Indeed, for nearly half of 
its independent existence, Sri Lanka has been in a state of 
emergency, with its attendant censorship, preventive detention and 
police excesses. Therefore, while the United Kingdom may yet 
indulge in debate on whether or not it requires a bill of rights, 
the circumstances peculiar to Sri Lanka are such that a constitu­
tional affirmation of fundamental rights appears to be vitally 
necessary to stem the tide which is moving rapidly from intolerance 
and authoritarianism towards absolutism.
Content, Form and Scope
According to John P.Humphrey, who was Director of the United 
Nations Human Rights Division from 1946 to 1966, there are few 
instruments which are more representative of the will and aspirat­
ions of the international community than is the Universal Declarat­
ion of Human Rights:
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights reflects many 
different political philosophies. It had no father in 
the sense that Jefferson was the father of the American 
Declaration of Independence. Not even the Commission on 
Human Rights or the Third Committee of the General Ass­
embly or the two combined can claim sole authorship.
The Declaration is the work of literally thousands of 
people representing many points of view who contributed 
to the drafting through various United Nations bodies, 
the specialised agencies, and non-governmental organi­
sations; and, although Western influences were undoubt­
edly the strongest, both Marxist-Leninist theory and
1. Supra, pp.68-71.
2. In August 1977, the Times of Ceylon Ltd was compulsorily 
acquired by the Government under this Act on the ground that it was 
in serious financial difficulties. It has since continued to function 
as an institution of government under the direction and supervision 
of the President.
3. Supra, Ch.IV.
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Communist practice were important, as were the claims 
of the politically and economically dependent countr­
ies. 1
The content, form and scope of each subsequent bill of rights has
been determined largely by circumstances attendant upon its birth.
The omission in ICCPR of certain rights declared to be universal
eighteen years earlier in UDHR reflects the collision of interests
2
which resulted in its final form. Similarly, the ECHR and its 
progressive expansion by subsequent protocols, reflects the chang-
3
ing priorities of contemporary European societies. Many of the 
comprehensive statements of fundamental rights in Commonwealth 
constitutions were virtually imposed upon the about-to-be-independent 
territories by the British Government in constitutional settlements 
agreed upon for the protection of minority communities and for
4
other equally relevant considerations; a few resulted from the 
recommendations of post-independence constitutional commissions, as 
in Trinidad and Tobago,** from a combination of idealism and hard 
bargaining within a constituent assembly as in India, or as a 
reaction to colonial repression in the euphoria of newly-won indep­
endence as in Kenya. The Sri Lankan experience has been different. 
Both statements of fundamental rights were drafted and adopted by 
the very persons whose power and authority they were supposed to 
delimit. Neither was submitted for approval to the people whose 
rights they were seeking to assert. Additionally, the 1972 formul­
ation was determined by reference to a particular political ideology 
and was intended not to obstruct, rather than to facilitate, the 
realisation of those political goals.
Sri Lanka embarked on the time consuming and impractical 
exercise of constructing a new set of fundamental principles. The
1. John P.Humphrey, "The World Revolution and Human Rights", 
Human Rights, Federalism and Minorities (Toronto: Canadian Institute 
of International Affairs, 1970), p.148, at 155.
2.Among the significant omissions are the right to own property 
and the prior right of parents to choose the kind of education that 
should be given to their children.
3. The protocols have introduced the right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of one's possessions, the right to education, the right to 
free elections at reasonable intervals by free ballot, the right not 
to be deprived of one's liberty merely on the ground of inability to 
fulfil a contractual obligation, the right to liberty of movement, 
and the freedom from expulsion, whether individually in the case of 
a national or collectively in the case of aliens.
4. For instance, the Constitutions of newly independent States 
in the Pacific and the Caribbean.
5. Report of the Constitutional Commission of Trinidad and
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procedures in both the Constituent Assembly of 1970 and the Select 
Committee of 1977 were designed to ensure that these fundamental 
principles were limited in content and subject to restrictions 
which the particular government then in office considered to be 
desirable and necessary. In the result, both statements fell short 
of international standards. The ICCPR today represents the minimum 
standard acceptable to the international community. It is a 
reasonably adequate base for a national bill of rights. It can be 
improved upon, as for instance the ECHR has already done by speci­
fying the grounds upon which a person may be deprived of his liberty. 
But there appears to be no justification for derogating from its 
contents.
ICCPR, Article 2, in fact, requires each State Party "to adopt 
such legislative or other measures as may be necessary" to give 
effect to the rights recognised therein, and "to ensure that any 
person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognised are violated 
shall have an effective remedy". Therefore, a State which accedes 
to it, as Sri Lanka has now done, undertakes to abide by the guara­
ntees contained therein and to provide an effective national remedy 
for their violation. The obligation is not only to make available 
a national remedy, but also to incorporate in the national law the 
principles contained in the ICCPR. This is an additional reason why 
a bill of rights ought to be in conformity, at least, with the 
provisions of the ICCPR.
To whom should a bill of rights be addressed ? The 1978 
Constitution provides a remedy against the executive and, to a 
limited extent, against the legislature. There is no sufficient 
reason why, like other statutory provisions which regulate the 
exercise of its jurisdiction, the statement of fundamental rights 
should not bind the judiciary and be enforceable in respect of 
judicial acts as well. While traditionally, a bill of rights seeks 
to protect the individual from unjustified interference by the State 
or its agencies, the changing patterns of organisation of modem 
society would appear to require that such protection be afforded 
against the non-governmental sector too. Corporations, trade 
unions, educational establishments, political parties and other 
such conglomerations of power, and even individual citizens, are 
as capable of infringrg the rights and freedoms of others as any 
public authority and ought, therefore, to be restrained from doing so.
Tobago (Chairman: Sir Hugh Wooding, Chief Justice), 1974. For funda­
mental rights, see pp.18-27.
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Constitutional Status
The Sri Lankan statement of fundamental rights is already
entrenched in a written constitution which is the supreme law of
the country. To that extent, its constitutional status is settled
as it properly ought to be. The rights declared and recognised therein
are required to be "respected, secured and advanced by all the
organs of government".^ Parliament, whose function is to make law,
is one such organ. But when Parliament makes a law, "no court or
tribunal shall inquire into, pronounce upon or in any manner call
2
in question the validity of such Act on any ground whatsoever". 
Therein lies its inherent weakness. The provisions which enable a 
bill to be examined for constitutionality by the Supreme Court are 
capable of being, and have often been, circumvented by the Cabinet 
by the simple manoeuvre of labelling a bill as "urgent in the nati­
onal interest". This would not matter so long as this procedure of 
pre-enactment or anticipatory review is regarded only as an indep­
endent scrutiny, a monitor, or a warning device for the legislature, 
and not as a substitute for the judicial review of a legislative act 
which is alleged to infringe a fundamental right.
Pre-enactment review and post-enactment review are not mutually 
exclusive concepts. The former enables a bill to be examined in 
order to determine whether any of its provisions conflict with the 
Constitution in any respect. If they do, such provision may be 
struck out and Parliament may not vote thereon. By resort to the 
latter, a Court does not examine a legislative act in the abstract, 
but only in relation to an impugned executive act which claims legi­
timacy by reference thereto. Having done so, the Court may adopt 
one of two possible courses. It may hold that, having regard to the 
bill of rights, the statute has been wrongly relied upon as authority 
for the impugned executive act. It will conclude thus by construing 
and applying the statute so as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe 
the bill of rights. Thereupon, it will strike down the executive 
act, but not the statute or any of its provisions. Alternatively, 
in the face of an irreconcilable conflict between the bill of rights 
and a statute, it may declare the latter to be, to the extent nece­
ssary, void ab initio. It would be unfortunate if when a Court does 
so, Parliament were to regard it as an infringement of its own
1. Art.4(d).
2. Art.80(3).
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"Sovereignty".^ Parliament is itself the creature of the Constitu­
tion and it is from the Constitution alone that Parliament derives 
its own authority. When a Court determines that Parliament has 
stepped outside the parameters of that authority, it is only perfo­
rming its own legitimate function of applying the supreme law. 
Parliament's status as the sovereign law-making body is not in issue.
Article 16 of the 1978 Constitution provides that all exist­
ing law shall be valid and operative notwithstanding any inconsis­
tency with fundamental rights. This is another provision which is 
incompatible with the constitutional status of a bill of rights. No 
question of parliamentary supremacy arises here since existing law 
is the creation of other legislatures, some of which functioned 
under a colonial governor and never laid claim to sovereignty. An 
existing law ought, therefore, to be construed and applied so as not 
to abrogate, abridge or infringe the bill of rights. But where such 
law is incapable of such construction, it ought to that extent 
cease to have effect. It is, of course, not contrary to constitut­
ional practice or equity, that any determination that a provision 
of a statute is void ab initio should operate only from the date of 
such determination.
Interpretation, Enforcement 
and Implementation
An independent and impartial judiciary is essential for the 
effective protection of human rights. This cannot be achieved by 
merely including safeguards in a Constitution which superficially 
offer the Judges security of tenure. There must be a desire on the 
part of the executive to respect that independence, and a manifest­
ation of that desire in appropriate form. There must be an effort 
on the part of the judiciary to assert and maintain that independ­
ence, as well as a consciousness of its own responsibilities.
Finally, there must be a genuine belief among the people that such 
independence actually exists, a confidence in the ability and the 
integrity of the institution.
The interpretation and enforcement of a bill of rights is the 
function of the judiciary. The 1978 Constitution has vested this 
jurisdiction exclusively in the Supreme Court by providing not only
1. See O.Hood Phillips, "Self-Limitation by the United Kingdom 
Parliament", (1975) 2 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, 443, 
where it is argued that "self-limitation" rather than "sovereignty" 
is the relevant concept in this matter.
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a special remedy, but also a procedure of reference by subordinate 
courts. While not criticising these arrangements, an argument can 
be adduced for allowing human rights issues to be decided in the 
original courts and in the Court of Appeal as and when they arise 
in the course of ordinary litigation. Such issues, should they 
arise, would probably be collateral to other issues, all of which 
would require to be determined upon findings of fact reached on the 
evidence led in such proceedings. Apart from probably reducing the 
cost of litigation, a broadening of the available forum would also 
serve an educative purpose by making human rights issues part of 
the ordinary, everyday process of adjudication in courts throughout 
the country.
In this respect, a commission charged with promoting the 
protection of human rights can play a valuable role in their imple­
mentation.^ Such a commission should have the resources to conduct 
research and engage in educational activities, as well as the power 
to investigate, and institute proceedings in respect of, infringe­
ments of human rights. In a country where legal expertise is avail­
able only at a price which few can afford to pay, and human rights 
consciousness has not yet been seriously inculcated in the people, 
such a commission would have considerable potential.
Derogation
Judicial review during a state of emergency is essential if 
such state of emergency is to be maintained as an exceptional state 
within the normal legal order. The 1978 Constitution now defines 
the procedure for declaring a state of emergency, specifies its 
ordinary duration, and requires extraordinary legislative authority 
for any extension. Nevertheless, the Sri Lankan experience shows 
that Emergencies can quite easily acquire a state of hard durability, 
particularly when a government begins to find it a more convenient 
alternative legal order, and emergency regulations made Min terrorem" 
prove more effective than ordinary statutes in dealing with political 
challenges to its own authority. Accordingly, it appears to be 
necessary that the Constitution should define the situations which 
justify the declaration of a state of emergency and specify which 
rights should remain non-derogable under any circumstances, and which 
may be derogated from and when: a threat of civil disorder being
clearly distinguishable from a natural disaster. It is also neces-
1. See, for example, the Human Rights Commissions in Canada, 
and the Commission for Racial Equality (Race Relations Act, 1976)
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sary that the regular courts should have jurisdiction, not only to 
examine whether detention orders and other executive action infrin­
ging on an individual's rights formally comply with the procedural 
requirements of an emergency regulation, but also the question of 
the adequacy of the reasons offered for such action.
International Enforcement Machinery
It is desirable that a bill of rights should be complemented 
by enforcement machinery at the international or regional level. 
Incompatibility with state sovereignty is no longer an issue. Int­
ernational human rights law, in a radical departure from traditional 
international law, now recognises the individual as a subject, 
rather than an object, of international law. Accordingly, under 
several recent human rights treaties, the individual is regarded as 
having rights which are directly enforceable at the international 
plane, and is accorded the right to seek a remedy from an internat­
ional tribunal in respect of an act or omission of his own Government.
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. When 
Sri Lanka acceded to the ICCPR, it also made a declaration under 
Article 41, recognising the competence of the Human Rights Committee 
established under that Covenant to receive and consider communicat- 
ions from other States Parties, who had made similar declarations, 
to the effect that Sri Lanka "is not fulfilling its obligations" 
under the Covenant. Upon receiving such a communication, the Comm­
ittee is required to "bring the matter to the attention" of the Sri 
Lanka Government, whereupon that Government "shall afford the State 
Party which sent the communication an explanation or other statement 
in writing clarifying the matter". If the matter is not "adjusted 
to the satisfaction of both States Parties", the Comnittee may, upon 
a reference to it by either State Party, "make available its good 
offices to the States' Parties concerned with a view to a friendly 
solution of the matter on the basis of respect of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms". Failing to reach such a solution, the Comm­
ittee is required to prepare a report containing "a brief statement 
of the facts", and to communicate that report to the States Parties 
concerned. When making the Article 41 declaration, the Sri Lanka 
Government must have known that, apart from the fact that the
and the Equal Opportunities Commission (Sex Discrimination Act, 1975) 
in the United Kingdom.
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procedure contemplated was likely to be expensive, protracted and 
very ineffective, a Sri Lankan citizen was unlikely to succeed in 
activating another State to come to his aid,; which it would have 
done at the cost not only of jeopardising its own relations with 
Sri Lanka, but also of exposing itself to a retaliatory attack in 
the same forum.
What the Sri Lanka Government could, and ought to, have done 
was to have acceded to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, and 
thereby recognised the competence of the Human Rights Committee 
"to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to 
its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation . . .  of 
any of the rights set forth in the Covenant". Had that been done,
and an individual complaint was in fact made, the Government's only
obligation would have been to submit to the Committee, within six 
months of being required, a written explanation or statement clari­
fying the matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken 
by it. The Committee is required to consider the communications 
and then "forward its views to the State Party concerned and to the
individual". The Committee does not function as a tribunal; it
does not hear the complainant, nor does it examine witnesses. Yet 
the fact that there exists an international body to which a citizen 
can ultimately take his grievance after he has exhausted all his 
domestic remedies, is a matter that would probably operate, in some 
measure at least, in the minds of those who constitute the Govern­
ment as well as the Court. According to H.W.Jayewardene,Q.C., the 
brother of the Sri Lankan President, who is now the country's chief 
spokesman on human rights matters, the Government is considering 
the question of accession to this protocol; "but in view of the fact 
that there is an express remedy given in the Constitution, there is 
no immediate urgency in this regard".^ It must be noted, however, 
that the Optional Protocol is not, and was not intended to be, a 
substitute for a domestic remedy.
2. Commonwealth Commission of Human Rights. At the Common­
wealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka in 1979, the Government 
of The Gambia proposed the establishment of a Commonwealth Commiss­
ion of Human Rights which would, inter alia, investigate and pron­
ounce upon complaints made by individuals of alleged human rights
1. Ceylon Daily News, 29 May 1980.
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violations. A working committee appointed by the secretary- 
general to examine this proposal recctimended the establishment of 
a special unit within the Commonwealth Secretariat, charged with 
the "promotion" of human rights, and the appointment of a Common­
wealth Advisory Committee on Human Rights, with authority to 
inquire into and report to Heads of Governments on "situations 
which appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably 
attested violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms". The 
working committee, which included a Sri Lankan representative, H.W. 
Jayewardene,Q.C., emphasized that, in order not to "duplicate the 
work of other global or regional bodies in the field of human rights", 
the proposed advisory committee "would not be empowered to consider 
any communication submitted by an individual claiming that he or she 
was the victim of a violation of human rights". Indeed, the Sri 
Lanka Government, in its response to the Gambian proposal, also 
stressed the need not to duplicate the functions of existing inter­
national machinery.^ The Gambian proposal is therefore unlikely to 
materialise in the form in which it was originally presented. But 
the reason urged against it, both by the Sri Lanka Government and 
by Jayewardene, makes it all the more necessary for Sri Lanka to 
accede to the Optional Protocol.
3. Asian Convention on Human Rights. An Asian Convention on 
Human Rights has been discussed over many years, beginning at the 
1966 Colloquium on the Rule of Law convened by the International 
Commission of Jurists and held in Colombo. These discussions have 
been confined to non-governmental organisations. Today, Asia (incl­
uding the Pacific) remains the only region in the world where the 
principle of collective enforcement has not been found acceptable 
to governments. This has been attributed to a lack of a common 
consciousness on the question of human rights; the absence of a 
discernible common identity among Asian countries; and the non­
existence of the conditions which stimulate regional strategies in
3
this field. These factors are probably true if what is expected
1. Commonwealth Secretariat: Report of the Commonwealth Working 
Party on Human Rights (London: 1981). See also Interim Report (1980).
2. A more concrete proposal came from the Conference of South 
Asian and Pacific Jurists on the Freedom of Movement held in Banga­
lore in 1967. More recently, the subject has been revived at a 
Lawasia Conference: Ceylon Daily News, 14 January 1980. See also 
Nihal Jayawickrama, "A Council of Asia", Ceylon Daily News, 26 Jan­
uary 1967.
3. Daniel Rowland, "The Establishment of Appropriate Internat-
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to materialise is a regional convention applicable from Syria and 
Iraq in the west to Japan and the Philippines in the east, from 
China and Korea in the north to Singapore and the Seychelles in the 
south. That appears to be an unreal expectation, at least for the 
time being. An Asian Convention should aim to have a much less 
ambitious beginning. The Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), which seeks primarily to create political stability in the 
region, might have served as a nucleus if not for the fact that its 
member States - Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand - have so far shown very little concern for individual 
liberty. On the other hand, a respect for human rights based upon 
a common cultural heritage, such as Buddhism, which is still the 
dominant spiritual influence not only in Sri Lanka, but also in Burma, 
Thailand, Nepal, Bhutan, Laos, Japan and in parts of India, could 
well form the basis for a regional understanding on human rights.
Just as the outlawing of murder has not prevented man from
killing his fellowmen, a bill of rights will not prevent him frcm
violating the rights of others. But if the Penal Code has succeeded
in establishing norms which most men of good sense and conscience
now strive to observe, a bill of rights must surely, in due course,
create a consciousness in man, whether his role in society be that
of making, applying or enforcing the law, or of simply living his
own life, that there are higher standards and more exalted values,
to which all men, be they meek or mighty, must eventually conform.
That consciousness will follow when it is realised that rights are
always accompanied by duties, and that it is only the concern of man
for the rights of others that will ensure the continued observance
of, and respect for, his own inalienable rights. For, as the poet
foresaw many centuries ago:
No man is an island; entire of itself; 
every man is a piece of the continent, 
a part of the main; if a clod be washed away 
by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if
a promontory were, as well as if a manor of
thy friends or of thine own were; any man's 
death diminishes me, because I am involved in 
Mankind; And therefore never send to know 
for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for thee.l
ional Machinery for the Enforcement and Protection of Human Rights 
in the Lawasia Region: Working Paper, 6th Lawasia Conference, 1979.
1. John Donne (1571-1631), Meditation XVII.
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APPENDIX 1
Prime Minister 
Ceylon
9th December 1970.
My dear Minister,
I have been able during the last few weeks to devote some 
time to a study of the set of basic resolutions which have been 
prepared by you. I have also discussed them with some of the 
senior Ministers in my Party. The observations that follow 
represent not only my own thinking, but also that of my Party.
2. According to the basic resolutions proposed by you, the 
power of the State is concentrated in one body, namely, the 
National Assembly. Consequently, there will come into existence 
not a fundamental law under which all authorities will have to 
function, but a National Assembly which will exercise or at least 
control the exercise of every power of the State including judicial 
power. I should like to say that I am averse to a concentration 
of power of this kind.
3. The resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly 
contemplates the establishing of a Constitution which will be the 
fundamental law of Sri Lanka. To give effect and meaning to this 
resolution, the new Constitution should provide that even the 
Legislature should be bound by this fundamental law. There appears 
to be no better way of securing this result than by giving power
to an independent body like an established Court to examine whether 
any piece of legislation is contrary to such fundamental law. The 
arrangements contemplated for this purpose in the basic resolutions 
proposed by you do not appear to be satisfactory. To give the 
power of judicial review to the Courts is not to establish the 
superiority of the Courts over the Legislature. It only proceeds 
on the assumption that the power of the people is superior to both 
the Judiciary and the Legislature; it means that where a law 
conflicts with the will of the people as enshrined in the Constitu­
tion, the Courts ought to give effect to the Constitution rather 
than to the law which is in breach of it. If, however, the will 
of the people as contained in the Constitution subsequently 
undergoes a change, the provisions for amendment of the Constitu­
tion should be sufficient to meet such a situation.
4. We are also committed to include fundamental rights and 
freedoms in the new Constitution. The concept of fundamental rights 
as I understand it when incorporated in a Constitution is intended 
primarily to be a limitation on legislative and executive abuses of 
power. Here again I think that the new Constitution should give a 
sufficient assurance to the citizens of this country that legis­
latures and governments of the future will be bound to observe the 
fundamental rights written into the Constitution, and that they will
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not remain mere declarations of intent which can be departed from 
by any future legislature if it were so minded. I am myself of the 
view that there should be no impediment in the new Constitution to 
the realisation of socialistic objectives. If it is anticipated 
that the inclusion of any particular fundamental rights will stand 
in the way of implementing socialistic policies, decisions should 
be taken in regard to each one of such fundamental rights, that is, 
as to whether a particular right should find a place in the Consti­
tution, and if so whether it should be circumscribed in any way.
5. In regard to the basic resolution which refers to elections 
on "an equal and universal suffrage on a territorial basis", I think 
the present arrangements which require delimitation to be based on
a number of factors such as the total number of residents, the area 
and the number of citizens in a province, and the transport facili­
ties, the physical features and community or diversity of interests 
of the inhabitants, are satisfactory and require no substantial 
change.
6. Passing on to some matters of detail, I can see no 
objection to a President who as the Head of State would assent to 
legislation, to a parliamentary executive which would be in charge
of the government, to a system of courts, and to a body having powers 
of appointment and disciplinary control over public and judicial 
officers, except perhaps at the higher levels of the public service.
7. I have glanced through a summary of representations 
received by your Ministry from the public. I find from these and 
other sources that there appears to be a considerable demand in the 
country for Buddhism as a State Religion, and for the protection 
of its institutions and traditional places of worship. Some 
provision will have to be made in the new Constitution regarding 
these matters without, at the same time, derogating from the freedom 
of worship that should be guaranteed to all other religions.
8. I note that the proposed basic resolutions deal with the 
language question in considerable detail. There is already ordinary 
legislation covering this topic and I doubt whether it would be 
wise for us to open this matter for debate again at this stage.
The better course would appear to be to let those laws operate in 
the form in which they are.
9. For convenience of discussion, I have had some of the 
ideas which I have set out above put into the form of brief 
propositions. They are not exhaustive. A copy of these proposit­
ions is annexed.
Yours sincerely,
Sirima R.D.Bandaranaike 
Prime Minister.
The Hon. Colvin R.de Silva,
Minister of Plantation Industry 
and Constitutional Affairs,
Colombo.
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Sovereignty of the National Assembly
The Constitution envisaged by the Minister proceeds upon the 
basis that the people have abdicated the totality of State power 
to the National Assembly. A feature of any democratic Constitution, 
however, is the delegation by the people of State power to different 
institutions. For example, legislative power is delegated to a 
legislature elected by the people. Executive power is delegated 
to persons who are responsible to the elected Legislature. Judicial 
power is entrusted to Judges whose independence is ensured, but who 
are in the ultimate analysis responsible to the elected represent­
atives. This is a feature which is common to all Constitutions in 
the democratic world which have been prepared with the free partici­
pation of the people. On the other hand, in Constitutions which 
have been imposed on people as a result of political revolutions, 
one finds this total concentration of power in a single authority 
whether it be a National Assembly, a junta or a sole Leader.
It would be wrong to assume that a political revolution has 
taken place in this country. What happened in 1956 was that the 
late Mr.S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike set in motion, within the existing 
political framework, a social revolution. In 1960 and in 1970 this 
social revolution has been carried further, also within the existing 
political framework. Therefore, it would be seen that it has been 
possible for us within the existing political framework to effect 
changes which in other countries have been achieved only by a 
complete overthrow of that political framework. There appears to 
be, therefore, no real need to make drastic and radical changes in 
the present political framework.
The virtue in a system based upon a division of powers is 
that there is a built in system of checks and balances which prevents 
any one organ of Government from acting contrary to the wishes of 
the people which are expressed in the fundamental law - the Consti­
tution. If the Legislature were to exceed its powers and legislate 
contrary to the Constitution the Courts will declare such legislation 
invalid. If the Judges misconduct themselves the Legislature has 
the power to remove them from office. If the Executive acts 
contrary to the wishes of the Legislature, the Legislature has the 
power to replace it with another Executive. A separation of powers, 
therefore, constitutes the surest guarantee that the rights of the 
people remain with the people.
The Fundamental Rights and Freedoms
We have so far not had any guarantee of Fundamental Rights in 
either our present or previous Constitutions, but if it is intended 
to provide for fundamental rights in the new Constitution such 
provision must be genuine and meaningful and not be a fraud on the 
people.
Res.5(i) - (ix) set out several fundamental rights and 
freedoms. Res.(x) makes it possible for a National Assembly to pass 
legislation which infringes these fundamental rights. Such legis­
lation could be passed by a simple majority. There is no provision
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either in Res.5 or elsewhere which permits a citizen to enforce any 
of these fundamental rights. Without the power to enforce, the 
Chapter on Fundamental Rights will merely serve as an adornment in 
the Constitution without any meaning whatsoever to the citizen.
In 1959 when the revision of the Constitution was being 
considered by the then Parliament, Mr.S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike approved 
of, for inclusion in the new Constitution, the following provision 
in regard to fundamental rights: Right to enforce Fundamental Rights. 
The right to move the highest tribunal by appropriate proceedings 
for the enforcement of fundamental rights and to obtain suitable 
redress for which purpose such tribunal shall be vested with the 
power to issue the necessary directions or orders or rights requi­
site for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
The Constitutional Court
The new Constitution seeks to remove the right of the highest 
Court to declare a law invalid if such law is in conflict with the 
Constitution. The reason for doing this appears to be a fear that 
the Court would prevent the implementation of socialist legislation.
It must be noted at the outset that our Courts have never 
stood in the way of social legislation. Our Courts have consistently 
refrained from striking down legislation except where they consid­
ered that such legislation resulted in an erosion of their own 
powers. It is possible without much difficulty to provide in the 
Constitution for the creation by Parliament of tribunals other than 
Courts for the purposes of exercising judicial or quasi-judicial 
power whenever it becomes necessary to do so for the fulfilment of 
economic and social needs, while at the same time ensuring that the 
Courts will not be in a position to declare such action invalid.
If it has been possible under the present Constitution for the 
Courts to strike down such legislation, it was only because adequate 
provision did not exist in the Constitution to prevent this happening.
Reference has been made in the Ministry note to the Official 
Language Act and the view has been expressed that owing to a 
District Court judgment of 1964 it is not yet certain whether this 
Act is good law or not. It must be noted that the District Court 
judgment of 1964 did not have the effect of nullifying the Official 
Language Act or of preventing its implementation. It is not correct, 
therefore, to say that uncertainty exists in regard to the validity 
of this law. A simple solution to this problem would be to deprive 
all lesser Courts of the power to express their views on the 
validity of legislation and to vest that power exclusively in the 
highest Court. In this way the question whether a legislative Act 
violates the Constitution or not could be decided by the highest 
Court without any delay whatsoever.
The Constitutional Court which is contemplated does not 
appear to be an effective instrument. Only four classes of persons 
are permitted to invoke the Constitutional Court, namely, the 
Attorney-General, the Leader of a recognised Party in the National 
Assembly, a prescribed number of members of the National Assembly, 
and the Speaker. The duty of the Attorney-General is to advise the
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Government in regard to the validity of legislation and one could 
hardly expect him to initiate action thereafter to have such legis­
lation tested in another forum. If a prescribed number of members 
of the National Assembly wish to question the validity of legislat­
ion there would be no difficulty in their persuading a Party Leader 
to take the initiative. The Speaker is most unlikely to have any 
firm views on proposed legislation especially if such legislation 
had been approved by his own legal advisor who is the Attorney- 
General. Therefore, one is left with the position that only Party 
Leaders in the Assembly have the right to question the validity of 
the proposed legislation. If the Party Leaders, for example, agree 
among themselves to extend the life of the National Assembly indef­
initely, or to set themselves up as a Junta in place of the 
President and Council of Ministers, there is little that anybody 
could do about it. It is significant that the citizen, the voter, 
the common man, on whose behalf after all legislators are said to 
be acting, is deprived completely of the power to ensure that such 
legislators do not act in excess of or in abuse of their mandate.
It is relevant to note that when the revision of the Constitu­
tion was being contemplated in 1955 [sic] the Select committee 
headed by Mr.S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike expressed its views on this matter 
as follows:
The Committee considered the question of the Privy Council 
as a final Court of Appeal, arising from Question N0.A6 of 
the Questionnaire. They were of the opinion that appeals 
to the Privy Council should be discontinued, but that a new 
Judicial Tribunal should be set up to adjudiciate on Const­
itutional issues as well as to entertain appeals from the 
Supreme Court.
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TABLE 28
PUISNE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT 
1948 - 1973
Judge Previous Appointment
E.F.N.Gratiaen,K.C. Member of Parliament (Nominated)
E.H.T.Gunesekera Permanent Secretary to the Ministry 
of Justice
M.F.S.Pulle,K.C. Solicitor-General
V.L.St.C.Swan Permanent Secretary to the Ministry 
of Justice
H.A.de Silva District Judge
N.K.Choksy (acting)
L.M.D.de Silva,K.C.1
H. W . R. Weer asur iy a Acting Solicitor-General
K.D.de Silva District Judge
M.C.Sansoni District Judge
H.N.G.Fernando Legal Draftsman
L.W.de Silva (acting) District Judge
T.S.Fernando,Q.C. Acting Attorney-General
N.Sinnetamby District Judge
L.B.de Silva Permanent Secretary to the Ministry 
of Justice
H.W.Tambiah,Q.C.
K.Herat
A.W.H.Abeysundera,Q.C. Legal Draftsman
P.Sri Skanda Rajah District Judge
G.P.A.Silva Permanent Secretary to the Ministry 
of Justice
A.L.S.Sirimanne District Judge
V. Manicavasagar District Judge
A.A.A.Alles Solicitor-General
V.Siva Supramaniam District Judge
G. T. Samar awickrema, Q. C.
V. Tennekoon,Q.C. Solicitor-General
C. G. Weer amantry
O.L.de Kretser District Judge
S .R.Wijetilleke District Judge
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Judge Previous Appointment
V.T.Pandita Gunewardene Bribery Commissioner
V.T.Thamother am Solicitor-General
H.Deheragoda Solicitor-General
C. B. Walgampaya District Judge
J.Pathirana
D.Wimalaratne District Judge
T.W.Rajaratnam
D.Q.M.Sirimanne District Judge
1. This was an appointment of limited duration made in order to 
enable him to qualify for appointment to the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council. He had previously acted as a Puisne Justice.
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ABBREVIATIONS
ACHR ... American Convention on Human Rights.
AIR ... All India Reporter.
ALJ ... Australian Law Journal.
All E.R. ... All England Law Reports.
BLP ... Bolshevik Leninist Party.
CD ... Collection of Decisions, European Commission on
on Human Rights (1966-1974).
CIC ... Ceylon Indian Congress.
CILSA ... Comparative and International Law Journal of
Southern Africa.
CJHSS ... Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies.
CJJ ... Commonwealth Judicial Journal.
CLB ... Commonwealth Law Bulletin.
CLR ... Commonwealth Law Reports.
CLW ... Ceylon Law Weekly.
CP ... Communist Party.
DCC ... Decisions of the Constitutional Court.
DR ... Decisions and Reports, European Commission on
Human Rights (1975-1981).
EA ... East African Reports.
ECHR ... European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.
EHRR ... European Human Rights Reports.
FP ... Federal Party.
HCLQ ... Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly.
HMSO ... Her Majesty's Stationary Office.
HRJ ... Human Rights Journal.
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HRR
ICCPR
ISESCR
ICJ
ICLQ
Ind.
JAL
JB
Judgment
LP
LQR
LSSP
Mal.L.R.
NJ
NJW
NLR
OUP
Report
SCC
S.C.M.
SCR
SLFP 
SLR 
S.P.
TC
UDHR
Human Rights Review.
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.
International Commission of Jurists.
International and Comparative Law Quarterly.
Independent.
Journal of African Law.
Juristische Blatter (Austria).
Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights.
Labour Party.
Law Quarterly Review.
Lanka Sama Samaj Party.
Malaya Law Review.
Netherlands Jurisprudentie (Netherlands).
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (Federal Republic 
of Germany).
New Law Reports.
Oxford University Press.
Report of the European Commission of Human Rights. 
Supreme Court Circular.
Supreme Court Minutes.
Supreme Court Reports (Canada: when preceded by 
square brackets; and India: when preceded by 
round brackets).
Sri Lanka Freedom Party.
Sri Lanka Reports.
Sessional Paper.
All Ceylon Tamil Congress.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
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UHR Universal Human Rights.
UNP United National Party.
US United States Reports.
VRU ... Ver fas sung und Recht in Ubersee.
YB Yearbook of the European Convention on Human
Rights (1966-1978).
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